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Abstract 
This thesis is an examination of the Poverty Strategy Paper (PRSP) 
approach to regulating countries' access to external financing. It 
locates the PRSP project in the context of contemporary global 
governance and postcolonial international law and considers its 
impact on third world state engagement with the international 
economy and the regulatory webs and institutions, notably the World 
Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which underpin 
these relations. 
Approaching the subject from an inter- disciplinary perspective, 
straddling discourses of law, political economy and sociology, this 
research combines an empirical methodology for examining the 
linkages between the normative effect of the PRSP framework and the 
actors who advance these norms with a critical analysis of the power 
dynamics which underlie the relationships of the subjects and objects 
of the framework. 
The thesis demonstrates that far from its emancipatory language, the 
PRSP project, both in its operational and discursive manifestations, 
foreclose possibilities for the radical revision of the current 
asymmetrical rules and institutions of international economic law. 
Conversely, findings from this research suggest that the PRSP 
framework adversely reconfigures the form and substance of third 
world engagement with international law and the global economy. 
The PRSP project reframes fundamental tenets of international 
cooperation and global communal responsibility by problematising the 
state in the context of economic and social development; and 
constituting nation states as primary sites for the fulfilment of 
economic and social rights ascribed collectively. This restructuring 
takes place through a series of legal and institutional interventions of 
the PRSP framework, as well as through shifts in the regulatory 
mechanisms, notably the doctrine of conditionality, governing 
relationships between third world states and their external financiers. 
In this manner, the PRSP framework introduces a new regulatory 
discipline on third world states and represents a continuation, if not 
exacerbation, of the asymmetrical sovereignty characterising 
postcolonial international law and the imperial nature of the 
'development' project sustaining the logic of these relationships, with 
significant impact on the potential for resistance and reform. 
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A Note on Terminology 
1. PRSP, PRS and PRSP framework 
In tl-Lis thesis, the term 'Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper' (PRSP) will be used to 
refer to the document which is the outcome of the 'Poverty Reduction Strategy' 
(PRS) process. The terms 'PRSP framework', 'PRSP project' or 'PRSP initiative'will 
be used to refer to the PRSP operational framework as a whole , including the PRS, 
process, the PRSP evaluation, PRSP-related financing instruments) etc. 
2. World Bank and IDA 
The term 'World Bank' is commonly used to refer collectively to both the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development JBRD), the original 'World 
Bank' set up in 1944 at the Bretton Woods conference in New Hampshire, as well as 
the International Development Association (IDA), the World Bank's concessional 
financing arm, established in 1960. Unless otherwise stated, the term will be similarly 
utilised here. 
The World Bank Group consists of the IBRD, the IDA, the International Finance 
Corporation JFC) (established in 1956); the Multilateral Investment Guarantee 
Agency (MIGA) (established in 1985), and the International Centre for the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) set up in 1966. 
3. Development financing and aid, donors and recipients 
The term 'development financing' is generally used to refer to all forms of financing 
for economic development purposes, commercial or otherwise, and undertaken both 
by the private and the public sectors. I use the term 'development financing' to refer 
to what is commonly known as 'development aid' or formally classified as 'official 
development assistance' (ODA). 
The OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) classifies ODA as transfers 
from donor countries to recipient countries or multilateral institutions, such as the 
xv 
World Bank or regional development banks or UN agencies. In order for transfers - 
financial or in the form of 'technical assistance' to be classified as ODA, they must: 
(1) be undertaken by the official sector; 
(2) have economic development and welfare as their main objectives; 
and 
(3) be provided on a concessional. basis, through outright grants, debt 
relief, or loans with a 25 percent grant element 
Sometimes, for the sake of brevity or in reference to an external source, the term 'aid' 
will be used instead of 'development financing' but I recognise the anachronism of 
the term and its connotations. It will normally be used to denote the asymmetrical 
nature of the financing relationship between the disbursers of aid ('donors' or 
'financiers') and the parties in receipt of it ('recipients' or 'clients'). 
4. Third world, developing countries, north and south 
While the term 'third world' has been characterised in various quarters as 
anachronistic in today's global context, and has been discarded in favour of the 
geographically-attributed 'north/south' terminology, many scholars and activists 
from the developing countries have retained its usage as a continuing form of 
resistance to hegemonic attempts to disperse the collective voice and orgamising unity 
of third world states and third world peoples. As Chimni has argued, 'once the 
common history of subjection to colonialism, and/or the continuing 
underdevelopment and marginalization of countries in Asia, Africa and Latin 
America is attached sufficient significance the category 'third world' assumes life' 
(Chimni, 2003: 49). 
The term has particular resonance for third world legal scholars for whom the 
uniformity in application of international law has had the effect of aggregating the 
structural iniquities which continue to characterise the developing world's 
engagement With the international legal order (see discussion in Chapter Two). 
Again, as argued by Chimni, the category of the 'third world' is 'crucial to organizing 
and offering collective resistance to hegemonic policies' and 'reflects a level of unity 
xvi 
imagined and constituted in ways which would enable resistance to a range of 
practices which systematically disadvantage and subordinate an otherwise diverse 
group of people' (ibid). 
In this thesis, the tern 'third world' will be used interchangeably with the term 
'developing countries' and with the occasional reference to the terms 'north' and 
'south' but again in recognition of some negative associations with the use of such 
terms. 
Low-income countries 
Low-income countries are defined as countries with less than a per capita Micome of 
US$1,025a year (as of 2006). These are the countries eligible to borrow from the 
International Development Association (IDA), the concessional lending arm of the 
World Bank. The term is used in this thesis technically rather than normatively. 
6. Policy-based versus project financing 
Policy-based lending is discussed in detail in Chapter Four but generally, policy-based 
or programmatic lending differs from 'investment lending' - financing for a specific 
project - in that it provides balance of payments support to countries 
in exchange 
for a progran-ane of economic reform, either at the national or sectoral level. 
Figure 1: Relationship between PRSP and PRSP Enabling Instrurnents 
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Introduction and Overview 
The late 1990s was a period of dislocation and change in development policymaking 
and in international economic governance. The street protests against the locus of 
international trade and financial policymaking in Seattle (World Trade Orgarnsation), 
Cologne (GS) and Prague (World Bank and the International Monetary Fund) M 
1999 capped the crescendo of public dissatisfaction brewing over the past two 
decades resultant from the globalization of the economic policies advanced by the 
Washington Consensus' and pursued through national regulatory reforms overseen 
by global and regional governance institutions 2. 
A new discourse of development was taking place amidst the growing discontent 
with the processes and institutions driving the global economy. A decade and a half 
of structural adjustment policies imposed on third world countries by the World 
Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in exchange for badly needed 
financial resources had seen little or no improvement but had, in many cases, led to a 
deterioration in the social and economic situation of the countries in receipt of such 
financing. Debt accumulation was starving many countries of the resources needed 
to fund basic goods and services and countries were increasingly locked in a vicious 
cycle of aid-debt servicing-more aid. 
The Washington Consensus' is a term often misrepresented and misunderstood. The term itself is 
coined by US economist John Williamson who first used it in a background paper for a conference on 
Latin American structural adjustment to refer to a set of ten economic reforms that he considered 
were necessary in order to redress the economic problems faced by Latin America in the 1980s. The 
paper entitled 'What Washington Means by Policy Reform' identifies the ten policy instruments - 
including fiscal austerity, trade and financial liberalisation, deregulation and privatisation - which 
Williamson felt could be deployed in these countries with 'a reasonable degree of consensus' in 
Washington, the 'Washington' being 'both the political Washington of Congress and senior members 
of the administration and the technocratic Washington of the international financial institutions, the 
economic agencies of the US government, the Federal Reserve Board and the think tanks' 
(Williamson, 2004: 2; 2002). The term has been used since as a catch-an phrase to encompass the 
policies espoused by Williamson. See discussion in Chapter Three, section 3.2. 
2 The key to the 'politics of globalization' articulated in part through what Higgott (2000) terms the 
'combative politics' of the late 1990s, is this correlation between globalization and poverty as 
exemplified by the growth in income disparity between the world's richest and the world's poorest, 
demarcated usually along geographical lines. FEggott argues that independent of whether the two are 
causally related, this perceived relationship between inequality and the policies of economic 
globalization combined with 'the degree to which the existing institutions [are seen] to underwrite the 
status quo rather than work for its eradication' has led to the challenges heaped on these institutions by 
their detractors (Higgott, 2000: 137; see also discussion of this point in Chapter Three, section 3.1). 
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In 1996, jubilee 2000 was set up by a coalition of groups and individuals, including 
religious organisations and church groups, to campaign for a ftffl cancellation of third 
world debt before the millennial year. In 1998, the coalition, enjoying broad-based 
support from organisations and individuals from the north and the south, mobilised 
300,000 demonstrators in Birmingham at the site of the G7 summit calling for 
greater and deeper debt relief than the existing measures offered, including under the 
Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIpC)3. 
The jubilee 2000 campaign was pivotal in fostering a new public consciousness in 
what is now termed as the 'post-structural adjustment' era by explicitly linking the 
problem of sovereign debt with citizenry Impoverishment in developing countries at 
the level of international policyrnaking. The coalition also exemphfied the increasing 
political clout of non-state actors in the international normative order, notably that of 
a cadre of speciahst non-governmental advocates and lobbyists in the form of 
international non-governmental organisations (INGOs). Unlike their predecessors, 
these new actors brought onto the world stage a professionahsation of traditional 
advocacy and lobbying roles and increasing sophistication in global policy analysis, 
not only creating an alternative tapestry of political and policy narratives but also 
forming an emerging constituency of civil society advocates at the global level. 
While the existence of pressure groups in decision-making fora was not a new 
development, the role of debt campaigners as lobbyists forgovernments mi the south 
rather than as lobbyists against the same governments' was a significant development 
in international pohcYtnaking. Bolstered by the support of this new political force, a 
new confidence was imbued in the weaker state actors involved in the negotiating 
structure of global economic governance. The effect was a powerful assault on the 
asymmetrical norms of international economic law and the global regulatory regimes 
which sustain them. 
3 The HIPC initiative was introduced in 1996 to grant debt relief to a ring-fenced set of countries who 
were deemed to have 'unsustainable debt burdens' and included for the first time, relief from debt 
owed to multilateral institutions, such as the IMF and the World Bank (see Annex II). 
4 This was in contrast to what was (and still is) the case with areas such as human rights and 
environmental safeguards. 
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The collapse of the World Trade Organization (WTO)'s third ministerial meeting in 
Seattle in 1999 demonstrated to the world the strength of political mobilisation on 
the part of weaker actors in the global system - the developing countries within the 
WTO who walked out of an unfair negotiating structure of the trade talks and the 
affected communities of individuals and groups outside on the streets who coalesced 
in numbers outside the institutional framework to make their voices heard'. 
As protesters thronged the streets, the analytical and operational framework of 
international economic governance, including the fundamental aspects of sovereign 
debt and development financing, was subject to re-exarrunation within international 
policy circles. The collapse of the tiger economies in east and south-east Asia during 
the Asian financial crisis of 1997 - 98 and the subsequent social and economic 
upheavals accompanying IMF stabilisation programmes in countries such as 
Thailand, 1ndonesia and South Korea provided the catalyst for the financial 
community as a whole to reconsider the fundamental tenets of the global economy. 
While deriding the masses of 'anti-globalization' protesters' for their railings against 
the international economic system, there were real concerns within the international 
financial community of the consequences of not addressing these concerns with the 
state of the world economy. 
It was in this political climate that the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) 
were introduced. The World Bank and IMF Board of Governors announced at their 
annual meetings M September 1999 that PRSPs would serve as the new framework 
for regulating access to debt relief and concessional financing' for low-income 
countries (World Bank and IMF, 1999). In terms of its relationship to the Bank and 
5 For detailed analysis of the collapse of the talks, see Khor (1999a) and the documents in Africa 
Policy E-journal on Africa: Seattle Aftermath at: httl2: //ww,. v. africaaction-org/docs99/```xvto9912. htm 
(1 March 2007). 
6 The term 'anti-globalization', often used as an adjective to describe the social movements opposed to 
the globalization of Washington Consensus-type economic reforms, was initially coined by the 
Financial Times. It is another term that is commonly misused and is misrepresentative of the majority of 
these non-governmental organisations and social movements as well as supporters of their campaigns 
who are not opposed to the concept of 'globalization' on principle but are critical of the modalities of 
certain types of economic globalization. Campaigners have sought to reclaim the terrain of 
terminology by substituting their own nomenclature. For example, the term 'economic justice 
movement' is now Widely used to denote the coalition of civil society groups and individuals fighting 
to reform the structural inequities of the current global economy. 
7 Concessional financing is typically financing extended to countries who cannot afford market-based 
lending and is used here to denote all or either of concessional lending (loans provided on an interest- 
free basis with generous repayment periods); grant financing; or debt relief 
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the Fund, the PRSP replaced the Policy Framework Papers (PFPs) as prerequisites 
for their financing. The announcement of the PRSPs came qwckly after the 
announcement by the G8 ministers in Cologne of a new enhanced debt relief 
package for developing countries - the enhanced HIPC (HIPC 11) - which would be 
centred upon the PRSPs and be funded from by bilateral and multilateral donors and 
from proceeds of gold sales by the IMF (see Annex 11). 
Taken together, the PRSP framework and its attendant financing instruments 
represent a significant shift not only in the modalities of delivering development 
finance to low-income countries, but also in the form and substance of these 
countries' engagement in the international arena. For many countries dependent on 
external public financing, the PRSP framework would become central to the 
development of the 'new architecture of aid', governing not only their access to 
financial resources but also their engagement with the international community. 
1.1. A New 'Social Contract' 
A PRSP is primarily a document outlining a country's national economic policy with 
a focus on a programme for poverty reduction, developed nationally through a 
participatory process involving a cross-section of stakeholders. Aside from 
identifying the nature, sources and incidences of poverty in the country, a PRSP must 
detail how the country's resources - chiefly those provided through debt relief and 
concessional financing - will be disbursed to ameliorate these problems. Programme 
support from the World Bank and the IMF and debt relief - under H1PC II or the 
recently instituted Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) is contingent upon the 
completion of a PRSP - or at least an Interim-PRSP J-PRSP) - and the said 
PRSP 
evaluated by the Bank and the Fund (see Annexes I and 11). 
PRSPs have now become the focus for much of the policy dialogue and negotiations 
for financing between low-income countries, international financial 
(IFIs), and bilateral and multilateral donors. PRSPs now provide the basis for all 
World Bank and IMF financing to low-income countries, the facilities for which were 
also renamed in the PRSP changeover, with the IMF replacing its Enhanced 
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Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) with the Poverty Reduction and Growth 
Facility (PRGF) and the World Bank introducing Poverty Reduction Strategy Credits 
(PRSCs) as new financing instruments for countries borrowing from the 
International Development Association (IDA) (see Annexes I and II). PRSPs were 
also to inform the World Bank's Country Assistance Strategies (CAS), the blueprint 
for all Bank financial operations in member states and are 'increasingly instituted as 
prerequisites for bilateral donor financing and Paris Club debt restructuring 
negotiations for low-income countries (see ibid). 
The PRSP framework represents the consolidation of development agendas of the 
1990s. Operationally, the PRSP represents a bridge between the new conceptual 
framework of development financing, such as the principles enshrined in the World 
Bank's Comprehensive Development Framework (CDF)' or the United Nations- 
initiated IýJillennium Development Goals (MDGs)', and new financing Mistruments, 
outlined below, that would facilitate the disbursement of resources for meeting these 
objectives. 
The PRSP approach however goes beyond conceptual rhetoric and procedural 
documentation - it operationalises a framework which prescribes and 
institutionalises procedural and institutional reforms that PRSP countries have to 
undergo to facilitate their access to external financing from the IFIs and official 
donor agencieslo. Evaluation of countries' compliance with these criteria is conducted 
primarily by the Bank and the Fund through the Joint Staff Advisory Note USAN) 
process which will assess the PRS in relation to its suitability to form the basis of 
financial support from the Bank, Fund and other financiers" (World Bank and IMF, 
8 See Chapter Three, section 3.2 for details on the CDF. 
9 The MDGs refer to the eight development goals to be achieved by 2015 by state signatories to the 
Millennium Declaration (adopted in September 2000 by 189 nations and signed by 147 governments 
at the UN Millennium Summit). These goals include the eradication of poverty, the achievement of 
universal primary education, the reduction in child mortality and improvement in maternal health and 
the promotion of gender equity). See: http: //xvww. un. org/nilnenniumgoals/ (1 March 2007). 
10 For example, the World Bank distinguishes the PRSP from the CDF in terms of this attachment to 
resources and operations. According to the Bank, the CDF is 'a set of principles, processes or 
mechanisms rather than a programme of action' like the PRSP which as 'an instrument of policy 
implementation' to detail priorities, targets, indicator, costings and financing plans, and procedures for 
monitoring (World Bank, 2003b: 13). 
11 The JSAN replaced the joint Staff Assessment USA) in November 2004, primarily to dispense with 
the received notion that the JSA represented a 'Washington sign-off and to enable Bank and Fund 
staff to exercise greater frankness and candour in their evaluations (World Bank and IMF, 2005b: para 
2; see Chapter Five for a detailed discussion on this shift). 
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2005b). A World Bank-led study describes the PRSP approach as 'a new form of 
social contract' entered into by governments of low-income countries with official 
bilateral and multilateral financiers for the production of 'credible framework' for 
concessional financing and debt relief (World Bank, 2003: 13). 
Each PRSP is required to be: (1) nationally owned, meaning the strategies outlined in 
the PRSP is generated by the constituencies it purports to serve and by the 
government of the country involved in the process; and (2) formulated in a 
parfi6ipatog manner, involving a wide range of government and civil society actors, 
including representatives of 'the poor' whom these policies affect. This is 
institutionalised in a participatory Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) process, a 
mechanism through which intra-governmental, inter-governmental and non- 
governmental dialogue is established with a range of stakeholders and policy 
formulated via a process of representation, consultation and engagement between all 
parttes. 
From the point of view of PRSP proponents, this process rebalances the power 
asymmetries inherent in international development financing and injects a measure of 
agency and accountability into a previously opaque and hierarchical decision-making 
process. Cash-strapped countries now possess the operational framework through 
which social and economic priorities may be developed in a consultative manner with 
all segments of society and government and subsequently presented to the official 
financing community as a plan for effective utilisation of financial assistance. 
The implementation of the agreed economic reforms (exchanged in return for 
external resources) and the appropriate disbursement of resources is subsequently 
policed through greater oversight of public expenditure management. Accordingly, 
the Bank and Fund view the PRS approach as one of 'balancing mutual 
accountabilities' - of client governments to domestic constituents and official 
financiers, and of official financiers to client governments - over the use of state 
economic resources gMF and World Bank, 2005: para 21). 
Yet, herein lays the fundamental premise - and the fundamental problem - of the 
PRSP initiative - that is, the framework serves to a large extent, as a regulatory 
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restraint for the states subject to its disciphne. It follows, from the conceptual 
principles and operational directives underpinning the PRSP approach, that the 
PRSP state as recipient of concessional. financing and debt relief, must demonstrate 
its desire to be disciplined by a set of rules representing the universal normative 
framework for all state resource extraction, allocation and administration. 
The PRSP framework involves a substantial reorganisation of state apparatuses in 
PRSP countries, facilitating not only the universalisation of national economic 
planning - the setting of uniform 'development' targets and common prioritisation 
of public policy - but also a globalization of bureaucratic and political structures - 
the establishment of a template for public participatory policyrnaking and intra- 
governmental policy dialogue. 
These extensive interventions belie the PRSP project's rhetoric of 'country 
ownership' inasmuch as it serves to establish compliance with the asymmetrical rules 
of the current international economic order. Conformity with the status quo is 
assured by excluding those states who fail to play by the rules, not through force but 
through the evaluation of their wiffingness to be subjected to 'universafly' recognised 
policy objectives and the corresponding reforms to secure these objectives. 
1.2. Domain of Research 
This thesis seeks to locate the PRSP framework within the context of contemporary 
global governance, Mternational relations" and postcolonial international law", 
12 Although some scholars do not place importance in distinguishing between the use of the terms 
'global governance' and 'international relations', I feel that the distinction between them should be 
noted. 'International relations' is a subset of 'global governance', referring to relations between 
sovereign states on a bilateral basis. 'Global governance' would refer to the system of governing global 
relations, including relations between states but not exclusively so. It also involves the establishment 
of institutions of governance at the global and international level to regulate international relations, 
political, economic or social. Most of such institutions remain international rather than Slobalin nature 
as representations are still primarily made by state actors who remain primary subjects of international 
law and which constitute the primary legal personalities under constitutions of global -govemance 
organisations. However, the increasing jurisdiction of these institutions into what were previously 
sovereign territorial concerns under the delegated authority conferred on these institutions has 
morphed many of such 'international organizations' into 'global governance agencies' task with 
specific administrative duties over their members (see Scholte, 2000: 22; 132 - 134). 
13 The term 'postcolonial international law' is used here to distinguish the set of rules, doctrines and 
institutions which form the normative and operational framework of the international legal order in 
the postcolonial era from those which served to order the conduct between imperial powers and 
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particularly, but not exclusively, in global economic governance and international 
economic law. This thesis is a critique of the PRSP operational framework, the 
conceptual underpinnings of the project and the political and geo-strategic agenda 
driving its operationalisation. it is not about specific PRSP processes in individual 
countries nor is it an examination of the substantive content of PRSPs and/or PRSP- 
related instruments. 
There is a wealth of literature, including many empirical studies conducted on the 
different country processes and individual and comparative studies of PRSP 
documents (for example, Christiansen with Hovland, 2003; Gould, 2005a & b; 
Moleanears and Renard, 2002) many of which have also been carried out by NGOs 
participating in either the country processes or Washington DC-based reviews (for 
14 example, Chavez-Malaluan and Guttal, 2003 & 2002; World Vision, 2005) .I do not 
wish to duplicate the excellent work that has been done by these researchers but to 
conceptualise the phenomena they describe in the context of its impact on 
international law and econorn1c relations. 
This research concentrates on examining the effect of this new approach to 
regulation and consequently, its impact on international law and global governance, 
specifically third world engagement in these arenas. The epistemological objective 
here is to construct a theoretical understanding of the PRSP process and its attendant 
financing and policy instruments in the context of international law and global 
governance. This thesis aims to site the PRSP initiative within existing debates on 
globalization, law and global governance by asking if the PRSP framework 
constitutes an extension and/or an intensification of existing patterns of global 
between colonial states and their dominions. The term 'postcolonial' is used here temporally and 
distinguished from its use to denote a specific epistemological practice, that is the scholarship of 
'postcolonialism', although the thesis is sympathetic to the theoretical concerns of the postcolonialism. 
14 In tJ-1iS regard, the PRSP framework has significantly changed the landscape of research on subjects 
of this nature, in particular the involvement of a broader range of actors - notably civil society 
organisations (CSOs) in the research and hence, a change in the type of research produced - as well as 
a shift towards more advocacy type research. While NGOs have been involved in empirical research 
before, the difficulty in obtaining documents had deterred many from undertaking research on the 
impacts of development finance on the constituencies they represent or work with. The PRSP 
framework, while still marred by lack of transparency in many areas, have at least enabled the 
publication of essential documents as part of the consultation process, and hence, facilitated research 
on the substantive content of PRSPs. Engagement with governments, and the IFIs, in the process of 
policy formulation has also led to a rise in anecdotal literature on the process of development 
financing and enabled more first-hand experienced critique on the process. 
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-regulation 
in the postcolonial period, particularly in the era of econornic, social and 
cultural globalization, and if so, how. 
The questions posed by this research were twofold: 
(1) does the PRSP approach to development financing constitute a 
departure from the existing modalities and regulatory norms of 
international development financing ? and 
(2) if the PRSP approach does constitute a departure from eXisting 
modalities and norms, what are the implications of this shift on the 
constitution of global economic governance and international law ? 
In seeking answers to the questions, I combine an analysis of the operational aspects 
of the PRSP initiative, including its legal and policy components, with an 
examination of its conceptual framework and its political and econon-nic drivers. This 
involves an examination of the PRSP project as both a legal and political phenomenon. 
For the PRSP to have a legal impact, it must affect the rights and dudes of actors 
involved in the framework and for it to be political, it must have an impact on the 
normative power of these actors, that is, the ability to set rules and to advance 
principles through normative mechanisms. 
This thesis is born out of a discovery of the paucity of research on the reaoolifik of 
the PRSP project - locating the conceptual and operational underpinnings of the 
PRSP project and PRSP-related instruments within the discourse and historical 
context of international law and politics. While research into development policy and 
practice has traditionally straddled the disciplines of political economy, econon-Uics 
and sociology, there have been very few interdisciplinary analyses of the normative 
framework regulating relationships between parties to development financing 
agreements, much less of the forms of power that structure these relationships. 
Scholarship in this area is clearly bifurcated between positivistic accounts of the 
techno-legal aspects of development financing (see Gold, 1996, Shihata, 2000a, b 
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c 15 ) and contextual political economy analyses of aid relationships and development 
policy (see Helleiner, 2002, Wade, 2001; Woods, 2006; 2001). Legal scholars of 
international economic law, such as Lastra (2006); Lowenfeld (2002) and Qureshi 
(1999), have contributed substantially to a substantive understanding of the legal 
framework of the World Bank and the IMF but have stopped short of an analysis of 
what these legal structures mean to the construction of international law and global 
governance, and less so, on how they impact on the dynamic of -relationships 
between the actors involved. Similarly, institutional approaches to the study of 
development financing and policy contribute to the understanding of the 
context in which development financing takes place (see Miller-Adams, 1999, Pincus 
and Winters, 2002, Stone and Wright, 2007) but do not link these institutional 
processes to a wider normative context. 
This thesis is therefore both a critique of the PRS process and its accompanying 
policy and financing mechanisms as well as a critique of the current epistemology of 
PRSPs in the context of development studies and approaches to international law 
and global governance. It considers, in particular, the PRSP initiative in relation to 
the Bretton Woods institutions (BWIs) and examines the framework in the context 
of the evolving mandates of these two organisations over the decades since their 
inception. Specifically, it examines their centrality to the system of resources 
mobilisation and extraction and the roles they play in managing third world 
engagement in international law and economic relations. 
However, the research here goes beyond an institutional analysis of the BWIs, either 
from an organisational theory perspective, an intellectual approach popularised in 
recent years (see Babb and Buira, 2004; MiRer-Adams,, 1999; Stone and Wright, 2007; 
16 Woods, 2006) , or 
from a standard political economy approach which analyses the 
15 Both Gold and Shihata were former general-counsels of the IMF and the World Bank Group 
respectively. 
16 'ne adoption of methodologies from organisational studies and management research in the study 
of international organisations, notably the World Bank, has become increasingly popular over the 
years, as researchers begin to recognise the limitations of relying on a singular approach to social- 
political research on these organisations and their impact on their constituents. In particular, 
phenomenological approaches to organisation theory depicting orgardisational structures as 
legitimating myths have been utilised by World Bank researchers to explain the Bank's rationalisation 
of its policies and the constraints the bureaucracy of the Bank places on its own operations. This has 
followed on from the popularity of socio-organisational approaches in economic sociology - 
pioneered by Karl Polanyi and popularised by organisational theorists such as Mark Granovetter and 
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effect of Bank and Fund operations, either from a conventional materialist 
perspective (see Cammack, 2001 a&b; Craig and Porter, 2003; Chossudovsky, 1997a 
& b) or from an socio-anthropological perspective (see Gould, 2005a & b; Harrison., 
2005,2001 a& b). 
While I feel that a focus on the organisational structure and culture of the World 
Bank and IMF - given that these institutions are large, hierarchical bureaucracies - is 
critical to understanding the driving imperatives behind the PRSP approach, I feel 
this can only partially explain the widespread acceptance of the process by their 
membership. The universalisation of the PRSP process can only be fully explained by 
entering into the realm of political economy where political power at the 
international inter-state level, to a large extent, structures the policies that are 
conceived and implemented by financing institutions, such as the Bank and Fund. 
Recourse to the theoretical categories established by international relations 
researchers, in particular, postcolonial research in this area., remains necessary in an 
attempt to answer the aforementioned research questions. In particular., it is 
necessary to question the existing methodologies of studying the PRSP phenomena 
in the context of the development financing and international economic law. Socio- 
legal research in this area is limited, and tends to be clustered around the 
epistemology of political economy, and occasionally, anthropology and sociology. 
Except for Anghie (2004,2002,2000) and to a limited extent, Rajagopal (2003) and 
Pahuja (2004,2000), few legal theorists have approached the subject of IFIs through 
the prism of postcolonial research, or have successfully adopted sociological and 
political economy approaches in their consideration of the substantive structural 
concerns of international law and power. For me, an examination of the modalities 
for the PRSP framework and their implications on the structure of global governance 
and international regulatory norms must include an exploration of the historical 
context that gave birth to the PRSPs, including its imperial heritage, as well as an 
examination of the methodologies of research that shape the narratives of the PRSP. 
Paul DiMa io- that have applied sociological models of analysi mic phenomena (see Zukin 991 is to econo 
and DiNfaggio, 1990). 
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Therefore, it is critical that research on PRSPs must also take into account the 
methodological narratives that shape research on PRSPs and development financing 
as a whole and take care not to reinforce (through adoption) methodological 
stereotypes. A critique of methodology was thus an ongoing exercise during the 
course of this research. Like the authors in Cooke and Kothari's insightful 
compendium of research into participatory development approaches, this research 
aimed at moving away from the 'methodological revisionism' that characterises the 
study of PRSPs towards addressing 'more directly how the discourse itself, and not 
just the practice, embodies the potential for an unjustified exercise of power' (Cooke 
and Kothari, 2002: 4). 
It is hoped that adopting a different approach to the study of PRSPs will lead to the 
excavation of the real dynarn1cs of power that reside within the PRSP initiative and 
that this thesis will contribute to the unmasking of fissures that will serve as 
opportunities for real transformatory power. 
1.3. Methodology 
This thesis approaches its subject matter from both a structural matefialist perspective 
- examining the apparatus of the PRSP process and its effects on the structure of 
global governance and international regulatory mechanisms - and a discursive 
perspective - examining the discourses that inhabit the PRSP process and the means 
in which these discourses contribute to the foundations of global governance. Here, I 
juxtapose an empirical methodology for examining the normative linkages between 
the operational framework of the PRSP initiative and the actors who forward these 
norms with a critical analysis of the power dynamics underlying the relationships of 
the subjects and objects of the framework. 
This thesis borrows from the methodology adopted by Braithwaite and Drahos 
(2000) in their study of global business regulation and combines it with a materialist 
analysis of power at the global level. At the same time, it goes beyond the materialist 
critique and adopts a discursive method of analysing the mechanics of structural 
power by studying the conditions that give rise to the representational power of the 
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PRSP discourse. Here, Foucault's analysis of power enables us to understand the 
technologies of power at play in international economic relations and the 
postcolonial structures of international law and global governance which regulate 
these relationships. 
a) Analysing the Relationship 
Mechanisms of Globalization 
between Actors, Principles and 
As a starting point, I found it necessary to draw the links between the empirical 
reality of PRSPs and the contribution of the PRSP framework to international law 
and governance by drawing on the techniques adopted by Braithwaite and Drahos. 
Braithwaite and Drahos view the process of globalization as best conceptualised in 
terms of the relationships between actors, mechanisms and principles, With 
understanding conflicts of principles as key to understanding regulatory globalization 
(Braithwaite and Drahos, 2000: 15). 
Adopting the approach to social scientific study from Elster (1989)", Braithwaite and 
Drahos use mechanisms as a means of explaining the causal link between events in 
regulatory globalization", identifying mechanisms of globalization as 'processes that 
increase the extent to which patterns of regulation in one part of the world are 
similar, or linked, to patterns of regulation in other parts' with these processes 
involving 'one or mote actors (state and non-state) in a series of actions (and 
reactions) that ate linked to the goals and desires of the actors (Braithwaite and 
Drahos, 2000: 15 ) 17). Mechanisms, such as economic or military coercion-, 
modelling and capacity building, are used by actors Within the global economic 
system to effect change in their favour through the advocacy of principles, such as 
'transparency', 'reciprocity', and 'national treatment'. 
Braithwaite and Drahos found in their study of global business regulation 'that actors 
involved in the processes of globalization articulate, support and seek to entrench 
17 Elster approaches the study of social phenomena through 'explanation by mechanisms', using a 
causal mechanism to explain the link between two events in order to build a 'temporal snapshot' of 
events to construct a factual account of social reality (Elster, 1989, p 3). 
18 Braithwaite and Drahos define the globalization of regulation (or regulatory globalization) as the 
replication of regulatory norms, standards, principles across different regulatory jurisdictions 
(see for 
example, Braithwaite and Drahos, 2000: 3- 10). 
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principles in regulatory systems in different ways' and that 'in the contest of 
principles, actors use mechanisms to give weight to sorne principles over others' 
(Braithwaite and Drahos, 2000: 18 -19). Principles are defined as norrns5 which may 
or may not be juridical in nature, that inform the construction of rules in the 
globalization of business regulation (Braithwaite and Drahos, 2000: 18 - 20). The 
authors view the examination of this contest of principles crucial: 
Understanding the conflict of principles is integral to understanding 
the globalization of business regulation. The successful weighting of 
one principle over another has consequences at both the level of 
conduct and for regulatory change (Braithwaite and Drahos, 2000: 
18). 
As a policy instrument that is applied to all countries seeking bilateral and multilateral 
debt relief as well as concessional financing from the Bank and the Fund, the PRSP 
may be categorised as a 'mechanism of globalization' as defined by Braithwaite and 
Drahos. Exarnining the impact of the PRSP approach on the constitution of 
international law and global governance, it is necessary to consider how the PRSP 
framework promotes the universalisation of regulatory norms that further the 
interests of actors engaged in the process. Approaching the PRSP framework from 
this perspective enables us to consider the contest of principles between actors that 
exist In the wider sphere of global economic governance and to locate the PRSP 
framework within this contest. 
The relationship between these principles and the actors who advance the principles 
shed light on how the PRSP framework is conceived and constructed, and, more 
importantly, highlights the means by which the PRSP initiative serves a larger 
governance purpose outside the regulation of development financing. Principles, 
according to Braithwaite and Drahos, serve as 'abstract prescriptions that precede 
rule complexity' (Braithwaite and Drahos, 2000: 15) and consequently, it is possible 
to analYse the principles that underlie the PRSP framework as the prescriptive 
instruments upon which regulatory mechanisms, such the PRSP process and PRSP- 
related policy and financing instruments, are based. 
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A complementary methodology is used by jayasuriya in analysing the phenomenon 
of globalization. jayasuriya adopts an epistemological approach to studying the 
changes in the globalized economy that is premised on understanding the means in 
which globalization and 'its new ensemble of governance institutions' work towards 
changing 'the internal architecture of the state' GayasurlYa, 2001b: 5). He argues that 
the 'key issue' for understanding the way in which globalization is reshaping domestic 
and global governance is understanding the modalities of producing and reproducing 
'economic order' locally and globally and that such analysis should be directed at 
examining the 'production of 'order' in the global economy' rather than focused on 
'the significance of trade and capital market transformations in the global economy' 
(ibid: 4- 5). 
In other words, Jayasuriya provides the inverse but complementary approach to 
studying the globalization of regulation to that of Braithwaite and Drahos, 
contending that an examination into how the state is being transformed internally 
through external pressures will enable us to better understand how regulatory norms 
are translated and homogenised across jurisdictions (ibid). Through an examination 
of this 're-engineering' of the state, we can understand how state forms are 
embedded within a larger global framework of regulation and how these global 
institutions and the hegemonic actors which shape them correspondingly embed 
these norms within domestic state structures Gayasuriya, 2001a and 2001). The 
modalities of state reconfiguration taking place under the PRSP initiative may 
therefore be seen as part of wider shifts in the technologies and modalities of 
governance at the global level. 
These shifts may also be reflective of the practice of 'forum shifting' by the 
hegemonic actors seeking to forward favoured principles in the different regulatory 
regimes. Braithwaite and Drahos define 'forum shifting' as the means in which 
powerful actors in global regulatory regimes, usually states, most notably the United 
States, shift the regulatory agenda away from a particular forum to another forum or 
abandon the forum when the forum proves inconvenient for advancing its interests 
(Braithwaite and Drahos, 2000: 564). The reason for shifting forums, the authors 
argue, is to prevent defeat at the hands of negotiating opponents: 
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Forum shifting is a form of optimizing behaviour. An actor avoids a 
suboptimal outcome by shifting to a new garne in which it has a 
better shot at an optimal outcome (ibid). 
Here, the PRSP framework may be regarded as a form of 'forum shifting' by the 
dominant states in the global economy seeking to maintain the legitimacy and 
operational status quo of the regulatory norms and practices under attack from the 
resistance against neoliberal globalization". In the contest of principles, only 
powerful actors have the capacity to utilise this mechanism inasmuch as they have 
the capacity to redraw the disciplinary landscape of international economic law and 
global governance. 
b) Locating Regulatory Patterns within a Wider Analysis of Power 
In considering the contest of principles in the wider global governance forum, it is 
necessary to locate these principles within a larger theoretical and methodological 
framework. It is in this critical assessment of the PRSP operations that the limitations 
of Braithwaite and Drahos' methodology become clear and a need to have recourse 
to an alternative method of critique becomes apparent. While the authors identify key 
principles that underlie the processes of globalization through their empirical 
research and provide a methodological link between the advocacy of principles, 
actors' interests and mechanisms used to advance these principles, they do not enter 
into a debate about the power structures that underlie this contest of principles. 
Similarly, while scholars of international relations, such as jayasuriya, seek to 
construct an understanding of the operational impact of regulatory structures, either 
through an analysis of the impact of globalization on internal structures or from the 
internationalisation of state structures, such analyses often fall short of providing a 
contextual account of the nature of the power relationships behind these changes. 
Accordingly, while it is imperative that we study the impact of the PRSP framework 
on the structures of international law and global governance, including examining its 
19 1 use the term 'neoliberal globalization' to denote the globalization of regulation facilitated by 
adherence to the Washington Consensus model of economic organisation and to contrast between 
other forms of social, cultural and economic forms of globalization (see footnote 1 for a definition of 
the Washington Consensus'). 
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impact on third world engagement on the same, it is also crucial that we unmask the 
modalities and dynamics of power which underpin the framework. 
This thesis therefore relies on Foucault's methodology of analysing power and 
representation to inVestigate both the contested terrain in which the principles that 
underlie the PRSP project are constructed and their effect on international law and 
global governance. Specifically, Foucault's methodology of studying the 
manifestations of power through understanding power relations rather than studying 
the effects of powerful institutions (or entitieS)2' enables us to map the transition in 
means M which this power is manifested or rather, in the means through which 
discipline is enforced over the objects of power (see Foucault, 1994; 340 - 345; 1991: 
261-266). 
For Foucault, power is immanent to the ob)ect it regulates, it is reproductive rather 
than hierarchical, to be appropriated by individuals, *institutions or states when they 
exercise control over another individual, institution or state (Foucault, 1994: 340 - 
343). Accordingly, a Foucauldian theory of power rests upon understanding power as 
the sum of power relations: 'Power exists only as exercised by some on others, only 
when it is put into action' (ibid: 340). In analysing the impact of the PRSP framework 
on the globalization of regulation and the constitution of international law therefore, 
it is necessary to understand the dynamics between the parties to the framework and 
their relationship to each other and the discipline to which they are subjected. 
According to Foucault: 
A power relationship ... can only be articulated on the basis of two 
elements that are indispensable ... : that the 'other' (the one over 
whom power is exercised) is recognized and maintained to the very 
end as a subject who acts and that, faced with a relationship of power, 
20 For Foucault, analysing power by analysing specific institutional manifestations of such power, 
without its grounding within the social nexus from which it is drawn, risks masking the real source of 
power in pursuit of analysing the bureaucratic imperatives which drive the institutional agenda and 
risks giving the institutions and their attendant regulations 'an exaggerated privilege in the relations of 
power and, hence, seeing in the latter, only modulations of law and coercion' (Foucault, 1994: 342 - 
343). 
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a whole field of responses, reactions, results and Possible inventions 
may open up (ibid). 
The exercise of power is therefore 'a management of possibilities' (ibid: 341) and 
understanding the operations of power is to understand how these possibilities are 
administered over the object of the power relations, either miciting, inducing or 
seducing the object to be disciplined or making things easier or more difficult for it, 
releasing or contriving, making probable or less and 'in the extreme' constraining or 
forbidding absolutely (ibid). Consequently, for Foucault, it is the exercise of such 
power over the process of economic production and reproduction that constitutes 
the mode of action called 'government' (ibid: 341). The process of 'govern-mentality' 
thus involves an ensemble of institutional apparatuses and strategies 'that allow the 
exercise of this very specific albeit complex form of power' and 'the development of 
a whole complex of knowledges' to manage the objects of this power (ibid: 219 - 
220). 
Foucault's methodology enables us to consider the historical conditions that gave rise 
to the principles that underlie the PRSP project and to locate them in the context of 
the PRSP as a mechanism of globalization. In unmasking the dynamics of power 
inherent in the framework, we can excavate the objectifying narratives of its 
underlying disciplinary norms and critically assess their wider impact on the 
construction of other regulatory norms and normative networks. Scheurich terms 
this 'policy archaeology' - the deconstruction of a priori assumptions about a 
problematic that contributes to policy research and the 'powerful 'grids' or networks 
of regularities' that determine the problematising of key concepts within policy 
studies (Scheurich, 1997: 94 - 118). 
Using this methodology also enables us to examine how power is exercised through 
various regulatory instruments at the global level, including how the PRSP 
framework represents a shift M the modalities of global power. Specifically, this 
thesis considers how the PRSP framework constitutes an evolution from what 
Foucault terms the 'technologies of domination' to 'technologies of self', the two 
poles from which 'the organisation of power over life' is deployed or, in other words, 
the movement from a 'disciplinary society' to a 'society of control' (see Foucault, 
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1994: 220 - 221; 1991: 261 - 263). Here, the movement is away from the disciplinary 
supervision of societies (or in our case, third world states) - that is, through 
establishing normative frameworks for behaviour and the exclusion/penalisation of 
departures from such norms - towards the establishment of a 'bio-political' power in 
which the objects of power (societies or states) reproduce these norms and seek to 
insert themselves Mto the very relationship of power (ibid). 
This dovetails with Braithwaite and Drahos' analysis of the processual shifts 'in global 
business regulation today which sees the movement away from -remunerative and 
coercive webs of influence towards the use of dialogic webs in securing both 
adoption and compliance with norms in the aforementioned contest of principles. 
According to Braithwaite and Drahos: 
Dialogic webs also heighten the probability that the norms 
established by means of the web will be internalized by actors who 
are part of the web. Dialogic commitments to a regime bring fidelity 
to norms that webs of coercion do not. Obtaining a fidelity to norms 
means that compliance with the norms is more likely to be robust 
(Braithwaite and Drahos, 2000: 563). 
Although Braithwaite and Drahos do not subscribe to postmodern analyses of 
discourse, their analysis of dialogic regulatory sequences resonates with Foucault's 
conception of power, inasmuch as it resonates with Foucault's discourse politics and 
the power of discursive technologies (see below). As Braithwaite and Drahos 
contend: 'Hegemony means that within dialogic webs there is more reason to hear 
the voices of those with a capacity to escalate webs of reward and coercion' (ibid: 
551). 
Thus, insofar as dialogic webs rema-in dominated by powerful actors within the 
regulatory fora, compliance with the norms advanced by these actors by weaker 
actors In the system through such mechanisms of dialogue indicate the reproductive 
nature of the power inasmuch as it demonstrates continuity with the overt 
disciplinary force of power. 
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C) Representational Power and the Discipline of Discourse 
Fidelity to the norms advanced by powerful constituencies are also an indication of 
the discursive strength of their dialogic webs, indicating the persuasiveness of their 
representations. Consequently, adopting a discursive methodology to studying the 
representational power of concepts articulated in the PRSP project enables us to 
understand not only the conditions under which such concepts are problematised 
but also the normative impact flowing from this problematisation. This contributes 
to our understanding of the relationship between the principles of the PRSP project, 
the actors who advance these prInciples and the mechanism by which these 
principles are advanced, namely the PRSP framework. 
A Foucauldian analysis of the development discourse has been applied in recent years 
by authors mapping the evolution of development thinking. In particular, Escobar 
has examined the role of development discourse in constructing the current reality of 
development policy and practice through the 'colonization of reality', that is, 'how 
certain representations become dominant and shape indelibly the ways in which 
reality is imagined and acted upon' (Escobar, 1995: 5; see also Chapter Two, section 
2.1). 
A team of researchers at the Institute of Development Studies (IDS) have utilised 
this approach to examine the policy processes that impact upon poverty policy. As 
McGee and Brock explain: 'Seeing policy as a discourse illuminates some of the 
processes by which particular methods of poverty assessments gain hegemony, 
through their attachment to particular narrative of cause and effect' (McGee and 
Brock, 2001: 6). This requires an analytical approach that can account for how 
particular versions of policy triggers and solutions 'are taken up and embedded and 
to locate the emergence and shaping of these versions in particular social and 
historical contexts' (Brock et al, 2001: 4). 
This approach to the study of development policy and practice - in this case, that of 
regulating access to -development financing - offers what Crush terms as the 
cconceptual space' for exploring 'the links between the discursive and the non- 
discursive; between the words, the practices and the institutional expressions of 
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development; between the relations of power and domination that order the world 
and the words and images that represent those worlds' (Crush, 1995: 6). 
Braithwaite and Drahos do not preclude the possibility of subjecting their 
methodology to further theoretical scrutiny, acknowledging that there is opportunity 
within their methodological framework to consider theories of globalization that are 
cmore reductive or structural in orientation' (Braithwaite and Drahos, 2000: 15). 
However, at the same time, the authors reject structuralist Marxist critiques and 
critical 'postmodernist' approach, including discursive techniques, to explaining the 
phenomena of globalization, arguing that their method reveals 'little support' for a 
'more sophisticated structuralist Marxist explanation which subordinates purposive 
action to the reproduction of systemic inevitability' at the same time that 
postmodernist theory fails to take into account the dominating forces of military and 
financial coercion when priontising discourse in the construction of social reality 
(Braithwaite and Drahos, 2000: 601). 
This thesis argues to the contrary and demonstrates the epistemic advantage of 
combining a positivist methodology of conceptualising legal and political 
phenomena, such as that adopted by Braithwaite and Drahos, and a critical 
methodology that aims to unmask the power relations behind the processual shifts. 
In examining an institutional framework such as the PRSP and PRSP-related 
instruments, it is necessary to adopt a structuralist perspective 'that sees certain 
phenomena as having a function, without implying that it is completely purposive, 
still less conspiratorial' but at the same time conforming to an unalterable system 
(Biel, 2000: 231). While not necessarily adopting the structuralist explanation as to 
the systemic inevitability in the contest of principles and power relations among 
actors, employing a structuralist materialist approach to studying globalization is 
necessary to identify the structure and forms of dominance, in this case, in 
conceptualising the powerful interests behind the PRSP approach. 
ring the research questions posed in section 1.2 above, ii Therefore, in answe it is 
necessary to view the PRSP framework as both: (1) an institutionalprocess - locating the 
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general PRSP process within the historical and contemporary context and examining 
the structures of power that inhabit this process and (2) a textualfoundation of knowledge 
production - examining the discourse of the PRSP process as embodied in PRSP 
documentation and in ideas, concepts and episternic rules that emerge from the 
PRSP process through actors connected with the process. Only in this way can we 
construct an epistemology around the PRSP framework as a regulatory mechanism 
and/or a new disciplinary framework. 
1.4. A Note on Methods 
As mentioned above, this thesis aims to conceptualise the PRSP process and its 
implications for international law and global governance. Much of the research for 
the thesis therefore involved theoretical and contextual analysis of existing reports 
and documentation on the PRSP processes M different countries and reviews of the 
overarching operational framework of the initiative and its associated financing 
instruments, encompassing primary and secondary documentary material sourced 
from libraries and organisational archives. 
The documentary research for this thesis entailed a consultation and analysis of a 
range of official and unofficial documentation on the PRSP framework, PRSP 
processes and PRSP-related instruments, such as the PRGF and PRSCs. These 
documents were drawn from a myriad of official BWI and non-BWI documents - 
most of them now freely available on the World Bank and IMF websites - as well as 
legal agreements and some confidential policy documents obtained from first-hand 
sources. Qualitative assessments of specific documents were undertaken in line with 
the methodologies outlined in section 1.3 above. 
This review of PRSP and PRSP-associated literature was supplemented by qualitative 
interviews and informal conversations with a sample of policyrnakers, activists and 
campaigners, politicians, and institution bureaucrats; including some of key players 'in 
the PRSP process, as weR as observations from attendance at a number of 
consultative meetings and internal discussions with campaigners and activists. This 
field research was carried out mostly during the period of a year from April 2004 to 
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April 2005. As some of the information obtained through such interviews, 
conversations and observational engagements are highly confidential and/or 
controversial if ascribed to particular sources, some sources have asked to remain 
anonymous or have non-attributed quotes. These interviews have supplemented, 
expanded upon or clarified data drawn from the aforementioned literature and 
documentation. 
Map of the Thesis 
This thesis aims to draw a conceptual and methodological map of the PRSP 
framework and its irnpact on the constitution of global governance and postcolonial 
internadonal law. 
Chapter Two situates the PRSP framework within the wider context of postcolonial 
international law, locating this initiative within the legacy of circumscribed 
sovereignty which characterises third world state engagement with the exterior. 
Establishing the theoretical frame of reference for the thesis., this chapter examines 
how the PRSP framework has been insetted into this dynamic of postcolonial 
relationships and how the World Bank and the IMF emerged as central institutions *in 
the management of the third world, particularly states' engagement with the 
international economy. 
Chapter Three proceeds to examine how the pivotal toles played by the Bretton 
Woods institutions in the postcolonial. international order established them as key 
institutions for managing the crisis of legitimacy *in the international order in the late 
1990s. This chapter seeks to understand how the temporal convergence between the 
shifting institutional agendas of the Bank and Fund and the geo-strategic imperatives 
of their major shareholders - the industrialised countries that form the metropolitan 
centres of the postcolonial. global economy - to quell the rising tide of dissent against 
the dislocations of neoliberal economic reforms resulted in the formation of the 
disciplinary framework of the PRSP project. 
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Chapter Four begins the examination of the disciplinary power of the PRSP 
framework through an analysis of how the reforms of the PRSP architecture reshape 
the modalities of states' engagement with the external economy and, notably, with its 
external financiers. This chapter wiR demonstrate how the changes in the 
technologies of aid regulation reflect the shifting forms of power at the global level, 
with particular reference to the evolution of the doctrine of 'conditionahty' as a 
pivotal regulatory instrument. 
Chapter Five continues with the analysis of the PRSP framework's disciplinary 
power over third world states through examining the Impact of the PRSP framework 
on the internal constitution of states, particularly through the efforts at capturing 
domestic polig space. It considers how the paradoxical incentivising and disciplining of 
the states subject to the PRSP initiative - together with their domestic constituents 
21 
and external sympathiserS - has been operationalised through a framework which 
engenders the utilisation of new modalities of discipline highlighted in the previous 
chapter. 
Chapter Six follows on from the analysis in the preceding chapter, examining the 
participatory process mandated under the PRSP framework, locating these socio- 
political reforms within the overarching effort to rehabilitate the state apparatus 
under the PRSP framework. Where Chapter Five examines how discipline is 
maintained through the internalisation of policy and institutional reform by states, 
this chapter seeks to examine how these reforms are legitimated through the capture of 
political ipace - the mobilisation of domestic political consensus in support of such 
reforms. 
Chapter Seven will consolidate the fin(: Engs of the thesis within a wider examination 
of the dynamics of power in the international arena and considers the implications of 
the reforms on the constitution of global governance and 'international law. This 
chapter will consider if the forms of intervention into sovereign nations necessitated 
by the PRSP project are deeper and greater than previous forms of control, and 
considers the potential of the PRSP project M subverting or rekindling the 
21 1 use this term to refer to the coalition of citizenry groups from the third world and their 
metropolitan centres (that is, the south and north) which proVided the external support to groups 
fighting the domestic manifestations of structural adjustment. 
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possibilities for engaged coRective action among the state actors in resistance to the 
inequities of the current globalized economy. 
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PRSPs in Postcolonial International Law and Global 
Governance 
The international legal ystem IS a powerful silefor contestation ... Because law has the constitutive 
power to universaliýZe cettain knowledges and to disqualij otbers, the abilio to ýbeak and to 
influence law-makin 
, gprocesses 
is a critical determinant of access to power' 
- Dianne Otto, 1996. - 359 - 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers have been hailed as the greatest change in 
development financing since the introduction of structural adjustment lending in the 
early 1980s, reflecting not only a change in the structure of concessional financing 
but also a shift in the discourse of development policy and practice. Crucially, the 
framework signals a larger paradigmatic shift in the cartography of aid and, 
consequently, in the constitution of north-south relations, of which aid relations 
form a pivotal strand. For many third world states whose relationships with the 
exterior have been primarily characterised by such relationships of resource 
dependency, the PRSP framework has fundamental implications for their 
engagement, both individually and collectively, in multilateral governance 'institutions 
and in the global economy. 
The reorganising of the form and substance of negotiations between developing 
countries and international financial institutions as well as other official financiers 
impact critically on the relationships these countries maintain in other areas of 
significance, notably in the realm of international economic law and global financial 
and economic governance. In this manner, PRSPs are not only restructuring the 
modalities of financing but also reframing fundamental tenets of international law 
and mechanisms of global governance, implemented through a series of strategic 
interventions into target countries. 
25 
Chapter Two 
The opportunity for the extensive state interventions brought about through the 
PRSP framework is however only possible where the sovereignty of the states in 
question are circumscribed through their initial insertion into the 'international order 
and the continued existence of international institutions that facilitate the extension 
of this imperial character of international relations. Accordingly, there is a need to 
situate the PRSP approach and its attendant institutional framework - notably its 
organisational drivers, World Bank and the IMF - within the structure of 
postcolonial international law as well as in contemporary global governance. 
In this chapter, I seek explore the ways In which third world states were originally 
incorporated into the international legal order to explain how the PRSP framework 
and other interventions of the postcolonial period can and have been effected and 
legitimised, in spite of incongruence with conventional understandings of 
international law. Locating third world engagement with international law in the 
ccolonial encounter' (Anghie, 2004; Otto, 1996); in the logic of modern legal 
mythology (Fitzpatrick, 1992; Tarullo, 1985) and in contemporary politics of 
patronage (Badie, 2000), including the central facilitating role played by the Bretton 
Woods institutions-, will enable us to better situate the PRSP framework within the 
current framework of economic globalization and contemporary international 
relations. 
This will demonstrate that rather than being inimical to the project of international 
law, the PRSP framework forms a vital and cohesive part of international law, 
specifically international economic law and the attendant institutions of global 
economic governance, so constituted in the postcolonial era. Crucially, the 
disentanglement of the PRSP approach and its attendant discourses from the self- 
validating narratives of universalism, enfranchisement and empowerment is key to 
understanding the role it plays in perpetuating inequalities at the international level. 
Consequently, I argue here that the PRSP framework represents a continuation, if 
not an exacerbation of the asymmetrical sovereignty characterising postcolonial 
'international' law and the imperial nature of the 'development' project which has 
sustained the logic of this relationship. In doing so, this chapter demonstrates, 
in a 
similar vein to Anghie's analysis of the 'good governance' project which preceded the 
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PRSP framework, that the insertion of the PRSP framework into sovereign lending 
operations masks 'the imperial character' of international law 'even when it is being 
reproduced in a way that powerfully shapes contemporary international relations' 
(Anghie: 2004: 250). Understanding this legacy is central to developing a theory 
about the role of the PRSP framework in the context of globalization and 
contemporary global governance. 
2.1. PRSPs in the International Order: Asymmetrical 
Sovereignty and Circumscription of State Autonomy 
The PRSP framework may be regarded as an affront to the principles of sovereign 
equality and non-intervention, the pillars of the postwar international legal order 
enshrined by the norms established in the Charter of the United Nations 1947. The 
extensive domestic interventions of the PRSP approach and its reorganisation of the 
socio-political. fabric of PRSP countries represent a clear circumscription of the 
principles of state autonomy, non-discrimination and self-determination constituting 
the lynchpins of international law in the postcolonial period. 
Yet, the near universal implementation of such an intrusive, Mistitutionalised 
instrument of state reorganisation in the third world has gone virtually unchallenged 
in the international arena. On the contrary, the introduction of such a process of 
cparticipatory' policyrnaking and 'consultative' decision-making, linked to the 
disbursement of much needed external financing, has been welcomed, if not 
celebrated, by previous detractors of the BWIs and the current aid architecture on 
grounds of its inclusiveness and its promotion of 'country ownership. Where there 
has been criticism of the PRSP approach, such critiques have centred upon the 
disjuncture between the rhetoric of the PRSP principles and their operational 
implementation rather than on the impact or potential impact of such an 
interventionist mechanism in international law. 
This can be partially explained by the practice of epistenuc delineation and/or 
clisciplinary incoherence in analysis of the PRSP framework, notably in the absence 
of legal critique on an issue that is viewed primarily as a subject of international 
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political econorny or international relations or under the rubric of 'development 
studies'. 
More significantly however, this failure to critically contextualise the PRSP 
framework in international law can be attributed to the perception that the PRSP 
approach is appropriately constituted within international law - international 
economic law in particular - in that the framework rehabilitates, albeit incrementally, 
the unequal nature of international economic relations. In this manner, the PRSP 
framework is viewed as reforming the iniquities associated with the circumscription 
of autonomy under structural adjustment. At the same time, its spotlight on poverty 
reduction rescues the focus of international economic law from a mandate premised 
on the project of modernity that accompanied postcolonial economic governance. 
These conceptualisations, and consequently, the operational efficacy of the PRSP 
framework, could only have taken place within a legacy of state asymmetry in 
international law into which postcolonial third world states - now the only states 
subject to the interventions of the Bretton Woods institutions - have been inserted. 
The wholesale revision of the modalities of PRSP countries' engagement with the 
international community - through the rules regulating access to aid, concessional 
financMg and debt relief - exemplifies the current international legal order in which 
third world states remain objects of international law rather than its subjects. The 
interventions facilitated by the PRSP approach may thus be regarded as being both 
lqgifimised by andfatilitafive of the imperial character of international law, exemplifying 
what Pahuja (2005) terms as 'the postcoloniality of international law'i - 
2.1.1. Locating the PRSP Project in the 'Postcoloniality' of International 
Law 
Fundamental to the constitution of this 'postcoloniality' in international law is its 
sustenance of the 'dynarnic of difference' (Anghie, 2004: 4) as reflected 
in a) the 
construction of European/ western/ occidental identity 
in opposition to a self- 
constructed, alternate representation of what 
it is not or, in Fitzpatrick's words, 'an 
identity in negation' (Fitzpatrick, 2001: 147); and b) the ceaseless creation of an 
1 Pahuja uses this term to refer to how international law 'both sustains and contains within it what we 
might call the condition of the postcolonial' (Pahuja, 2005: 460). 
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'Other' -a reduction of non-European identity to the characteristics which this 
definitive 'Self rejeCtS2 (Anghie, 2004; Fitzpatrick, 2001; Pahuja, 2005; Said, 2003)3. 
This process creates the 'gap between two cultures, demarcating one as 'universal' 
and civilized and the other as 'particular' and uncivilized' (Anghie, 2004: 4) in which 
the constitution of the 'universal' avoids the fixity of definition by positing itself 'in 
an irredeemable opposition' to savagery which that constitutes the 'particular' 
(Fitzpatrick, 2001: 147) 
The European or occidental. identity therefore reserves for itself the characterisation 
of the 'universal' and of 'civilisation' not through the design of rules for what it 
should include but by reference to what it should exclude, that is, anything the west 
abrogates, abhors or declares as aberrant. It is this underlying delineation which 
defines the function of postcolonial international law not as one of creating order 
among sovereign states but as one of seeking containment of this 'cultural difference' 
among states (Anghie, 2004; 2002). It is also this binary between 'civilisation' and 
'prinlitivity' that distinguishes between first and third world engagement with 
international law, a distinction which also underlines the logic of the PRSP approach 
and inserts this framework within the current context of international law. 
Firstly, the 'dynarnic of difference' ensured the unlVersahsation of 'a single system of 
international law with explicitly European origins' (Anghie, 2002: 516) -a process 
forged during the colonial era and intensified during the period of decolonisation - 
and the unquestioning assumption of newly independent and non-European societies 
into the pre-existing community of nations and their subjection to norms for which 
these new entities had played no part in designing (Anghie, 2004 & 2002; Fitzpatrick, 
2001; Pahuja, 2005). As a consequence, asymmetrical relationships were established 
in the international legal order between the 'subjects' of international law - the 
former colonial powers for whom international law pre-decolonisation regulated 
2 This analysis viewing the constitution of reality as a complex intersection between domains of 
recognition and relational experiences - the formation of self identity residing in the modality of that 
identity's relation to others (or the 'modality of relation to the self' or 'technologies of self') bolstered 
by a series of discursive practices- was pioneered by Foucault (see for example, 'Preface to the I-Estory 
of Sexuality, Volume II'in Foucault, 1991: 336 - 339 and Foucault, 1972) and applied to the 
construction of knowledge about non-European societies by Said (1972) in his germinal work on 
orientalism and later, to the practices and institutions of 'development' by Escobar (1995). 
3 The bulk of such scholarship on postcolonial. representational practices, have all drawn heavily upon 
Edward Said's germinal work on the Orientalist discourse - the phenomenon of 'Orientalism' - in 
which the production of ideas about the non-West is bound up with the complex hegemomc 
relationships of power and domination between the Occident and the Orient (see Said, 2003). 
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their access to and use of terra nullius - and the 'objects' of international law - former 
colonies and other non-European states whose inclusion into the sovereign realm 
were governed by their accession to the aforementioned established 'universal' norms 
(Anghie, 2004: 100 _ 104)4. 
The force of the corpus of rules, doctrines, practices and institutions which make up 
international law thus has differing applications for the differing states patty to them. 
Whereas for first world states, international law served, and still serves, the function 
of ordering relations among sovereign states, for third world states, the question was 
one of 'acquisition of sovereignty', because the concept of sovereignty was aligned as 
it were 'with European ideas of social order, political organization, progress and 
development' (Anghie, 2004: 102 - 103). This has resulted in what Badie calls 'the 
juridical fiction of sovereignty' in which the 'international system can be constituted 
only of sovereign states whose juridical identity reflects that of Western states' 
(Badie, 2000: 78). 
Formal sovereignty acquired in its juridical form in the postcolonial period therefore 
did not accord postcolonial states with substantive equality in their engagement with 
international law because the doctrine of sovereignty itself was 'improvised out of the 
colonial encounter' when applied to new recruits to the international 
legal order, 
rendering third world sovereignty 'distinctive' and 'uniquely vulnerable and 
dependent' from that of first world sovereignty (Anghie: 6) 
Consequently, and secondly, because international law is 'responsively oriented and 
contained by the idea of civilisation' (Fitzpatrick, 2001: 152), a 
'civilisation' that is 
premised on the redemption of 'the backward, aberrant, violent, oppressed and 
underdeveloped people of the non-European world' (Anghie, 
2004: 3), international 
law and international institutions sought to bridge the aforementioned gap 
between 
cultures through the development of techniques to confront and contain this 
difference and to achieve 'uniformity and universality' among states 
(ibid: 4; Anghie, 
4 An exception to this development has been the 
diverging economic trajectories of the countries of 
the Communist bloc during the Cold War as well as 
Cuba and China prior to the liberalisation of the 
Chinese economy in the late 20th and early 21 st century. However, the economic reforms which 
then 
followed the Eastern European and ex-SoViet Union countries and China (and to a 
lesser, extent, 
India's) accession into the current global economy post-Cold War, reiterates the application of this 
norm. 
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2002: 516 - 520). This became more imperative in the aftermath of the 
decolonisation process which necessitated 'a new form of containment' of the 
'Other', the newly established states brought 'into an even more proximate relation 
with the West' (Pahuia, 2005: 465). 
The technologies and institutions of postcolonial international law provide the 
instruments for such containment inasmuch as they provide the mechanisms to 
frustrate anything less than an orderly entry of these new states into the international 
legal order, and anything less than a full acquiescence to the terms and conditions, 
through, inter alia, the withholding of commensurable rights and privileges associated 
with such entry. The legitimacy of interventions on the part of the 'international 
community' via 'international' institutions was secured through the maintenance of 
the aforementioned 'dynamic of difference', enabling the 'application of sanctions' 
and necessitating internal interventions in communities which failed to comply with 
the universal norms established by the international community in the same way that 
imperial conquest had been legifirnised by the 'civilizing mission' to transform 
'backward and primitive' societies' (Anghie, 2004: 3-4; 2002: 519; Pahuja, 2005: 
465). 
For Anghie, the development of new international institutions - beginning with the 
Mandate System of the League of Nations' and culminating with the birth of the 
international financial institutions - were crucial to the foundation of the postwar 
legal order, enabling the development and implementation of new technologies to 
rehabilitate the state in aberration of 'universal' values (Anghie, 2004; 2002). 
Subsequently, the circumscribed nature of third world sovereignty and the colonial 
legacy of international law enabled international law and institutions of global 
governance to intervene in the domestic sphere and 'to administer civilizing therapy' 
to these newly 'sovereign' states (Anghie, 2002: 547). 
5 The Mandate System was an international regime created by the League of Nations in the aftermath 
of the First World War for the purpose of governing the territories annexed or colonized by Germany 
and the Ottoman empire, the two great powers defeated in the War, placing these territories 'under a 
system of international tutelage' rather than distributing them 'among the victorious powers as spoils 
of war' (Anghie, 2004: 116). The Mandate System marked a shift from an endorsement of conquest in 
international law to an attempt to include previously exploited and colonised peoples into the 
international system and 'promote self-government' in accordance with the norms of the 
'international'community (ibid). 
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2.1.2. Reproducing Colonial Asymmetries through Postcolonial Law 
The imperial heritage of international law juxtaposed with the invention of 
'developmentalism' has thus produced a powerful body of rules, doctrines) 
institutions and regimes of knowledge which has governed third world engagement 
in the international arena in the postcolonial era. For Escobar, the systems of 
discourse and representation associated with the advent of 'development' as 'a 
domain of thought and action" in the immediate postwar period has not only 
(created an extremely efficient apparatus for producing knowledge about, and the 
exercise of power over the Third World', the organisation of the third world into a 
social Darwinistic model of progress has enabled the successful deployment of 'a 
regime of government over the Third World, the one half of a bifurcated reality 
between 'developed' and 'underdeveloped' (Escobar, 1995: 9- 10). 
Accordingly, while the justification for the interventionist restructuring of sovereign 
third world states was refrained from one based on biological hierarchies to one 
delimited by cultural polarities, the object of the 'civilising mission' remains the same. 
The replacement of 'biological racism with an equally pernicious form of cultural 
racism' through which Eurocentric ideas of sociO-polidcal and economic 
organisation became superior (Tucker, 1999: 5) thus became an important instrument 
in the consolidation of the postcolonial world economy. 'Development' became a 
'historically singular experience, the creation of a domain of thought and action' 
(Escobar, 1995: 10) which served to contain and discipline not only the internal 
productive capacities of postcolonial states but also the liberative potential and 
political autonomy of their new-found sovereignty. 
The recognition of third world states and the legitimacy of third world claims under 
international law then became premised on a) their capacity to demonstrate 
adherence to the norms established by the 'international' legal order; and b) in their 
6 Escobar Views the process of 'development' as constituting a part of the 'anthropology of 
modernity', a historically contingent phenomenon premised upon the elevation of one system of 
knowledge - the 'modem', industrialised west - and the 'marginalization and disqualification of non- 
Western knowledge systems' (Escobar, 1995: 13). Escobar attributes the possibility of this 
epistemological approach to the development of tools of analysis in the 1960s and '70s, notably those 
found in Foucault's. work 
on discourse which 'produces permissible modes of being and thinking while disqualifying and even 
making others impossible (Escobar, 1995: 5; see Chapter One for a discussion on Foucault's theory 
discursive power). 
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failure to demonstrate the aforementioned, their Willingness to be rehabilitated and 
accept interventions for reform in order that they may be restructured into 
compliance. In this manner, colonialism gives way to a 'new legal imperialism' which 
operates not through 'direct colonial imposition' by singularly powerful nation states 
but through the control and manipulation by these states of a community of nations 
- the 'internationahsation' of colonial power through new 'contractual modes of 
domination' or a voluntary accession to the institutions of the global political 
economy (see Fitzpatrick, 2001: 212 - 213). 
International law and the institutions sustaining it therefore became not only the 
means through which first world states determined third world accession into the 
global political and economic order, but also a means through which third world 
participation in these international domains is continually disciplined through a 
constant revision of the terms and conditions of their engagement. The modernist 
discourse of difference which underpinned the development of the postwar 
international legal order - whereby 'decolonization was only available on narrow 
terms, to entities that resembled the European nation-state' (Otto, 1996: 343) - 
continue to serve as exclusionary devices in current international relations (ibid: 338). 
Hence, the translation of what Tarullo terms 'the myth of normalcy'- the sanctifying 
of a singular linage of what is 'normal' for states participating in the international 
economy 7- into international economic law constramis the third world's participation 
in and contribution to the development of its organising principles (Tarullo, 1985: 
547 - 548; 550)'. The institutionalising of this logic of normalcy in international 
economic relations between states not only naturalises and perpetuates the 
aforementioned categories of representation in international legal discourse, it also 
confines negotiations and resolution of disputes to the reproduction of these 'images 
of sameness where they do not already exist' and the 'eradication of communities of 
difference' where they do exist (Tarullo, 1985: 550 - 552). These 'myths' inherent in 
7 In this respect, Tarullo adopts the Escobarian definition of developmentalism -and its critique of the 
modernist categorisation of 'development' as a societal graduation from agrarian to industrial (ibid) - 
less as a normative interpretation of international economic relations, as Escobar et al do, but as a 
heuristic device for understanding the logic of international economic law which has at its core the 
emyth of normalcy' as its organising principle (Tarullo, 1985). Oppositional interpretations are viewed 
not as generating alternative systems of knowledge or practice but as departures from the norm for 
which rehabilitation is necessary. 
8 See also Pahula's exploration of Tarullo's 'myth of normalcy' (Pahuja, 2000: 792 - 793). 
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international economic relations, 'teach difference as a departure, often temporary, 
from normal' and aberrations which necessitate the intervention of the international 
community, such as IMF conditionalities to redress the financial imbalances of an 
indebted state (Tarullo, 1985: 546 - 547). 
At the heart of these attempts at 'containment' are both the need to ration the 
transfer of capital from the north to the south and the need to maintain access to the 
resources of the south by the north, in keeping with the geo-strategic and economic 
imperatives of maintaining the status quo of colonial economic relations in the 
postcolonial period. This regulation of capital flows to the south - in terms of 
monitoring the volume of resource transfers as well as the utilisation of such 
resources domestically - is driven by the necessity to maintain what Hopkins and 
Wallerstein term the 'core-periphery zonal organization of world production' 
(Hopkins and Wallerstein, 1996: 4)9 characteristic of the postcolonial 'international 
financial and trade architecturelo. 
Accordingly, the sustenance of the systemic 'peripheralization' of the world economy 
- maintaining developing countries within the lower echelons of the global 
commodity chains pivoted around organising centres in the north (Hudson, 2003: 
186) - necessitates that 'development occurs only within the tightly controlled 
parameters of structural adjustment' (or any other terms established by the 
9 As 'world-systems' theorists, Hopkins and Wallerstein's approach to understanding the postcolonial. 
world economy and its impact on socio-political relations is premised upon an analysis of the systermic 
changes in the forms and structures of the interstate system and world production - 'evolving 
institutional domains' they term as 'vectors' of the world system which have served to organise 
people's activities in the period following the end of the Second World War. According to Hopkins 
and Wallerstein, 'the modern world system' has developed six 'distinguishable but not separable 
vectors': 'the interstate system, the structure of world production, the structure of the world labour 
force, the patterns of human welfare, the social cohesion of states and the structures of knowledge' 
(Hopkins and Wallerstein, 1996: 2). Hopkins and Wallerstein, while acknowledging the role of 
hegemonic state power under the interstate system, place greater emphasis on the dominating impact 
of the world production structure in organising social relations worldwide (ibid: 2- 5). Specifically the 
process of capital accumulation on a world scale which saw 'the establishment of commodity chains of 
production extending backwards from the organizing centres' continually maintains the 'core' 
countries in a position of privilege by virtue of their capture of the means of production and the 
countries in the 'periphery' constantly being subject to the exigencies of the centres of production 
(ibid). Nonetheless, 'world systems' theorists generally reject the theories of dependency or neo- 
imperialism as they argue that 'core-periphery zonal organization' could occur within third world 
states and that it is not confined to state accumulation on a global scale. 
10 As Hudson argues, the narrow preoccupation of the northern architects of the postwar world 
economy was centred on the development of 'export enclaves' in the south 'to produce raw materials 
needed by North American and European industry, at prices satisfactory to the user countries' 
(Hudson, 2003: 186). 
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metropolitan states) and that the 'political and social conditions for the global 
accumulation system are maintained' (Biel, 2000: 87). In other words3 in maintaining 
the imperial relationships of dependency in the postcolonial period, the flow of 
capital to postcolonial. states needed 'to be regulated to prevent the South from using 
the resources to catch up with the centre' (ibid: 86). 
This logic of unequal exchange still characterises the relationship between third 
world states and their former imperial powers today. The continued dependence of 
postcolonial states on the political and financial patronage of the metropolitan centre 
necessitates the constitutional mimicry by these states that facilitates the 
reproduction of the aforementioned norms (Badie, 2000: 24 - 27; 77 - 780). This is 
mediated through the financial flows from the north to the south - either in the form 
of private capital investment (foreign direct investment (FDý or technology 
transfer), publicly guaranteed debt (bond issues, development financing loans) or 
concessional. resource transfers (bilateral or multilateral aid or debt reheý - which 
remain contingent upon the adoption of reforms contractually obliged by such 
transfers. 
Thus, the fact of juridical sovereignty is incommensurate with the act of self- 
determination which in itself remains a normative value for many third world states, 
divested of economic resources and dispossessed of political and territorial authority, 
in the postcolonial era. This leads to the paradoxical legitimating of interventions 
aimed at redressing this 'sovereignty gap', a justification that is also increasingly 
advanced in the discourse accompanying the PRSP-led 'new architecture of aid'. The 
circumscribed nature of third world sovereignty, along with the uneven integration of 
states into the postcolonial international economy, has resulted in creation of a 
discourse of 'quasi states' or 'negative sovereignty' (see Jackson, 1990; Williams, 
2000) to describe the condition of postcolonial statehood, including that of many 
PRSP states, in accordance with the binary representations of difference discussed 
above. 
Here, states which depart from the norms of statehood are considered to have 'failed 
to fulfil the purposes of state sovereignty' (Williams, 2000: 567) by failing 'to meet 
the basic prereqwsites of a sovereign government' (Ghani, Lockhart and Carnahan, 
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2005: 4), thereby necessitating the imposition of 'state-building' exercises from the 
exterior to close the gap between their dejure and defacto sovereignty (ibid). Badie 
argues that this paradox of sovereignty is encouraged by the metropolitan states 
'because they readily benefit from it' (Badie, 2000: 79). The maintenance of the 'non- 
West' in the condition of Jackson's 'negative sovereignty' worsens both 'the effects 
of distance between the center and the periphery within the international system' as 
well as the relationships of dependence between the core and peripheral states by 
weakening the authority of the state 'thereby increasing their propensity to seek the 
status of client to the states in the center' (ibid: 80). The need to maintain this 
juridical fiction of statehood thereby legitimises interventions to negate the 
fragmentation of 'the decomposition of the internal functioning of peripheral 
societies' (ibid), either as a result of failure of resources or political cohesion. 
The rehabilitation of states under the PRSP framework, organised around 
dependence on external resources, resonates with the logic of asymmetrical 
sovereignty and the embedded paternalism of 'international cooperation' therein. The 
conceptual premise and operational framework of the PRSP approach therefore 
reflect a continuity with the legacy of international law as forged in the colonial 
confrontation and represent the most recent example of how Anghie's 'dynamic of 
difference', as manifested contemporarily in Tarullo's 'myth of normalcy', continue 
to serve as mechanisms for revising third world engagement with international law. 
2.2. Institutions of Postcolonial Governance: 
The Bretton Woods System 
The binary constructions of 'order ' and 'disorder' and 'positive'/'negative' 
sovereignty in international law necessitated, as discussed above, the establishment of 
institutional structures to support the management of third world states' entry into 
and participation in the international legal order, including the maintenance of the 
aforementioned systems of representation. The birth of the Bretton Woods 
institutions must therefore be located in the context of this 'unique relationship 
between international institutions and the non-European world' (Anghie, 2002: 625), 
requiring the development of technologies aimed at 'developing, refining, reinforcing, 
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reproducing and managing this model of statehood and sovereignty' (Anghie, 2000: 
289). 
Consequently, it follows that the efficacy of the PRSP framework *in managing the 
participation of postcolonial states in the global economy is centred upon the 
historical influence of the World Bank and the IMF on these states. The evolutionary 
(but not necessarily linear) progression of modalities of development financing 
towards the PRSP approach must therefore be situated within the postcolornial 
political economy of aid and the centrality of the BWIs to this system of resource 
mobilisation and transfer. 
Since their inception in 1947, the World Bank and the IMF have served as pivotal 
institutions mediating postcolonial states' engagement with the *international 
economy and with the international legal mechanisms sustaining such engagement. 
Both the Bank and the Fund have, particularly in the last three decades, served as 
powerful intermediaries between postcolonial states and their imperial metropolis". 
Due to their formidable institutional leverage, the BWIs have, crucially, acted as 
conduits for the transmission of the aforementioned narratives of normalcy, seeking 
to contain and manage the difference located between the oppositional 
representations of the two worlds and at the same time, providing the organisational 
framework through which these narratives may be transformed into operational 
norms and institutions. 
Legacies of the Colonial Encounter 
The force of the World Bank and the IMF resides in their unique governance 
structure which remains fundamentally different and separate from that of the 
United Nations and other UN specialised agencies, even though the institutions are 
formally incorporated as 'specialised agencies' under the Charter of the United 
Nations 12 . Reflecting the geo-strategic and economic 
imperatives of the immediate 
11 While not explicit at the outset, this role has expanded over time (see discussion below). Since the 
collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the BWIs have also assumed the key responsibility 
for mediating 
the rehabilitation of ex-Communist bloc countries, notably in eastern Europe, into the neoliberal 
economic order as well. 
12 Mficle 57 of the UN Charter 1945 provides that inter-governmental orgaruisations, having 
responsibilities in 'economic, social, cultural, education, heath and related areas' may be brought into a 
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postwar period, the current governance structure of the Bank and the Fund continue 
to operate on an anachronistic decision-making framework favouring the powerful 
former imperial powers and marginalising the economically weak and politically 
peripheral postcolonial states. While both institutions justify their autonomy from the 
UN system on the grounds that each of them is 'required to function as, an 
independent organization'13 , neither of these institutions are truly 'independent' nor 
'international' in character. 
Although there is a limited equalising provision 111 the decision-making structures of 
the World Bank and the IMF in which each member state is allocated a basic share of 
votes, the voting power of each member is contingent primarily upon how much 
weight the country's economy carries in the world economy (Buira, 2005; Woods, 
2006: 22 - 24) 14 . This relative economic weight is then reflected in assigned quotas 
for each member which is then translated into 'a share of contributions and votes 
(and in the IMF, access to resources) 5,15 , resulting 
in the US possessing the largest 
share of votes (and effective veto power), followed by four other G7 countries, 
Japan, Germany, France and the UK (Woods, 2006: 22)" 
relationship with the UN under Article 63 of the Charter. Article 63 authorises the Economic and 
Social Council (ECOSOC) to enter into agreements with these agencies and coordinate the activities 
of these agencies in consultation with the General Assembly and UN members. The Agreement 
between the UN and the IMF and the Agreement between the UN and the IBRD 1947 
(hereinafter known as the 'Relationship Agreements'). Agreements between the UN and other 
members of the World Bank Group, such as the IFC in 1956 and the IDA in 1961, are governed 
by 
similar provisions to that of the UN-IBRD agreement. 
13 Articles 1(2) of the Agreement between the United Nations and the International Bank 
for 
Reconstruction and Development 1947 and the Agreement between the United Nations and 
the International Monetary Fund 1947. 
14 See Article V, Section 3(a) of the IBRD Articles of Agreement and Article XXII, Section 5(a) 
of the IMF Articles of Agreement. The IDA has a slightly different voting structure 
in which 
members are accorded 500 membership votes plus an additional vote 
for every US$5,000 of their 
initial subscription (Article Vi, Section 3(a) IDA Articles of Agreement). 
This was reviewed during the 
Third Replenishment negotiations and voting rights now take into account the cumulative 
financial 
contributions of IDA creditor (known as Part 1) countries although the 
basic votes of borrower (or 
Part II) countries are maintained through a increase in subscriptions at a nominal rate 
JDA, 2001 a: 
para 11; Shihata, 2000a: 585 - 589; also see discussion below). 
15 In the IMF, each member receives, in addition to the 250 basic votes, one vote 
for every 
US$100,000 (or subsequently for every SDR 100,000) of quota while in the 
Bank, each member 
receives an additional vote for each share of stock (valued at 
US$120,635 per share) held by the 
country on top of the 250 basic votes (Woods, 2006: 
22 - 24; see also Buira, 2005: 9). 
1611e US currently holds 17.08 percent of the total voting power in the Fund and 
16.39 percent in the 
Bank - followed by Japan (6.13/7.86), 
Germany (5.99/4-49), France (4.95/4.3) and the UK (4.95/4.3) 
JMF, 2006a; IBRD, 2006a). G7 countries collectively hold around 45 percent of the total votesin 
both institutions and the combined share of the European Union countries stand as 
high as 32 
percent while African countries as a whole only wield slightly 
less than siX percent of the overall total 
(Buira, 2005: 10, Table 1; Van Houtven, 2004: 19). 
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The controlling influence of these countries at the BWIs is reinforced by the 
representation structure of the Bank and Fund Executive Boards, the main decision- 
making organ of the BWIs", in which only the largest five countries (plus China, 
Russia and Saudi Arabia), are represented individual1y by a single Executive Director 
(ED) appointed by their countries. Other members are grouped into 16 
constituencies reflecting the relative strength of their members and elect an 
Executive Director between them. Consequently, the countries most subject to Bank 
and Fund interventions, including, especially, the low-income countries subject to the 
PRSP framework, have the least voice. Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries, 
representing 25 percent of the membership and making up the majority of PRSP 
countries are particularly matginalised. Forty-four SSA countries are represented by 
only two Executive Directors and wield a mere total of 4.4 percent of the total voting 
power in the IMF and slightly under two percent at the Bank JMF, 2006b; IBRD, 
2006b; Rustornjee, 2005: 23 -24). 
The disenfranchisement of developing countries at the BWIs is further magnified by 
the asymmetrical manner M which countries are represented by the Executive 
Directors. Employed as officials of the Bank and the Fund and funded by the two 
institutions, Executive Directors are theoretically responsible to their institutions and 
not to individual member states and are not obliged 'to defer to the view of his or 
her member states nor cast votes in accordance with their instructions" (Brown, 
1992: 105 - 107; Shihata, 2000a: 653 - 656). In practice, the system favours single- 
country constituencies where Executive Directors are appointed by countries they 
represent and are almost likely to take instructions from their capitals19. Executive 
17 Constitutionally, the highest decision-making bodies at the Bank and the Fund are the respective 
Boards of Governors, comprised of the finance ministers, central bank governors or other high- 
ranking government official of all member states. However, the governors may (and have) delegate the 
exercise of their powers to the respective Executive Boards, except those powers reserved exclusively 
for the Board of Governors (Article V, Section 2(b) IBRD Articles of Agreement; Article VI, Section 
2(b) IDA Articles of Agreement; and Article XII, Section 2(b) IMF Articles of Agreement). Two 
committees of governors have also been created in each institution, the Development Comn-uttee for 
the Bank and the International Monetary and Financial Committee JMFC) (previously the Interim 
Committee) for the Fund with a similar composition to that of the respective Executive Boards to 
provide greater political oversight of the institutions. 
18 According to Brown, the Bank's (and by extension, the Fund's) Articles of Agreement can be 
interpreted as providing that 'it is the members who have the voting power but it is the Governors 
and/or the EDs who are actually entitled to cast the votes of those members' (Brown, 1992: 107). 
19 The United States ED's office in particular acts almost like an arm of the US government With US 
federal law entitling such executive directors to all benefits accruing to US civil servants ((ibid: 108) 
and the US Treasury oversees and vets all decisions undertaken by the US Executive Director. US 
Executive Directors at multilateral development banks (MDBs) are also bound by a number of 
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Directors elected in group constituencies on the other hand are not able to split the 
votes in his or her constituency to reflect the differing views of member states (ibid: 
656). This particularly marginalises developing countries in mixed constituencies 
where the Executive Director is ahnost likely to be from an industrialised member 
country. 
Moreover, in spite of this complicated voting structure, decisions at the Bank and the 
Fund do not involve a formal tally of votes. Instead, they are made through an 
ascertainment of 'the sense of the [Board] meeting' by the Bank president or the 
IMF's managing director as chairs of the respective Executive Boards, although this 
tsense) must be a position that 'is supported by Executive Directors having sufficient 
votes' (Van Houtven, 2002: 23; see also Shihata, 2000a). Consequently, both the chair 
of the Board and sufficiently influential Executive Directors can - and frequently do 
- have significant impact on the decisions taken at the Executive Board (see Van 
Houtven, 2002: 24), more so when BWI convention dictates that the Bank President 
is appointed by the US and the IMF Managing Director by the European members, 
once again reflecting anachronistic postwar alliances. 
The porousness of the Bank and Fund's governance structure to political pressure is 
reflected in the policy shifts of the institutions over the years, including the decision 
to implement the PRSP framework2o. As will be discussed in Chapter Three, the 
impetus for the PRSP initiative came not from the south but from a constellation of 
political and economic forces in the north and the decision to operationalise the 
framework was adopted in spite of opposition by representatives of the low-income 
countries affected on the Bank and Fund Executive Boards (see section 3.3). 
2.2.2. Aggravating Asymmetry 
Congressional legislation to vote in accordance to the relevant legislative provisions in pursuit of US 
political and economic interests. For example in opposing financing by the MDBs 'if it will establish 
or expand production for export of certain agricultural commodities ... and thereby cause injury to 
US producers of the same or competing products' (Brown, 1992: 204 - 205). 
20 The PRSP initiative may also be viewed as part of a larger UK government-dri'ven - or more 
specifically, UK Treasury-driven - campaign on Africa, particularly in relation to debt relief and aid, 
operationalised at the Bank and the Fund largely as a result of the UK Chancellor Gordon Brown's 
chairmanship of the International Monetary and Financial Comnuttee JMFC), the political oversight 
committee of the Fund. Meanwhile, the Bush administration's policy stamp at the World Bank is 
clearly marked by recently appointed president Paul Wolfowitz's push for governance and anti- 
corruption measures to be instituted as part of the operational policy of the World Bank Group. 
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Over the six decades since their inception, the governance asyrnmetry at the World 
Bank and the IMF has been exacerbated through a series of manoeuvres by the 
powerful states to strengthen their influence at the BWIs and to block institutional 
reforms called for by developing country members. These interventions have also 
resulted in the defacto cartelisation of development financing by the Bank and the 
Fund as financier countries chose to channel multilateral financing through the 
institutions over which they have greater leverage. 
Firstly, the limited voice and vote of developing country members have been further 
eroded through unbalanced quota reviews over the years. Quota increases at the 
Bank and Fund have not reflected the increasing economic strength of developing 
countries, particularly emerging market economies, in the world economy - 
exacerbating comparative voting anomalies so that, for example, Brazil's quota is 
two-thirds that of Belgium and China's quota is smaller than Italy's (Van Houtven, 
2004: 19). Quota reviews have also failed to revise the number of basic votes., 
resulting in the decline of basic votes relative to total votes from 11.3 percent in the 
1970s to 2.1 percent today 21 (Buira, 2005: 9; Van Houtven, 2004: 19; 2002: 6). 
Secondly, and more importantly for the purposes of this thesis, is the creeping 
bilateralism at the BWIs which has undermined the initial objectives of 
multilateralism, however circumscribed. Central to this development has been the 
introduction of donor-driven concessional windows at the Bank and the Fund, 
primarily the IDA and the ESAF, now the PRGF, the operations of which centre 
around the PRSP framework. Although the original financing structure of the BWIs 
- notably through market-based lending at the Bank22and capital subscriptions at the 
21 Current efforts to increase the 'voice and vote' of developing country members at the IMF will 
contribute little to reforming this system of representation based on economic strength. The reforms 
have only seen immediate aý-hoc quota increases for four major middle-income countries - China, 
Mexico, South Korea and Turkey - With further quota increases proposed for a yet unnamed number 
of countries pending a review of the existing quota formula and an increase in the basic votes to 
maintain the current voting power of low-income member states in light of these increases (see IMF, 
2006d). These proposals have been criticised by a number of developing countries - notably 
Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, and India who voted against the proposalm a recent resolution - for failing 
to guarantee the enlargement of voting share of developing countries as a whole and for failing to 
guarantee such comprehensive reform (see Khor, 2006). 
22 Founded by the paid-in capital subscriptions of its members, the IBRID raises financial resources 
from investments on the international capital markets, drawing upon the callable capital of its 
members (representing 90 percent of capital subscriptions) as guarantees, as well as through retained 
earnings and loan repayments while the IMF relies on the capital subscriptions of its members and the 
General Arrangements to Borrow (GAB) and the New Arrangements to Borrow (NAB) which 
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Fund - tendered them relatively immune from political pressures (Woods, 2006: 23), 
the establishment of these concessional windows have drastically eroded this 
financial autonomy. The periodic replenishment requirements of these concessional 
facilities have enabled the major shareholding countries of the Bank and Fund to 
exert leverage over the policies of the Bank and the Fund outside the formally 
constituted decision-making framework and enabling the bilateral interests of these 
financiers to be cloaked in the veneer of multilateral policyrnaking. 
The creation of the IDA with its short three-year replenishment cycle, in particular, 
has enabled the US to significantly influence not only the policies of the Association 
but also those of the World Bank Group as a whole J-' Capur, 2003: 7; Shihata, 2000a: 
564; Woods, 2006: 28 - 29). Substantial expansion of the Bank's mandate has come 
about as a result of IDA replenishment negotiations carried out by the 'IDA 
Deputies', representatives of creditor (or Part 1) countries involved 'in replenishment 
discussions, bypassing formal channels of decision-making and thereby excluding 
representatives of developing countries 23 . The US has repeatedly 'used threats to 
reduce or withhold contributions to the IDA in order to demand changes in policy' 
at the World Bank (Woods, 2006: 28), a policy which has now been imitated by other 
IDA creditor governments, albeit to a lesser degree. Such operational policy reform 
impact upon the relationship between the World Bank and its borrowers and are 
often reflected in more onerous conditions for financing. 
Bilateral influence at the World Bank has also further increased as a consequence of 
the Bank's use of co-financing instruments and trust funds which are managed and 
administered by the Bank in collaboration with an external donor 24 as well as the 
creation of debt relief trusts, notably the HIPC and the new MDRI Trusts. The 
introduction of the ESAF, now the PRGF, and the equivalent debt relief trust funds 
- the PRGF-HIPC and PRGF-MDRI Trusts- at the IMF also create a 
enables the Fund to borrow from select members to finance drawings from other members (see 
Woods, 2006: 24; 3 1). 
23 The extent to which the IDA Deputies now control policymaking at the Bank has been crificised by 
its former Bank general counsel, the late Ibrahim Shihata. He argued that attaching policy conditions 
to IDA replenishments circumvents official governance arrangements by allowing policy decisions to 
be 'practically predetermined by IDA Deputies' - who 'are not an organ of the IDA in any formal 
sense' - instead of being freely considered by Executive Directors who are duly appointed or elected 
by members (Shihata, 2000a: 567 - 568). 
24 These co-financing arrangements and trust funds, which include the Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Trust Fund (PRSTF) that funds PRSP-related activities, give donors 'much more direct control over 
the resources used' (Woods, 2006: 29) and undermines cohesive policyrnaking at the Bank. 
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corresponding problem of bilateralism at the Fund in that resources for such funds 
must be mobilised elsewhere but that conditions attached to financing from these 
trusts are implemented by the IMF m IMF member stateS21 
Consequently and thirdly, the leverage exerted bilaterally by their most powerful 
members has resulted in extending the influence of the Bretton Woods institutions 
into areas outside their original constitutional remit. Significant institutional reforms 
have been formulated during the IDA replenishments as a result of donors making 
such changes a prerequisite for IDA contributions. Most notably, since the Ninth 
Replenishment, issues of institutional policy, including Bank operational policies and 
management of Bank activities have 'become a fundamental element' in the IDA 
replenishment negotiations 26 (IDA, 2001a: para 13; Kapur, 2003: 2- 3), 'including 
policies which led to the inception of the PRSP framework. This 'Mission creep )27 has 
correspondingly increased the institutions' leverage over third world states and has 
progressively bolstered the role of the IMF and the World Bank in facilitating north- 
south financial flows, notably but exclusively, that of official financial transfers. 
Moreover, as financing for PRSP countries is drawn exclusively from the IDA, the 
PRGF and the relevant debt relief trusts, much of the operational decisions affecting 
these countries are likely to be made in these bilateral forums with little or no input 
from the countries affected by such policy shifts. Instead, the structure of the Bank's 
MDRI Trust which remains premised on the IDA replenishment model - that is, the 
debt relief allocated to eligible countries is contingent upon periodic donor 
contributions JDA, 2006: para 42) 28 - ensures that the terms of financing for debt 
25 For example, the locus of the HIPC initiative and the MDRI was at the G7 summits of 1999 and 
2005 but the modalities for these instruments were developed at the Fund (see Chapter Three). 
26 This includes the incorporation of environmental safeguards in IDA (and subsequently IBRD, IFC 
and MIGA) operations (Ninth and Tenth Replenishments) as well as the inclusion of governance- 
related conditionalities (GRCs) which were pushed through by donors during the 12th IDA 
replenishment in 1998 JDA, 2001a: paras 14 - 17; Kapur and Webb, 2000: 3). 
27 The concept of 'Mission creep' is often used to describe the progression of the World Bank and 
IMT activities over the years. Babb and Buira define 'Mission creep' as 'the systematic shifting of 
organizational activities away from original mandates' (Babb and Buira, 2004: 2) 
28 According to IDA, 'additional resources for financing the costs under the MDRI will be added to 
IDA's resources broadly following the established procedures for regular IDA replenishments. 
Donors will contribute the additional resources under Instruments of Commitments, which will be 
amended over time to reflect updated cost estimates as well as additional donor financing 
commitments as these become available' JDA, 2006: para 42). The crucial factor here is that the 
resources allocated for cancelling an eligible country's debt service for any given year will be deducted 
from the country's total allocated IDA allocation for the year and any additional donor resources will 
be allocated to countries according to their performance under the IDA performance-based allocation 
43 
Chapter Two 
relief-eligible countries will remain contingent upon negotiations between the IDA 
Deputies as opposed to discussions at the Executive Board level. 
2.2.3. Monopolising the Forum 
The decision to retain the organisational independence of the Bretton Woods 
institutions from the UN systeM29 and the maintenance of the aforementioned 
governance structure favouring a small cartel of industrialised countries has had 
significant implications for global economic policyrnaking and international 
economic and financial regulation. The increasing encroachment of the Bank and 
Fund into areas outside their traditional remit has meant the emergence of the Bank 
and the Fund as the primary global institutions for social and economic development 
and regulation with the treatment of their additional mandates subject to the political 
and economic interests of their major shareholders. 
At the same time, the influence of the UN economic agencies have been 
progressively weakened, with these organisations' capacity in economic research, 
policy formulation and international economic negotiations eroded through financial 
and other pressures brought to bear on these agencies and their personnel by 
industrialised countries (South Centre, 1996). The coinciding of the expansion of the 
BWIs' work programmes with the reduction in the UN's role in economic policy 
agenda setting represented a slow but sure 'transfer of power' from the UN agencies 
to the World Bank and the IMF (ibid: ch 8) who are shielded from the UN's 
relatively more representative governance structure by Virtue of their specific 
I 
Relationship Agreements (see section 2.2.1 above). 
According to the South Centre", the policy positions adopted by northern countries 
vis-ý-vis these agencies have been driven by more than budgetary concerns and 
represented 'consistent efforts to discourage and diminish the South's coUective 
(PBA) system (ibid: para 31; see also Chapter Four; for further details on the 
PBA system), making 
future financing contingent upon the implementation of 'performance cnteria' set by the 
IDA, 
primarily through the IDA replenishment negotiations. 
29 And hence from the more rigorous scrutiny of the more representative UN General Assembly. 
30 The South Centre is an inter-governmental. organisation established by developing countries 
following on from the work of the South Commission, to mobilise expertise, policy support and 
collective action for southern states at the international 
level. See South Centre website: 
http: Z Z-, vww. southcentre. org/ASouthIGO. h (1 March 2007). 
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action, and to limit key econonuc activities and initiatives within the UN system', 
thereby 'eroding and weakening those organizations which were notfully, under the 
maj*or powers' control (ibid: ch 2, emphasis added). As a result, the UN agencies, 
including other specialised agencies, which have comparative advantage over 
economic research and social and development policies and in poverty reduction and 
humanitarian relief, such as the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Health Organisation 
(WHO), have been increasingly sidelined in the shift of these issues to the Bank and 
the Fund. 
More importantly, there has been a concerted effort on the part of northern states to 
undermine the regulatory powers of the UN, particularly in extinguishing efforts to 
develop regimes for transnational economic regulation within the ambit of the UN 
system. The stalled attempts at mobilising a New International Economic Order 
(NIEO) " in the late 1970s and early 1980s and the collapse of the international 
commodity agreements - coordinated under the auspices of UNCTAD - in the 
1980s are illustrative of efforts by the industrialised countries to reassert hegemony 
over postcolonial states by shifting the regulatory forum for negotiations on 
international economic issues. 
This progressive undermining of more democratic and inclusive regulatory forums 
cognisant of the needs and interests of postcolonial states, particularly in the last 20 
years, and the corresponding rise of the Bank and Fund as institutions of governance, 
as opposed to merely financial institutions, is reflective of the significant 'forum 
shift ý32 of the northern states towards regulatory regimes favourable to the interests 
of not only metropolitan capital but global capitalism in itself. The centrality of the 
BWIs under the 'new architecture of aid' - in terms of administering the PRSP 
framework and debt relief mechanisms as well as providing concessional finance - 
has further marginalised the role of the UN economic agencies, notably UNCTAD 
31 The NIEO or 'New International Economic Order' represented a concerted effort by the newly- 
independent states to assert their rights for a more equitable and redistributive global economy which 
dispenses with the pre-existing framework of colonial extraction and exploitation of the developing 
world. See discussion in Chapter Three, section 3.2.1. 
32 See Chapter One, section 1.3 for a description of 'forum shifting'. 
45 
Chapter Two 
and the UNDP, from key toles in the social and economic organisation of these 
countries. 
2.3. Managing the Third World: The Bank and Fund in 
Postcolonial Governance 
The asymmetrical governance framework of the World Bank and the IMF5 
replicating colonial power relations and privileging the industrialised countries of the 
north, has resulted in the creation of a formidable apparatus of governance and 
management of the third world. The role played by the World Bank and the IMF in 
sustaining the imperial character of postcolonial international law has been twofold. 
Firstly, the institutions have intervened to rehabilitate, internally, the postcolonial 
state in the process of bridging or normalising the 'difference' among states and 
thereby sustaining the logic of 'normalcy' in international relations. Secondly, the 
BWIs have served to manage the third world's engagement in the international order 
through organising the terms of their participation in the global economy and 
administrating their economic relationships with the north, both official and 
commercial. Not only have the Bank and Fund established themselves as repositories 
of knowledge about the third world, with increased regulatory powers, these two 
institutions have effectively marshalled this knowledge into controlling the 
participation of developing countries In the international system. 
2.3.1. Bridging the Dynamic of Difference 
One of the key mandates of the World Bank and the IMF in developing countries in 
the postcolonial period, as alluded to at various stages of this thesis, has been the 
containment of 'difference' between states and the modernising imperatives to efface 
structures of socio-political. and economic organisation -incommensurate with the 
logic of postcolonial economic relations and, in the past three decades, with the logic 
of neoliberal globalization. The transformation of these societies and the erasure of 
different systems of social and economic organisation were critical to the sustenance 
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of the postcolorlial international relationships In Purswt of neocolonial econormc 
expansion. 
As discussed in section 2.1, the problematisation of poverty in the postcolonial 
period created new regimes of representation in which racialised constructions of 
identities of 'Self' and 'Other' forged in the colonial confrontation have been recast 
in the modernist discourse of development. These powerU regimes of 
representation, defined by Doty as 'the ways in which the South has been discursively 
represented by policyrnakers, scholars, journalists and others in the North' Poty, 
1996: 2), are central to the development of techniques of discipline and incorporation 
in the postcolonial. period. 
This 'body of theory and practice' - Said's 'Orientalism' - sustained through 
generations of 'considerable material investment' and systemised into 'an accepted 
grid for filtering though the Orient into Western consciousness' (Said, 2003: 6) has 
been effectively deployed in the postcolonial era to maintain exploitative 
relationships between the north and south. The problematisation of 'poverty' and 
'underdevelopment' in postcolonial states therefore necessitated the production of a 
'science' of 'developmentalism' which inserts 'into a regime of thought and practice' 
about the third world 'certain interventions for the eradication of poverty [that] 
became central to the world order' (Escobar, 1995: 21 - 24). 
The BWIs have been instrumental in developing this 'science' of development and in 
sustaining such practices of representation through the organisation and 
dissemination of particularised and essentialised knowledge and meanings about the 
developing world and about the structure of the global economy. Over the years, the 
Bank and the Fund have progressively reserved for themselves the task of gathering, 
disseminating and most importantly, gatekeeping, the information about and for 
developing countries. This includes naturalising knowledge about certain types of 
socio-economic development and political organisation, and classifying countries) 
involvement in the international arena in accordance to the adherence to such 
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naturalised understandings of the domestic and international economy and the -role 
of developing countries within it". 
And while the organisation of such knowledge was primarily linked with the 
disbursement of financial resources by the institutions themselves in their early 
period, the emergence of the BWIs as 'development agencies' since the 1970s have 
extended the discursive reach of the Bank and Fund's narratives on development and 
financial and economic organisation. In other words) where previously the generation 
of financial and economic knowledge about their borrowers have been confined to 
what is necessary for institutional fiduciary assessments of project loans (for the 
Bank) and for access to counter-cyclical financing (for the Fund)", the expanded 
mandates of the two institutions have resulted in a wider and much more influential 
role for the production of such information and generated an expansion in the 
coverage of the information gathered and disseminated. 
Ban. Zdng on Knowledge 
The Bank's role in knowledge production and dissemination is particularly extensive 
as it is intensive, encompassing a wide range of research work, analytic and advisory 
services and capacity building programmes. This knowledge dissemination role is 
critical to developing the Bank's reputation as a development agency, more so than 
its financing operations. The ideas generated by the Bank in this capacity, along With 
information emanating from the Fund, are extremely influential M shaping the 
development trajectories of its borrowing members as they are often 'vital in 
providing roadmaps for pohcymakers contemplating change' (Woods, 2006: 4) as 
well as providing key signalling to other official financiers and private markets". 
33 According to Doty, the rhetorical strategies of 'naturalisation' and 'classification' are central to the 
disciplinary power of discursive practice - where 'naturahsation' serves to construct a presupposed 
reality, creating 'background knowledge that is taken to be true', the strategy of 'classification' 
establishes hierarchies of belonging in accordance to observance With such naturalised conduct, often 
serving 'to naturalize by placing human beings into the categories in which they 'naturally' belong' 
Poty, 1996: 10). 
34 For more on the expansion of the Bank and Fund's original mandate, see Chapter Four and detailed 
accounts in Aky-dz (2004) and Tan (2006a). 
35 A Bretton Woods Project report, for example, cites a World Bank 1999 report highlighting the 
widespread reach of the Bank's analytic work: 84 percent of 271 high-level pohcymakers in 36 
developing countries and transition economies surveyed said they used the Bank's analytical reports 
and rated the Bank as 'the most iMportantInformation source of a Est of domestic and international 
organisations' (Wilks, 2004: 1). According to the Bank itself, the institution delivered 694 economic 
and sector work (ESV/) 'products' and 351 technical assistance 'products' in 2005 (World Bank, 
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The unparalleled access of the Bank to 'rare, privileged and sensitive cache of 
country level information' on its diverse areas of work (Guttal, 2004: 200) not only 
lends legitimacy to its narratives but also gives it an enormous advantage over 
alternative discourses. Diagnostic economic and sector work (ES)N) instruments , 
work in powerful ways to contain the aforementioned dynamic of difference by 
establishing the threshold of the 'norm' and by reviewing the extent of countries' 
departure from such 'norms' in order that such 'aberrations' may be confronted and 
redressed. These analytical tools, constituting wide-ranging assessments and reviews 
of a country's economic, financial and governance systenIS36, not only generate an 
enormous amount of data on the Bank's borrowing members,, they also evaluate 
countries' social, political and economic systems in accordance with the criteria 
established by the Bank and the geo-strategic and economic interests which underpin 
these criteria3l. 
This process of reproducing the discursive dichotomies of difference is reinforced by 
the Bank's technical assistance and capacity building work to promote the 
internalisation of the aforementioned norms of social and economic organisation. As 
Stone and Wright note: 'Part of the mission of the World Bank is to conduct 
research and produce new ideas to inform. policy, as well as to spread knowledge 
about best practices and persuade client countries and other stakeholders of the 
validity of such knowledge' (Stone and Wright, 2006: 9). 
PoKcing the Financial System 
2005p) and an external evaluation of the Bank's research noted that the institution's researchers and 
consultants produced over 4,000 reports and papers between 1998 and 2005 (Banerjee et al, 2006: 3). 
36 Such as poverty and social impact assessments (PSIAs), public expenditure reviews (PERs) and 
country financial accountability assessments (CFAAs). These instruments focus respectively on 
reviewing countries' poverty policies, evaluating public expenditure management, and review the 
regulatory framework of public and private sector financial management (World Bank, 2006). Other 
diagnostic instruments include institutional governance reviews which 'focus on the fiinctioning of key 
public institutions and bow to reform tbem'; financial sector assessment programme reports 'which assess 
priatepublicpolicies'; country environmental analyses 'which analyze financial systems and beo design appro 
countries' environmental problems and beo devise reýbonses` and country infrastructure framework 
reports 'which assess infrastructure and outline investment needs andpriorities' (World Bank, 2006, 
emphasis added). 
37 For example, the Bank's country procurement assessment reviews 'diagnose whether a country's 
procurement system and practices meet acceptable international standards of openness and accountabik_*' (World 
Bank, 2006). 
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Although the IMF's role in such knowledge production is much less extensive than 
the Bank's, the information generated by the Fund is much more mifluential. 
However limited in comparison, there remains significant competition for the ideas 
generated by the Bank's vast knowledge machinery from other multilateral 
development organisations, such as regional development banks and the UN 
development agencies, and from bilateral development agencies, think tanks and 
research institutions. There remains little counterweight to the specialised 
information collated and generated by the IMF, particularly in its capacity as 
supervisor of the international financial architecture. Furthermore, like the World 
Bank, the Fund is privy to highly sensitive and confidential financial information of 
its member states, particularly the developing country members which draw on its 
resources., and its analysis on the domestic policies of these members are often key 
determinants for these countries' access to official and private financing". 
Central to the discursive power of the IMF is its surveillance work under Article IV 
of its constitution" which gains the institution entry to key financial and policy 
records of member states and accords it with the power to translate the harvested 
data into the 'technical' knowledge upon which these countries ate represented In the 
world economy. Consequently, like the Bank, the Fund uses its privileged access to 
information about its members to construct representations about these countries 
and reproduce entrenched meanings about the structure of the world economy and 
the role of these countries within it. 
The organisation of such information by the Fund therefore rearticulates the 
dichotomies of 'civilisation' and 'primodialism. ' by classifying countries in accordance 
with their adherence to the strictures of the neoliberal postcolonial economy. The 
Fund's oversight responsibilities, and consequently the amount of data it generates 
and the meanings it reproduces, have expanded greatly in the last decade, 
encompassing not only issues under its original mandate of surveillance but also 
38 As will be discussed in following chapters, this gatekeeping role extends even to World Bank 
financing which are contingent upon a satisfactory macroeconomic assessment from the Fund. 
39 The Fund's annual bilateral surveillance of its members include assessments of countries' exchange 
rate, fiscal and monetary policies; financial sector issues, including reviews under the Financial Sector 
Assessment Programme (FSAP); risks and vulnerabilities arising from the countries' exposure to 
international capital flows; and domestic institutional and structural policies, including countries' 
adherence to 'internationally recognized standards and codes in areas Crudal to the effidentfunctioniq of a 
modern econom ' ýMF, 2006c, emphasis added). y 
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assessments of countries' compliance with other international regulatory norms. The 
institution's work on standards and codes - evaluating countries' compliance with 
international. regulatory standards4' - is particularly Mustrative of the contribution of 
the IMF's discursive role in maintaining the 'myth of normalcy' - premised on 
adherence to fundamental principles of capitalist regulation - in the international 
financial system. 
The Bank and Fund's near-monopoly of information on critical aspects of social and 
economic development and financial issues has led to a crowding out of alternative 
voices on many issues of critical import to its developing country members, 
particularly those from low-income countries for whom other sources of information 
remain either prohibitively expensive or linguistically inaccessible. As Guttal 
observes) these institutions, backed up by 'immense financial resources' create a 
'giant 'knowledge monopoly', edging out competition from alternative perspectives, 
analyses and ideas' (Guttal, 2004: 204). The 'epistemic' role of the Bretton Woods 
institutions is reinforced by their leverage as 'lenders of last resort', providing 
financing and technical advice in times of crisis (Woods, 2006: 68). 
This institutional foray into new areas of work has been driven by a combination of 
deference to the politically motivated demands of their major shareholders (see 
section 2.2.1 above) and by the BWIs' own bureaucratic imperative to maintain 
institutional relevance and legitimacy in the world economy. Therefore, while the 
impetus to reproduce the dichotomous images of modernity and primodialism may 
be largely driven by the geo-strategic and economic interests of their industrialised 
country members, a significant part of this effort may be attributed to the Bank and 
the Fund's organisational. instinct for survival (see Woods, 2006: 4-5; also Tan, 
2006a). 
The maintenance of the aforementioned embedded distinctions between states thus 
provides political and personal justification for the continued interventions of both 
institutions in developing countries. Accordingly, while the technical work 
40 The Fund conducts regular assessments of countries' compliance with any one of 12 areas and 
associated standards which it considers useful for its and the Bank's operational work, including areas 
such as banking supervision, fiscal transparency, insolvency and creditor rights, insurance supervision 
and even anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFI) (introduced in 
November 2002) ýMF, 2003b: 8, Box 1). 
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undertaken by the Bank and the Fund are used extensively in support of their policy 
interventions, these financial data sets and 'academic' prescriptions of social and 
economic development have often been found to be 'based neither on clear evidence 
nor on pure expert analysis or predictions' but instead reflect bureaucrats trying to 
square political pressures and institutional constraints (Woods, 2006: 4). 
Additionally, due to their conflicting interests as financiers and technical advisors to 
member states, much of the 'knowledge' generated by these two institutions has been 
produced to justify lending practices and changes in operational policies due to 
shifting political interests (see Guttal, 2004: 200; Woods, ibid). In a recently released 
external evaluation of the Bank's research from 1998 - 20053 for example, auditors 
slammed the Bank's use of its internally generated research 'to proselytize on behalf 
of Bank policy, often without taking a balanced view of the evidence, and without 
expressing appropriate skepticism' , adding that 'research that was favorable to Bank 
positions was given great prominence, and unfavorable research ignored' (Banerjee et 
al) 2006: 6). 
2.3.2. Managing the Terms of Engagement 
Having constructed the discursive regime within which postcolonial states need to 
operate, the BWIs have proceeded to act as interlocutors between these countries 
and the international community, particularly in respect to their insertion into the 
global economy and the public and private international law which sustains it. The 
management of postcolonial states' entry into and engagement in the international 
economic and financial system is a critical aspect of the work of the World Bank and 
the IMF, providing the institutional framework through which the disciplinary 
technologies sustaining the postcolonial international economy may be applied on 
states subject to their jurisdiction. As discussed above, the legitimacy for these 
interventions stem from the regimes of representation which naturalise certain ideas 
of progress, the lack of which in third world states requires the intercession of the 
'international' community as embodied by these two multilateral organisations. 
Given the institutions" juxtaposed mandates as financiers 'in and regulators of the 
global econorny, these institutions have provided the ideal institutional framework 
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for the management of such postcolonial economic structures and relationships. 
Firstly, the Bank and the Fund have supplied or facilitated access to the necessary 
financial resources - both catalytic and compensatory - for the internal 
reorganisation or rehabilitation of third world states to accommodate the project of 
development and consequently, the exigencies of neohberal globalization. Secondly, 
the institutions have served to manage the conditions of entry and participation of 
these states in the international economy, not only rationing their access to external 
economic resources but also organising the terms of such transfers to and from these 
econon-nes. 
a) Financing the Postcolonial Economy 
Implicit in the constitutional mandates of the World Bank and the IMF is 
acknowledgment of the inherent instability of the international economy and system 
of social, economic and political organisation into which the institutions were born. 
The failure of capital markets and the private sector to finance the provision of 
global public goods and to stimulate developing economies as well as the intrinsic 
fragility of financial markets prone to cycles of expansion and depression have long 
served as rationales of official multilateral lending (see Akyiiz, 2006) and the 
imperative to mitigate the effects of unfettered private capital markets was 
fundamental to the decision to establish the BWls in 1947. 
While originally aimed at regulating postwar econornic relations between 
industrialised countries to prevent recurrence of the economic depression and 
destructive adjustment policies during the interwar period 41 , the World Bank and the 
IMF quickly evolved into institutions aimed at managing the insertion of the former 
colonies of these industrialised countries into the international economy. The 
inability of the newly independent states to raise sufficient capital for the process of 
modernisation and incorporation into the international economy necessitated the 
facilitation of financing for these countries, but on terms that would subject them to 
the discipline of international capital markets and within the careffilly controlled 
41 This included the prevention of what is commonly known as the 'beggar-thy-neighbour' policies in 
which countries facing balance of payments problems unilaterally undertake deflationary adjustments 
in their fiscal policies and adopt trade and exchange rate restrictions which resulted in negative 
externalities affecting other countries (see Akydz, 2006), raising the propensity for military conflict as 
happened in the period preceding the Second World War. 
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parameters of BWI supervision. At the same time, the fragile dependence of these 
newly Mtegrated economies into the international financial architecture also required 
the existence of some form of safety net to cushion the effects of market volatility in 
these states and on private capital. 
Catalysing Gtowth 
The catalytic role of BWI financing has been realised through the provision of loans 
(and later, grants) by the IBRD and subsequently, the IDA and to a limited extent) 
the IMF through the PRGF, for capital investment in social and economic sectors, as 
well as through the facilitation of private capital flows. World Bank financing 
therefore plays a dual role in catalysing market-led growth in postcolonial states 
firstly by directly financing development and economic restructuring projects in 
developing countries and secondly, by creating a conducive environment for private 
investment through the conditions of its loans and grants. World Bank financing is 
also aimed at catalysing private capital flows by promoting market discipline among 
its borrowing members. 
The financing of specific projects for 'reconstruction and development' enables the 
Bank, on behalf of the US and other major shareholders, to channel financial 
resources into sectors of the economy which are conducive for the maintenance of 
the aforementioned demarcated world economy and to control the conditions under 
which third world states could organise their economies. Financing large-scale 
infrastructure and agricultural development projects, including extractive industries 
and cash crop production, alongside investment in transport and financial service 
sectors, have enabled the World Bank to assist countries in reorienting their 
economies towards export-oriented commodity production aimed at servicing 
northern-based transnational commodity chains at the expense of domestic 
industrialisation and food securitY42. Meanwhile, the shift from project lending to 
policy-based lending in the late 1970s and early 1980s enabled the Bank to finance 
extensive restructuring of third world economies to better facilitate their insertion 
42 The political economy of these projects and the adverse social and economic impacts of such 
projects have been well-documented (see for example, Chossudovsky, 1997; George and SabeUi, 1993; 
Sender, 2002). 
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and integration into the globalized world economy (see Chapter Three; also section 
(b) below). 
The regulation of borrowing country economies by Bank financing is further 
reinforced through the terms of such financing. For example, the prohibition against 
financing local expenditureS4' has, for many years, meant that borrowers could only 
use Bank resources forpurcbasin ggoods and serm*ces from abroad unless circumstances 
warrant such financing, preventing the endogenous development of local industries 
and maxitnising the utility of local capacity (see Hudson, 2003: 190 - 191; World 
Bank, 2004j: paras 18 - 22)4. 
Although this policy has now been relaxed - in terms of allowing greater latitude for 
financing local expenditures - the Bank remains prudent in authorising such 
financing, citing macroeconomic considerations, such as inflationary pressures (see 
World Bank, 2004j, ibid). Additionally, loan or grant resources from the Bank are not 
directly transferred to the borrower but only disbursed against authorised 
expenditures from a central disbursement account 'following a very rigid procedure 
under the strict supervision and control of the World Bank' (Agarwal, 2000: 7; Article 
II, IBRD General Conditions for Loans; Article 11, IDA General Conditions for 
Credits and Grants). 
Additionally, World Bank financing is viewed as stimulus for private capital flows 
through the fostering of financial discipline in respective borrowing countries and the 
accrual of investment ratings for individual countries through their continued debt 
servicing to the Bank. Hence, although the IBRD extends financing to countries 
which do not have the requisite financial standing to borrow from international 
capital markets", these loans are provided under market or near-market conditions. 
43 Unless justified under 'exceptional' (for IBRD lending) or 'special' (for IDA lending) circumstances, 
World Bank loans are denominated inforeign currencies to meet theforeiTn costs of the project financed 
(Article IV, Section 3 IBRD Articles of Agreement; Article V, Section 2 IDA Articles of Agreement). 
44 Hudson, and others like him, have argued that while such currency restrictions have had the positive 
effect of maintaining financial prudence in borrowing countries - that is, making countries commit 
substantial amounts of their own resources towards financing domestic expenditure for development 
projects - it has precluded the development of local industries since capital has to be imported from 
abroad, such as financing only aspects of agricultural technology that could be imported from more 
advanced nations (Hudson, 2003: 19 1). 
45 Article III, Section 4(ii) provides that IBRD loans or guarantees may be extended if '[t]he Bank is 
satisfied that in the prevailing market conditions the borrower would be unable otherwise to obtain the 
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While the IBRD Articles of Agreement state that loans should be provided to 
members on 'reasonable' terms (Article III, Section 4(ii)) with such terms 
remaining unspecified4, the Bank has consistently applied market-based interest rates 
to its loans 47 (World Bank, 2003a: paras 1; 4). Furthermore, as IBRD loans are to 
facilitate the 'investment of capital for productive purposes' only (Article I (i), 
IBRD Articles of Agreement), such loans must be 'capable of generating a financial 
surplus to amortize the loan and pay interest upon it in a definable time span' 
(Hudson, 2003: 191). 
Meanwhile, although the IDA was established to provide similar financing on 
concessional. terms to developing countries ineligible for IBRD lending, the IDA 
Articles of Agreement stipulate that such financing should not be extended if 
members can obtain similar resources from either the IBRD or 'from private sources 
on terms which are reasonable for the recipient' (Article V, Section 1(c)). 
Both the IBRD and IDA constitutions also stress the supplementary function of 
World Bank financing, that is, Bank financing should only be ancillary to or 
supportive of private capital flows and that such financing should be aimed 
ultimately at facilitating country access to private sources of financing (see Articles I 
(ii) ORD Articles of Agreement; Article V, Section 1(c) IDA Articles of 
Agreement; Shihata, 2000b: 75 - 76). The creation of the International Finance 
Corporation (1FC) in 1957 and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency 
(MIGA) in 1988 to provide loans JFC) and investment guarantees (MIGA) to the 
private sector in developing countries further cements this mandate of the World 
Bank Group. 
Compensating Losses 
loan under conditions which in the opinion of the Bank arc reasonable for the borrower' (IBRD 
Articles of Agreement, emphasis added). 
46 Except for the provision that the rates, charges and repayment schedule should be 'appropriate to 
the project' (Article III, Section 4(iv-) IBRD Articles of Agreement) 
47 Although repayment terms may vary with the per capita income of the borrower (World Bank, 
2003a: paras 1; 30 - 33). 
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In addition to their catalytic financing function, the Bank and the Fund also play an 
important role in moderating the excesses of the global capitalist system, primarily M 
financing the fallout from financial crises, in terms of cushioning the effects of such 
crises on affected member states but also, more importantly in recent years, in 
n-utigating the effects of such crises on northern private capital and the credibility of 
the globahzed financial architecture. 
By providing counter-cyclical financing - that is, providing resources during periods 
when private capital is unwilling or unable to extend finance - the Bank and the 
Fund operate to shore up the existing financial system by underwriting the risks 
associated with reliance on private markets. Such financing, available through 1MF 
drawings and the World Bank's policy-based lending, enables these institutions to 
compensate for financial difficulties faced by member states as a result of their 
integration into the global economy. However, while some proportion of the 
resources disbursed for such purposes may serve as social and economic safety nets 
in affected countries, the primary objective of such financing is to militate against any 
moves to radically change the fundamental premise of the postcolonial world 
economy or the international financial architecture. 
Crisis financing by the IMF - through its Stand-By Arrangements (SBAs), Extended 
Fund Facility (EFF) and the more recently created Supplemental Reserve Facility 
(SRF)" - enables members experiencing balance of payments 
difficulties, arising 
from what the Fund classifies either as 'short-term, temporary or cyclical' causes or 
'longer-term structural Problems' respectively (IMF, 2001b: 10), to draw on the 
IMF's collective pool of resources to meet its external financial obligations. 
Originally aimed at providing financing to support domestic economic activity and 
stimulate local productive capacities in times of global capital market failures, even 
this mandate of the Fund has evolved over the years to a more retrogressive function 
of maintaining countries' currency on debt repayments 
49 
. 
48 Established at the height of the Asian financial crises in 1997, the SRF in particular was designed 
specifically to deal with countries experiencing the type of crises resulting 
from current patterns of 
financial globalization, that is, those facing 'exceptional balance of payments difficulties due to large, 
short-term financing need following a sudden and disruptive 
loss of confidence reflected in pressure 
on the capital account and the member's foreign reserves' 
JMF, 2001b: 42). 
49 As Shihata observed, in relation to the financial crises of the 1980s, '[t] he inability of many middle- 
income countries to service their commercial bank debt posed a systemic threat to the banking 
systems of the major developed countries' and necessitated 
'a continuous flow of new money to 
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Accordingly, the IMF's interventions in financial crises now primarily involves 'ad 
hoc financial bailout operations designed to keep countries current on their debt 
repayments to private creditors, to maintain capital account convertibility and to 
prevent default' (Akyiiz, 2005: 27). Often, this also involves governments assuming 
the financial liabilities of the local private sector to foreign investors, converting 
private debt into public debt and ironically, undermining the true market discipline 
by encouraging imprudent lending by private investors and creating what economists 
term 'moral hazard' (Aky-i1z, 2005: 30). In other words, the IMF's 'overdraft facility' - 
replenishing government reserves through its own resources and facilitating bilateral 
lines of credit - 'constitutes a convenient 'social safety net' for the institutional 
speculator' (Chossudovsky, 1997b). 
Nfidgating financial crises and balance of payments difficulties associated with the 
volatile global economy through policy-based lending also enables the BWIs to recast 
the negative consequences of iniquitous international economic law and financial 
rules as domestic problems, caused by endemic internal institutional or policy failures 
which require 'structural adjustment' rather as systemic failures requiring a radical 
revision of the rules of global finance and international trade. Consequently, the 
provision of much needed financing during periods of crises by the Bank and the 
Fund obscures what Biel terms 'NIEO-style-demands to change the system itself 
and so reducing policy solutions to a question of adaptation of domestic institutions 
to the global system and providing 'pre-emptive' financing to compensate local 
political elites from the economic fallout of the crises and mitigating 'the poverty 
which encouraged revolution' against the system (Biel, 2000: 233). 
b) Managing Participation in the Postcolonial Economy and 
International Legal Order 
One of the most significant outcomes of the third world's reliance on financing from 
the Bretton Woods institutions and from BWI-Iinked resources, as will be alluded to 
throughout this thesis, has been the appropriation of domestic policy space by these 
two institutions-, including the circumscription of state regulatory authonty. A 
debtor countries in order to ensure that they remained current on their interest payments' (Shihata, 
2000b: 362). 
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corollary of such a requisition has been the curtailment and/or containment of states' 
autonomy in managing their external relations with other members of the 
international community. As discussed above, the discursive regime established by 
the World Bank and the IMF and the accompanying conditions of resource 
dependency create a powerful regulatory forum through which the major 
shareholders of the institutions - the northern, metropolitan states - can oversee the 
insertion of these economies into the international economy and hence, supervise 
their relationships With northern capital. 
These interventions have been facilitated by the consolidation of the use of 
'conditionahty' as a default regulatory instrument between the BWIs and their 
borrower, a development which has accorded the Bank and Fund and, by extension, 
their most powerful shareholders, greater autonomy over borrowing countries and 
which has progressively entrenched the BWIs as regulatory domains as opposed to 
functioning purely as financial institutions (see Chapter Four). 
Adjustment ConditionaKties 
The terms of structural adjustment lending - and to a large extent, the conditions of 
crisis financing - have enabled the World Bank and the IMF to facilitate the internal 
regulatory reforms necessary for states' integration With other international regulatory 
fora, notably in international trade and finance. The extensive restructuring of 
domestic institutions and regulatory policy through structural and sectoral adjustment 
conditionalities have resulted in the Bank and Fund's effective management of 
borrowing countries' external trade and financial policies. The impact of these 
reforms have been a collective undermining of developing countries' negotiating 
strength within the multilateral (and some bilateral) fora as a result of concessions 
undertaken unilaterally by these countries under the auspices of Bank and Fund 
adjustment programmes. 
Two important reforms wrought by structural/ sectoral adjustment and/or economic 
stabilisation programmes by the Bank and the Fund on developing countries in the 
past three decades have been the progressive liberalisation of the domestic trade and 
financial regimes to facilitate greater integration of countries into the global 
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economy. In particular, the drastic reduction and elimination of trade barriers and the 
removal of controls on capital flows in countries subject to economic reform 
programmes of the Bank and the Fund have meant that the pace and sequencing of 
these countries' entry into the international trading and financial system has been 
determined less by national economic geo-strategic needs than by the dictates of 
financing conditionalities and the imperatives of global capital. The BWIs thus 
mediate the engagement of their borrowing members' in the world economy through 
determining the conditions under which these countries can and should engage in 
cross-border movement of trade and financial capital. 
This development has had two major impacts on affected countries. Firstly, the 
rationalisation of trade and finance regimes under structural adjustment have created 
what Chimni has referred to as 'afunctional unifiedglobal economic ipace for the operation 
of transnational capital' through the 'prescription of uniform global standards' 
(Chimni, 2004: 6 -7; 9). In presiding over the economic restructuring of countries 
undergoing structural or sectoral adjustment programmes, the Bank and the Fund 
have been able to harmonise trade and financial rules across a large cross-section of 
the third world. For example, Stewart points out that the BWIs, notably the IMF 
through its lending conditionalities and technical assistance work, have been at the 
forefront of what she terms the 'mass production of tax reform' M developing 
countries, modelling fiscal policies after tax regimes in industrialised countries which 
favour private investors and the home countries of foreign capital (Stewart, 2003). 
Often, these reforms have paved the way for formalised entry into binding bilateral 
agreements, such as bilateral tax or investment treaties, or international or regional 
regulatory regimes, such as the WTO or the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA), or accession of 'soft' regulatory norms, such as the Basel Committee's 
standards of banking supervision. This has included, in some cases, specific 
conditionalities requiring countries to bring domestic legislation in conformity with 
international regulatory norms, such as estabhshing intellectual property rights, and 
implement financial codes and standards, such as central 
bank accounting 
procedures, without the countries involved necessarily having negotiated 
for itself 
within the said regulatory forum. 
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Secondly, by obliging countries to undertake unilateral liberahsation measures or, in 
some cases, privatisation reforms, Bank and Fund conditionalities have undermined 
these countries' negotiating positions in other regulatory fora and enabling, in many 
cases, for the unilateral concessions made under structural ad)ustment to be 'locked- 
in' by binding legal obligations in other forums' (Rowden, 2001; Tan) 2001). 
Developing countries which enter into talks with low applied tariffs or with many 
more sectors of their economies liberalised under structural adjustment lose their 
bargaining position as a result of such unilateral liberalisation 
Conditionalities requiring countries to reduce or eliminate applied tariff rates, for 
example, impact on these countries' ability to negotiate for higher bound tariff rates 
during trade bilateral or multilateral trade talks, such as at the WTO, as these 
countries would be hard-pressed by trading partners, usually the powerful 
industrialised countries which also represent the BWIs' major shareholders, to justify 
a higher bound tariff rate in view of existing tariff structures" (see Khor, 2005b). 
Additionally, countries which have unilaterally liberahsed their financial services 
sectors or privatised public service sectors 52 under structural adjustment may be 
pressured by the same trading partners in the WTO to bind such commitments 
under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). 
Coercion oflndebtedness 
The undermining of thýrd world capacity to negotiate in the international arena is 
compounded by the roles that the World Bank and the IMF play in gatekeeping 
financial resource flows to these countries, including in the management of sovereign 
debt. While not the largest providers of global development financing, the Bank and 
Fund exercise enormous influence over borrowing countries because of the 
50 And as shall be discussed in following chapters, despite some rhetoric to the contrary, these 
economic reforms have not changed with the advent of the PRSPs. 
51 Bound tariff rates are maximum rates which countries have contracted to be bound by under the 
WTO - countries may however choose not to apply tariffs up to the bound tariff rate and frequently 
do so, so that applied tariffs are usually lower than bound tariffs. However, many developing countries 
choose to bind their tariffs at a higher rate in order to provide for exigencies, such as responding With 
imposition of higher import duties to instances of import surges whereby the local market is flooded 
by imported products as a result of low or non-existent barriers, 
52 Services 'supplied un the exercise of governmental authority', including basic services such as water, 
health and sanitation, are exempt from being subject to GATS discipline under Article 1.3(c) of the 
Agreement but if a public service has been privatised, even partially, such a service is no longer 
exempted and therefore can be brought under the purview of GATS (Khor, 2005b: 18 - 19). 
61 
Chapter Two 
sequencing and significance of such financing. Aside from the fact that 'the timing of 
their loans gives them considerable leverage because they lend at times when 
governments have few alternative sources of finance' (Woods, 2006: 71), the signalliq 
function of these loans to other official donors and private creditors reinforces 
countries' dependency on the Bretton Woods institutions, particularly in times of 
financial crises and prolonged sovereign indebtedness. 
Over the years, and especially since the onset of the debt crises in Latin America and 
Africa in the 1980s, the Bank and Fund have emerged as important interlocutors 
between indebted third world states and their creditors /donors, defining the means 
and methods by which these countries engage with the international financial 
community. This function is both contributory to and resultant of the 'preferred 
creditor' status of the World Bank and the IMF which situates the two *institutions at 
the top of the pecking order when it comes to debt repayment from debtor countries 
(see ibid: 164). Furthermore, the vast technical arsenal of the two institutions and 
their privileged access to country data also place them, especially the IMF, at the 
helm of any coordinated financing effort, rendering financial flows contingent upon 
Bank and Fund accreditation, such as the commonly utilised IMF macroeconomic 
'stamp of approval"'. 
The IMF, in particular, is at the heart of managing third world debt, both in terms of 
facilitating financial 'rescue packages' for middle-income countries 'in cnises - 
mobilising resources from bilateral creditors and donors M addition to its own 
financing (see Aky-dz, 2005: 27) - as well as administrating debt relief and 
debt 
rescheduling negotiations for low-income countries. Not only does the Fund 
coordinate countries' relations with their creditors, it also establishes conditions for 
debt relief or terms for debt rescheduling. 
53 Due to the absence of any other agency with comparable capacity, INEU accreditation is used as the 
default assessment of a country's macroeconomic framework for almost all bilateral and multilateral 
donors and a number of private investors. According to a former UK government advisor, many 
bilateral donors are ill-equipped or reluctant to invest in resources to undertake their own 
macroeconomic assessments, preferring instead to rely on the IMF 
(interview, January 2006). 
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Most notable is the prominent role it plays at the Paris Club" negotiations, the first 
port of call for countries seeking to reschedule sovereign debt or seek debt relief. 
Not only are countries required to prepare a PRSP - coordinated and evaluated by 
the Bank and Fund - as well as implement an IMF-supported programme, either the 
PRGF or the new Policy Support Instrument (PS1)", as pre-requisites for Paris Club 
negotiations (Vilanova and Martin, 2001: 2), assessments of a country's 'debt 
sustainability' and hence, its eligibility under various debt rescheduling and debt relief 
schemes are determined by the IMF. Callaghy contends that 'debt sustainability' is 
often 'a highly ambiguous and manipulatable [and] political, notion', determined in 
many cases through consideration of political rather than economic or technical 
factors (Callaghy, 2003: 212 - 213). 
Additionally, the IMF also sits on, and often chairs, alongside the World Bank, the 
various country or regional Consultative Groups of donors and creditors which 
negotiate at the national level with country authorities on issues of debt and official 
development financing. This cooperative of donors and creditors form an 
intimidating pre-emptive bloc to indebted countries, often undermining their capacity 
to negotiate bilaterally with creditors on more favourable terms or seek to bargain 
collectively as a group or on multilateral terms. Paris Club negotiations are conducted 
on a country-by-country basis between the organisation of creditor country 
representatives and a delegation from the country seeking debt rescheduling, 
resulting in bilateral agreements between the creditor and debtor countries giving 
weight to the multilaterally agreed minutes of the negotiations (Callaghy., 2003: 202; 
Paris Club, 2006). 
54 The Paris Club was founded in 1956 as 'an informal group of creditor countries with no permanent 
members', established originally 'to provide debt relief to debtor countries With temporary liquidity 
problems, with the aim of preventing imminent defaults' (Vilanova and Martin, 2001: 1). Since the 
1980s, the organisation (which derives its name from its permanent secretariat based in Paris) has 
primarily fiinctioned as a debt rescheduling institution not only aimed at preventing further liquidity 
problems but also it alleviating debt burdens of heavily indebted countries. 'Ille Club functions to 
ensure 'unanimity' of rescheduling terms to debtor countries and 'equal burden sharing' among its 
creditor members (ibid). In other words, the Paris Club acts as a cartel for creditor countries to ensure 
that none loses out in rescheduling debtor country debt. 
55 The PSI is essentially a non-borrowing or non-financing Fund-monitored programme of reforms 
that a country enters into voluntarily With the institution. Compliance with policy conditions 
equivalent to upper tranche conditionalities by the country involved is necessary 
for a successful 
programme review or otherwise known as an IMF 'sign-off that the country is 'on-track' with its 
economic reforms (see IMF, 2006ý. 
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The cartelisation of debt management ensures that debt strategies of countries are 
managed in accordance to the interests of the OECD countries and private capital 
rather than on the basis of the country's national interests. The individualisation of 
debt negotiations precludes collective bargaining by debtor states, even though these 
states often accrue the debts to the same creditors and are subject to the same debt 
regime" and the effect of such 'case-by-case' negotiations has been 'to institutionalize 
huge asymmetries in bargaining power in debt negotiations' (Fogarty, 2003: 237). 
This enables creditor countries to extract the greatest concessions from debtors to 
maximise their share under association's burden-sharing framework. 
Like the lead role of the BWIs in consultative donor/creditor groups for 
development financing - which have become increasingly widespread under the new 
architecture of aid with the shift from project to programme aid and budget support 
systems (see Chapter Three, section 3.2) - the linking of debt negotiations with BWI 
assessments and implementation of Bank and Fund programmes severely 
circumscribes indebted countries' ability to obtain alternative sources of financing 
and has contributed to the unpredictability of resource flows to these countries. As 
Biel contends, the absence of competition among sources of development finance 
makes it difficult 'for the South to bargain for better terms in funding' and debt relief 
and enables creditor countries to 'present a united front to developing countries'with 
demands that approval by the BWIs 'is a necessary condition for investment' (Biel, 
2000: 241). 
2.4. Conclusion 
The insertion of postcolonial states into the international legal order was premised on 
the sustenance of colonial economic relationships and the national geo-strategic 
interests of the postwar planners of the international governance architecture. This 
chapter has demonstrated that despite formal bequests of sovereignty and 
constructions of state autonomy in the postcolonial era, third world states remain 
conscripted into a straightJacket of interlocking economic and political strictures as a 
56 A reform of this format of debt negotiations was sought 
by third world states as a key demand in 
their calls for an NIEO but this faltered alongside the other 
demands of the NIEO lobby (Callaghy, 
2001, in Fogarty, 2003: 237). 
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result of the asymmetrical international order and system of global governance they 
were initially inserted into. These iniquitous relationships are continually validated by 
the evolving discursive regimes of representation deployed to legitanise the 
interventions of the former and new (read: United States) imperial powers in the 
ostensibly sovereign states of the postcolonial international order. 
The symbols of the new 'international community' have since been harnessed to 
recast the colonial 'civilising mission' into the logic of 'reconstruction', 'development' 
and 'cooperation', the acquiescence of postcolonial states to the intercessions of this 
new 'community of nations' acquired through the perceived need by recently 
sovereign states to constitutionally mimic the socio-econornic, political and juridical 
structures of the metropolitan states to maintain access to the econonnic resources 
and geo-strategic alliances resulting from their continued relationships of 
dependency. Consequently, as Badie observes: 
Western international law had become universalized, accepted and 
recognized by non-Western partners as the procedure for regulating 
international relations', with 'the conditions of inequality and 
dependence [having been] softened symbolically by the fact that they 
appeared to result from the voluntary consent of the contracting 
parties, hence from their sovereignty (Badie, 2000: 77). 
Conceptualising the new north-south relations in terms of representational practice 
enables us to situate current interventions of the international juridical and economic 
order within this series of historical encounters which Doty terms as 'imperial 
encounters' - 'the idea of asymmetrical encounters 
in which one entity [the 
west/north/Anglo-European world] has been able to construct 'realities' that were 
taken seriously and acted upon and the other entity [the non-west/South/non- 
European world] has been denied equal degrees or kinds of agency' (Doty, 1996: 3). 
The continued constructions of identities of peoples, societies, states and regions in 
binary terms - the abstract oppositions between 'developed' and 
'underdeveloped', 
'modern' and 'traditional', 'rich' and 'poor' - creates the 'dynamic of difference' that 
justify the reconstructions of postcolonial societies and economies by "institutions of 
the new international legal order. 
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The creation of the Bretton Woods institutions and the progressive enlargement of 
their mandate in years following their inception was premised upon this fundamental 
demarcation between the north and the south, and the need to efface the difference 
between the west and non-western world to better facilitate the project of new 
international economy based on what Badie calls 'the logic of universalization' 
(Badie, 2000: 77). These institutions have been cast as the face of the 'international 
community', the source of multilateral economic engagement, serving to create 'the 
international system [that] was unified around a center that the West intended to 
occupy' (ibid), thereby universalising the laws and principles of social and economic 
organisation which the west pioneered and which serves the geo-strategic interests of 
the northern states and the economic imperatives of transnational capital. 
This is validated by the regimes of representations which continue to characterise 
and regulate international relationships. The birth of international financial 
institutions have been pivotal to sustenance of this postcolonial order and based on 
the need to mediate the engagements of these countries in the governance of the 
global economy. At the same time, this mandate, corresponding with the design of 
the postcolonlal system of aid, was suffused with the very real objective of rationing 
capital transfers to the south, effectively preventing the endogenous development of 
southern countries which may threaten the relationship of dependence upon which 
the postcolonial world order was premised (see Biel, 2000: 87). This necessitated the 
development of disciplinary instruments - the 'science' of developmentalism and aid 
management - to mediate the engagements between the south and the north and 
between the south and northern private capital. 
The existence of a regime of knowledge production and dissemination, embedded 
with particular 'myths' of social, economic and political organisation, therefore 
sustains, inasmuch as it is sustained by, a corresponding regulatory regime 
disciplining the detractors of such conventional wisdom. In other words, unless there 
are punitive repercussions, real or perceived, resulting from normative departures or 
disengagement from the established order, the efficacy of this discursive framework 
in containing the cultural difference so feared by the former colonial states of their 
newly sovereign colleagues (or in the case of the most recent postcolonial period, the 
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endogenous economic strength of the newly industrialising countries) is 
circumscribed. The process of subordinating peripheral economies to the dictates of 
imperial capital through certain social transformations - including the restructuring 
of indigenous patterns of socio-economic organisation - not by direct coercion or 
military force but by new means of indirect control - through development financing 
modalities for example - has, according to Wood, 'been a major function of capitalist 
imperialism since its Mception' (Wood, 2005a: 21). 
The asymmetrical governance structure of the BWIs and their tentacular reach into 
the interior of third world member states over the years have furnished powerful 
imperial states with the ideal institutional framework through which such disciplinary 
power may be exercised. 
The PRSP framework, located within this imperial legacy of international law and 
international institutions, may therefore be viewed as part of the evolution of 
disciplinary instruments - regulatory norms and discourse - central to the 
governance of the postcolonial world order, characterised today by patterns of 
neoliberal globalization. Understanding the way in which third world states were 
originally incorporated into the international legal order will go far in explaining how 
these and other interventions of the postcolonial period can and have been effected 
and legitimised in spite of their apparent incongruence with fundamental principles 
of international law. 
At the same time, the changes in the world economy and the shifting geo-politics of 
the international order over the period of decolonisation has necessitated 
corresponding changes in the means in which these structures, ideologies and 
disciplinary techniques are deployed to further aforementioned entrenched economic 
and geo-strategic interests. The shifting locus of global power - and correspondingly, 
global authority - have shifted the foundations of the immediate postcolonial order 
premised on the Westphalian model of postcolonial international law and 
governance. In particular, the emergence of a transnational capitalist class as well as 
what Cutler terms as the new 'mercatocracy' - 'an elite association of public and 
private organizations engaged in the unification and globalization of transnational 
merchant law' (Cutler, 2003: 180 - 181) - has challenged not only the traditional 
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instrumentalities of regulatory disciPline on a global level, but also the ontology of 
global governance in the postcolonial period. 
These new developments, along with exhortations about the demise of the state, 
necessitate an examination into the new modalities of control and configurations of 
power, including those of which the PRSP framework and its attendant forces 
represent. Therefore, where the instruments of postcolonial governance resonate 
with the technologies of imperialism, the reconfigurations of global power, 
particularly in the past three decades, and the new patterns (and sophistication) of 
resource transfers requires a more nuanced analysis of how postcolonial international 
law and the institutions of postcolonial economic governance - notably the Bretton 
Woods institutions - have evolved to reinforce the patterns of influence in the 
postcolonial period. In this regard, the PRSP framework forms a pivotal part of this 
new disciplinary global constitution and the following chapters will explore the 
framework's role in this wider shift in the regulatory framework of global 
governance. 
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PRSPs and the Crisis of Legitimacy in the 
International Order 
e-r L 
y poverty isframed clearl, nw rry -I he wa y 
has an imporeant influence o tbewaysin bicbpove 
reduction policies come to be shaped ... these narratives establish theframes of qference that 
define and bound wbatforms of knowled , ge count, and whose versions, claims and interests are 
lqiXimate. ) 
- Karen Brock, Andrea Cornwall andjobn Gaventa, 2001: 8- 
The Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper framework departs conceptually and 
operationally from previous modalities for development financing, forming a central 
pillar in the 'new architecture of aid', the collective term ascribed to the constellation 
of new financing initiatives and regulatory instruments that have emerged in the 
'post-structural adjustment" era. However, far from being just a policy instrument, 
the PRSP framework represents a larger ambitious attempt to harmonise aid 
regulation, hitherto a fragmented web of overlapping yet dispersed network of policy 
and practice. 
The previous chapter's situation of the PRSP approach outside the immediacy of its 
operational function as an instrument for delivering development finance and within 
the larger framework of international relations and global governance enabled us to 
conceive of the role of PRSPs in advancing wider objectives in the international legal 
and political order. In this manner, the PRSP framework seeks not only to 
consolidate the diffused network of actors M these processes but also to shape the 
1 '17he term 'po st- structural adjustment', like the use of the term 'postcolonial' in this thesis, is utihsed 
nomenclaturally rather than substantively or normatively. It is used to denote the temporal period of 
development financing in the retirement of the conceptual and operational use of 'structural 
adjustment' by the 'international development' community, notably the World Bank and the IMT. It 
does not assume that the substance of 'structural adjustment' policies have been replaced by more 
progressive policy prescriptions in the facilities which succeeded such financing progranunes. 
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normative content of these actors' engagements in the aforementioned regulatory 
and quasi-regulatory webs. 
Consequently, an examination into the historical context that gave birth to the PRSPs 
is necessary in order to locate the sites of dominance and influence in which the 
conceptual and operational underpinnings of the framework emerged. This is an 
important exercise as conventional narratives of the PRSP framework often fail to 
locate the birth of the PRSP project Within a specific temporal and geo-political 
space. This has limited the analysis of how the framework sits within the shifting 
constitution of postcolonial. power relations, particularly within the dynamiics of 
inter-state and inter-national engagement in the era of globalization. 
This chapter argues that while aspects of the PRSP approach reflect the evolving 
agendas of and changing dynamics between institutional actors in the 'international 
development cornmunity'2 in the period preceding its mception, the framework itself 
and its relationship to the wider 'new architecture of aid' can be specifically 
foregrounded in the aftermath of a aisis of legifimag in the international economic 
order in the late 1990s and the failure of conventional disciplinary mechanisms - 
notably structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) - to contain this crisis. 
The operationalising of a framework, such as the PRSP, linking a political and social 
governance agenda to disbursement of financial resources, was primarily catalysed by 
an imperative to restore relevance to existing structures of multilateral trade and 
finance, notably to third world states, and to mitigate the groundswell of public 
dissent to the free-wheeling policies of the globalized Washington Consensus, often 
bankrolled by the international financial Mstitutions'. 
21 use the term 'international development community' as a means to describe a particular set of 
actors who work on issues relating to the social and economic policies in developing countries. Most 
of these actors are based in the north, comprising of individuals and organisations in international 
organisations such as UN agencies, the Bretton Woods institutions, INGOs, such as Oxfam, World 
Vision and the jubilee coalitions, in academia and within donor organisations. In no way is the word 
'international' meant to convey any notion of a truly global community in terms of inclusiveness of 
voices from all corners of the globe. This is not the case as governments in the south and most civil 
society actors outside the key policymaking capitals of Washington DC, Brussels and London, have 
little input into the policy outcomes affecting development models and options. 
3 This is not to say that all actors involved in this process have such deliberate intentions individually, 
nor are the institutional apparatuses of the Bank, Fund and bilateral donors homogeneous in their 
outlook and are beholden to these precepts and ambitions, but the nature of the capital and 
its 
resulting systernic power is such that these twin alms appear to be consistently recurrent in 
conversations and documentation over the course of this research. While 
driven by different 
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Accordingly, this chapter will demonstrate that the norms which subsequently 
formed the conceptual and operational basis of the PRSP framework had been 
framed arrudst a contested terrain of policy narratives and regulatory objectives, the 
outcome of which was the result of privileging certain voices and excluding others, 
notably the very constituency - the third world - upon whom the framework 
impacts. At the same time, the paradox of the PRSP process is illustrated by its 
implementation within a disciplinary framework, established through the precedents 
of SAPs and the opportunities afforded by the attendant regulatory vacuum left by 
their economic reorganisation. 
3.1. PRSPs as a Response to the Limitations of Structural 
Adjustment 
The reorientation of international development policy vis-a-vis low-income countries 
in the decade preceding the inception of the PRSP framework was clearly a response 
to a carefiffly couched problematic: the economic reforms of neoliberal globalization 
were leading to a deterioration in the social and economic condition of communities 
in countries undergoing such change and that development financing, delivered 
through conventional mechanisms, notably SAPs, have failed to contain the 
dislocations and mitigate the pressures associated with these reforms. 
Like Higgott's (2000) analysis of the political impact of the correlation between 
globalization and inequality', I argue here that for the purposes of understanding the 
context in which the PRSP approach was developed, the causal relationship between 
imperatives, there is even a reluctance to address or assume personal responsibility for the 
consequences of the policies recommended or a failure to see the consequences of their actions in a 
larger scheme of operations. See Biel's elucidation of structuralism which 'sees certain phenomena as 
having a fanction, Without implying that it is completely purposive' (Biel, 2000: 231). just as '[t]he 
World Bank does not necessarily start from a subjective desire to promote exploitation', so do the 
individual technocrats Within the Bank and Fund and within donor agencies not possess a desire to 
control but that control is part of a systemic desire 'so one can only conform as best possible to it' and 
that this system is 'driven by capital accumulation' (ibid). 
4 See Chapter One, footnote 2. Higgott argues that regardless of whether there is a causal relationship 
between globalization and income inequality, either within or between states, 'the identification of the 
correlation' is sufficient to cause 'the dispossessed to believe that globalization is the source of their 
plight' (1-figgott, 2000: 136). Correspondingly, I argue that regardless of whether certain institutional 
actors central to in this process of globalization, of which SAPs form a part of, believe in the veracity 
of this correlation, the fact that it exists necessitates an appropriate technical and/or political response. 
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these economic reforms (pursued through SAPs or other mechanisms) and 
impoverishment need not necessarily be verified for it to form what Higgott terms 'a 
political issue of utmost importance' (Higgott, 2000: 136) for the actors involved. 
The mere correlation between structural adjustment and poverty necessitated the 
corresponding revision of institutional policy and regulatory practice in response, the 
difference residing in the differing desired outcomes of the actors involved. 
Accordingly, the interaction of the various actors engaged in the formulation of the 
PRSP process with this problematic has been, as we will see in section 3.3 below, 
dependent on their political, institutional and geo-strategic objectives. The PRSP 
framework may be viewed as a reflection of the contested heritage of the principles 
fought at this level. For the hegemonic state actors involved, d-iis impetus was driven 
largely by the aforementioned failure of SAPs to contain the disruptive potential of 
the fallout from neoliberal globalization. 
3.1.1. The Disciplinary Rationale of Adjustment Lending 
Locating the PRSP framework within the wider political economy of neoliberal 
globalization, we may therefore trace the genesis of the project to the failure of SAPs 
to respond to the challenges in the world economy preceding the inception of 
PRSPs. As discussed in Chapter Two, adjustment financIng enabled hegemonic 
states, operating through the aegis of the Bretton Woods institutions, to manage 
third world participation in the postcolonial international economic system through 
the prescription of specific policy conditionalities tied to the disbursement of aid. 
The motivations for the introduction of SAPs were themselves primarily rooted in 
another crisis of legitimacy In the international political economy in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s. The emergence of policy-based lending in the 1980s originated 
largely from an imperative to stem the rising tide of economic nationalism among 
developing countries, using conditionality as a tool for reforming the nationalist 
economic policies that were taking shape in these countries (see Mosley et al, 1991: 
3-4)'. As the period of mass decolonisation drew to a close, the industrialised 
5 There are a couple of caveats which must be stressed with regard to the work by Mosley et al in this 
respect. Firstly, while the authors did conduct ar wide-ranging study of the World Bank's policy-based 
lending, their research findings are largely empi 'cal and the authors do not attempt much of a larger 
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countries In the west faced a new third world rebellion in the form of the movement 
for a New International Economic Order (NIEO). 
The NIEO movement challenged the fundamentals of the international economic 
system, which, in spite of decolonisation, remained premised upon the exploitative 
relationship of the colonial period and linked the notion of economic sovereignty 
with political independence. Developing countries began to address issues of 
ownership and control over their natural resources, questioning the concentration of 
economic power in northern-based transnational entities and many began embarking 
on a process of delinking from the patterns of colonial ownership in their national 
plans (Biel, 2000: 124; Mosley et al, 1991: 3- 4). 
The demands of the developing countries vis-a-vis western capital culminated in the 
United Nations General Assembly Resolution of 12 December 1974 on the Charter 
of Economic Rights and Duties of States (GAR 3281 (XXIX), 12 December 
1974) and the adoption of a manifesto on the 'Declaration and Program of Action of 
the New International Order". The NIEO demands threatened to undermine the 
rationing of capital from the north to the south that was carefully regulated through 
existing aid policy and trade agreements that mirrored former colonial relationships. 
As discussed in Chapter Two, the role of administering the ration was vested by the 
industrialised powers in the World Bank and the IMF, enabling these institutions not 
only to act as conduits for financing to the south but also as monitors of public and 
private capital flows from the north to the south (see Chapter Two sections 2.2 & 
2.3; Biel, 2000: 86 - 87; 232- 232). 
theoretical understanding of the Bank's structural role. Secondly, while the authors state that their 
objectives of study as an assessment of 'aid and power', their study is limited to an instrumental 
assessment of such power. T'he authors concentrate on assessing the power exerted by international 
organisations, namely the World Bank and the IMF, over the policy autonomy of developing countries 
(Mosley et al, 1991: 3) but do not question the role played by the Bank and Fund as institutional 
instruments of leverage by the industrialised countries which control the institutions. 
6 The Charter reasserted, inter alia, the rights of states to full sovereignty over their natural resources, 
authority over foreign investment, including the right not to give preferential treatment to foreign 
investors, regulate and supervise the activities of transnational corporations and the right to 
expropriate and nationalise foreign property with due compensation determined by the domestic law 
of the nationalising state (Article 2, Chapter H, General Assembly Resolution 3281 (XXIX), 12 
December 1974). 
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SAPs were consequently the response to these increasing threats to the hegemony of 
western capital. Through SAPs, the industrialised countries, via the Bank and the 
Fund, were able to substitute their definition of 'structural problems' interpreting 
them as internal macroeconomic disequilibria which had to be corrected and 
unnecessary state intervention into markets which had to be removed. This new 
discourse, argues Biel, 'completely rejected the NIEO-style demands to change the 
system itself, reducing policy solutions to 'a question of 'adapting' a country in the 
South to fit into the system by creating local conditions' conducive to foreign capital 
(Biel, 2000: 233) and increasingly, the globalized economy'. 
The Failure to Discipline 
The resurgence of economic liberalism that accompanied the rise to power of Ronald 
Reagan and Margaret Thatcher on both sides of the Atlantic in the 1980s had set the 
conceptual framework for foreign policy objectives of the industrialised countries 
during the period of structural adjustment and, along with the geo-strategic 
imperatives of the Cold War, heightened the political imperatives to stern the -rising 
tide of economic nationalism in the developing world that was cresting on the NIECI 
wave. The Washington Consensus model of socio-economic otganisation, premised 
on the geo-strategic imperative to promote an ideological shift during the period of 
its inception, has been described by Brock et al as 'the basic policy instrument of the 
neolibetal resurgence' (Brock et al, 2001: 13). 
Under this conceptual approach, econornic growth led by market forces became the 
new econornic rationale and the potential for development and poverty reduction lay 
in ensuring fiscal and monetary austerity in the developing economies and creating an 
enabling environment for econorMc activity, which included trade and financial 
liberalisation, investment deregulation, privatisation of publicly-owned enterprises, 
7 Indeed, Boughton's institutional biography of the IMF which charts the evolution of the Fund from 
1979 to 1989 - the years during which SAPs were widely introduced and implemented - is revealing in 
its analysis of the central role played by the IMF (and to a analogous extent, the World Bank) in 
restructuring the framework of international economic relations during that period and of the 
motivations of the actors primarily responsible for instigating these reforms (Boughton, 2000). 
Boughton conceives the changes wrought through structural adjustment programmes as amounting to 
a Silent Revolution (the tide of his publication), one that effected 'a shift in the prevailing paradigm for 
international and political relations, away from tendencies toward autarky, insularism, mercantilism, and 
governmentalplannin and control over economic activi 'T _*; 
and toward a common set of beliefs and policies 
based on open international trade and finance, competitive pricing and production decisions, and 
cooperation between countries' (Boughton, 2000: 3, emphasis added). 
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including public services and the creation of an enabling environment for private 
capital, both domestic and foreign (SAPRI, 2004: 1-4). 
Consequently, the policies driving development financing were premised on 
facilitating the universal adoption of the Washington Consensus model of economic 
policyrnaking, operationalised primarily through the introduction of policy-based 
loans at the World Bank and the introduction of structural econormc conditions for 
lending from the IMF. Among others, this has led to the now-universal critique of 
SAPs as the 'one-size-fits-afl' blueprints or boilerplates for economic planning' (see 
Craig and Porter, 2003: 55; Stiglitz, 2002: 34; 47). 
Financing agreements under SAPs were drawn up based on assessments by staff at 
the World Bank and the IMF and loan conditionalities were drawn from economic 
policies designed at the Bank and Fund headquarters in Washington DC with little or 
no input from the local communities and civil society and marginal input from 
country policyrnakers and legislators. While wide-sweeping reforms were introduced 
in domestic regulatory policy, public expenditure, fiscal and trade policy, very little 
consultation took place nationally (between civil society, the public and the 
government) and bilaterally (between the government and the international financial 
institutions) prior to the entry into force of each agreement (see discussion in 
Chapter Two, section 2.2.3). 
Towards the end of the 1990s, however., evidence began surfacing of the limitations 
of SAPs to rrUtigate the pressures associated with the economic reforms they sought 
to implement. In spite of the promises of economic growth and prospects for a 
raised standard of living under SAPs, poverty, even by the World Bank and IMF's 
own accounts, rose in most countries that underwent structural adjustment. 
According to Bank and Fund figures, the number of people living below the poverty 
line (delineated at US$1 a day) in most parts of the world rose between 1990 and 
2000, many in countries where SAPs were introduced in the 1980s (World Bank and 
IMF) 2004 and World Bank, 2003 in World Bank, 2004k: 2, figure 1.1). Economic 
8 Joseph Stiglitz describes as standard, for example, the IMF practice of preparing a draft report 
known as the 'boilerplate' in full prior to visiting a client country in which 'whole paragraphs' 
had 
been 'borrowed from the report of one country and inserted into another' (Stightz, 2002: 47). 
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growth for least-developed countries (LDCs) frOn' 1990 to 1996 was recorded at an 
average of two percent9 per annum. (UNCTAD, 2002b: 3). Meanwhile, the burden of 
external debt was crippling many countries across the developing world, particularly 
in sub-Saharan Africa where governments can spend up to one third to a half of their 
national budgets on debt servicing (Vandermoode, 2003: 16). 
This extensive criticism of the Washington Consensus, the conceptual approach 
underpinning adjustment financing, coupled with a series of crises in the 
international financial system (see section 3.2. below), began to strain the capacity of 
SAPs to provide this disciplinary framework, necessitating a new institutional andgeo- 
political response to the incipient crisis of legitimacy in the global economy. 
3.2. Postscripting the Washington Consensus 
PRSPs sought to redress the economic relativism of structural adjustment 
programmes by ftaming a conceptual approach to development financing that went 
beyond the fiscal and monetary straitJacket of SAPs, and at the same time, redressing 
the democratic deficits inherent in the process of accessing financing by enabling a 
more inclusive ftamework to socio-economic policyrnaking. In this manner, PRSPs 
reflect what Higgott describes as the 'mood swing' in the global political economy at 
the time from the Washington Consensus to the post-Washington Consensus, driven 
by the recognition in policy and academic circles, as we shall see below, 'that 
y legitimized, democratized and socialized if the gains globalization has to bepolificall 
of the economic liberalization process are not to be lost to its beneficiaries Hig ott, 99 
2000: 134). 
The post-Washington Consensus does not, however, see the rolling back of the 
policies of liberalisation, deregulation and privatisation which underpinned the 
modalities of SAPs or other regulatory reforms of globalization in the 1980s and 
1990s, but seeks rather to 'develop a political Mstitutional framework to embed the 
structural adjustment policies of the Washington Consensus' Gayasurlya, 2001b: 1, 
9 This figure excludes Bangladesh which accounts for a quarter of the economic size of the group of 
LDCs profiled. With the inclusion of Bangladesh, this figure rises to 2.8 percent (UNCTAD, 2002b: 
3). In sub-Saharan Africa, the poverty 'headcount' rose from 47 percent to 49 percent with a 
corresponding zero rate of economic growth in the same period (World Bank, 2004k: 1 -2). 
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emphasis added, see also section 3.2.1. below). Encapsulating the post-Washington 
Consensus' core of 'anti-politics' by substituting 'the politics of procedure for the 
politics of bargaining' (ibid), PRSPs therefore represent a conceptual departure from 
the previous modalities of regulating development financing - that is, under 
structural adjustment - in three critical areas: the substantive emphasis on social 
mitigation; the broadening of constituents in policy formulation; and the mechanisms 
for dehvery of financing. 
3.2.1. From Adjustment to Poverty Reduction 
Firstly, PRSPs move away from a reductionist approach to economic policymaking 
by placing an emphasis on poverty reduction, and, to a limited degree, on wider 
development priorities. The premise of structural adjustment - to correct the 
disequilibrium. in a country's domestic balance-of-payments - focused largely on 
imposing fiscal and monetary discipline on the recipient country through IMF 
stabilisation programmes and on restructuring the domestic economy targeted at 
attracting pnVate and foreign capital through the liberalisation of key economic 
sectors, such as trade and public utilities (SAPRI, 2004: 1- 2) in hope that these 
reforms would generate a 'trickle down' effect to the general population, alleviating 
poverty as the economy corrected itself. 
The PRSP approach, on the other hand, prioritises poverty reduction in the 
economic planning of countries in receipt of PRSP-related financing, both in terms 
of assessing poverty impacts of economic policies and prioritising social sector 
expenditure in national budgets. The discourse of the PRSP also focuses on longer- 
term objectives, such as developing education and health sectors, and ensuring 
sustainability of development programmes, opposed to short-term stabilisation 
measures under SAPslo. 
10 It must be noted however, that these objectives remain underpinned by objectives of overaH 
economic growth as '[t]he policy and institutional underpinnings for rapid sustained growth and 
poverty reduction - including goals for poverty reduction, institutional and structural reforms, sectoral 
strategies and specific anti-poverty programs, and the associated domestic and external financing 
needs - should all be integrated into a consistent macroeconomic framework over a three-year 
horizon' JMF and World Bank, 1999: para 15). 
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This departure was particularly momentous for the IMF as, along with the 
changeover from the ESAF to the PRGF, it marked the first time the institution had 
explicitly adopted 'poverty reduction as a formal objective of its activities"' (IMF, 
2004e: 26; Whaites, 2002: 12). In particular, this shift cements the IMF's transition 
from a crisis lender financing temporary balance-of-payments deficits to a 'lender of 
first reSort, 12 providing longer-term development financing to low-income countries. 
The PRSP approach also paved the way for reform of the World Bank's 
programmatic or policy-based lending operations, culminating in the replacement of 
'adjustment lending' programmes with 'development policy lending' operations 
under the new Operational Policy 8.60 (OP 8.60) on 'Development Policy 
Lending'. This new Policy framework replaces the Operational Directive 8.60 
(OD8.60) on 'Adjustment Lending Policy' and unifies all previous adjustment 
financing instruments under one umbrella (World Bank, 2004c: para 20). The 
plethora of acronymed policy-based loans, such as structural and sectoral adjustment 
loans and credits (SALs/SECALs/SECACs) and prograrnmatic structural adjustment 
loans and credits (PSALs/PSACs) have been 'retired' and replaced by a single 
lending instrument - the development policy loan PPL) although PRSCs retain their 
name cto maintain continuity with this well-established approach' (ibid)". 
3.2.2. Securing Legitimacy through Participation 
Secondly, PRSPs reinstate, at least, nominally, the concept of agenýy in development 
financing policy and practice by institutionalising the requirements of participation 
and partnership in the financing operations of the Bank and Fund and other 
multilateral and bilateral donors. This represents a significant departure from the 
PRSP predecessor, the Policy Framework Paper which has been described as: 'a 
document drafted by the Fund and agreed by the Bank and the borrowing 
governments' (Mosley et al, 1991: 53). 
11 Whether or not the adoption of the 'poverty' work programme is desirable or appropriate in the 
context of the Fund's legal and institutional jurisdiction remains subject to contest (see Chapter Four). 
12 See discussion in Chapter Two, sections 2.2 & 2.3, also in Aky-dz, 2005 and 2004. 
13 PRSCs differ from regular development policy loans as they normally disbursed in a series of three 
or four single tranches based on countries fulfilling a set of prior actions under a medium-term 
framework as opposed to a multi-tranche financing operation in which each subsequent disbursement 
is contingent upon fulfilment of a set of ex-ante conditions (see World Bank, 2005e: paras 
9 -12; Box 
1 and Annex IL see also discussion in Chapter Four). 
78 
Chapter Three 
Mosley, Toye and Harrigan's extensive study of the World Bank's policy-based 
lending observed that the introduction of the PFP had significantly curtailed the 
borrowing country's ability to develop its own economic development agenda, 
effectively restricting 'room for independent manoeuvre' and creating 'a managed 
duopoly of policy advice' in which client countries - particularly 'poor, indebted 
countries where conditionality already bites the hardest' - find it difficult to challenge 
the policy decisions of the Bank and Fund once they have been taken (N4osley et al, 
1991: 55). 
PRSPs have therefore been designed to alleviate the hostility associated with this 
centralisation of control. They are instead geared towards facilitating the engagement 
of a broad-based constituency of stakeholders in the formulation of domestic policy 
objectives, although not necessarily policy formulation JMF and World Bank, 1999: 
para 19; see also Chapter Five). Unlike SAPs, economic planning under PRSPs 
should reflect the development objectives and expenditure priorities of the countries 
in receipt of financing as well as the citizens of those countries. 
This concept of oxnersbip of development programmes represents a key shift in the 
discourse of development policy and practice brought about by the PRSP and the 
larger 'new architecture of aid' by shifting the emphasis from 'conditionality' to 
partnerships as the cornerstone of donor-reciPient negotiations in aid relationships 14 
3.2.3. Universal Framework for Disbursement 
Finally, PRSPs consolidate the shift that began with SAPs from project to policy- 
based financing which links aid efficacy with the reorganisation of the recipient 
institutions, and marks the movement from what Hall and de la Motte term as 'tied 
aid' to 'globahsed aid' (Hall and de la Motte, 2004: 3) whereby financing is 
increasingly funnelled through multilateral channels and through a single policy 
instrument to reduce transaction costs. This harmonisation is at the heart of the 
PRSP framework and underpins the wider 'new architecture of aid'. 
14 See Chapter Four for detailed discussion on this shift in conditionality. 
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While the policies driving the different operational frameworks may have changed, 
the essence of a policy-driven model of engagement between the donor community 
and the client countries remains the same. The terms of financing are inherently tied 
to a policy brief subscribed to by the donor policyrnakers and engagement takes the 
form of 'policy dialogue', described by Cassen et al as 'exchanges between aid donors 
and recipients about the domestic policy framework' and using the influence of 'aid 
transfer' to restructure domestic economies (Cassen et al, 1986: 69). The difference is 
that the policy dialogue is now expected to take place in a more coordinated manner 
under the PRSP umbrella. 
Prior to the PRSP approach, aid policy harmonisation has taken place on an ad-hoc 
basis or through country-specific mechanisms, such as the Bank and Fund-led 
Consultative Groups or debt rescheduling meetings under the auspices of the Paris 
Club. These meetings are usually secretive, donor-controlled and usually centred on 
aid distribution and allocation from a lender's perspective as opposed to the 
recipients (Degnbol-Martinussen and Engberg-Pedersen, 2003: 191). 
The new financing modalities, such as the PRSCs and other general budget support 
instruments, which have developed alongside the PRSP framework have been 
designed to take into account this conceptual shift towards an allegedly more 
transparent and cohesive multilateralisation of aid". According to Hall and de la 
Motte: '[t]his shift from micro to macro levels takes a number of forms through 
shifting aid from project support to more general budget and policy support, through 
the 'pooling' of donor aid from different countries behind common policy 
conditions or the use of regional aid instruments (Hall and de la Motte, 2004, p 4). 
The PRSP is expected to form the backbone of this new aid agenda, acting as the 
common instrument through which bilateral and multilateral donors align their 
support to low-income countries. 
On paper at least, these conceptual changes to the policy framework governing 
access to development financing appear to be wrought M favour of the communities 
in need of such financing, framed by a response to the failure of pre-existing 
15 it must be stressed at this point, however, that the multilateralisation of aid 
is aimed primarily of 
harmonising aid outside the UN agencies as the UN itself represents a form of multilateralised aid that 
has been taking place for a long time before the PRSP approach was formalised. Subsequent chapters 
of this thesis will discuss this in greater 
detail. 
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modalities of financing to deliver on wider developmental objectives, including that 
of political franchise. However, as the following sections reveal, the aforementioned 
the conceptual discourse of the PRSP was shaped and framed by imperatives which 
go beyond technicalities of aid and management of development finance. As such, 
the reforms of the PRSP project were brought about as a result of pressures brought 
to beat on the IFIs and the G8 countries that represent the major disbursers of 
development financing and took root within an inherently asyn-nnetrical relationsbip 
between the parties to the new initiative. 
3.3. Competing Agendas for Change 
The 'new architecture of aid' developed in the 1990s is a product of what Brock, 
Cornwall and Gaventa term 'a process of hybridisation' by which 'dominant 
narratives of development policy and practice are constantly reshaped by their 
absorption of elements of counter-narratives giving rise to 'the articulation of new 
variants that appear to offer a convergence of competing agendas, recasting old 
elements of older approaches in evocative new storylines' (Brock et al, 2001: 8)". 
This is evidenced by the process M which the new problematic of the PRSP is 
framed and articulated and later transformed into policy, practice and regulatory 
norms. 
Callaghy (2001) in his analysis of the shift M the regulatory norms of the international 
debt regime from the Paris Club restructuring to the multilateral debt relief 
programme under the HIPC in 1996 and the HIPC II M 1999, sites the locus of 
change outside the state-to-state bargaining system of the international econonnic 
regulatory fora. Instead, he identifies a 'triple helix' of relationships and connections, 
comprising 'the institutions of the international debt regime, the NGO debt 
networks, and the epistemic community' that, having been confronted with a 'central 
structural dilemma of the international political economy', reacted in different ways 
towards the resolution of the problem (Callaghy, 2001: 116 - 117). 
16 As mentioned in Chapter One, Brock et al adopt a Foucauldian analysis of development policy, 
viewing the evolution of development policy, including 'international' development policy and poverty 
policy, as the result of certain voices being privileged in the process of policy formulation and of 
dominant discourses setting the framework through which the 'problem' of poverty is framed, 
constructed, and resolved (Brock et al, 2001). 
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Having identified the 'structural dilemma' (or what I term as the 'new problematic') - 
the existence of a group of 'weak' states and economies which pose the potential for 
conflict in the international political economy due to their inability to 'benefit as 
easily or quickly from economic reform and democratization as those elsewhere in 
the world' - Callaghy considers how the disparate groups have responded to the 
problem. Change in the international debt regime to reflect the identified structural 
dilemma came as a result of 'the synergy between these various forms of power, 
knowledge and discourse as they interacted with the underlying structural dilemma' 
(Callaghy, 2001: 116 -118). 
Similarly, in mapping the evolution of SAPs to the PRSP framework, it is clear that 
the impetus for reform can be traced to three separate but Mterrelated clusters of 
actors and processes, each with distinct but interlinked objectives for reforming the 
system for delivering development financing to low-income countries. These 
developments serve to clear the ground for a convergence of policy, practice and 
politics at the critical moment -I call it the 'tipping point'17 - in which the PRSP was 
introduced. 
In each of the three instances - academic, institutional and geo-strategic - the 
objectives of the dominant actors and dominant discourses within the processes set 
the parameters for engagement with the problematic and, as a consequence, shaped 
the responses to the problematic accordingly. The PRSP and related financing 
mechanisms are the result of the convergence of these policy and political responses 
to the problematic and which corresponded with the strategic objectives of the 
dominant actors. Linking these three clusters of actors and events is the crucial role 
played by civil society organisations, M particular a cadre of specialist NGOs which 
formed advocacy coalitions and moved in between the three clusters, pitching their 
cause according to the strategic interests of each cluster of actors. 
17 Sociologist Malcolm Gladwell conceptualises this phenomena as the 'tipping point' of social 
epidemics - '[t] he name given to the one dramatic moment in an epidemic where everything can 
change all at once' (Gladwell, 2000: 9). In the case of the PRSP, the tipping point would be the event 
which consolidated developments of the 1990s served to create a catalytic shift in the policy towards 
aid and concessional lending to low-income countries and consequently, a shift in the regulatory 
regime governing financial and economic transactions between the north and the south. 
82 
Chapter Three 
The Role of the Epistemic Coalition 
Firstly, PRSPs and the new financing modalities accompanying this initiative may be 
viewed as the outcome of a convergence of thinking in academia and policyrnaking 
circles on the effectiveness of aid and the impact of structural adjustment policies in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s. This 'episten-iic coalition' played a crucial role in the 
formulation of the conceptual and operational principles that underlie the PRSP 
framework, helping not only to shape a consensus around identifying and fran-iiing 
the problematic, but also its policy solutions". For Masood Ahmed, a key player in 
the design of the PRSP framework", the initiative is a prime example of the results to 
be achieved when episten-lic shifts in development policythinkin ,g coincided with the 
political and institutional shifts in development pohcymakin: g (Ahmed, 2004). 
., 
'Epjsteinic Shifts 
For this episternic coalition, what was important was the shaping of a new discourse 
of development policy and practice. To do so meant framing the problematic and 
proposed solutions within an acceptable policy narrative - the process of 
'hybridisation' - palatable to the key institutional and political actors with the power 
to change the regulatory regime. The power of this epistemic coalition was that of 
which Ahmed aRudes to as the 'multiplier effect' of a body of multi-disciplinary 
research with similar conclusions which led to the formation of a set of policy 
18 However, it is important to note here that while the framing of this problematic and its policy 
prescriptions reflect in some way the heterogeneous nature of this coalition, the overarching 
consensus Within the coalition furnishes evidence of what Kapur terms as 'crony intellectualism' 
(Kapur, 2003: 12) characteristic of networks of this nature. Stone and Wright describe this 
predisposition as 'an in-breeding tendency within intellectual networks to contact, consult and invite 
to conferences those who speak the same technocratic language or come from similar acadermc 
backgrounds' (Stone and Wright, 2007: 14). Like all knowledge networks, the contest of knowledge 
within this particular episternic coalition took place Within limited parameters and privileged certain 
mainstream voices over other more radical voices. The nature of engagement also precluded the 
involvement of more critical researchers who have either not been invited because they do not speak 
the same technocratic language as the policy advocates or they have chosen not to engage in what they 
view as a flawed process. 
19 Ahmed has been credited as being a key player in moving the PRSP forward as an institutional 
advocate of the proposed framework within the Bank as Vice-president of the Bank's Poverty 
Reduction and Economic Management (PREM) department, and within the Fund, working 
specifically on the PRGF, as deputy director of its Policy Review and Development (PDR) 
department (interview: Whaites, 2004; also see IMF, 2000b). Ahmed left the Bank shortly after the 
inception of the PRSPs in 1999 for its sister institution after a falling out with Bank president James 
Wolfensohn (Mallaby, 2004: 256 - 257). At the time of making the aforementioned speech, he was 
policy director at the UK's Department for International Development (DFID). At time of writing, he 
is the IMF's director of external relations. Ahmed's career itself exemplifies the effect of the revolving 
door characteristic of employment practice at the level of international development policymaking. 
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recommendations transmitted into policy narratives by key 'policy translators' in both 
the research and policy communities (ibid). 
This body of research may be categorised into three key areas: a) empirical economic 
research into the impacts of SAPs and the effect of the debt overhang in low-income 
countries; b) research into the methodologies of aid assessment and aid delivery; and 
c) scholarship on civil society participants and participation in policyrnaking. The 
third category is important as the increasing influence of civil society groups on 
international development policyrnaking has both corresponded with and often 
precipitated the rise in academic scholarship on these developments. 
Each of the three categories of research contributed to the development and final 
articulation of the fundamental tenets governing the PRSP project. Empirical 
research on SAPs provided the foundational body of data to support policy change 
while research into the methodologies of aid assessment and financing modalities 
suggested the problems with the existing system and proposed solutions for a new 
framework which were, in turn, supported by studies into incorporating new actors - 
civil society - into the policyrnaking process. 
First of all, developments in the scholarship on poverty and welfare dimensions of 
structural adjustment and debt marked a shift away from the economic rationalism 
that characterised the SAPs. Catalysed by studies, such as Cornia, Stewart and Jolly's 
influential report, Adjustment u4th a Human Fac? in 1987, the concept of 'poverty' was 
being redefined away from a purely economistic definition of income per capita 
towards encompassing issues of exclusion from social, political and economic 
services; of vulnerability by virtue of gender, class or race within communities of 
poor people; and of access to political structures, accountability and democratic 
participation in decision-making processes (Brock et al, 2001: 15 - 16; Christiansen 
with Hovland, 2003: 10) 21. 
20 The study, commissioned by the United Nations Children Fund (Uniceý, concluded that SAP 
reforms were affecting clffldren adversely and called for 'alternative approaches to adjustment ... to 
tackle the rising problem of debt, poverty, and social strain' (CorMa et al, 1987: 3). Unicef s Human 
Face campaign that followed on from that report was the one of the first examples in this narrative of 
the 'hybridisation' policy, leading to the introduction of 'social safety nets' Within adjustment 
programmes (Brock et al, 2001: 14; Whaites, 2002: 11). 
21 'fl-IiS distinct conceptual shift in the discourse of poverty within development circles can be 
bracketed by two issues of the World Bank's annual flagship publication, the World Development Report 
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Conceptualising poverty as both a socio-political. as well economic construct required 
constructing policy prescriptions which take into account the processes of policy 
formulation as well as issues of accountability and transparency in resource 
allocation, a key factor in determining the agency of poor people and in fostering 
empowerment. As such, policy prescriptions advocated by members of the episten-. Lic 
community who took this view of the problematic focused on developing 
participatory methods in development assessment and planning (see for example, 
Sen, 1999, Stiglitz, 2001/1999) and on addressing the issue of governance within the 
recipient state to ensure transparency of aid allocation and disbursement. 
Questions of ownership of economic reforms surfaced as NGOs increasingly 
lobbied the Bank and the Fund for greater access to the policymaking process. It was 
this criticism of donor-dictated policymaking associated with SAPs that began to find 
favour with donor technocrats who viewed the Emits of policy conditionality from a 
technical perspective of aid efficacy. The limitations of structural adjustment as an 
instrument for policy leverage were highlighted by key studies which linked the 
failure of policy reform in SAP countries with the lack of political ownership in the 
design of adjustment programmes. 
Mosley et al, for example, argued that the lack of policy uptake in recipient count-ties 
was due to both the political nature of SAP conditions and the non-inclusive nature 
of programme formulation (Mosley et al, 1991: 128). Implicit in Mosley et al's 
conclusions was the need to incorporate the political elites of recipient countries Into 
the process of programme policy design in order to ensure greater adherence to the 
policy prescriptions set by the Bank and the Fund under econorrUC reform 
programmes (ibid: 129). 
(WDR)21, the first being the WIDR 1990 on Povedy which first emphasised the centrality of poverty in 
development policy and practice in line with the stance taken by UN agencies, such as the United 
Nations Development Fund (LJNDP) through its Human Development Reports2l. The second WIDR. 
2000101 entitled Attacking Povero broadened this approach by addressing issues of empowerment, 
security and opportunity for poor people, taking a wider construction of poverty 
in the context of 
larger development objectives (see Maxwell, 2003: 8- 9)- The lFlorld Development Reports (WIDRs) are 
influential in shaping the conceptual approaches to development policy in the international arena 
due 
to the sheer scale of their dissemination - estimated at a minimum print run of 
50,000 copies and 
50,000 produced in seven other languages - and their origins from the World Bank's large research 
department which lends them 'considerable weight and legitimacy' amongst many quarters (Mawdsley 
and Rigg, 2002: 5 -6). 
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The findings from this study were supported by two influential World Bank research 
papers by Burnside and Dollar (1997) and Dollar and Svensson (1998) which linked 
the problem of aid effectiveness with the problem of institutional deficiencies within 
the recipient countries. Their contention that development aid was not having an 
impact on countries because of the countries' capacity to absorb and implement aid 
in an effective manner (Pender, 2002: 193) resonated with pohcymakers in the 
financier community who 'were keen to demonstrate a more rational basis for 
allocating their funds' (Ahmed, 2004). This discourse on aid effectiveness has widely 
been regarded as the overarching impetus for reform of the regulatory regime 
governing access to development financing 22 - 
From Research to PoKcy Change 
One of the key epistemic components in creating the impetus for change from 
structural adjustment to the PRSP framework was the ESAF reviews. Coirnnissioned 
by the IMF in 1996 to evaluate its concessional. lending facility, the ESAF reviews 
were a first on many levels, including being the first IMF review to include an 
external evaluation. The external reviewers concluded that country studies indicated 
that 'ownership was a necessary condition of successful policy reform and program 
implementation' and recommended that ownership be strengthened at country level 
through the formulation of a national medium to long-term strategy around which a 
body of national consensus can be built around prior to negotiations with the Fund' 
JMF, 19 9 8: 2 1). 
The impact of ESAF reviews demonstrates the effect of the epistemic convergence 
in forging the conceptual framework for the PRSP approach. While the reviewers of 
the ESAF, both internally and externally were mainstream economists, some of 
whom were committed to the Washington Consensus economic ideology, the views 
of the ESAF reviewers nonetheless resonated with other external researchers, and 
some researchers within the Bank, who subscribed to a more comprehensive view of 
development models and means of achieving development objectives. At the same 
time, the ESAF reviews reinforced what the pohcymakers M Washington DC had 
already been aware of for some time - that the PFPs were failing to generate results 
22 See further discussion in Chapter Five. 
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and creating deeper resentment in the relationships between the IFIs and the 
recipient countries (interview: Plant, 2004). 
The discourse of aid effectiveness as well had particular resonance with the decision- 
makers at the IFls, namely the Bank President and the Fund Managing Director" 
and major shareholding governments on the Executive Boards, in considering 
operational changes to the development financing regime. The policy consensus 
emerging from mainstream discourses on aid effectiveness and the efficacy of 
conditionality provided policyrnakers with, in effect, an escape clause to architectural 
reform of the aid system. Policy conclusions that 'there was no need to change 
fundamentally the policy prescriptions associated with aid' but rather that 'aid should 
be directed only to those countries that have already demonstrated the capacity to 
adopt good policies' (Pender, 2002: 193)24 enabled the Bank and the Fund to absorb 
the alternative conceptual approaches to development financing without rocking the 
foundations of its substantive content. 
This episode demonstrates the centrality of epistemic coalitions to changes in public 
policy, notably global public policy. Engagements with the external research 
community reinforce internal knowledge shifts within policy *institutions but such 
changes are operationalised only when there are political pressures to build 
convergence between the two. According to former World Bank senior economist 
Ravi Kanbur" (whose resignation from the World Bank over the furore relating to 
the WDR 2000101 marked the first of a series of high-profile departures from the 
institution), more often than not, the epistemic community was called upon to 
provide the intellectual response to external demands on the Bank and Fund created 
by developments in the global context (interview: Kanbur, 2004). 
23 Who were, respectively at the time, the charismatic James Wolfensohn (see following section) and 
Nfichel Cammedessus, a conservative bureaucrat who was fairly unconvinced of the need to 
incorporate larger development priorities into structural adjustment and stabilisation programmes. 
24 Ahmed himself admits to the negative impact the discourse on aid effectiveness has had by 
advocating cutbacks to the countries with 'poor' policies (Ahmed, 2004; see also discussion on 
(selectivity' in Chapters Five and Six). 
,g 
Poverý, and resi ed 25 Kanbur was also responsible for coordinating the VDR 2000101 on Altackin gn 
at the later stages of the project when Bank sen-ior management insisted on rewriting parts of the 
report, eliminating some of the reports more critical elements although the Bank 
has stated that it 
believed Kanbur's reservations to be 'unfounded' (see Bretton Woods Project, 2000). 
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In other words, more than the 'agenda-setting' role of ep1stemic networks, academic 
research, within and outside the policy environment often becomes 'a source of 
institutional legitimacy for chosen development paths' (Stone and Wright, 2007: 9). 
Therefore, the 'tipping point' for the shift from SAPs to the PRSP framework took 
place not only in the convergence within the epistemic coalition but also a 
convergence between the interests of the advocates for reform and the politics of 
reform. In Ahmed's words, 'the time was right, the politics (sic) was right' (Ahmed, 
2004). 
3.3.2. The Institutional Response to the Conceptual Framework 
Under pressure from both the public lobby and their political masters to reform the 
aid delivery system in the face of the incipient systemic crisis and the backlash against 
the IFIs in the late 1990s) the World Bank and the IMF, and, to a lesser extent, 
bilateral aid agencies such as the UK's Department for International Development 
(DFID), were confronted with the impetus to provide a sustained organisational. 
solution to the problematic. The institutional processes that shifted the political 
ground for the inception of PRSPs are distinguished from the role played by the 
institutional pohcymakers who formed a part of the aforementioned epistermc 
community. These institutional advocates for reform relied upon the organisational 
impetus to respond to external pressure by translating the narratives for reform into 
policy solutions to the problematic, drawing upon the support of the wider epistemic 
community to legitimise their own strategies for reform. 
The Wolfensohn Legacy 
A key political development in the 1990s that led to the PRSP framework was the 
appointment of former banker James Wolfensohn as president of the World Bank 
Group in June 1995. Wolfensohn's appointment has been widely regarded as a 
turning point for World Bank operational policies and, consequently, for that of 
most other bilateral and multilateral donors who regard the Bank as the 'leader' in 
development policy thinking". Wolfensohn was under pressure from the US 
26 A charismatic but temperamental entrepreneur, Wolfensohn had been passed over in the previous 
appointment to the presidency in favour of conservative financier Lewis Preston in 1991 
(Mallaby, 
2004: 56). Preston, however, took over the helm of the Bank at a critical political period for the Bank 
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administration and from other major Bank shareholders to address the rising tide of 
criticism of the Bank, particularly from a coalition of Anglo-American NGOs and its 
domestic supporters. 
Wolfensohn's appointment was, to all intents and purposes, deliberately orchestrated 
to reinvent the Bank in the face of mounting criticism and to rehabilitate the Bank in 
the *interests of US foreign policy. Vice-president Al Gore was said to be keen to 
revitalise the Bank's role in what was seen to be 'security areas' neglected during the 
Cold War, such as poverty, disease, etc (Mallaby, 2004). According to veteran 
environmental campaigner, Bruce Rich 27, the Bank at the time when Wolfensohn 
took over was faced with a serious crisis of credibility, threatened with 
marginahsation in the international arena not only due to its inability to 'move 
money' to developing countries but also in constructing 'coherent, believable 
approaches' to resolving 'the economic and social quandaries of poorer parts of the 
world' (Rich, 2002: 28). 
Wolfensohn was particularly mindful of the fact that he had inherited an institution 
in crisis, riddled with bureaucratic inertia and faced with external credibility issues. 
Not only were the protests against Bank project becoming more public, internal 
reports such as the critical Wla penbans RepoW' in 1992 confirmed that the Bank senior 
management was deeply steeped in a 'culture of loan approval' which was overriding 
performance and efficacy considerations in Bank operations, a practice that the 
incumbent president had pledged to change when taking office (Rich, 2002: 26 - 27). 
and the financial policyrnakers in Washington DC. Not only was 
i 
the first Bush administration facing 
electoral defeat at the hands of telegenic Democrat Bill Clinton, institutions such as the World Bank 
were facing increasing public hostility towards its activities in developing countries, especially by the 
environmental movements. Wolfensohn biographer Sebastian Mallaby, recounting the public protests 
against the Bank during the 50th anniversary of the Bretton Woods institutions, said of Preston: 
'Preston's qualities - his reserve, his modesty, his gentlemanly style - were no match for the theatrical 
antics of his NGO critics; the old Marine was up against guerrilla acti-ýists who didn't know or care 
what 'gentlemanly' meant, and they had overwhelmed him' (Mallaby, 2004: 63). When it became clear 
that the Bank was in need of a leader more capable of dealing With the criticisms it faced in the 1990s, 
the US administration decided to appoint Wolfensohn because 'Wolfensohn was a charmer, a seducer, 
a force of nature' or, in a nutshell, Wolfensohn 'was no 1--wis Preston' (Mallaby, 2004: 66 - 79, emphasis 
added). 
27 Rich currently heads the Washington-based lobby group, Environmental Defense's international 
programme, examining the social and ecological irnpacts of the US's aid policy and activities of 
. multilateral 
development banks on developing countries. 
28 officially known as the Effective Implementation, Kg to Development Impact- Report of the Wlorld Bank's 
'folio 
Task Force, the report was christened the Wla lh nhan penhans Re por, - port after Wi Wape s, the Bank 
vice-president who oversaw the study. 
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Part of Wolfensohn's brief was to create greater legitimacy for Bank interventions in 
the developing world, both for the benefit of external critics such as advocacy groups 
and NGOs, and for detractors within the US Congress, particularly a group of hard- 
core Republican politicians who were viewing the Bank as an unnecessary tax on the 
US public. In the face of the congressional Meltzer Commission, established in 1998 
to examine the role of the BWls, and its unfavourable report", Wolfensohn's plan 
was to engage the critics head on. One of such strategies was to engage in a dialogue 
with NGOs (see section 3.3.3), a precedent for the Bank administration. 
Joseph Stightz'o, appointed as the Bank's chief economist in February 1997, 
supplemented Wolfensohn's reforms by supplying the intellectual counterpart to 
Wolfensohn's political strategies. Stightz's time at the Bank marked the demarcation 
in the policy discourse of the Bank between the top-down monetarist approach of 
the SAPs and the more inclusive, holistic approach of the post-structutal adjustment 
era (Chang, 2001: 1-4; Pender, 2001: 402 - 408; interview: Guerrero, 2004). Indeed, 
Stightz's ideas formed the basis of much of the new post-Washington Consensus 
ideology, triangulating the link between the neoliberalism. of structural adjustment era 
and what Hatcher terms the 'neo-institutionahsm' of the post-structural adjustment 
era and helping the Bank shape what she calls the 'integrated development model' 
which sought to 'implement new forms of governance in order to lock-in market- 
enabling policies' in client countries (Hatcher, 2006). 
Stightz, in many ways, served as the link between the shifts in the conceptual 
framework of development pohcy and the political unperatives that drove 
institutional policy". For some researchers at the Bank, Stiglitz paved the way for the 
21 The final report called for, inter alia, severely reduced roles for the World Bank and the IMF, calling 
for an end to long-term lending for poverty reduction by the IMF and limited assistance from the 
Bank, utilising regional development banks where possible and replacing loans with grants and 
subsidismg privately- funded public goods (US Congress, 2000). 
30 A former economics lecturer and economics advisor to US president Bill Clinton, Stightz was to 
become, and remains today, one of the most vociferous mainstream critics against the neoliberal 
economic policies set by the Washington Consensus and promulgated through the Bretton Woods 
institutions. Although Stiglitz's most strident criticisms were reserved for the IMF - his famous book, 
Globak, -ation and Its Dis, -ontents (Stiglitz, 2002) created a very public spat between Stiglitz and the IMF 
bureaucracy in which senior IMF staff raced to the defence of the institution by denigrating the 
substance of the book and through personal attacks on Stiglitz himself (see Dawson, 2002) - his wide- 
ranging views on development policy extended to the approach adopted by the World Bank (Chang, 
2001: 2). 
31 In the series of papers published during his tenure at the Bank, including those that make up the 
volume alluded to here, Stightz openly attacked the narrow conception of development offered by the 
Washington Consensus and operationalised through the policies of the international financial 
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articulation of alternative policies and provided the intellectual cover under which 
these policies may be developed and operationalised. In Chang's opinion, Stiglitzs 
criticism of the Washington Consensus came at a critical period, coinciding as it were 
'with rising intellectual criticism and a renewed political resistance from the 
developing countries towards the neo-liberal world order' (Chang, 2001: 2)32. 
In 1995, the financial crisis hit Mexico and the contagion subsequently spread to East 
Asia in 1996 - 97. The collapse of key East Asian economies - Thailand, Indonesia, 
South Korea, Malaysia - in the financial crisis of 1996 - 97 served as a wake-up call 
to the financial community and the ensuing political unrest that accompanied the 
IMF stabilisation programmes in countries such as Thailand and Indonesia 
highlighted the social and political consequences of an economic programme based 
on fiscal austerity that neglected the social welfare dimension. Advocacy groups, 
including debt campaigners, seized on the opportunity of the East Asian financial 
crisis to call for a change in the global economic order, using the effects of the 
financial crisis and the negative impacts of IMF stabilisation programmes, including 
rising fuel prices, as an indicator of the fallout from unbridled capitalism and trade 
and financial libetalisation. 
Stightz's ideas were ideally placed to counteract charges that the IFIs were not 
responding to global events and to form the foundation upon which an alternative 
policy framework could be conceptualised and operationalised". This alternative 
framework was ultimately set out by Wolfensohn in his Comprehensive 
Development Framework, the conceptual treatise that would form the theoretical 
institutions, including the IMF and the World Bank, and called for a more comprehensive view of 
economic policy which took into account the role of institutions, people and regulatory mechanisms 
(see Chang, 2001: 4- 15). 
32 Paradoxically, these counter-ideas and Stighzt's increasingly nascent criticisms against the IMF 
orthodoxy led ultimately to his high-profile resignation from the World Bank in November 1999. 
Commentators have previously suggested that his removal was demanded by then US Treasury 
Secretary Lawrence Sununers in exchange for Wolfensohn's re-appointment in 2000, a suggestion that 
Wolfensohn biographer Sebastian Mallaby dismissed as a doubtful claim (Mallaby, 2004: 266). Stiglitz 
himself has said that his resignation came as a result of increasing disillusionment with the policies of 
the World Bank and with working for reform 'from the inside' which were not leading to timely policy 
responses (Ambrose, 2000). 
33 The political currency of Stiglitz's ideas may be demonstrated by his retention by Wolfensohn as 
cspecial advisor to the president' post his resignation as chief economist. According to Mallaby, 
'keeping Stiglitz on the payroll helped to distance the Bank from the IMF and mollify NGO critics' 
(Mallaby, 2004: 266 - 267) although pressure from the US administration later proved to difficult for 
the Bank to continue defending Stightz's attacks on the IMT and he was subsequently dropped 
altogether. 
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framework for the PRSP project. Senior Bank economist Pablo Guerterro adnifts 
that the CDF was a result, to all intents and purposes, of an admission of failure on 
the part of Bank of previous policies, in particular that of structural adjustment: 
'[ad) ustment] was a big disaster because we were pour - ng huge amounts of money 
into countries that were unable to absorb the capital in a usefi. 11 manner, [yielding] 
misery, indebtedness and no outcome (sic) ... the CDF is a product of arriving at that 
conclusion' (interview: Guerrerro, 2004). 
PoEtical Currency of Change 
The institutional change at the World Bank was encouraged by the success of the 
Labour Party in the 1997 UK parliamentary elections and the subsequent 
appointment of UK Chancellor of the Exchequer Gordon Brown to the chair of the 
International Monetary and Financial Committee gMFC). Coming in after almost 
two decades in the political wilderness on a platform of third way reformism, the 
entry of this new British government into international development policy circles 
provided valuable support to the post-structural adjustment Stiglitz-Wolfensohn 
reforms in Washington and the conceptual framework for reform set by the 
epistemic coalition as discussed earlier34. 
The CDF was also, in many ways, shaped by the Ugandan success story. The Uganda 
story has been cited as a successful story of participation in poverty reduction and an 
important example of policy success that shifted the discourse of development 
financing from conditionality to partnership and participation. Uganda's economic 
planning model developed under President Yowerl Museveni in the late 1990s was 
premised on a programme of participatory politics centred around a series of 
consultations with local communities and NGOs, chiefly, branches of transnational 
34 At time of writing, the UK government, along With the Nordic countries, remain the most 
committed to the framework of development policy envisioned by Wolfensohn and Stiglitz in the 
post-structural adjustment era. In paper at least, the UICs DFID, created under the new Labour 
government in 1997, remains committed to channeling most of its development assistance through 
die PRSP framework and using budget support mechanisms (interviews: van Gelder, Guerrerro, 
2004). Both Blair and Brown have also since sought to capitalise politically on their support for low- 
income countries, particularly those in Africa through various campaigns including the most recent 
Make Poverty History campaign. Brown, in particular, have in recent years, tacked his prime 
ministerial ambitions onto his international work and many activists View his encouragement of 
various debt relief initiatives as part of his larger political platform, responding to NGO demands that 
the Bretton Woods institutions be made more accountable andinclusive. 
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development NGOs - Oxfam International and ActionAid - that resulted in the 
Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP) in 1997. 
This document later formed the basis upon which negotiations between the Ugandan 
goverm-nent and the IFIs were later conducted. This included negotiations under the 
Ugandan Multilateral Debt Fund (UMDF) which was proposed by the Ugandan 
government and acted as a vehicle through which debt negotiations would take place 
(Callaghy, 2001: 128 - 131; Christiansen with Hovland, 2003: 21 - 23; Mallaby, 2004: 
217 - 229). The Ugandan model was subsequently taken up by Bank designers of the 
PRSP framework and later supported by the British government, largely because of 
the revolving door of policyrnakers within the Ugandan policyrnaking processes at 
the time and NGOs such as Oxfarn, debt campaign groups such as jubilee 2000 and 
DFID whereby the same persons who were instrumental in formulating Uganda's 
policies were later posted to London or Washington DC. 
The Washington CDF compact and the Ugandan debt and development model also 
provided a useful conceptual base upon which the conditions for debt relief under 
the HIPC could be drawn. These conditions would later be translated mto concrete 
policies upon which the PRSP framework would operationalise. The debt campaign 
was a critical step in the evolution of the PRSP as principles in a conceptual 
framework to conditions that would be attached to development financing and this is 
the result of the institutional response of the IFIs and donor countries to the 
demands of the debt campaigners and other advocacy groups. 
The translation of CDF principles into a regulatory framework for accessing 
development financing was therefore an institutional response to the external 
pressures on the Bank, Fund and the G8 countries which had subscribed to the 
enhanced HIPC initiative. Debt campaigners, such as the jubilee 2000 coalition, had 
been denouncing the original HIPC Initiative set up in 1996 in their demands for 
greater and deeper debt relief for impoverished countries as inconsequential due its 
limited impact on poverty reduction in the affected countries (see Christiansen with 
Hovland, 2003: 25 - 27; Callaghy, 2001,131 - 139). As a result, their campaign 
for an 
enhanced HIPC initiative included calls for an alignment of debt relief with plans to 
reduce poverty In the indebted countries. NGOs campaigning for debt relief 
had 
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demanded that the money that was to be saved from debt reduction was to be spent 
by the country in receipt of such relief, on expenditure earmarked for poverty 
eradication. 
3.3.3. Geo-Strategic Interests and the Role of the NGO Lobby 
The jubilee 2000 debt campaign demonstrated the strength of public opinion In 
mobilising support amongst institutional players for a change in the status quo and 
opened the space for the participation of a new coalition of actors in international 
development policyrnaking - that of the specialised NGO advocate. These 
developments served to widen the actors in international development policyrnaking 
and normalised the participation of non-state actors into the process of policy 
formulation and regulatory governance. 
Th e Ne w Non -Sta te A ctors 
Fogarty (2003) and Callaghy (2001) both view 'regime change' in the international 
debt regime from the ad-hoc Paris Club system to the multilateralised agenda of the 
HIPC regime as resulting from, in the absence of any other explanation, the 
pressures brought to bear upon the G7 governments by the debt campaign lobby. 
Fogarty observes that: 
The LDCs' debt relationships through the mid-1990s were managed 
in a closed, secretive ad rigid process among rich-country creditors, 
but since 1996, these relationships have become embedded in a more 
open, consultative and flexible process in which sovereign and 
multilateral creditors have ceded a greater voice to the LDCs and 
their NGO advocates. In the absence of a major impetus to Changefrom other 
relevantfactors, the role of the NGOs seems to have been the kg reason for this 
, ge 
(Fogarty, 2003: 230, emphasis added). cban 
This observation is accurate to a certain extent for while NGOs certainly contributed 
to the creation of pohfical. space in which the discourse of debt relief and poverty 
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reduction could be articulated, framed and acted upon, the real political impetus for 
reform came less from the direct advocacy power of NGOs and social movements 
than from the discursive fallout of such pressure. While arguably, some northern- 
based NGOs,, such as Oxfam International, have claimed the credit for restructuring 
the debt regime, and consequently, for the initiation of the PRSP framework", their 
advocacy role in promoting this shift has not been as significant as the geo-strategic 
consequences of their 'profoundly political act of critique and mobilization' (Fogarty, 
2003: 230). In other words, the political alliances built as a result of the NGOs' debt 
campaign created the impetus for the industrialised countries to act, through their 
majority voice in the decision-making processes of the international financial 
governance institutions, to retain their geo-political hegemony in these areas. 
While protests against the multilateral banks and financial institutions have been 
ongoing since the 1980s, the movement in the 1990s shifted gears politically at the 
geo-strategic level as a result of the alliances built between advocacy groups in the 
north and governments of the south. In the 1980s, advocacy groups were largely 
campaigning against environmental and social impacts of projects on affected 
communities in the south. In many of these campaigns, criticism was directed both at 
the IFIs, the multilateral and bilateral donors and the governments of the recipient 
countries themselves. 
With the advent of structural adjustment and the move away from project lending, 
the NGO lobby began to link the economics with the environmental and campaigns 
began to be built around the general injustice of the global econon-nic system as 
opposed to the mere singling out of a single campaign. According to Fox and Brown: 
'As the social, geographic, and institutional base of the campaigns broadened, anti- 
poverty concerns and structural adjustment became growing priorities on the 
[multilateral development bank] agenda' (Fox and Brown, 2002: 6). 
This was encouraged, albeit to a limited extent, by the Wolfensohn presidency at the 
World Bank. In 1996, a coalition of NGOs from the north and south, formed the 
Structural Adjustment Participatory Review International Network (SAPRIN) in 
response to the incoming Wolfensohn's challenge to civil society groups to engage m 
35 Caflaghy provides a descriptive account of these events (see Callaghy, 2001: 
140). 
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a joint Bank and civil society 'multi-country, participatory investigation' into the 
impacts of structural adjustment policies. The five-year project, conducted through 
wide-ranging empirical research by grassroots organisations in 10 countries, 
culminated in the SAPRI report" which revealed danu-iing evidence against SAPs 
(SAPRIN, 2004: 1- 35). While the Bank subsequently disengaged itself from the 
project and sought to distance itself from the findings (ibid: 31 - 35), the impact of 
the initiative had already been felt though the galvanising of political voices against 
the institutional agenda of SAPs". 
One crucial difference in the NGO campaigns around SAPs though was that unlike 
the environmental campaigns, the concerns about structural inequality and the 
welfare dimensions of sovereign debt and fiscal austerity, required campaigners, in 
spite of their reservations, to work with the governments of indebted and low- 
income countries. This brought about a critical shift in the public lobby against the 
financial institutions and posed a more immediate and more potent geo-strategic 
threat to the G7 countries than the environmental campaigns that had focused solely 
on the complicity of the IFIs and the recipient governments. The campaigns against 
structural adjustment marked the beginning of an often uneasy and wary relationship 
between NGOs and governments of low-income countries. In thiis respect, NGOs 
soon began to work with governments in the south as opposed to working against 
them. 
At the same time, the raft of regulatory reforms pushed through neoliberal reforms 
embedded in structural adjustment programmes and through increasingly powerful 
multilateral institutions such as the WTO were increasingly Incurring resistance from 
developing countries. The campaign against the Multilateral Agreement on 
Investment (MAI) cemented the relationship between campaign groups in the north 
and the governments in the south - the proposal for a draft MAI was first obtained 
through government leaks by a Canadian environmental NGO which circulated the 
information to the rest of the NGO community. 
36 StructuralAdjustment, The SAPRI Report. - The Polig Roots of Economic Crisis. Pover* and lnequaliýy 
(SAPRIN, 2004). 
37 For more details on the SAPRI controversy and the findings, see SAPRIN (2004). 
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The strength of the international protests took many western governments by 
surprise in the late 1990s with the large demonstrations of force outside key inter- 
governmental summits (G8, WTO, World Bank and IMF meetings) and corporate 
meetings (such as the annual World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland) forcing 
heads of state to confront the reality of the global order. Globalization was creating, 
in Stiglitz's own words, 'its discontents' (Stightz, 2001). The famous 'Battle of Seattle' 
at the site of the aborted WTO ministerial meeting in 1999 exemplified the force of 
this new political alliance and although the significance of this event is contested, it 
did, at its minimum, bring together a disparate network of dissenting voices restive 
for change and, in Higgott's analysis, set into motion 'a series of trigger points on the 
road to a changing international intellectual and policy agenda' (Higgott, 2000: 136). 
Queffing the Disruption 
The international citizenry protests bolstered the 'renewed political resistance' 
(Chang, 2001: 2) of developing countries against the disadvantageous economic 
policies that were being enforced in their jurisdictions through iniquitous regulatory 
processes such as structural adjustment, and uneven economic forums such as the 
WTO, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and conditions 
attached to debt restructuring. After the OECD was forced to retract plans for the 
MAI as result of the refusal of developing countries to subscribe to 'the discussion of 
what they saw as a highly biased agenda' (Chang, 2001: 3), the renewed political force 
of a united 'third world' became clear, as did the new political leverage of the 
transnational social movement. 
The social and economic dislocations of the aforementioned financial crises and 
socio-econornic fallout from their accompanying adjustment programmes heightened 
the global loss of faith in the international economy, precipitating a series of third 
world rebellions in the global governance arena, from the collective ministerial 
walkout of Seattle to the unilateral dismissal of IMF interventions in Mahathir-led 
Malaysia, which held the threat for an incipient mass third world revolt against the 
rapaciousness of the neoliberal postcolonial world economy. 
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These geo-strategic imperatives were important in fran-Hing the objectives and later, 
the regulatory agenda of the PRSP framework. The necessity to control the resistance 
- the 'prose of counter-insurgency' III the words of Pahuja (2000: 797) - was a very 
real geo-political factor in the conceptualisation of the PRSP framework. Like the 
introduction of its predecessor framework, SAPs, the origins of the PRSP initiative 
are located within the percolating incipient crisis of faith in and threats to the status 
quo of the international economy of its times. 
Here, the impetus was driven by the concern within the international financial 
community - by this mean, I refer to the community of sovereign donors, IFIs and 
the international corporate community - that the political resistance by the 
developing countries within the global economic system, bolstered by the support of 
an increasingly powerful transnational social movement with networks of citizenry 
support spanning both north and south posits a real danger to the functioning of the 
existing international economy and the global juridical order which sustains it. PahuJa 
speaks of a 'fear of exit' that posits an eternal spectre in the participation of the third 
world states in the international legal order: 
The effect of the eternal presence of the spectre of the Third World 
primodialism means that implicit in the articulation of the fear of 
entry and the risk of systemic breakdown u-nmanent in that entry, is 
the fear of exit, or the desire to prevent nations in financial difficulties 
from dropping out of the international system altogether (Pahuja, 
2000: 797, emphasis added). 
This 'fear of exit' is accompanied by the afore-mentioned 'fear of entry': the 
potentially disruptive potential of an inclusion into the international legal and 
economic order of 'developing' states whose juridical systems have not attained the 
corresponding safety level of 'governance' and institutional sophistication of the 
'developed' world and whose bmitations as such posit a real challenge to the 
maintenance of geo-strategic hegemony of the industrialised nations (Pahuja, 2000: 
785-788). 
98 
Chapter Three 
In this respect, the PRSP framework may be seen as a means of quelling this 
potential danger of 'exit' by the low-income countries from the international 
economic system and, at the same time, tackling the danger of 'primodialism' that 
accompany these countries' inclusion in this system. This is evidenced by the 
conceptual and operational emphasis on country ownership of financing 
programmes and the provisions for debt relief to tackle the problem of 'exit' by 
providing incentives to countries to remain in the system, and by instituting process 
requirements such as poverty reduction strategies and monitoring systems to provide 
the necessary governance conditions to regulate the countries' continued 
participation in the economic legal order. 
Conversation with a Bank staffer illustrates this point. This staff member admits that 
regulating the recipient countries' use of aid and debt relief (provided in response to 
the pressures of the NGOs and internal advocates for reform) was a particular 
concern for the industrialised country Board members in the changeover from 
structural adjustment to PRSP-initiated financing modalities, such as the budget 
support PRSC, demanding, in many cases that these countries adopt the fiscal 
accountability regimes set by their own domestic jurisdictions. According to this 
senior researcher, the G7 governments often refuse to give consent to economic 
policies which accord the recipient countries blanket autonomy unless 'these 
countries can show that they meet standards, and not only standards, but the highest 
and most demanding standards' available (interview: 2004). 
The PRSP framework with its set of operational parameters provided the 
opportunity to arrest the dissonance within the international political economy. 
While the PRSP only extends to the peripheral nations of the global economy, mostly 
located in sub-Saharan Africa - as opposed to the politically powerful Asian and 
Latin American middle-income countries - the importance of maintaining this bloc 
of countries within the global capitalist system is as much an exercise of discourse as 
one of utility, the offsetting of the loss of faith in the policies of globalization. The 
PRSP framework thus becomes the new regulatory framework for containing the 
threat of revolt, replacing the outmoded discipline of SAPs. 
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3.4. Missing Pieces in the Jigsaw - The Absent South 
One very clear conclusion that can be drawn from the genealogical discussion of the 
PRSP framework above is that the impetus for change from structural adjustment to 
this new approach of development financing came from outside the communities 
and countries which the PRSPs are designed to affect. The planning, design, and 
implementation of the PRSP approach were consolidated in Washington DC, 
London, Brussels and Paris with little input from the participants of the framework. 
The imperatives for these conceptual and operational shifts in the delivery of 
development financing he outside the state-to-state negotiating structure and outside 
the democratic apparatus of accountability and transparency within the jurisdictions 
in which the framework is supposed to operate. 
Christiansen and Hovland's study of the historical narrative of the PRSP project and 
its tole in multilateral policy change found that there was little southern government 
input into the process of formulating the PRSP framework. They conclude: 'Other 
than some lirnited discussion at Executive Director level of the World Bank and 
IMF, the contribution of Southern governments was largely indirect, through the 
demonstration effect of poverty reduction programmes in practice. Countries named 
in this respect were Mozambique, Tanzania, Bolivia, and especially Uganda' 
(Christiansen with Hovland, 2003: 21). 
The overarching framework of the PRSP was thus designed and executed in the 
OECD countries, in consultation with northern-based NGOs, driven by 
organisational and political imperatives of the north. Even where the 'contribution' 
of southern governments has been recognised as a precipitating factor, this process 
was largely driven by large transnational NGOs". In Uganda for example, as noted 'in 
section 3.2.2 above, international NGOs played a key role in drafting the conceptual 
and operational framework for the PEAR According to Christiansen and Hovland, it 
was Oxfam. and the Ugandan government which initiated Uganda's first Participatory 
Poverty Assessment (PPA) that formed the backdrop for the PEAP process (ibid: 22 
-23). 
38 The role of these INGOs in the PRSP framework is considered in greater detail in Chapter Six. 
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The absence of genuine southern participation in the PRSP project's inception is 
significant when analysing the impact of the framework as a regulatory mechanism 
and as a mechanism for globalization. The lack of input from communities and states 
within this structure belies the true nature behind the rhetoric of PRSPs that the 
framework is premised on notions of ownersbip, parti6ipation, and Poverty redu"'fion. While 
the framework responds to some of the notions alluded to within its stated 
objectives, the origins of the PRSP approach not only impacts significantly on the 
pursuit of these goals, it questions the authenticity of its stated objectives. 
Ironically, the means through which the PRSP framework was conceived, negotiated 
and approved by the shareholding governments of the Bretton Woods institutions 
and subsequently adopted by these governments in their bilateral relationships with 
PRSP countries demonstrate the continued subservience of third world states and 
their communities to the political constituencies of the north. It also highlights the 
fundamental asymmetries of the decision-making structures of the World Bank and 
the IMF, as discussed in Chapter Two (see section 2.2.1. ) In that the weighted voting 
structure of the institutions enabled reforms to be approved in spite of significant 
opposition from countries to be affected by the changes and 'muted the voice of 
those members that knew most about the issue' (Rustomjee, 2006: 26). 
Cyrus Rustomjee, former Executive Director for a constituency of sub-Saharan 
African countries at the IMF, reveals that the decision to operationalise the PRSP 
was taken by the Executive Boards of the Bank and Fund 'during a key board 
meeting in December 1999' in spite of significant objections from developing 
country members, notably SSA countries, on the form and substance of the PRSP 
approach and the capacity of resource-strapped client governments to implement 
such an ambitious project (ibid). According to Rustomjee: 
Relevant and legitimate issues were raised regarding the pacing and 
phasing of the PRSPs, the need for different approaches to PRSP 
preparation, the lack of domestic capacity to prepare PRSPs in many 
countries, the lack of fiscal resources to give effect to the 
recommendations which PRSPs were likely to generate; diversion of 
policy-maker's efforts from other crucial activities, including their 
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macroeconomic reform efforts and their efforts to secure bilateral 
and multilateral debt relief Only a few of these objections were 
translated into amendments to the framework's inception (ibid). 
The absence of third world voices from the construction of the PRSP project 
highlights the colonial legacy of not just this particular policy instrument and its 
attendant regulatory framework but also of the larger architecture of aid, the impact 
of which continue to -resonate 
in the implementation of PRSPs and its financing 
instruments. It highlights what southern constituencies have criticised as a northern 
preoccupation with the technocratic nature of development and the aid architecture, 
a sense of 'tweaking' the systematic components rather than redressing the systemic 
flaws of the political and economic relations that underlie the aid system (Menocal 
and Rogerson, 2006: 7). 
The framing of the PRSP project in this context therefore demonstrates the extent 
that third world states and communities in the south continue to be the objects, as 
opposed to subjects, of the project of development. This is exacerbated, as we shall see 
below, by the legacy of state fragmentation left by structural adjustment in ex- 
SAP/current PRSP countries and the precedents established by adjustment reforms 
which legitimise the interventions of the actors central to the PRSP initiative. 
3.5. PRSPs and the Legacy of State Fragmentation 
The imposition of the PRSP with its significant interventions in target countries and 
implemented in a pohcymaking process that is set', by and large, by actors external to 
the country is indicative of the destructive legacy of structural adjustment policies on 
the constitution of the state in SAP countries and the resultant marginalisation of 
domestic structures of decision-making in the context of national planning and 
regulation and international engagement of these states. 
A critical impact of the disciplinary force of structural adjustment was the creation of 
a domestic political space that enabled the imposition of PRSP reforms. Efforts at 
restructuring the state that were pivotal to structural adjustment policies have 
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resulted in the dispersal of state autonomy which has paved the way for successful 
insertion of the PRSP framework in these countries. The legacies of structural 
adjustment on recipient states have paved the way for the successful insertion of the 
PRSP framework in these countries insofar that the negative governance externalities 
of SAPs provided the impetus for interventions and that the disciplinary framework 
provided the regulatory precedents for interventions. 
Two significant consequences of structural adjustment therefore have been both the 
concession of national regulatory authority to the international arena, resulting from 
the merging of domestic and international governance structures, and consequently, 
the fragmentation of state capacity, in terms of both economic reproduction and 
regulation, resulting from this shift in regulatory power. The 'successful' 
implementation of the PRSP framework is therefore a corollary to the 'successful' 
implementation of adjustment policies, a paradoxical heritage that is rarely 
represented in the discourse on the post-Washington Consensus architecture of aid. 
Internationalisation of Decision-Making 
Structural adjustment, as alluded to in Chapter Two and sections 3.1 and 3.2, 
legit4-nised policy reform as an objective of resource transfer and as a subject of 
financing. The introduction of 'policy-based' financing - based on a programme of 
structural reform In recipient countries as opposed to financing an earmarked project 
under traditional 'investment' financing - under SAPS not only marked a shift 'in the 
substance of development financing but also in the process of policyinaking in 
recipient countries. 
The design of structural adjustment had enabled the IFIs to permeate internal 
structures of recipient countries in ways that were not possible before. Where Bank 
and Fund bureaucrats previously possessed only the autonomy to dispense technical 
advice on (a) project implementation (in the case of the Bank) and (b) the domestic 
monetary and fiscal policy insofar as they impact on domestic economic stability and 
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international financial cooperation, SAPs endowed these institutions with the 
political capital to capture key policymaking spaces within the domestic economy" 
In doing so, SAPs had created a transnational regulatory -regime which has 
fragmented the internal sovereignty of states subject to its discipline and created what 
JayasUriYa terms 'polycentric legal orders' by internationalising specific state agencies 
and institutions - notably finance ministries, central banks and national financial 
regulatory authorities - which engage with the Bretton Woods institutions and which 
oversee domestic regulatory compliance, autonomously from other institutions of 
domestic governance (Gayasuriya, 1999 : 438 - 441). 
The importance of Bank and Fund signalling to external resource mobilisation for 
many countries has resulted in the creation of 'islands of sovereignty' (ibid: 439) 
within a state as the aforementioned state agencies linked into the larger global 
financial architecture begin to (and are encouraged to) operate autonomously from 
other parts of the government machinery in order to facilitate more effective policy 
dialogue with these institutions and enforce greater regulatory compliance with their 
policy prescriptions. This has created the development of 'transnationalized sectors' 
of the economy which operate in accordance 'to regulatory logics' imposed by 
external financial institutions and respond to the disciplinary imperatives of these 
institutions (Santos, 2006: 50), resulting in relocation of regulatory accountability to 
international rather than domestic governance structures. 
This reality is compounded, as we see below, by the internal fragmentation of state 
authority caused by the SAP reforms, notably the increasing reliance on external 
resources, financial and personnel, to carry out basic state functions. SAP policies to 
cut government expenditure (see below) has meant that many low-income countries 
are now dependent on aid to plug not only the fiscal gap in government but also the 
39 In Bangladesh, for example, the SAPRI report found that where financial sector reform was a core 
element of the structural adjustment package of the Bank and the Fund, measures were instituted to 
denationalise and privatise the banking sector and undertake reforms such as floating interest rates, 
abolishing 'directed lending to priority sectors, and instituting a raft of regulatory measures aimed at 
improving loan recovery, taking legal action against defaulters and strengthening bank supervision. 
At 
the same time, agricultural policy reform was being pursued, including measures to increase private 
sector involvement in the distribution of agricultural inputs, and a corresponding reduction in 
subsidies for such input, and to liberalise 
food grain exports and imports, and state-owned industrial 
enterprises, namely the jute sector, was 
denationalised and privatised (SAPRIN, 2004: 73,115 and 
134). 
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human resources gap, leaving many countries dependent on aid to fund civil service 
personnel. Consequently, in many SAP countries, donor influence is significant in 
public administration, with expatriate personnel, usually funded or seconded from 
bilateral aid agencies, occupying and often heading, key ministerial positions in 
government departments'. 
One of the implications of such dependence has been the Integration of donor 
policies, or what Harrison terms 'the international orthodoxy of reform', Mi domestic 
governance (Harrison, 2001b: 670; see Chapter Five), thereby translating aid 
dependency into policy leverage 41 . Another important consequence has been the 
emergence of non-traditional actors in the policymaking processes in SAP countries, 
including non-state actors and donors, as key players in the process of state 
reconfiguration, legitimised at the international level through their links with the 
institutions of global governance (see sections 3.3.3 and 3.5.2). 
Accordingly, it is not surprising that the reforms advocated by the constellation of 
actors responsible for the PRSP initiative have not been significantly challenged by 
the domestic constituencies it affects. Where the regulatory authority has been 
shifted to an external body and where domestic institutions are enmeshed in chains 
of resource dependency, the capacity for opposing a new disciplinary structure, 
initiated as it were within a discourse of political franchise, is geo-strategically and 
economically limited. 
3.5.2. The Retreat of the State 
The PRSP approach has taken toot in a political and economic vacuum in states 
where the apparatuses of governance and the functions of government have been 
weakened by successive onslaughts of structural adjustment reforms and where this 
40 Harrison notes, for example, that the Danish donor agency, DANIDA had 22 'advisors of one kind 
or another' within Uganda in 1998 and that numerous expatriate 'technical ai dvisors' held significant 
positions Within the decision-making structures of the Ugandan and Tanzanian governments during 
the 1990s (Harrison, 2001b: 670 - 671). 
41 'Technical assistance' therefore has often been used as an instrument of such leverage. A Ghanaian 
activist recounts, for example, the shock he had when he found out that a member of DFID had been 
placed in the Ghanaian delegation at the World Trade Organisation (WTO) ministerial meeting in 
Cancun, Mexico in 2003 as a condition for DFID funding the travel expenses of two Ghanaian civil 
servants on the delegation. This meant that an official from the UK government would be privy to 
sensitive information and strategising of the Ghanaian government prior to multilateral trade 
negotiations (conversation, 2004). 
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vacuum has been partially filled by private entities and agencies, most of them linked 
operationally to organisations external to the countries in which they operate. It 
follows then that the restructuring of state apparatuses under the PRSP framework 
reflects the interests and strategic locations of the parties which have gained 
ascendancy in political and policy circles resulting from the regulatory driving seat 
vacated by the state under structural adjustment. 
Reforms under SAPs were premised on the rationale that state intervention in the 
markets stagnated economic growth and created inefficiencies and distortions in the 
production and delivery of goods and services, and that the potential for 
development lay in the retreat of the state from economic activity through 
deregulation, privatisation and hberalisation of economic sectors and the removal of 
government support for domestic productive sectors. Meanwhile, the fiscal austerity 
of financial stabilisation programmes, with its ceilings on public expenditure and 
curbs on domestic monetary supply42, and the non-negodable debt service conditions 
led to a reduction in the resources that can be generated and spent by the 
government43. 
The imposition of such policies on developing countries has led to a steady erosion 
of the function of government in these countries. Removing the state from economic 
activity and curtailing government regulation of domestic economic sectors have 
served to circumscribe the role of government, leaving little left for governments - 
including those democratically elected to serve the interests of the electorate - to do 
except to enforce policies set for them by external parties and create an enabling 
environment in which foreign capital is free to operate. The SAPRIN report 
concluded that many of the negative social, economic and ecological impacts of 
SAPs were directly correlated with the declining role of the state in national 
policyrnaking, particularly in the undermining of the state's productive, 
redistributional and regulatory roles (SAPRIN, 2004: 222 - 223). 
42 'fhiS included caps on budget deficits and freezes or reductions in government expenditure levels, 
curbs on monetary supply in the domestic economy, including limits on domestic resource 
mobilisation through taxes, and the devaluation of national currencies (Rowden, 2004: 11; SAPRIN, 
2004: 176) 
43 For a detailed critique of the IMF's low-inflation targets and their impact on social sector spending, 
see Rowden, 2004. 
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This sentiment is echoed by Ghanaian economist and veteran activist Charles Abugre 
who contends that the neoliberal policies of structural adjustment programmes have 
precipitated what he calls 'a new crisis of the state' in countries affected by these 
policies, particularly those in sub-Saharan Africa, whereby the functions of 
government have been gradually eroded by successful adjustment programmes to the 
extent that there is no effective state left. He argues: 'As a result of the policies of 
structural adjustment, you have a situation in Africa now where there are good, active 
goi)ernments but hardly any space forgovernance' (Abugre, 2005b). 
This undermining of state capacity in countries under structural adjustment is 
worsened by the policies of decentralisation and accompanying reform of the public 
services sectors that have been pursued by the Bank and the Fund in recent years 
through SAPs and other lending instruments, such as Community-Driven 
Development projects and Output-Based Aid". The bypassing of central 
government under these circumstances further erodes the fiscal autonomy of the 
state and weakens administration of national government as a whole. The 
undermining of national budgetary and other administrative processes though 
policies of decentralisation not only results in inconsistent spending allocations and 
uneven coverage of public services and other state functions but also weakens 
political accountability and creates opportunities for interventions by other parties 
into the political affairs of the state. 
The replacement of government with private entities, such as NGOs and 
corporations, weakens the compact between the state and its citizens and creates the 
opportunity for the proliferating private, profit and non-profit sector to capture key 
policymaking spaces 45 . Many non-govern-mental, non-corporate entities working 
in 
the delivery of basic services M low-income countries are branches of large, 
northern-based INGOs who have, on the basis of the scale of their operations, 
demanded a larger voice in the policyrnaking processes, both in the local 
44 This development sees the locus of decision-making and financing for development projects, 
particularly for infrastructure development and service delivery, being transferred from national 
governments to the private sector with resources being transferred directly from aid agencies and 
financial institutions to sub-national governments and local communities and private entities. At the 
same time, sub-national governments were supposed to develop 
fiscal self-sufficiency and national 
governments are to refrain from transferring central government resources to such 
devolved entities 
or to 'bail out' insolvent or indebted sub-national governments 
(Alexander, 2003). 
45 Harrison, for example, highlights that in the mid-1990s, NGOs contributed 64 percent of the 
running costs of health services in 
Uganda (Harrison, 2001b: 668). 
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conununities and national governments, and at the locus of decision-making in the 
north. 
The influential role played by the NGO lobby in the formulation of the PRSP 
initiative, as highlighted in section 3.3, is significantly due to this increasingly 
prominent role they played in the development sector in developing countries in the 
period preceding the PRSP inception, notably through their 'increased presence at the 
grassroots as substitute providers of goods and services that governments were 
unable, due to constraints of SAPs discussed above3 to provide. 
International development NGOs in particular, such as Oxfam, World Vision, Save 
the Children and ActionAid, which have traditionally focused on discrete and 
disparate project work in developing countries soon recognised the importance of 
shifting policy perspectives to engender greater changes and have increasingly used 
their leverage to push for policy and operational reform at higher policyrnaking 
levels. As observed by Gould and Ojanen: 
A novel feature of the PRS is the extent to which a certain category 
of private, non-state actors have succeeded in legitimizing demands 
for inclusion in the direct exercise of decision-making power (Gould 
and Ojanen, 2003: 49). 
3.6. Conclusion 
PRSPs emerged in the fallout from structural adjustment programmes. In many ways, 
PRSPs can be viewed as mechanisms for the contalnment of the political and 
economic pressures that were building up as a result of the negative impact of SAPs 
in the 1980s and early 1990s and a response to the backlash against the neoliberal 
resurgence and western unilateralism that characterised international development 
policy and international law regulating access to development financing in the 1980s. 
These pressures were leading to a 'structural dilemma' of economic stagnation and 
negative impacts on social welfare in large tracts of the developing world and the 
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potential geo-strategic consequences that would follow in the event that such 
pressures were not addressed and managed. 
The temporal convergence between the institutional agendas of the Bretton Woods 
institutions and the geo-strategic need on the part of the northern countries - the 
'rule-makers 46 of the international economy and underwriters of concessional 
finance - to quell disquiet in the international economic order resulted in widespread 
support within the development financing community of the PRSP and its attendant 
financing 'instruments At the same time, the opportunities for operationalising the 
disciplinary framework of the PRSP project has also been facilitated by the state 
reorganisation that took place under structural adjustment. 
This chapter has demonstrated that while the PRSP approach shifted the conceptual 
approach of the multilateral development financing community, the conceptual 
changes that were brought about in response to the operational and political 
pressures faced by the dominant actors In the process, namely the institutional 
players - the World Bank and the IMF, and the G7 countries - and developed in 
collaboration with a cadre of transnational. NGO advocates 47 . These NGO actors 
have secured a space within the international development policyrnaking arena 
through their role in linking the epistemic coalition to the larger political platform, 
giving a voice to the discourses that need to be articulated. However, whether In 
doing so, this particular group of advocates have excluded necessary voices in their 
desire to privilege their own is a question that will be considered in later chapters. 
This chapter has further shown how the dominant actors Within the development 
financing connnunity have had the ability to absorb the narratives and counter- 
narratives and reshaped the conceptual framework of their operations to maintain 
their institutional and geo-political. hegemony within the international economic and 
legal order. Organisational theorist Miller-Adams who studied the World Bank's 
shifting agendas in the 1990s observes that 'one of the primary strategies of an 
organization is to 'buffer' its technical core from disturbances in the environment' 
and considers the appropriation of outside agendas and the cooptation of outside 
46 As opposed to the 'rule-takers', states who do not have the power to underwrite the norms of the 
international political economy and the legal rules which bind them (see FEggott, 2000: 142). 
47 The role of these INGOs will be considered in detail in Chapter Six. 
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elements as one of these strategies (Miller-Adarns, 1999: 17; 74). She argues that: 'By 
incorporating alien and sometimes hostile elements into their decision-i-naking 
structure, organizations are able to defuse external opposition to their activities' 
(MiUer-Adams, 1999: 74). 
In this regard, the conceptual changes wrought by the PRSP framework in relation to 
the operational and regulatory framework of international development financing 
may be viewed as a means of organisational survival, a necessary systemic change to 
ensure the maintenance of the status quo. Consequently, as other observers have 
suggested, this incorporation 'reflects a conscious political containment strategy' 
(Pincus and Winters, 2000: 1) by an institution famous for its periodic *invention (the 
World Bank) and an institution forced to incorporate the political demands of its 
major shareholders in the face of external pressures (the IMF). 
This is turn was driven by the impetus to control potentially 'insurgent nation states 
in the south in the face of dissonance within the international political economy and 
in the face of the diminished capacity of existing disciplinary instruments, such as 
structural adjustment programmes, to contain an incipient revolt. At the same time, 
the PRSP framework tackles the danger of 'primodiahsm' that accompany these 
countries' insertion into the system - the potentially disruptive force of an inclusion 
into the international economic order of countries whose domestic regulatory 
apparatuses lack the maturity and sophistication to perform the disciplinary and 
redistributive functions of a state that is imperative to govern and mitigate the effects 
of an integrated market economy. 
The conceptual and operational emphasis of 'country ownership', cpartnership', 
'participation' and 'poverty reduction' of the PRSP framework serves a dual purpose 
in providing the incentive for southern states to remain in the international system 
and instituting the requisite discipline to regulate this continued participation by 
providing the framework for states to diffuse internal opposition and alleviate the 
social and economic dislocations of economic globalization. 
However, far from reflecting a break with the relationships of power and control that 
underpinned the structural adjustment programmes, the PRSP framework represents 
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instead continuity with the dynamics of difference that characterised the conceptual 
and operational policies under structural adjustment. The need to reconstruct the 
state through the imposition of a participatory process of pohcytnaking that engages 
the government in discussion with the citizenry and the reassertion of state 
autonomy through the representational practice of 'ownership' of development 
policy can only be evidence of how state authority, state autonomy and state activity 
have been curtailed by the policies of structural adjustment and the practice of 
control exerted by the international financial institutions in pursuit of these policies. 
Locating the genesis of the PRSP framework within this crisis of legitimacy 'in the 
international economic and political order enables us to critically consider how the 
project that discursively represents a progressive agenda for change - in the rhetoric 
of 'poverty reduction', 'participation' and 'partnership' - is conversely retrogressive in 
its disciplinary force. It enables us to situate the framework within its wider 
objectives of enforcing multilateral disc* line on terms of engagement established by IP C), CP 
hegemonic state and non-state actors in the postcolonial world economy and how 
such a framework revises the rules of international economic law. 
This evolution in the mechanisms of discipline in development financing is illustrated 
more starkly when examining the shift in the modalities of regulation under structural 
adjustment to the new disciplinary framework of the PRSPs, notably through the 
PRSP approach's impact on one of the most significant regulatory impacts of 
structural adjustment - the emergence of policy conditionality as a regulatory 
instrument and its development as a mechanism of economic governance. The 
following chapter considers how the disciplinary force of the PRSP initiative is 
translated through a corresponding revision of the modalities of conditionahty for 
development financing. 
Chapter Four 
Chapter Four 
'Ownership' as Conditionality: PRSPs and the 
Evolution of Conditional Financing 
The cbieffunction of the disciplinag power is to 'train, ratber than to select and to lezy; or no 
doubt, to train in order to lezy and select all the more ... The success of disciplinagpoxer derives no 
doubt m the use of sim ir fro ple instruments: hierarchical observation, normaIi#qjudTment, and the * 
combination in a procedure that is spe6ific to it - the examination. ' 
Micbel Foucault, Discipline and Punisb (in Rabinow (ed), 199 1) 
'Country ownership' is a key pillar of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 
framework. This prioritisation of 'country-owned' strategies in the negotiations for 
development financing including engendering a broad-based participatory 
policymaking process is considered a hallmark of the PRSP approach, 
distinguishing it from previous modalities of financing and signifying part of a wider 
conceptual shift in development policy and practice. 
In this respect, the principle of 'ownership' is regarded as the opposite of the 
doctrine of 'conditionality' - as a conceptually and operationally divergent 
mechanism for regulating relationships between the disbursers of development 
financing, notably the World Bank and the IMF, and their client states. 'Ownership' 
is perceived of as a departure from the practice of 'condidonahty' associated with 
structural adjustment financing, in which the behaviour of states - with particular 
reference to national economic pohcyrnaking and development planning - is 
governed by the financing terms set by the financiers. 
Conventional critiques of the PRSP approach, including reviews by Bank and Fund 
evaluation offices, have therefore often centred on considerations of the tension 
between the conceptual objectives of the PRSP framework - the engendermg of 
ownership of national policies - with the restraining instrument of conditionality. 
These conflicts, along with evidence demonstrating the clear disjuncture between the 
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policies articulated in PRSP documents and the financing instruments that these 
documents inform, lead to the conclusion that the PRSP framework - inserted as it 
is into the dynamics of an unequal relationship between parties to the initiative - 
does not reflect a genuine shift in the modus operandi of the financing institutions and 
the international aid regime. 
This chapter contends that the PRSP framework does represent a marked shift in the 
mechanisms of aid regulation, but conversely, it does so in terms of the impact it has 
had in entrenching conditionality as a mechanism for regulation. In examining this 
shift, I argue that the principle of 'ownership' must be situated within the continuum 
of the conditionality doctrine rather than be perceived of as a break in the evolution 
of this regulatory instrument. Locating the concept of 'ownership' within the 
evolutionary history of conditionality enables us to examine the significance of the 
PRSP approach within the constitution of global governance and international law 
through an analysis of its impact on one of the most important regulatory 
mechanisms of the postcolonial era. 
This chapter contends that the principle of 'ownership' as articulated under the PRSP 
framework and the accompanying 'new architecture of aid' must not be conflated 
with the principle of policy autonomy which is clearly conceptually divergent from 
the doctrine of conditionality. Rather, 'ownership' should be viewed as an extension 
and refinement of the doctrine of conditionality which has, over the decades since 
the inception of the Bretton Woods institutions, evolved to alter not only the 
relationships between the Bank and Fund and their borrowing members, but also to 
reshape these members' engagement M the wider global economy. The progressive 
entrenchment of conditionality as a regulatory instrument thus facilitated the 
emergence of the BWls as the powerful institutions of postcolonial economic 
governance alluded to M Chapter Two. 
The emergence of the principle of 'ownership' within the framework of the PRSPs 
and the new modalities of development financing therefore reflects the refinement of 
a specific instrument of disciplinary control over postcolonial economies that 
has 
evolved in tandem with the econon-Lic and geo-strategic 
imperatives in the 
international. order. I argue here that the fundamental objectives of conditionality as 
it 
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has developed have not changed with the introduction of the PRSP approach. 
Instead, the modalifid of conditionality have substantially altered, representing a 
deeper and more intrusive form of disciplinary control that has produced new 
mechanisms for controlling and restructuring the state apparatuses in the third world. 
4.1. Deconstructing Conditionality 
'Conditionality' represents the regulatory aspect of the relationship between parties 
involved in international sovereign financing, most notably between the World Bank 
and the IMF and their client states. While the doctrine of conditionality shares similar 
characteristics with other contractual instruments, the nature and practical 
application of conditionality is largely peculiar to the nature of the relationship it 
regulates and to the type of financing that is being regulated. The disciplinary force 
of conditionality extends beyond the privity of regular contractual relationships, 
derived not exclusively (and often not primarily) from standard contractual sanctions 
but from the wider economic and geo-political impact of non-comphance. 
4.1.1. Conditionality versus Conditions for Financing 
Like other contractual financing obligations, the principle of conditionality contains a 
fiduciary component requiring the performance of due diligence on the part of the 
financing institutions to minimise the risk of a debt default or a departure from 
agreed financing objectives. However, the scope and scale of this exercise under the 
doctrine of conditionality is far greater and much more intrusive than undertaken in 
conventional contractual relationships. 
This is reflective not only of the disproportionate gap in bargaining power involved 
between the donor/lender and the client/borrower but also of the disciplinary 
objective of development financing as a whole, that is, to compel the client state to 
undertake domestic reforms in pursuit of objectives - social, economic or political - 
of the financier state or financing institution. The World Bank itself acknowledges 
conditionality's disciplinary force, admitting that conditionality 'is involved whenever 
. 
rhese are the tools or Instruments of conditionality, each of which 'provide a specific way of linking 1- 
INIF [and World Bank] financing to policy implementation' qMF, 2002a: para 35). 
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the donor has the right to halt the flow of -resources 
if the recipient country does not 
meet certain conditions' (World Bank, 2005q: 2). 
'Conditionality' must be distinguished from 'conditions of financing' in the context 
of development financing agreements. 'Conditionality' refers to conditions which 
regulate the aspect of the econonuc programme or specific institutional or structural 
reforms that is being financed by the financing agency or institution, either at the 
national or sectoral level. Such programme or policy conditionalities are not specified 
in the legal agreements for financing but are, instead, incorporated by reference in 
such contracts (see discussion below; also Tan, 2006c: 14, Box 2). These may include 
prior actions and tranche release conditions for the Bank and performance criteria 
and programme reviews for the Fund (see Box 1). 
In contrast, 'conditions for financing' comprise of the terms of the legal agreement 
between the financing entity and the client state, including financial conditions 
pertaining to the repayment period, loan charges, interest rate, procedures for loan 
withdrawals and policies on cancellation and dispute settlement provisions 2 (Tan, 
2006c: 18; Agarwal, 2000: 1- 9). In policy-based loans, this will also include a 
covenant referring to the 'programme' of policy reform or stabilisation that is being 
financed and an undertaking by the client state that it shall implement such a 
programme in exchange for financing' (Tan, 2006c: 14, Box 2). 
Failure to comply with such policy or programme conditionality win not necessarily 
mean a breach of a legal covenant but may be considered evidence of such a breach 
if the financing institution deems it fundamental to the agreement (see for example, 
Shihata, 2000a: 14 - 21). From a legal perspective therefore, a 
borrower does not 
usually breach a legal obligation should it fail to comply with policy conditionalities. 
Instead, the penalty would be the non-disbursement of funds under the loan (World 
Bank, 2005c: 1, para 1). 
2 This does not apply to funds drawn from the IMF' 'general resources' as these are not considered 
'loans' per se (see section 5.2.1 below).. 
3 For example, the Ugandan PRSC Agreement, dated 5 July 2001, provides 
in Article III, Section 3 
that 'the Borrower undertakes to implement the Program with due diligence to ensure that actions and 
policies adopted under the Program are put into effect' With the program of actions attached in 
Annex 
2 of the agreement (Republic of 
Uganda, Article III, Section 3.01 (a)). 
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Examples of Programme Conclitionalities 
The form and substance of conditionality varies from institution to institution but the following 
are example of what the World Bank and IMF consider core programme conditionalities. These 
conditionalities are incorporated by reference in the legal agreement (for all Bank loans) or 
financing arrangement (for IMF drawings). Non-compliance may result in a suspension of 
disbursements. 
Prior Actions: Policy actions or measures to be adopted by the client government before 
approval of a loan or financing arrangement by the Bank or Fund Executive Boards or, in the 
case of the IMF, before the granting of a waiver of a performance criteria. Prior actions are 
commonly used in programmatic lending where a series of single-tranche loans are disbursed 
in accordance to a medium-term expenditure framework. Poverty Reduction Strategy Credits 
(PRSCs) are examples of programmatic lending (see section 4.6 below). 
" Tranche Release Con&tions- Policy actions which must be implemented before 
disbursement of each tranche of a standard multi-tranche loan by the World Bank. The Bank 
Executive Board may grant a waiver of conditions subject to circumstances. 
" Performance Criteria: The IMF's equivalent of a tranche release condition. An IMF 
programme may be suspended (or go 'off track') if performance criteria are not met. 
Compliance with performance criteria may be waived by the IMF Executive Board under 
certain circumstances. 
" Programme ReTdews: The IMF conducts regular reviews of adjustment programmes it 
finances to assess if the programme is on track, taking into account the member's observance 
of other conditionalities. Conditionalities may be modified or new policy actions imposed as 
an outcome of a programme review (see section 4.6 below). 
In addition to the binding conditionalities above, the Bank and Fund also impose other conditions 
on their clients. These are not formally classified as 'conditionalities' as they may not be loan- 
specific and/or are not formally detern-unative of disbursements. 
Td-&-aers- Triggers are what the Bank considers policy 'expectations' which inform the Bank's 
decision to lend. Implementation of Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) triggers inform the 
Bank's lending portfolio to a particular country while triggers in programmatic operations, 
along With outcome conditions, form the basis of the Bank's decision to proceed with the 
second loan in the series and can form the prior actions for the second loan. 
Benchmarks: Benchmark measures are 'milestones' or standards against which a country's 
performance under a programmatic operation is measured at the Bank. Like triggers, they are 
not tied to disbursements but can be used to inform future lending decisions and form prior 
actions for the next loan. Structural benchmarks are used in IMF programmes to assess 
country's compliance with policy actions in programme reviews, along With indicative 
targets. 
Source: LAIF, 2002; Vorld Bank, 2005f, Wlood, 2005b. 
Box 1: Example of Programme Conditionalities 
4.1.2. IMF Conditionality 
IMF conditionality applies to aR its financing arrangements. VA-Lile the use of 
conditionality is not unique to Fund operations, the IMF may be regarded as the 
originator of conditionality as we know it today. This is ironic giVen that the link 
between the policies of a Fund member and access to its resources was rejected at its 
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founding conference at Bretton Woods in 1944 for fear of jeopardising members' 
access to financial resources 4. In spite of its initial rejection, the process of ratcheting 
up conditionality started soon after the conclusion of negotiations at the behest of 
the US government (Akydz, 2004: 19; Woods, 2006: 25). The principle of 
conditionality was adopted by the IMF's Executive Board on 13 February 1952 
which, while reiterating that resources should not be denied to members in 
ctemporary' financial difficulties, stated for the first time that in disbursing the 
resources, 'the Fund should pay attention to a member's general creditworthiness, 
particularly its record with the Fund' (IMF, 1952, emphasis added)5. 
In their consideration of this aspect of conditionahty, Mosley et al conceive of 
conditionality as 'a side condition designed to ensure the execution of a contraa') the 
contract being that of a lending agreement between the financing party and the 
financ6e (Mosley et al, 1991: 66). The authors contend that unlike conventional 
financing contracts, the international financial institution involved in lending to 
sovereign states does not have much in a way of guarantee in the event of debt 
default because there is no practice of collateral lending in international finance. 
Conditionality therefore serves as 'a substitute for collateral' by 'increasing the 
likelihood of loan repayment' through policy reform and monitoring of compliance 
with such reforms, thereby 'giving the lender an early warning of potential repayment 
difficulties' (ibid). 
The 1952 provisions were extended and codified in the Fund's constitution by the 
First Amendment to the Articles of Agreement in 19696 - Notably, Article V was 
amended to constitutionally mandate the use of conditionality in Fund financing. It now 
reads: 
4 US negotiators at the conference had advocated for the Fund to be invested with wide discretion to 
impose conditions on the use of Fund resources but UK negotiators, led by economist John Maynard 
Keynes, argued for full automaticity in Fund financing along the lines of a rule-based international 
credit union. The fear was that a highly discretionary regime 'would give the Uni'ted States too much 
control over the use of the Fund's resources' and hence, impeded access to funds by other countries 
(Woods, 2006: 25). 
5 This consideration should include: 'the member's records of prudence in drawing, its willingness to 
offer voluntary repayment when its situation permitted, and its promptness in fulfilling the obligation 
to transmit monetary reserves data and in discharging repurchase obligations' jMF, 1952). 
6 The revised Article I of the Articles of Agreement now states that the purposes of the IMF include 
giving 'confidence to members by making general resources of the Fund temporarily available to them 
guards, thus providing them with opportunity to correct maladjustments in their under adequate sqfiý 
balance of payments without resorting to measures destructive of national or international prosperity' 
JMF Articles of Agreement, Article 1, Section (y), emphasis added). 
117 
Chapter Four 
Section 3. Conditions governing use of the Fund's general resources 
(a) The Fund shall adopt policies on the use of its general resources 
... that will assist members to solve their balance of payments 
problems in a manner consistent with the provisions of this 
Agreement and that will establish adequate sqfiýguards for the temporary 
use of the general resources of the Fund gMF Articles of Agreement, 
Article V, Section 3(a), emphasis added). 
The IMF membership has since interpreted this provision as one delegating authority 
to the institution to implement its own policies to ensure that funds are disbursed 'in 
accordance with their fiduciary objectives under the Articles of Agreement. The 
Fund has subsequently implemented this through the issuance of guidelines on the 
modalities and practice of conditionality in general, such as the Guidelines on 
Conditionality and the conditions established under the special disbursement 
instruments, such as the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) Trust 
Instrument JMF, 2001 a: Box 2). 
The IMF's revised Guidelines on Conditionality 2002 reaffinned that the purpose 
of conditionality is to ensure that Fund resources provided to members needing 
financial assistance is utilised 'in a manner that is consistent with the Fund's Articles 
and that establishes adequate safe guards for the temporary use of the Fund's resources' 
(IMF, 2002b: para 1, emphasis added). As such, a member's application for Fund 
assistance 'will be approved only, if the Fund is satisfied that the member's program I's 
consistent n4tb the Fund's provisions and poliiies and that it will be carried out, and in 
particular that the member is sufficiently, committed to implement theprogramme' (IMF, 2002b: 
para 5, emphasis added). 
The exercise of conditionality is therefore governed by the provisos contained in 
these documents and in Executive Board decisions on financing arrangements for 
individual countries rather than by the constitutional provisions of the Fund's 
Articles of Agreement. Over the years, this discretionary authority has been 
strengthened5 in tandem with the increasing power asymmetries at the Fund (see 
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Chapter Two, section 2.2.2), to the extent that constitutional oversight is limited, if 
not non-existent, in the practice of conditionality, contrary to the initial objectives of 
conditionality. 
4.1.3. World Bank Conditionality 
For the World Bank, conditionality is synonymous with policy-based lending as it is 
through this form of financing that conditionality was first introduced at the 
institution (see World Bank, 2005f: 2, para 5). The advent of structural adjustment 
lending changed the landscape of development financing by disbursing credit for 
policy reform ('adjustment) in the borrowing states as opposed to lending to fund 
specific development projects (see section 4.2.2. below; also World Bank, 2005f.: 
para 
Approval of financing in the form of structural adjustment loans - now known as 
development policy loans - hinged on two preconditions: 1) the country was 
anticipating or experiencing balance of payments problems, necessitating 'rapidly 
disbursing' external financing; and 2) the country's government was agreeable to a 
programme of policy reform or 'adjustment' in return for financing (Shihata, 2000a: 
377; World Bank, 2005f: 1, paras 1- 2). Conditionality was brought into play to 
monitor country compliance with the latter programme of reform. 
Mosley et al distinguish World Bank conditionality from the IMF's rationale for 
conditionality on this basis. The authors argue that unlike the IMF's basis for 
administering conditionality - serving as a collateral substitute - the purpose of 
conditionality in the Bank policy-based lending is not to increase the likelihood of 
loan repayment but rather as a means of administering reforms to remove 'policy- 
induced obstacles' to wider developmental objectives, notably economic growth 
(Mosley et al, 1991: 66 - 67). Although this objective has been revised in the 
switchover from adjustment lending to development policy lending to encompass 
goals such 'poverty reduction', the core purpose of policy-based loans remains the 
same, that is, to 'support a program of policy and institutional actions' (World Bank, 
2004e: para 2). 
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This is reflected in the Bank's operational policy on policy-based loans today. The 
new Operational Policy on Development Lending (OP 8.60) restated the 
provisions in the substituted Operational Directive on Adjustment Lending (OD 
8.60) which enables the Bank to specify 'which policy and institutional actions by the 
country are critical for the implementation and expected results of the program 
supported by the development policy loan' (World Bank, 2005e: para 15). While 
reiterating that there is 'no formal definition of 'conditionality' in the institution's 
legal framework or operational policy or procedures, the Bank's legal department has 
adopted the three requirements stipulated in OP 8.60 as 'essential conditions' for 
loan disbursements that are 'appropriately reflected in the legal agreement for these 
operations' (World Bank, 2005f. 4, para 9). 
The OP 8.60, which governs all Bank interactions with client countries on the issue, 
states that disbursements of policy-based loans are contingent upon: 1) the 
maintenance of an adequate macroeconomic policy framework'; 2) implementation 
of the overall program in a manner satisfactory to the Bank; and 3) compliance with 
critical policy and institutional actions (World Bank, 2005e: para 13; World Bank., 
2005f: 3, para 9). In this manner, conditionality serves as 'triggers' for financial 
disbursements from the Bank, the non-compliance of which will halt such transfers. 
Policy Regulation 
The combination of the policy reform content of conditionality and the link between 
such policy prescriptions has lead Kalderimis to conclude that the practice of 
conditionality is a form of 'regulation by appropriation' (Kalderimis, 2004: 105) 
whereby regulatory norms are insetted into a )urisdiction - in this case, within a 
country subject to conditionality - outside conventional arenas of norm-creation. 
Accordingly, Braithwaite and Drahos view 'conditionality' as 'an enabling principle' - 
an operationalising mechanism through which 'states which are subject to it have to 
accept and institutionalize other principles ... in a range of regulatory domains' 
(Braithwaite and Drahos, 2000: 525). 
7 The satisfaction of this criteria is usually demonstrated by a country's satisfactory implementation of 
an IMF programme, such as a PRGF. (World Bank, 2005e: para 13; World Bank, 2005f: 3, para 9). 
8 For example, conditionahties may trigger states' adoption of principles of deregulation and 
hberalisation in regulatory domains such as trade or labour treaties (Braithwaite and Drahos, 2000: 
525). 
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Conditionality is therefore primarily a means of regulating the behaviour of the party 
in receipt of financing through the terms of credit disbursement, including the 
securing of compliance with certain performance criteria, and/or a programme of 
measures prior to or after the disbursement of funds from the financing party (Buira, 
2003: 3; Kalderimis, 2004: 103). Some of these criteria and policies may be relevant 
to the technical exercise of due diligence on the part of the financing institutions or 
agencies, but, as this and following chapters demonstrate, most of the requirements 
set in these arrangements go beyond standard financial obligations to include changes 
in government policy and institutional reform. 
The penalty for non-adherence to these terms of financing is the withdrawal of 
financing and/or ineligibility for further financing, as well as the attendant 
consequences of this withdrawal of support, including the effect this has on the 
borrower's credit rating M the international capital markets and/or other bilateral and 
multilateral development financiers resulting from the signalling role of the IMF and 
World Bank (see Chapter Two; also Babb and Buira, 2004: 14). Conditionality 
therefore acts as a mechanism for policy leverage - 'a tool by which a country is 
made to adopt specific policies or to undertake certain reforms that it would not 
have undertaken, *in exchange for support' (Buira, 2003: 3; see also Wood, 2004: 11; 
Morrissey, 2004: 1). 
It is this wide regulatory impact - the impact of conditions of lending outside the 
subject of the loans - which not only differentiates the doctrine of conditionality 
from conventional contractual principles but which also represents the source of 
contention with conditionality. For Braithwaite and Drahos, as 'global regulatory 
norms [tend to] follow self-regulatory practice', the instrument of conditionality may 
therefore be viewed as activating the globalization of regulatory norms through 
promoting the operation of such norms or principles in the countries under its 
jurisdiction (Braithwaite and Drahos, 2000: 491,525). Accordingly, conditionality 
functions as an instrument of economic coercion deployed by the Bank and the 
Fund, on behalf of its powerful members, to pursue the globalization of economic 
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regulation by tying financial disbursement to compliance with prescribed regulatory 
business norms (ibid: 525 - 535)'. 
The intensification of this regulatory role and the BWIs' progressive encroachment 
into areas outside their original mandate through the use of conditionality are central 
to contemporary critiques of conditionality. Over the years, conditionality has 
evolved into an important means of facilitating the roles of the Bank and Fund as 
intermediaries between third world states and the international arena, emerging not 
only as a default mechanism for regulating the relationship between the BWIs and IL-Y C)I 
their borrowers, but also as an instrument of economic governance. 
4.2. Conditionality as a Default Regulatory Instrument 
The emergence of conditionality as a default mechanism for regulating the 
relationship between the BWls and their clients stems largely from the Bank and 
Fund's reluctance to employ full or, in the case of the IMF, an y, contractual force in 
their policy-based financing arrangements with members. While the rationale for this 
reluctance and its operational effect differs between the two institutions, the outcome 
has been the progressive intensification of conditionality as a mode of regulation and 
a corresponding expansion of the regulatory scope of conditionality. 
The consequence of these developments has been the construction of a highly 
discretionary regime of financing, relying on the supervision of client states by an 
army of trained and expert staff With correspondingly few fixed rules of guidance 
(Woods, 2006: 25 - 26) and fewer constitutional limitations on the decision-making 
powers conferred on Bank and Fund bureaucrats. For Woods, this discretion 
accorded to the Bank and the Fund not only gave the US, as the major shareholder, a 
9 As discussed in Chapter One, Braithwaite and Drahos examine the phenomenon of global business 
regulation through the interplay between the principles contested in this process of globalization, the 
actors involved in this contest, and the mechanisms used by various actors to universally embed 
pursued principles (see Chapter One, section 1.3; also Braithwaite and Drahos, 2000: 15 - 33). 'Ille 
ability of hegemonic actors, notably powerful state actors, to weave webs of rewards and coercion is 
fin ig or 'forei critical to the globalization of particular regulatory norms. Development ancin, gn aid' is a 
significant and powerful instrument of reward and coercion, with it functioning both as a means of 
(raising the expected value of compliance' With prescribed regulatory reforms ('reward') and as a 
means of reducing the expected value of non-comphance' ('coercion') (see Braithwaite and Drahos, 
2000: 550 - 559). 
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measure of influence over the financing policies of the institution, 'it also cast a large 
role' for the technocrats at the institutions in their advisory role to the Executive 
Boards in determining how and what conditions are imposed on borrowing countries 
(Woods, 2006: 27) without the necessary checks and balances on such discretion. 
4.2.1. Evolution of IMF Conditionality: From Automaticity to Conditional 
Financing 
The use of conditionality as a mechanism for regulating the relationship between the 
IMF and its borrowing member states intensified largely as a result of the IMF's 
traditional refusal to classify Fund arrangements - notably funding from the General 
Resources Account (GRA) "- as conventional contracts, in deference to its 
founders' original design for an international credit union and in recognition of the 
source of such financing and the Fund's constitutional obligation under Article 1(v) 
to provide counter-cyclical financing to members facing financial difficulties (IMF, 
2001b: 83 19 - 21; see also discussion in section 4.1.2). 
Funds in the GRA are drawn from a repository of members' currencies lodged with 
the Fund through quota subscriptions or via standby credit arrangements with 
members' central banks" and as such, drawing upon Fund resources by member 
countries to meet balance of payments deficits can therefore be construed as akin to 
asserting a right as an IMF member to draw upon funds to which it contributed under 
the terms of the IMF's constitutional charter. The 'language of credit' is therefore 
absent in the construction of IMF agreements as a result of the founding ethos of the 
institution to treat as a right, this automaticity of financing under the Articles of 
Agreement (Aky-dz, 2004: 13). 
10 T'he GRA is the principal account through which the IMF transacts with its membership. It is made 
up of 'a pool of currencies and reserve assets built up from members' fully Paid capital subscriptions 
in the form of quotas' JMF, 2001b: 19; see also Figure 3). Members 'borrow' from the GRA under a 
complicated 'purchase-repurchase' mechanism which sees members 'purchasing' the reserve assets 
from the IMF with its own currency and repaying the 'loan' by 'repurchasing' its own currency from 
the IMF with the reserve assets subject to a rate of interest JMF, 2001b: 21). Resources in the GRA 
are supplemented by borrowings by the IMF from official lenders under 
both the General 
Arrangements to Borrow (GAB) and New Arrangements to Borrow (NAB) with a group of 11 
industrialised and 25 industrialised and emerging market economies respectively 
(ibid: 72 - 73; see also 
Woods, 2006: 30 - 32). 
11 See GAB and NAB, ibid. 
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The revised Guidelines on Conditionatity 2002 thus reaffirmed the decision made 
in the original Guidelines on the Use of the IMF's General Resources and 
Stand-By Arrangements 1979, stating that: 
A Fund arrangement is a decision of the Executive Board by which a 
member is assured that it will be able to make purchases or receive 
disbursements from the Fund in accordance with the terms of the 
decision during a specified period and up to a specified amount. Fund 
arrangements are not international agreements and therefore Ian-aua-ae C:? C? 
having contractual connotation will be avoided in arrangements and in 
program documents ýMF, 2002b: para 9, emphasis added). 
Accordingly, a member's use of Fund's resources should be governed by the 
provisions of its constitution so as to represent its obligations to the membership of 
states that the institution represents, rather than by contractual terms entered into 
between itself and the institution as a bureaucracy. However, as suggested by former 
IMF general counsel, Joseph Gold, it is this difficulty with defining breaches and 
administering penalties for breaches of the Fund's Articles of Agreement that has 
led to the creation of facilities such as the Stand-By Arrangements 12 and the resulting 
mechanism of conditionality to regulate the behaviour of members and meet the 
institution's fiduciary obligations under the charter without recourse to contractual 
terminology (Gold, 1996: 343 - 355). 
Although the IMF's Articles of Agreement enables the IMF to limit or suspend 
members' access to its general resources under Article V, Section 5 (for using funds 
(in a manner contrary to the purposes of the Fund), Article VI, Section 1 (for using 
funds to meet a large or sustained outflow of capital') or under Article XXV1, 
Section 2(a) (for failure to fulfil any obligations' in the charter), there is ambiguity as 
to the interpretations of these provisions. Here, the difficulty in prescribing uniform 
criteria for establishing what measures are adequate to constitute a fulfilment of a 
12 Stand-By Arrangements are used by members wishing to draw beyond their reserve tranche 
(equivalent to 25 percent of their quota) or, in other words, drawing in the upper credit tranches 
(members can draw up to 100 percent of their quota). These are arrangements in which the IMF 
assures the member of its ability to draw beyond its reserve tranche subject to the terms of the 
Executive Board decision to extend this line of credit (Iý, 2001b: 41). The terms of the Executive 
Board decision are what constitutes the policy conditionalities of each particular credit. 
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member's obligations under the respective provisions - such as what constitutes 
appropriate use under Article V, Section 5- has led to the reluctance on the part of 
Fund members to consider failure to comply with financing conditions as a breach of 
a member's constitutional obligations (Gold, 1996: 345). 
Regulation of a member's economic policies vis-ý-vis its obligation to the Fund and 
its constitution therefore turned to a less legalistic regime of conditionality as a 
mechanism was needed to act as fiduciary instrument. This instrument had to ensure 
that resources ftorn the Fund are utilised in accordance with its mandate but Without 
the penalty of a constitutional violation should this obligation not be fulfilled. SBAs 
were introduced so that a programme of economic adjustment could be designed 
prior to disbursement of resources and that disbursement was made contingent upon 
the falfilment of the conditions of the program design. 
Countries who wish to borrow from the Fund beyond their reserve tranche" would 
have to submit a Letter of Intent (LOI) and/or a Memorandum of Economic and 
Financial Policy (MEFP) stipulating policy measures the country authorities will 
undertake in return for financial assistance JMF, 2002b: para 10; see Figure 3) 14 . 
This programme of economic adjustment constitutes the basis for considering the 
country's eligibility to draw from the Fund, implemented through an Executive 
Board decision constituting the financing arrangement, with conditionality serving as 
the means of enforcing compliance with the aforementioned policy reforms. 
Consequently, the practice of conditionality has gradually eroded the automaticity of 
Fund financing over time. Commentators have suggested that the extensive use of 
conditionality policies as a regulatory mechanism has curtailed any real sense of 
entitlement of an IMF member country to draw beyond its reserve tranche, with the 
focus shifting progressively towards the content of conditionality policies rather than 
13See ibid. 
14These documents are supposedly 'prepared by the country authorities, with the cooperation and 
assistance of the Fund staff JMF, 2002b: para 10) but, as discussed in earlier chapters, it is the IMEF 
that determines the major portion of the content of the policies contained in these documents. In fact, 
the IMF admits that country authorities 'generally do not write the first draft of the LOP although 
they may participate in designing the programme or contribute towards the redrafting of the 
document JMF, 2005c: para 79). However, the Fund does not view this as 'a source of significant 
concern' as this did not mean there was no policy dialogue between the IMF and the borrowing 
country - 'it is clear that the task of document production is less important than the central work of 
program design' (ibid). 
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on the role of conditionality (Kalderimis, 2004: 115; Lowenfeld, 2002: 513 - 514; see 
also Akyuz, 2004: 19 - 21). As Kalderimis notes, 'most of the debate now centres on 
the meaning of 'adequate safeguards' in Article 1 (v) / Article V (3) (a)', reserving the 
right for the IMF to require conditions for use of its credit and to determine what 
those conditions should be (Kalderimis, 20004: 115). 
Trust Funds and Concessional Financing 
The evolution from automatic to conditional financing at the IMF has been 
reinforced by the introduction of concessional financing via trust funds in the late 
1970s (see section 4.3.1 below). The Second Amendment of the Articles of 
Agreement in 1979 conferred upon the IMF the power to grant concessional loans 
to low-income countries under Article V, Section 2 (b) which provides that: 'If 
requested, the Fund may decide to perform financial and technical services, including 
the administration of resources contributed by members, that are consistent with the 
purposes of the Fund"' JMF Articles of Agreement; see also Gold, 1996: 368 - 369) 
A significant distinction between financing under the IMF's General Resources 
Account and financing under the concessional lending trusts is the treatment of the 
legal status by the Fund of the financing agreement between the IMF and the 
borrowing member states under the two types of financing. Conversely from SBAs 
and other arrangements to borrow from the general resources, financing from the 
trust funds - such as from the PRGF Trust (formerly the ESAF Trust) or from the 
16 Exogenous Shocks Facility (ESF) - are clearly defined as 'loans' 
The contractual language in these financing instruments has, once again, toots in the 
nature and source of such financing. Unlike financing from the general resources, 
financing from the PRGF or the ESF involves drawing on funds that have not been 
contributed by the borrowers themselves but rather are 'loans' from other sources, 
15 This confirmed the legality of the IMF's Trust Fund established in 1976 for the same purpose but 
originally under an implied power (see Gold, ibid). '1he Trust Fund was replaced by the Structural 
Adjustment Facility (SAF) in 1986 and then by the ESAF in 1989, the precursor to today's PRGF. 
16 Section 1(1) of the Instrument to Establish the PRGF Trust states that: `1he Trust shall assist 
in fulfilling the purposes of the Fund by providing loans on concessional terms ... to 
low-income 
developing members that qualify for assistance' JMT, 1999b, emphasis added). 
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17 the interest rate on which are subsidised by the PRGF or PRGF-ESF Trusts . The 
language of constitutional obligation and cooperative purpose that characterise the 
SBAs need not apply to PRGF financing". Funds from the PRGF are clearly 
earmarked for countries who meet the eligibility criteria for assistance from better-off 
members, disbursement of which is clearly contingent upon compliance with Fund 
policy conditionalities. 
As trustee, the IMF is also under a fiduciary duty to ensure that the terms and 
conditions of the trust instrument are complied with but the Fund is generally 
accorded wide powers of discretion to determine the terms of eligibility and 
conditions for financial assistance to eligible members. For example, Section 11 
(1)(b) and (bb) of the Instrument to Establish the PRGF Trust provide that 
assistance should be provided to a qualifying member upon approval by the Fund of 
a three-year macroeconomic and structural adjustment programme with 
disbursements contingent upon reviews of the country's performance under the 
programme, including compliance with key structural reform policies JMF, 1999b: 
section I-II). 
However, the instrument is silent on the content of the structural adjustment 
programme to be undertaken and on the criteria for determining compliance with the 
conditions for policy reform in the borrowing member state. Under the PRGF 
Trust Instrument, it is left to the Trustee - the IMF - to determine the phasing 
of loan disbursements and the conditions attached to such disbursements 'in the 
context of a review of the program with the member' JMF, 1999b: section II, Para 1 
Once again, this leaves the IMF with broad discretionary authority to 
17'fhe PRGF Trust borrows from a number of sources to lend to PRGF-eligible countries and repays 
the loans with market rate interest to the lenders. The difference between the rate of interest paid to 
lenders and the concessional. interest rate of 0.5 percent paid to the Trust by PRGF borrowers is 
subsidised by contributions from bilateral donors and from earnings from the IMT JMT, 1999b: 
section IV). The PRGF-ESF Trust operate on the same basis JMF, 2006e). 
18 Nonetheless, Gold is of the opinion that regardless of its classification, nothingin the trust 
instruments for concessional. financing suggest that policies prescribed within a member's programme 
supported by Fund financing has contractual force 'so that no inference could be drawn that a 
departure from them was a breach of [a contractual] obligation' (Gold, 1996: 369). This view appears 
to be supported by the recent board decision on the Guidehnes on Conditionality 2002 (Para 9, 
reproduced in section above). While reaffirming that no Fund arrangements can be considered as 
having contractual force, the statement does not refer specifically to general resources and can 
therefore be assumed to encompass all forms of IMF financing, including concessional lending under 
the PRGF- 
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determine the content of loan conditions and when and if those conditions are met 
by borrowers. 
As discussed earlier, there is reluctance on the part of the Fund to declare members 
mehgible under Article V, Section 5 for failure to comply with the conditions of 
their loans. Similarly here, conditionality offers a less punitive mechanism for 
disciplining errant borrowers which still enables the Fund to link pohcy compliance 
with the disbursement of resources. 
Consequently, it may be argued that the difference between financing from the GRA 
and from specially-administered accounts, such as those under the PRGF and 
PRGF-H1PC Trusts, do not substantially alter the nature of IMF conditionality with 
respect to individual facilities. Conditionality remains the primary mechanism by 
which the relationship between the Fund and its members is regulated, the 
preference for such 'soft law' stenuning from a reluctance to both confer on or hold 
members accountable to obligations under formal IMF law, that is, those originating 
from its Articles of Agreement or from its formal trust instruments. 
4.2.2. From Projects to Policy Reform: Conditionality and the Bank's New 
Role 
The doctrine of conditionality under policy-based lending has shifted the Bank's 
fiduciary role from a purely technical focus - adherence to the technical obligations 
of traditional development financing (project documentation) - to that of an 
increasingly political role of monitoring policy reform as a means of contractual 
compliance. As discussed above, conditionality under World Bank structural 
adjustment was primarily focused on the achieving of influence over the levers of 
government policy, viewed as an end it itself as opposed to a means to an end to 
prevent debt default as is the purpose of Fund conditionality. 
This distinction stems in part from the difference in legal construction of the Bank's 
lending versus the Fund's. Financing instruments of the World Bank are clearly 
regarded as loans and give rise to contractual obligations (World Bank, 2001d: para 8 
9; interview: Zerabruk. and Braka, 2004). Bank loan agreements are classified as 
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international treaties between the borrowing member state and the World Bank and 
are registered as such with the Secretary-General of the United Nations in pursuant 
of Article 102 of the United Nations Charter. 
Therefore, unlike the Fund whereby the relationship between the organisation and its 
members are defined by their constitutional obligations under the founding treaty, 
the Bank operates very much like a financial institution in which the principal legal 
instrument that regulates the relationship between itself and a borrower is that of a 
contractual legal agreement for financing. This includes agreements for policy-based 
loans even though the Bank admits that such operations sit uneasily with the Bank's 
traditional contractual framework because there is no specific 'project' for the 
borrower to 'carry out' in exchange for financing (World Bank, 2005f. 11). 
However, the Bank has traditionally adopted a broad interpretation of the term 
cproject', to encompass 'development programs' as a whole" (Shihata, 2000a: 177). 
Former Bank general counsel Ibrahim Shihata notes that 'the practice of the Bank 
has consistently upheld a broad definition of the term 'project' which covered 
'programs' where specific goods and/or services were allocated for well-defined 
purposes' (Shihata, 2000a: 178 2 ). This programme of economic policy and 
institutional reform therefore constitutes the object of the agreement between the 
Bank and the borrowing country. It would follow on that obligations of the parties 
involved would still be governed by the terms and conditions of a standard Bank 
agreement2'. 
Circumventing Constitutional Limitations 
19 Some observers, such as Degnbol-Martinussen and Engberg-Pedersen contend that in any case, the 
institutional framework for pohcy-based financing, including balance of payments support, structural 
adjustment and budget support, remain orgarnsed along the lines of a project which they define as 'an 
externally formulated intervention in the local development process' (Degnbol-Martinussen and 
Engberg-Pedersen, 2003: 188). This is because most policy-based programmes have 'a clear time 
perspective and a series of well-defined activities financed by a donor in agreement with a partner in 
the developing country' enabling the donor to support 'directly only those activities that are in 
accordance with the goals of its development and aid policy' (ibid) 
20 Reproducing the 'Memorandum of the General Counsel to the Bank Senior Management', 1 May 
1984, circulated to Bank Executive Directors on 21 December 1984 (Shihata, 2000a: 173). 
21 Although the terms and conditions are slightly different in event of a breach (see the following 
section) - 
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The classification of a policy-based loan as constituting a 'project' for all legal intents 
and purposes, also enables the Bank to resolve one of the most pressing 
constitutional questions that has arisen since the introduction of such lending - that 
is, whether such loans constitute a violation of the Bank's constitutional charter 
which stipulate that the Bank should be primarily involved in 'project' lending. 
Article III, Section 4 (vii) of the International Bank of Reconstruction and 
Development (IBRD)'s Articles of Agreement state: 'Loans made or guaranteed 
by the Bank, shall, except in spea'al a. rcumstances, be for the specific 
_projects of 
reconstruction and development' (lBRD Articles of Agreement, emphasis added). A 
corresponding provision in the Articles of Agreement of the International 
Development Association (IDA) state: 'Financing provided by the Association 
shall be for purposes which in the opinion of the Association are of high 
developmental priority in the light of the needs of the area or areas concerned and, 
except in special circumstances, shall be for ýbecificprq1ect? ýDA Articles of Agreement, 
Article V, Section 1 (b), emphasis added). 
2 The Bank has traditionally relied upon the 'special circumstances' exception2 in the 
Bank charters to justify their disbursement of policy-based loans. Although the 
definition of and criteria for accessing what constitutes a 'special circumstance' was 
left to be 'determined on a case by case basis', Shihata has contended that these 
circumstances must be assessed in accordance with the Bank's constitutionally 
mandated purposes under Article 1 of the IBRD (and, by extension, IDA) Articles 
of Agreemene' - 'If a Bank loan therefore does not directly finance a specific 
productive purpose, it must aim at serving other Bank purposes' (Shihata, 2000a: 
379). 
22 The exception has been 'liberally construed' early on by an authoritative interpretation issued by the 
IBRD's Executive Directors on 20 September 1946 at the request of the US (Shihata, 2000b: 83; 
Shihata 2000c: 233). 
23 For the IBRD, this would include 'the facilitation of investment of capital for productive purposes, 
the promotion of private foreign investment, and the promotion of the 'long-range balanced growth 
of international trade and the maintenance of equilibrium in balances of payments by encouraging 
international investment for the development of the productive resources of members' (Shihata, 
2000a: 379; IBRD Articles of Agreement, Article I) while, for the IDA, these purposes would include 
the promotion of economic development, increasing productivity and the raising of living standards 
within the less-developed members of the Association and the provision of concessional financing 
JDA Articles of Agreement, Article 1). The Bank's practice has been to classify policy-based loans 
'which do not indicate the specific uses to which their proceeds are to be put' - as Ufilling this 
requirement (World Bank, 2002b: para 5). 
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As a result of Shihata's authoritative legal opinions on this issue, the World Bank has 
been circumspect about the volume of its policy-based lending in contrast with its 
investment or project loans. The old Operational Directive on Adjust Lending 
Policy (OD 8.60) set a guideline ceiling that the share of adjustment lending should 
not normally exceed 25 percent of the total IBRD and IDA commitments over three 
years (World Bank, 2002b: para 17). However, with the exception increasingly 
becoming the norm over the years - the combined share of such lending from the 
IBRD and IDA has exceeded the one-third threshold since 1998, reaching 53 percent 
in 1999 and maintaining this level today (ibid) - the Bank has progressively 
disregarded this legal constraint and reinterpreted the constitutional provision to suit 
the evolving circumstances. 
The new Operational Policy on Development Policy Lending (OP 8.60), which 
replaced the OD 8.60 in August 2004, dispenses With the quota on such lending, 
providing instead that the volume or share of development policy lending for a 
borrower be established on a case-by-case basis, determined in the context of the 
country's Country Assistance Strategy (see below) and that each policy-based 
operation must be approved by the Executive Directors as meeting the 'special 
circumstances' justification under the Articles of Agreement (World Bank, 2004e: 
para 3,4 & 8; see also World Bank, 2002b: para 17). 
Consequently, conditionality became increasingly important as a means to justify 
policy-based loans under this constitutional exception by linking the conditions of 
the reform programme with the aforementioned constitutional objectives of the 
World Bank and meeting Shihata's 'productive purposes' criteria. The Bank's legal 
department notes that conditionalities perform a corresponding function in policy- 
based lending as the 'specific legal covenants' found in investment/project lending 
which 'require the borrower to carry out a project ... with due diligence and 
efficiency' (World Bank, 2005f. para 31). It states that: 'Conditionality serves the role 
of a useful na*ational aid to keep the borrower's development program on course to 
ensure its productive outcomes and objectives are achieved' (World Bank, 2005f- 
para 31, emphasis added). 
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In contrast to an agreement for investment/project lending whereby the borrower is 
under a 'legal obligation to carry out a specific project', the World Bank does not 
regard the borrowing country's 'commitment to execute its program' as contractually 
enforceable for two reasons: (1) it could impinge upon the sovereign prerogative to 
determine policy and institutional actions to insist on compliance; and (2) 'treating a 
borrower's failure to implement a policy action as a breach of a legal obligation owed 
to the Bank could create significant financial repercussions for the country', including 
loss of other donor support and the borrower's standing in international financial 
markets" (World Bank, 2005f. - paras 38 - 39). 
Consequently, I argue here that the emergence of conditionality as a regulatory 
instrument in Bank policy-based lending - in spite of these loans' differing legal 
status to Fund financing - was also driven primarily by a reluctance to impose ftill 
contractual force on policy conditions in light of both constitutional ambiguity 
regarding the mandate of the Bank to finance such programmes and the political 
ramifications of subjecting such financing to the rigour of conventional contractual 
enforcement. Bank counsels, such as Shihata, have accordingly advised Bank staff 
that while there should be explicit and precise documentation of disbursement 
conditions in loan agreements, such agreements have to be structured 'to avoid 
covenanted legal obligation? (Shihata, 2000a: 382 - 383). 
Accordingly, policy-based lending arrangements at the World Bank have adopted a 
similar regulatory structure to that of the Fund, placing policy conditionalities within 
separate programme documents established prior to the financing agreement - here 
that Letter of Development Policy (LDP) and/or a Medium-Term Expenditure 
Framework (MTEF) - detailing a progran-une of actions, objectives and policies and 
incorporated by reference into the loan agreements (World Bank, 2001d: para 16). 
Financing is made contingent upon the borrower's implementation of the 
programme 'in a manner satisfactory to the Bank' (World Bank, 2004e: para 13; see 
also Mauritania, 1987, Preamble: para (A); Republic of Uganda, 2001, Preamble: para 
24 Ibis has, however, does not detract from the fact that the disciplinary impact of conditionality is as 
severe as that of a covenanted legal obligation as failure to implement policy reforms could lead to a 
suspension of financial disbursements from the Bretton Woods institutions and, in the case of the 
IMF, a corresponding declaration that a country's programme is 'off track'. The repercussions of such 
penalties are similar, if not, equivalent to the effect a breach of a legal obligation would 
have on 
financial flows to affected countries as many donors condition aid on satisfactory execution of a Fund 
and/or a Bank programme of adjustment (see discussion 
in Chapter Two). 
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(B)), thereby reinforcing the discretionary power of the Bank in stipulating 
conditions for financing. 
4.3. Conditionality as a Mechanism for Economic Governance 
The progressive entrenchment of conditionality as a default instrument for regulating 
the relationship between the BWIs and their client states has contributed significantly 
to the development of conditionality as a mechanism for economic governance. 
Chapter Two demonstrated that the disciplinary power of the Bank and the Fund is 
derived not only from their role as financiers but also from their constitution as 
economic governance institutions and the legitimacy they derive from the 
'multilateral' nature of their constituencies. 
The increasingly discretionary nature of conditionality, coupled with the asymmetrical 
decision-making structure of the World Bank and the IMF, has led to its emergence 
as a mechanism through which the major shareholders of the Bank and Fund have 
progressively embedded policy reforms M developing member states. Accordingly, 
conditionalities unposed by the institutions on client states now represent more than 
fiduciary instruments. Instead, the doctrine of conditionality has developed as a key 
mechanism for organising, harmonising and enforcing regulatory norms across 
different jurisdictions in the developing world. 
4.3.1. Fund Conditionality Enshrined 
The watershed in the evolution of IMF conditionality occurred in the late 1970s, at 
the time of the Second Amendment to the Articles of Agreement which 
cemented the legal and political developments occurring at the Fund (and by 
extension, the wider international financial arena) since the collapse of the par value 
system in 1971. Two major changes within the IMF during that period cemented the 
IMF's shift away from its original mandate and altered the nature of conditionality 
for good. 
Collapse of the Bretton Woods System 
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Firstly, the Second Amendment shifted the IMF's role away from ensuring stability 
through a fixed exchange rate system towards focusing on the soundness of domestic 
economic and financial policy as important factors in maintaining such stability. The 
amended Article IV, Section 2(b) now enabled IMF member states to choose their 
own exchange rate arrangements as opposed to adherence to the par value 25 under 
the original system. At the same time, Airticle IV, Section 1 obligated members to 
undertake domestic econorruc and financial policies that would not produce 
disruptions in the global economy JMF Articles of Agreement). 
International financial regulation was thus no longer Mifluenced by an understanding 
of the need for rules-based, multilateral cooperation as the basis of 'international 
financial stability but would be based rather on creating the appropriate domestic 
framework within countries to prevent international financial crisis (Khor, 2001: 4- 
5; Pahuja, 2000: 778 - 779). Threats to the international financial system were 
perceived as stemming from errant domestic policies undertaken by countries rather 
than from inherent systemic problems with the governance of the global economy or 
from the destructive policies of other member states. Financing for countries facing 
balance-of-payments problems then became increasingly conditional upon their 
willingness to undertake 'appropriate' domestic policies to redress the economic 
instability. 
At the same time,, the changing clientele of the IMF borrowers - from states which 
provided the bulk of usable currency through their subscriptions to states which 
relied upon the pool of other states' usable currencies as a source of finance 
OLowenfeld, 2002: 546) - changed the discourse of Fund financing from one of 
entitlement to draw to one of conditional financing, compounded by the fact that the 
former category of members were industrialised countries and the latter made up of 
developing states. 
25 Under the par value system, IMF member states must adopt a par value for its currency, expressed 
in terms of gold or of that of the US dollar at a fixed rate and all states were required by the IMF to 
maintain that value under Article IV, Section 3, including 'by governmental intervention in the market 
if necessary' (Lowenfeld, 2002: 524). The amended Articles of Agreement now include a declaration 
under Article IV, Section 4 that the Fund may revert to an exchange system of 'stable but adjustable 
par values' on a vote of 85 percent of the majority (IMF Articles of Agreement). 
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The doctrine of conditionality soon became a 'largely north-south debate' (ibid: 546). 
Conditionality, working as 'an enforcement mechanism with selective effect' thus 
enhanced the asymmetrical nature of the north and south 'as subjects of IMF law' 
(Pahuja, 2000: 780), cementing the demarcated roles of the rule-makers and the rule- 
takers Within the IMF's membership. 
b) Foray into Concessional Financing 
This asymmetry is further reinforced by the second major development in the role of 
the IMF in the late 1970s: the Fund's foray into development financing through its 
concessional lending window - currently the PRGF. The shift to development 
financing not only changed the nature of Fund financing and cemented the use of 
conditionality, it also altered the role of the Fund from that of an organisation for 
multilateral financial discipline focused on short-term, counter-cyclical lending to that 
of a development agency engaged in long-term economic rehabilitation. In doing so, 
the mandate of the Fund and, corresponding, the remit of conditionality, was 
expanded to encompass broader structural economic reforms M client countries 26 
These conditions are, 'in turn, driven by the regulatory priorities established by the 
major donors to the PRGF trusts as part of its establishment or periodic 
replenishment processes (see discussion in Chapter Two, section 2.2.2). 
Gold contends that the terminology is a result of these concessional loans departing 
from two basic principles that underpinned the IMF's Articles of Agreement: (1) 
the total resources of the IMF should not be reduced by its transactions with 
members; and, more importantly for our purposes, (2) the member need not lose se! ý-rejpect 
wben solicifing assistance by the Fund (Gold, 1996: 367 - 368, emphasis added). According 
to Gold, the abandonment by the IMF of 'these niceties of law and diplomacy' not 
only reflected the economic realities of the relationship between the IMF and 
borrowing countries but also helped develop the concept of conditionality as a 
modality of regulating this relationship (ibid). 
26 Some commentators, such as former UNCTAD senior economist, Yilmaz Akydz, have argued that 
there is and has never been a sound rationale for this move into development financing as not only are 
these areas better covered by other agencies, such as multilateral and regional development 
banks, 
including the World Bank, but also that 'it is not clear that the Fund has the necessary competence 
and experience in such complex issues' of structural and 
institutional reform (Aky-dz, 2005: 18 - 19). 
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Thus, the nature of conditionality and the basis of conditionality shifted from one 
that was premised on cooperation and respect for national sovereignty to one that 
was premised on control and discretionary governance. When one set of members 
are subject to IMF surveillance and policy purview resulting from resource 
dependency while another set of members (with more than 60 percent share of the 
voting power) are not, the flexibility associated with conditionality as a regulatory 
mechanism acquires a radically different form - increasing the number of legitimate 
interventions (conditions) into a borrowing member state under a correspondingly 
selective criteria without a comparative safeguard mechanism for adjudicating 
disputes. Conditionality, due to its flexibility and discretionary character, therefore 
began to serve as an increasingly effectual instrument in fulfilling the IMF's expanded 
disciplinary function over third world economies. 
4.3.2. Governance through Resource Dependency 
Unlike the IMF, the World Bank was not established as a regulatory body. It was not 
endowed with a governance mandate such as that established under the Fund's 
Articles of Agreement with regard to multilateral financial discipline. The primary 
function of the Bank was to provide resources for the reconstruction and 
development of developing countries or, in the case of IDA countries, to facilitate 
poverty reduction and generate economic growth. However, since the introduction 
of policy-based loans, the combination of financing and policy reform has led to a 
progressive embedding of a governance function in which regulatory norms across 
jurisdictions are harmonised through the Bank's credit process. 
The Bank itself has acknowledged that conditionality can serve as a means of 
purchasing policy reform in client states by compensating the government 'for the 
expected costs of reform and the implementation of the policy', including social and 
political costs of economic reforms (World Bank, 2005c: 3, paras 9- 11). The 
institution has also viewed the role of conditionality as a means of restraining 
government action in the face of opposition to regulatory reforms and incentivising 
and supporting government adherence to such reforms by strengthening its 
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bargaining position vis-a-vis what the Bank views as 'special interest groUPS)27 (ibid: 
15 - 16, paras 52 - 53). 
The Bank's expanding regulatory role has been facilitated by the fact that its criteria 
for financing as well as the content of its financing conditionality have been 
progressively established outside individual loan negotiation processes. Instead, many 
of these conditions have been pre-determined through the Bank's increasingly 
political process of portfolio allocation that is contingent upon the *interests of its 
major shareholders. This has led to increasing politicisation of Bank financing since 
such financing, unlike the original practice of the Fund, is not automatic nor based 
exclusively on a needs assessment of the country but on whether the countries meet 
Bank conditions for financial assistance and demonstrate willingness to execute the 
policy reforms associated with such assistance. 
a) Country Assistance Strategies 
Firstly, the allocation of funds to borrowing member states is based on the Bank's 
assessment of the country under the Country Assistance Strategy (CAS), a document 
prepared by the Bank staff, in dialogue with country governments. The CAS must a) 
describe the World Bank Group's assistance strategy for the country 'based on an 
assessment of priorities in the country'; and b) indicate 'the level and composition of 
assistance to be provided based on the strategy and the country's portfolio 
performance' (World Bank, 1995, para 1). 
In other words, the volume and composition of financial (and other) assistance 
extended by the Bank to its clients is determined by what the Bank considers 
appropriate for the country given its evaluation of inter alia, the country's econormc 
situation, governance, environmental/natural resource management, and poverty and 
27 The Bank views opposition to neoliberal. policy reforms as stemming from entrenched political 
interests with 'special interest groups' often having 'an interest in the maintenance of distorting 
policies and an incentive to oppose reforms aimed at removing them, including reducing or removing 
tariffs, privatization of state-owned enterprises or land redistribution' (World Bank, 2005c: 15, para 
52). Such groups have, in their opinion, 'the ability to take actions that are costly to the government, 
such as strikes, or simply have the power to veto the reform' and conditionality is therefore necessary 
to 'counterbalance the presence of such groups' (ibid: ii, para 6). 
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social aspects. As of July 2002, CASs of countries with a completed PRSP must be 
based on the PRSP but the CAS remains a non-negotiated document28. 
The Bank's Operation Manual provides that CAS statements must be presented to 
the Board alongside application for a lending operation and that the operation must 
be rationalised within the priorities of the country's CAS and in light of the country's 
compliance with established 'country performance triggers' for different lending 
29 
scenarios (World Bank, 1995: para 3& 16). These CAS 'triggers' are usually drawn 
from a country's compliance with their previous or existing loan conditions so that 
successful completion of policy conditionalities under different financing 
programmes, such as under a PRSC or other DPL, enables a country to move into a 
more favourable lending portfolio while unsatisfactory performance under previous 
programmes will see a country downgraded" (see Wood, 2005b: 7). 
b) IDA Mocation Criteria 
Secondly, for low-income countries, financing is also determined by the IDA 
allocation criteria which includes allocation based on the country's policy and 
institutional performance and IDA replenishment conditions. IDA's resources are 
allocated to member countries through a combination of. a) basic allocations"; b) 
performance-based allocations (PBA); and c) IDA replenishment conditions. The 
complexity of these criteria highlights, in some ways, how the Bank as an institution 
is trying to manage conditionality as a mechanism for regulatory change pursued by 
28 The Bank, however, maintains that differences in a country's own plans and the Bank's strategy 'are 
highlighted in the CAS document' (World Bank, 1995, para 1). See further discussion of the 
disjuncture between PRSP policy and practice in Chapter SIX, section 6.4.2. 
21 A 'lending scenario' is essentially a category for lending With countries receiving a more favourable 
portfolio the higher the grade, such as moving from 'base case' to 'high case' lending. 
30 Wood's study of the Bank's PRSCs found that, for example, Nicaragua moved into a high-case 
lending scenario after 'significant progress' in privatising its public power and telecommunications 
companies under its first PRSC while Benin fell into the low-case lending scenario after, inter alia, its 
unsatisfactory progress' with the privatisation of its national water and cotton companies which were 
prior actions linked to its second and third PRSCs (Wood, 2005b: 7). 
31 Each IDA member is allocated a basic US$4 million resource envelope with special considerations 
being given to 'blend' countries who may receive less than their quota due their ability to raise 
financing elsewhere; and to post-conflict countries and countries facing the aftermath of natural 
disasters who may require more (IDA, 2003, para 4- 5). 'Blend' countries are countries which have 
sufficient creditworthiness to draw on international capital markets but are also considered having 
sufficiently low per capita incomes to qualify for IDA assistance, for example Indonesia, Pakistan and 
Bolivia. See: 
httl2: /Zweb. worldbank-org/%VBSITE- /EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS /IDA /0,, content_N11DK: 212053 
70-lTlenuPK: 3414210-12agePK: 51236175-12iPK: 437394-theSitePK: 73154,00. htm (1 March 2006). 
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its major shareholders, developing complex techniques to administer and Justify 
politically-motivated reforms. 
The PBA is centred on the Bank's Country Policy and Institutional Assessment 
(CPIA) - which 'assesses a country's present policy and institutional framework for 
fostering poverty reduction, sustainable growth and the effective use of development 
assistance' (see section 4.6.2) - and guided by the Bank's Annual Report on Portfolio 
Performance (ARPP) which is 'used to determine a score for each country's 
implementation performance' JDA, 2003, paras 2- 3). A complex scorecard is then 
determined through the assessments of the CPIA (making up 80 percent) and the 
ARPP (20 percent) and 'a weighted average rating' is calculated based on these 
ratings and is then multiplied by the IDA's 'governance factor' -a score 'derived 
from the country's average rating for seven governance criteria that are part of the 
PBA system' JDA, 2003, para 3). 
In this respect, the political dimensions of Bank conditionality cannot be overstated, 
particularly in relation to its increasingly disproportionate emphasis on governance as 
criteria for determining individual country portfolios of financing. Not only has the 
focus on a country's policy and institutional performance in allocating IDA funds 
been a result of the emphasis placed on in the IDA replenishment process - donors 
in the last replenishment round, the IDA 14, highlighted that the 'key aspect' of 
IDA's financial support to poor countries must be 'the strong and transparent link to 
country performance on economic policies, governance and poverty reduction 
efforts' (World Bank, 2005g) - the operational procedure for determining IDA 
allocation has also been criticised for its subjectivity and lack of transparency. 
According to Bank staff themselves, the IDA Country Performance (ICP) rating, 
derived from the formula above, results in governance factors contributing to two- 
thirds of the weight of such country ratings 32 (World Bank, 2004g: para 14). An 
external expert panel evaluating the CPIA and related IDA allocation criteria Mi 2004 
criticised the procedure as 'highly nontransparent' given that 'the very large weight 
given to the governance factor is not obvious from the complex formula' (ibid: para 
15). The panel had found the emphasis on governance 'excessive' and questioned the 
32 As compared to factors such as population which only carries half as much weight and poverty 
indices which make up less than one sixteenth of the allocations 
(see Van Waeyenberge, 2006: 8). 
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basis of the weighting, particularly that of the CPIA, which it felt did 'not find 
empirical support in available literature' (ibid: para 
4.4. A New jurisprudence 
Examination of the development of the doctrine of conditionality within the World 
Bank and the IMF above has demonstrated that the logic that underpinned the 
inception of conditionality as a mechanism for regulating the relationship between 
subjects of international development finance - the flexibility, deference for the 
notion of sovereign equality and sovereign autonomy, and the discourse of right to 
development and international development and economic cooperation - have 
been subverted over the years to take on a conversely regressive role between the 
parties to the financing, reflective of the developments in the international Political 
economy and the corresponding necessity to respond to the geo-strategic governance 
imperatives of the major shareholders of the Bank and Fund. 
The development of conditionality as an instrument for regulating the relationship 
between the BWls and their borrowing member states and its consequent emergence 
as a mechanism for economic governance has, consequently, had significant 
implications on third world states' engagement in the global economy. 
a) Discretionary Control 
Firs the progressive entrenchment of conditionality as a quasi-legal mechanism in 
World Bank and IMF financial transactions in lieu of formal legal arrangements has 
accorded the Bank and the Fund significant autonomy and wide discretionary powers 
vis-a-vis the nature and substance of their financial and policy interactions with their 
borrowing member states. This has shifted the domain of regulation from what legal 
scholars term 'hard' to 'soft' law or, in other words, from a regime of fixed, binding 
juridical norms to one operating on a network of non-binding regulatory principles 
and standards". 
33 As Joseph Gold observes, 'soft law has been and is now more than ever an extraordinarily 
widespread and important element in the corpusjuris of the IMF, describing the characteristic of 'soft 
law' as an expression of 'preference for, or of abstention from, specified behavior by members. '1he 
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In this regard, the disciplinary characteristic of conditionality has not been derived 
from an express constitutional power of the institutions concerned but, rather, from 
the evolution of Bank and Fund practice. Conditionality has enabled regulation to be 
conducted, not through formal means of norm-construction, but through precedents 
set by the behaviour and conduct of the parties, -resulting *in a form of customary law. 
Under regulation through the mechanism of conditionahty, the legal relationship of 
the parties to the financing is based on the outcomes of individual processes of 
negotiation and bartering rather than on fixed contractual or other legal principles 
derived from a higher source of law. 
This characteristic of conditionality has led commentators, Mosley et al. (on the 
Bank) and, more recently, Sgard (on the Fund) to conceive of the process of 
conditionality as a negotiating game between the institutions and the borrowing 
member in which the 'two parties have (at least partly) opposed interests which they 
pursue by taking note of each other's likely behaviour, and in which the outcome 
depends on the strategies pursued by each party' (Mosley et al, 1991: 67 - 68), 
thereby shaping 'a framework within which the actors interact, where successive 
moves take place and where, hopefully, credibility will accumulate' (Sgard, 2004: 
17)34. 
Accordingly, the regulatory framework which governs the actors' behaviour mi this 
process is derived from an accumulation of seemingly bureaucratic steps on the part 
of the Fund with 'considerable rule-making activity' being invested by the institution 
in 'framing the sequential interaction with countries under [its] programme', such as 
prior actions, tranche release reviews, negotiations for waivers on performance 
criteria, and a host of programme evaluations (Sgard, 2004: 17). A similar process 
operates within the Bank in which conflict between the Bank's interests and the 
borrower's are resolved not through predetermined rules but by 'the outcome of 
strategy and external circumstance' (Mosley et al, 1991: 69). 
behavior, whether it be action, or forbearance, can fan within the regulatory or the financial 
jurisdiction of the IMF' (Gold, 1996: 302 - 303). 
34 While Sgard's analysis is based on his research into the IMF's role in sovereign debt restructuring, It 
can nonetheless be applied analogously to the Fund's practice of conditionality in general. 
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Consequently, Sgard regards the conferment of wide discretionary powers on the 
institutions as a necessary component of the bargaining process that characterises the 
practice of conditionality (Sgard, 2004: 17). As a result, the use of conditionality has 
increasingly consolidated more discretionary power in the hands of the Institutions 
and the non-borrowing member states. Given the governance structure of the Bank 
and the Fund, this shift has had an adverse impact on the policy autonomy and 
negotiating strength of less powerful member states and, as we will see in the 
following chapter, on the internal constitution of the borrowing states. 
Mosley et al's analysis of the bargaining process of conditionality concluded that 
power relations between the institutions and the borrowing states play a substantial 
role in determining the outcome of negotiations and the rules of engagement 
between the parties vis-a-vis financing: 'the less the donor needs the recipient - 
either as an outlet or as political ally - the more the recipient needs the donor [and] 
the less room for manoeuvre the recipient has in those negotiations' (Mosley et al, 
1991: 74). 
Mission Creep 
This leads us to the second conclusion that may be drawn from the historical reading 
of conditionality, namely that the remit of conditionality has extended beyond purely 
fiduciary objectives. The focus of conditionality has progressively moved towards 
restructuring the institutional framework of the country through policy reform as an 
end in itself rather than as a means to an end, that is, fiscal stability (for the IMF) and 
economic growth (for the World Bank). Conditionality has no longer become solely 
about maintaining debtor discipline in order to protect the 'revolving character' of 
Fund and Bank resources" or to meet fiduciary obligations under their institutional 
mandates. In fact, conversely, conditionality has enabled the BWIs to circumvent 
constitutional limitations on their roles as international financial institutions. 
This shift in the focus of conditionality reforms is both a result of, and a contribution 
to, the intensification of conditionality as regulatory instrument. The highly 
discretionary nature of conditionality has enabled it to be exercised as policy leverage 
35 That is, stipulating that resources made available to a member will be repaid to be reused by other 
members (see Buira, 2003: 3 and IMF, 2001b: 144 for further elucidation on this point). 
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while at the same time contributed to the increasing use of the instrument for such 
purposes. Conditionality is a convenient mode of regulating the relationship between 
the financing agency and the borrowing country as it is flexible and does not give rise 
to binding legal obligations. The lack of precise criteria for establishing non- 
compliance not amounting to a breach of a contractual obligation accords the 
financing agency - the World Bank and the IMF - not only the power to 
adjudicate disputes but also to determine when non-compliance constitutes a breach. 
Consequently, as Mosley et al argue, 'it is the power-relationship between donor and 
recipient, rather than the severity of the economic 'disease' from which a country is 
suffering, which principally determines the nature of the prescription offered as part 
of a conditionality package' (Mosley et al, 1991: 90). Former director of the G24 
Secretariat in Washington DC Ariel Buira" is particularly critical of the proliferation 
of conditionalities in Bank and Fund financing that has led to this concentration of 
power in the hands of the institutions. 
According to Buira, 'conditionality has increased to the point of becoming 
dysfunctional' because the governments can no longer keep track of the number of 
conditionalities associated with their various financing agreements and consequently, C), C) 
may only be able to comply with a percentage of them (interview: Buira, 2004). He 
argues that: 
... this gives enormous power to the staff and the managing 
director 
[of the Fund] to exercise discretion [and] gives rise to political 
interference because whether you should get a waiver or not will 
depend a lot on your external political support [from members of the 
Executive Board] (interview: Buira, 2004). 
The significant powers of discretion accorded to the BWIs under the practice of 
conditionality have enabled them to extract a wide range of policy commitments 
36 Buira retired ftom the directorship of the G24 secretariat in 2006 and served, among others, as an 
Executive Director of the IMF in the 1980s. The 'Intergovernmental Group of 24 on International 
Monetary Affairs and Development' (G24) was established in 1971to consolidate the position of 
developing countries on monetary and development finance issues and consists of countries 
from 
Africa, Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean. See: httl2: //www. gý24. org/aboutg24. htm 
(1 March 
2006). 
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from borrowing states with conditionality enabling a more intrusive reforms without 
the corresponding sanction of a challenge by members of breaching the 
constitutional norms governing the institutions nor subjecting the institutions to 
wider international norms. As Gold notes, whatever consequences a breach of IMF's 
csoft law' may entail, they fall short of such constitutional penalties such as the 
'ineligibility to use the general resources of the IMF, suspension of the tight to use 
SDRs, suspension of voting rights, or compulsory Withdrawal from the organization' 
(Gold, 1996: 302). 
C) Absence of External Oversight 
International legal commentators, such as Gold, Lowenfeld, Qureshi and Shihata, 
have suggested that the reluctance to use the norms of international law as their 
primary tool lie in the institutions' resistance to countries having recourse to external 
justiciability. External justiciability would impose corresponding obligations on the 
part of the Bank and the Fund and limit the extent to which the dominant, non- 
37 borrowing member states can exert control within these institutions . 
The doctrine of conditionality therefore operates within this framework of self- 
adjudication in which the Executive Boards of the Bank and the Fund operate as 
both the rule-maker and enforcer. The practice of conditionality allows the Executive 
Directors to set preconditions for access to development financing, determine which 
conditions should apply to countries and establish if a condition has been met or 
breached and which penalties should be meted out to the non-comphant member 
state. Correspondingly, this has enabled conditionality to be utilised as a mechanism 
for wider economic regulation of states subject to its jurisdiction. 
37 The World Bank and the IMF, particularly the IMF, have always been opposed to outside 
interference in their decision-making and administrative processes and have repeatedly opposed 
recourse to external adjudication on disputes. The Bank and the Fund have always reserved for 
themselves the right to interpret their own constitutions and by-laws. While both institutions have 
respective agreements with the United Nations giving them the authority to seek an advisory opinion 
from the International Court of justice (ICJ) on matters of interpretation and on legal issues arising 
from their operations, this procedure has never been used in the history of the two organisations (see 
Qureshi, 1999: 123; Shihata, 2000c: 222). Shihata observes: '[the] IFIs have never sought interpretation 
of their own charters from a court of law [unlike the principal and subsidiary organs of the UN] ... 
Decisions on interpretation in the IFIs are also not subject to appeal before the ICJ or an arbitral 
tribunal' (Shihata, 2000c: 222). 
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In this manner, conditionality operates very much like transnational merchant law in 
which the juridical authority for the reconfiguration of political, economic and socio- 
cultural life reside in a complex web of merchant custom and privately agreed codes 
of conduct (see Cutler, 2003). The Bank and Fund's use of 'soft law' over 'hard law' 
as a means of regulating their relations with borrowing member states is driven by 
the same objectives as the transnational merchant's use of the 'soft, porous 
discretionary standards and procedures' (Cutler, 2003: 23) to both regulate 
commercial, 'private' relations in international trade, investment and finance, as well 
as to govern the activities of the transnational merchant. 
In this respect, the flexibility, reduced transaction costs and lack of justiciability of 
non-binding codes and custom is both politically and economically expedient, 
notably to the stronger party in an asymmetrical bargaining relationship. As Cutler 
observes: 'Weaker states on the periphery of the global political economy tend to 
favour hard law because it provides a certain transparency, predictability, and 
locking-in commitments that become more difficult for stronger states to renege on' 
(ibid). On the other hand, parties with greater negotiating strength prefer 'soft law' 
which is 'easier to breach with impunity' and offers more opportunities for "creative 
lawyering' and the shaping of legal regulation' (ibid). 
4.5. Carrots not Sticks: 'Ownership' as Conditionality 
The progressive entrenchment of conditionality as a means of regulating the 
behaviour of borrowing member states by the World Bank and the IMF (over other 
means of regulation) and the corresponding intensification of conditionality's 
substantive focus on reconfiguring the internal dimensions of the borrowing state, as 
an outcome of its increased governance function, has had a significant impact on the 
content and application of conditionality in practice, including, and notably so, on 
the development of 'ownership' as a principle governing the use of conditionality. 
As discussed in Chapter Three, the impetus for the shift in the conceptual framework 
of development financing came from a number of internal and external sources, 
including the need to respond to both an internal and an external crisis of legitimacy 
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in the international economic order.. The imperative to reshape the principles which 
underlie the use of conditionality was critical to resolving the increasing failure of 
conditionality to provide the disciplinary framework for neoliberal globalization. 
Specifically, the need to rehabilitate the credibility of conditionality was viewed as 
essential to institutionalising the policy content of conditionality and improving its 
regulatory efficacy. 
Former World Bank staffer Daniel Morrow, who was one of the architects of the 
PRSP framework, believes that the conditionality regime prior to the PRSP approach 
failed in bringing about desired policy reforms because 'too often aid-recipient 
governments did not fully implement or did not sustain the policies and institutional 
reforms to which they had committed themselves' (Morrow, 2005: 2). He argues that 
as many of these reforms are 'politically and institutionally complex', these reforms 
would not be implemented 'without sufficient ownership' of the policies by country 
authorities (interview: Morrow, 2005). However, Morrow, like many others, does not 
question the fundamental premise of the economic and institutional reforms that are 
to be undertaken nor the power relationship that is involved in the donor- 
government relationship. 
Morrow's views are reflective of the outlook of many at the BWIs on the issue of 
conditionality, who view the debate as not one of politics or policy content of 
conditionality, but rather of the efficacy of conditionality as an instrument of 
regulation". In spite of the number of fundamental shifts in the conceptual 
framework of their operations, the institutional culture of the Bank and Fund 
continues to be steeped in a decontextualised faith in the veracity of their economic 
policy prescriptions. For the Bank and the Fund therefore, the question is less about 
the legitimacy of conditionality as a mode of regulation, nor about the 
appropriateness of the policy reforms to be implemented through conditionalities, 
but more about improving the enforcement and implementation of such reforms. 
For Morrissey, this constitutes 'policy dialogue' (which serves as an mitegral element 
of the principle of ownership) which he perceives of as the opposite of conditionality 
38 This observation is gleaned from the interviews with current and former 
Bank and Fund staff 
members as well as from attendance at the institutional 
dialogues and meetings over the research 
period. 
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as a means of dehvering 'pohcy transfer' (Morrissey, 2004: section 1). He believes 
that such dialogue 'where donors engage with recipients to aim to contime them that 
parficularpo&ies should be adopted redresses the coercive firnits of conditionahty as a 
mechanism for regulating the behaviour of chent countries - 'whereas conditionahty 
has an element of coercion, pohcy dialogue is firmly rooted inpersuasion' (Morrissey, 
2004: section 1, emphasis added). Such an approach corresponds With the 'game 
theory' analysis of conditionahty. 
If the practice of conditionality is conceived of as a game of negotiation, the 
outcome of which establishes the rules of engagement between the parties, then the 
principle of ownership may be regarded as a continuum of conditionality, as part of 
the rule-making process with the balance of power tipped towards the World Bank 
and the IMF. The modalities of conditionahty may therefore be construed of as rule- 
making instruments that have evolved to serve the interests of the institutions by 
maxitnising their relatively stronger bargaining position. This is effected through a 
gradual repositioning of pohcy conditions as voluntary reforms undertaken by the 
borrowing member state in recognition of the viabihty of such reforms in achieving 
objectives such as econon-Lic growth or poverty reduction which, in turn, are 
rewarded by the disbursement of concessional financing or grant aid by the Bank, 
Fund and other donors to assist in the reform processes. The conferment of such 
policy 'autonomy' creates a tautology which shifts the burden of enforcement onto 
the borrowing party. 
With the advent of 'country ownership' as a principle governing the use of 
conditionality, the focus of conditionality has shifted from its previous fiduciary 
objective of safeguarding the use of multilateral funds to one of policing policy 
compliance and gatekeeping access to funds, ensuring that only countries most 
willing to undertake reforms (or most desperate for financing) are rewarded. This 
policy of 'country selectivity' in determining countries' access to resources is a 
hallmark of the PRSP framework and the 'new architecture of aid' (see Chapter Five, 
section 5.4). 
The rhetoric of 'ownership' therefore serves as a powerful discursive restraining 
instrument on borrowing countries' behaviour. These new modalities of 
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conditionality further removes any rights to recourse to formal Bank and Fund law in 
terms of regulation as the policy reform that is initiated bears no indication, formally, 
of it being a condition of financing. 'Ownership' removes the fiduciary duty of the 
Bank and the Fund to ensure that the funds are disbursed to the satisfaction of the 
constitutional mandate. Instead, the burden for compliance and the risk of financing 
is placed squarely on the shoulders of the borrowing state. 
As UNCTAD Special Coordinator for Africa Karnran Kousarl observes: 
The main danger [with the PRSP approach] is that few countries will 
say 'our own poverty reduction programmes ate being imposed on 
u' (sic s ). This [is about] getting people to police themselves and if 
there is slippage in policy implementation, then it is not because the 
design and the conceptualisation of the ptogrannne that is wrong 
because [the institutions] will say that the design and the 
conceptualisation is done by [the client countries] ... [They will say] 
'you selected the programme, we only have an advisory function. We 
take no responsibility for the failure of the programme'. This is very 
clever, extremely clever (interview: Kousari, 2005). 
It is not surprising then that the World Bank's issue note for its recent review on 
conditionality stated that 'the practice of conditionality has evolved from the idea 
that governments must meet a set of conditions to receive Bank financing to an 
approach in which the Bank supports policy reform in client countries' (World Bank, 
2005q: para 17). This evolution, viewed by Morrow as a response to the 'ownership 
critique' of conditionality, also in his opinion, represents a form of 'consensual 
conditionality' in which financing is linked 'only to conditions that have sufficiently 
broad support within the recipient country', or, at the very least, a collaborative 
design of the reform programme undertaken by the borrowing government in 
exchange for financing (Morrow, 2005: 2,5 - 8). 
From the Bank's perspective therefore, the shaping of conditionality in this manner 
is aimed at ensuring greater success in policy implementation through the removal of 
the element of formal coercion that characterised previous modalities of 
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conditionality. Harrison terms this development as 'post-conditionality"', a regime by 
which the disciplinary force is no longer enforced directly through disciplinary 
instruments but rather through a mechanism of self-imposed discipline on the part of 
borrowmg country authorities (Harrison, 2001b: 660). 
Country authorities are implicated in a regime of monetarism, fiscal austerity, 
liberalisation, marketisation and privatisation in accordance with the principles of the 
IFIs without subjecting thern to a contest of negotiations in the regulatory arena. 
These principles may be regarded as having 'made a transition from doctrine (openly 
colonizing the state terrain through the IFIs) to ideolqgv (far less contested, integrated 
into everyday language of policy-making' (Harrison, 2001b: 659). 
This new configuration of politics brought about by the principle of 'ownership' in 
conditionality has not extinguished the politics of adjustment nor the power relations 
inherent in conditions of donor dependency, but has rather resulted in a situation 
where external intervention is exercised not through coercive financing terms but 
'through closer involvement in state institutions and the employment of incentive 
finance' (Harrison, 2001b: 660). The process of negotiation - 'partnership' - that 
characterises the relationship between donor and borrowing government under the 
PRSP framework creates the conditions under which the central elements of the 
Washington Consensus is imbued into the psyche of the country authonties, or at 
least, the policyrnaking elite within borrowing countries. 
4.6. From Coercion to Consent: Conditionality on the Move 
The conceptual shift in the doctrine of conditionality represents both a continuity 
with pre-existing practice - the use of Letters of Intent and Letters of Development 
Policy to signal country acquiescence to policies that were shaped by the Bank and 
Fund bureaucracy under political persuasion from their principal members - as wen 
as a departure from these modalities. The concept of 'ownership' and its attendant 
modalities, particularly under the rubric of the PRSP significantly alters the practice 
39 1 disagree with Harrison's use of the term 'post-conditionality' as I believe current developments 
demonstrate a continuity with rather than a departure from the fundamental exercise of conditionality. 
However, the terminology does not detract from Harrison's analysis of the current state of 
conditionality in practice. 
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of conditionality by reconstructing the modes of governance through conditionality. 
Although coerciveness remains a substantial component of this new regime of 
conditionality, the mechanics of it depends less on the threat of sanction than on the 
incentive of reward for good behaviour. 
Operationally, this means a gradual shift towards new modalities of conditionality 
practice, notably, the gradual movement from ex-ante conditionalities - commitments 
based on forecasted performance - to ex-post conditionalities - commitments based 
on actual results rather than forecasts, and the increased application of non-binding 
conditionalities) such as benchmarks and triggers, and the principle of 'country 
selectivity' underpinning their use. It also means a shift, at least for the Bank, towards 
(programmatic' lending operations - financial support based on a series of individual, 
interlocking lending programmes - as opposed to the conventional multi-tranche, 
stand-alone loan. Taken together, these reforms represent a major overhaul in the 
modalities of conditionality, reflecting the wider reform of the disciplinary 
framework of development financing brought about by the PRSP framework and its 
attendant instruments of aid delivery. 
4.6.1. From Tranching to Front-Loading 
TraditionaRy, conditionalities have been linked to loan disbursements with borrowing 
countries having to meet specific conditions prior to the release of each tranche of 
the loan from the Bank or the Fund. The process of 'tranching' itself represents a 
fundamental element of the practice of conditionality in which each loan is sliced 
into segments with the release of each tranche dependent upon compliance with pre- 
established policy reform conditions". 
The most commonly used instrument in this regard is that ofperformance ctitefia (at the 
Fund) or trancbe release conditions (at the Bank). Introduced in the 1950s, the IMF's 
performance criteria 'specifies either a quantitative target to be met or a policy action 
to be implemented by an agreed date (or in some cases, continuously over a specified 
period) for the country to be able to continue to draw on the IMF's financing' JMF, 
40 Mosley et al note that the practice of 'tranching' had increased since the inception of pohcy-based 
lending at the Bank with loans being sliced into 'smaller and smaller elements' as a means of ensuring 
greater Bank leverage over borrowing countries (Mosley et al, 1991: 45). 
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2002a: para 35). Similarly, for the Bank, each segment of a multi-t-ranche 
disbursement will not be released until the agreed policy reform has been executed 
(World Bank, 2005b: 2, para 4; 2004e: para 18). If these performance criteria or 
tranche release conditions are not met, a country would have to obtain a waiver on 
those conditions from the institutions before the disbursements can proceed. There 
is, once again, a substantial element of discretion given to the Executive Boards as it 
is up to the Executive Directors of the institutions to determine whether a waiver can 
be granted or not. 
IMF programmes may also be subject to proýgramme rem*ews, the completion of which 
triggers disbursements. According to the Fund, the objective of programme reviews 
is 'to set performance criteria for the future life of the program as wen as to assess 
performance in particular policy areas' undertaken through an assessment of a 
borrower's compliance with the policies established by the programme of economic 
reform in the LOI (IMF, 2002a: para 35). Programme reviews are therefore more 
extensive than performance criteria - fulfilment of all performance criteria does not 
necessary mean a country has continued access to Fund financing where the terms of 
the financing include a programme review - as it demands detailed progress 
assessments of policy compliance and future policy directions 41 . Under the PRGF for 
example, the conditions to be attached to the second and third years of the three-year 
PRGF arrangement will be established by the IMF Executive Board 'in the context 
of a review of the program with the member describing progress made under the 
program, and of the policies it will f6flow during the subsequent year of the 
arrangernent3,42 (IMF, 1999b: section Il, para 1 (bb)). 
Programme reviews exemplify the opaque nature of the current practice of 
conditionality as new conditions could be imposed after the signing of the financing 
agreement, meaning that the terms and conditions for financing could change during 
the course of the financing programme, and old conditions waived or made defunct. 
41 A similar review takes place at the Bank in the context of its policy-based loans but unlike Fund 
financing, review conditions (see discussion immediately following) are not regarded as critical to 
tranche disbursements. 
42 Disbursements from the PRGF are serni-annual, requiring the compliance with semi-annual 
performance criteria and 'appropriate monitoring of key financial variables in the form of quarterly 
quantitative benchmarks and structural benchmarks for important structural reforms' JMF, 1999b: 
section II, para 1 (bb)). Financing under the PRGF is also stricter than lending under SBAs with 
waivers mandated for all missed performance criteria, in particular structural performance criteria, 
before disbursements contingent upon those criteria are made JMF, 2002a: Box 4). 
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While this maintains an element of flexibility to enable the terms and conditions to 
shift with prevailing economic circumstances, critics have contended that programme 
reviews render the process of conditionality untransparent and unaccountable to the 
legislatures of the borrowing countries as the conditions are not disclosed at the 
point of agreement. Veteran IFI watcher Nancy Alexander is particularly concerned 
that with the increasing transparency of LOIs through the increasing publication of 
the documents, 'much of the meat of the LOIs have migrated to the IMF reviews, 
which are not in the public domain' (Alexander, 2001: para 1). 
The problem of transparency is likely to be compounded by the increasing use of ex- 
post conditionalities in Bank and Fund financing, especially financing under the PRSP 
framework. Most notable is the use of prior actions, defined as a set of measures to be 
undertaken by the borrowing country in agreement with the Bank or Fund staff 
(usually on direction of Management after consultation with the Executive Board) 
and the country authorities prior to the Executive Boards' consideration of a 
financing arrangement, programme review or the granting of a waiver (IMF, 2002b: 
para 11(a); IMF 2002a: para 35; IMF 2001a: para 31). An IMF study of its own 
programmes between 1992 - 1999 revealed that the number of prior actions per 
programme rose tenfold from an average of less 0.5 in 1987 - 90 to more than five *in 
1997 - 99 (IMF, 2002b: para 55) and this is likely to increase with the advent of the 
PRSP framework and attendant financing mechanisms. 
While the Bank and the Fund insist that such prior actions may not necessarily affect 
approval of financing arrangements or tranche disbursements or waivers (see IMF 
2002a: para 35), prior actions are increasingly used as both a signalling device and a 
tool of selectitio for determining access to financing from the Bank and the Fund. The 
former role involves estabhshing 'strong, difficult-to-reverse reforms' (IMF, 2002a: 
28) at the inception of a programme to ensure that the policies for reform have a 
higher chance of being implemented while the latter role demonstrates the country 
authorities' commitment to the reforms favoured by the Bank and the Fund. 
Prior actions are compulsory for single-tranche operations from the World Bank, 
most importantly for access to Poverty Reduction Strategy Credits. PRSCs are 
examples of the Bank's programmatic lending, an approach that has been used 
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increasingly over the past few years, involving a series of single-tranche operations 
sequentially presented to the Bank's Executive Board with a medium-term 
framework specified at the outset (World Bank, 2005q: para 19). The share of single- 
tranche financing operations at the World Bank has risen from 21 percent of total 
Bank lending in the years 1990 - 94 to 51 percent in the years 2000 - 04 (World 
Bank, 2005b: paras 13 - 14). 
Approval of each PRSC will be based upon compliance with the policies set out in 
the country's Medium-Term Expenditure Framework (MTEF) which specifies 
(completed prior actions, monitorable progress indicators, and expected prior action 
(triggers) for subsequent operations' (World Bank, 2005q: para 19). Prior actions for 
PRSPs ought to be drawn from the country's PRSP and enshrined in the core 
objectives of the PRSP approach, namely rooted firmly in poverty reduction (World 
Bank, 2005q: pata 19), but, as will be discussed in the following chapter, this is often 
not the case. 
The growth in programmatic lending has also driven the increase in the use of 
'benchmark' conditionalities, with each programmatic loan containing on average of 
31 benchmarks than in non-programmatic loans in financial year 2004 - 2005 (World 
Bank, 2005b: para 22). The Bank defines benchmarks as 'progress markers' or 
milestones demonstrating the borrower's implementation of a policy reforms 
supported by the loan (ibid: para 3) and while they are not considered binding for the 
purpose of individual loan disbursement, they are used to monitor the country's 
overall compliance with the programme of reform outlined in the MTEF (see Wood, 
2005b: 7). 
Prior actions are incorporated into the PRSC loan agreement as an appendix to the 
agreement and referred to in the preamble. For example, the preamble to the PRSC 
agreement between Uganda and the IDA states that financing is provided on the 
basis that 'the Borrower has carried out the measures and taken the actions described 
in schedule 2 to this Agreement to the satisfaction of the Association' with the 
attached schedule referring to actions contained within the country's LDP and 
MTEF (Republic of Uganda, 2001). A similar procedure occurs at the Fund where 
cprior actions are incorporated into and expressly identified in arrangements' (IMF, 
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2002a: para 60). However, this process means these conditions are only forn-jaUy 
brought to the attention of the Executive Boards once the conditions have been 
complied with and the financing arrangement is submitted to Boards for 
consideration. 
Prior actions therefore do not need explicit Board review and approval unlike 
conventional conditionalities which are considered when the borrower's LOI or LDP 
is reviewed by the Executive Boards. The discussions on prior actions are undertaken 
largely between the IMF or Bank staff and the borrowing country authorities and 
agreed upon without the need for Board approval. The IMF's Guidefines on 
Conditionafity 2002 reaffirmed the original provisions of the superseded 1979 
Guidelines which stipulated that where a programme includes prior actions, 'the 
Managing Director will keep Executive Directors informed *in an appropriate manner 
of the progress of the discussions with the member' (IMF, 2002b: para 11 (a)). In 
practice, this is conducted informaRy through 'country matters sessions' of the Board 
and informal briefings (ibid). Proponents of prior actions contend that requiring 
Board approval for prior actions undermines the Bank and Fund staff s ability to 
negotiate with country authorities and procure advantage over 'less-reform miinded 
interest groups' (ibid), thereby enabling the IMF to gain an upper hand in 
negotiations without the requisite checks and balances that exist in a Board review. 
4.6-2. Increasing Institutional Leverage 
Critics have argued that the front-loading of conditionality discussed above 
significantly increased 'the leverage of Management and staff zýs-a4s the 
governments of developing countries' (Babb and Buira, 2004: 14). The Bank, for 
example, states that under the PRSC approach, '[t]raditional conditionality has been 
formance framework that reflects an understanding between the Bank and -replaced 
by aper 
tbegovernment on the priorities of the country's reform programs and the financing 
required' with the Bank requiring 'tangible evidence of progress in achieving the 
objectives of the medium-term program' before each PRSC operation is approved 
(World Bank, 2005e: para 11, emphasis added). 
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This implies a high degree of negotiation between the Bank staff and country 
authorities prior to the entry into force of a financing agreement regarding the 
institutional and policy actions to be undertaken in exchange for disbursements. In 
particular, there is extensive focus on the country's public financial management and 
expenditure systems with all PRSCs being 'underpinned by ex-ante fiduciary 
assessment[s]' of these systems in order to identify what the Bank perceives to be 
'deficiencies', 'fiduciary risk' and 'steps needed to secure acceptable fiduciary 
arrangements' (ibid: para 72). Countries are expected to secure changes, including 
legal or regulatory reforms 43 or institutional reforms44 before disbursements are 
made, blurring the line between 'actual conditionality and 'negotiated policy actions'. 
Even IMF staff have admitted that the use of prior actions obscures the actual 
number of conditionalities that may be present in a financing arrangement. 
According to Mark Plant, assistant director of the IMF's Policy Development and 
Review Department, in spite of evidence that IMF and World Bank conditionality 
appear to have been reduced and the content of conditionality lightened following 
the IMF review of conditionality and the revised guidelines and by efforts by the 
Bank and Fund to 'streamline' conditionality, the true picture is difficult to measure 
because of the numerous ways in which conditionality may be manifested, especially 
with regards to the use of prior actions (interview: Plant, 2004). Referring particularly 
to programmatic lending at the Bank, Plant observes: 
[this practice] gets away from [the process ofl turning the loan off or 
refusing a loan, or refusing continuation of a loan, but what it does, in 
some sense, is delay the loan coming about through prior actions ... I 
am not saying that it's a conspiracy - but conditionality gets hidden 
over there (sic) (interview: Plant, 2004). 
The opaque nature of prior actions is accentuated by the politicisation of decision- 
making at these institutions. While the Executive Boards does not consider prior 
actions before the application for financing comes before them for approval, the US 
Executive Director may receive advance notice of such actions and, as a result, may 
43 For example, 'the enactment of laws on fiscal responsibility, financial administration, procurement 
and internal audit' (World Bank, 2005e: para 72). 
44 Such as 'legislative oversight functions and new budget classifications' (ibid). 
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influence the sort of prior actions that borrowing countries have to adhere to. By 
custom for example, the US Executive Director to the IMF is consulted before any 
lending arrangement is considered by the Executive Board (Woods, 2001: 87 in Babb 
and Buira, 2004: 13). Examples of prior actions indicate a strong bias towards a 
particular economic ideology. Mongolia's arrangement under the PRGF in 1997 
contained 19 prior actions, including conditions to 'speed up the privatisation 
process, setting hard budget constraints and acting swiftly on bank restructuring' 
JMF, 2002a: Box 5). 
At the World Bank, ex-post conditionalities are compounded by the extens1ve use of 
CAS triggers and the CPIA index (see section 4.3.2) to deternune access to financing. 
There has been extensive criticism of the Bank's use of the CPIA with concerns over 
the capacity of Bank staff to assess inherently subjective areas of a country's 
domestic policy and institutional framework and ascribe a numerical rating to each 
criterion for the purposes of allocating funds under the CPIA. Some Executive 
Directors have even condemned the CPIA as 'being a one-size-fits-all instrument 
imposed on governments in a top-down manner replete with subjective judgments 
about their performance' (Alexander, 2004). 
The CPIA scores countries on an extensive range of institutional and policy actions, 
basing them on 'actual policies not on promises or intentions' (World Bank, 2004k: 
para 11). The 16 actions assessed are then grouped into four clusters - economic 
management, structural policies, policies for social inclusion/equity and public sector 
management and institutions - with each cluster forming a 25 percent weighting in 
the overall rating (ibid: Box 1 and para 15). The scores, determined from 
consideration of 'a variety of indicators, observations and judgments' including 
'country knowledge originat[ing] from the Bank, analytic work or policy dialogue, or 
work done by parameters, and relevant publicly available indicators' (ibid: para 11) 
have been criticised by some as a 'composite of subjective judgments' of Bank staff 
on these issues (Alexander, 2004) while others have expressed concern over the lack 
of empirical evidence and analytic work supporting the ratings given in each cluster 
(World Bank, 2005g: para 11). 
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While these requirements do not constitute fiduciary conditions per se, these pre- 
requisites provide a greater incentive for countries in need of external financing to 
implement the policies set by the BWIs as access to financing is blocked unless the 
required reforms are complied with. Contrast this with conventional conditionality in 
which financing is agreed upon subject to the compliance of certain conditions3l non- 
compliance of which may or may not result in the suspension of disbursements, 
depending on the outcome of a waiver application. Once again, this concentrates 
more power at the hands of the institutional staff and management. According to 
Alexander: 
Donors and creditors dominate the policy-making of low-income 
countries more than ever before. The CPIA represents a policy 
straightjacket. No matter what a country's own development strategy 
(or Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper) says, a country is likely to 
adhere to CPIA-derived policy prescriptions if it expects to retain 
external support. Governments are in a double bind if citizens and 
elected officials choose a path other than that specified by CPIA- 
derived priorities. Because of instruments like the CPIA, country 
'ownership' of the development process can be a mirage (Alexander, 
2004: section 
11ý45. 
Moreover, the repositioning of traditional conditionality under the rubric of 'country 
ownership' performs a significant restraining function at the level of the Executive 
Board. A former senior economist who has had substantial experience in the 
negotiations at the Bank and Fund contends that the PRSP and related financing 
instruments which are underpinned by the principle of 'country ownership' have the 
political effect of silencing opposition from borrowing country members to harsh 
financing conditions when reviewing financing arrangements *in deference to the 
principle of south-south solidarity. He argues that unlike previous arrangements 
where it was clear that the IMF or the World Bank have imposed the conditions on 
borrowing countries, Executive Directors representing developing countries find it 
difficult to reject or be critical of new arrangements which purport to be drafted by 
45 Reiterated in interview with Alexander, 2004. Alexander, who headed various Washington DC- 
based NGOs such as the Globalization Challenge Initiative and the Citizens Network on Essential 
Services (CNES), was one of the first activists who highlighted the potential pitfalls of the CPIA when 
the Bank proposed its implementation. 
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country authorities themselves under the rubric of 'country ownership' although the 
conditions which may be substantively detrimental to the borrowing countries 
(interview, 2003). 
4.7. Conclusion 
The doctrine of conditionality is an integral component of development financing 
and nowhere more so than at the Bretton Woods institutions at which it was born, 
extensively applied and evolved. Conditionality is a mechanism which governs not 
only the terms of financial support accorded to borrowing member states at the 
World Bank and the IMF, it also governs the relationship between the parties 
involved in such financing, that is, between the borrowing members and the 
institution, and between the borrowing members and the non-borrowing members. 
The evolution of the doctrine of conditionality demonstrates that the role and nature 
of conditionality have departed from the original objectives of conditionality - that 
is, to create a regulatory instrument that was responsive to the economic and socio- 
political circumstances of countries which borrowed from the Bank and the Fund 
and respectful of the sovereignty of nations that formed the membership of the two 
institutions. Instead, the flexibility which characterises the practice of conditionality 
has accorded the Bank and Fund a wide regulatory berth vis-a-vis their borrowing 
members. The substantial discretionary powers delegated to the institutions have 
shifted the terrain of regulation from 'hard' to 'soft' law making adjudication of 
disputes difficult, if not impossible. The historical evolution of conditionality as a 
regulatory instrument situates ownership within the continuum of conditionality. 
The evolution of conditionahty, in particular, the movement from ex-ante to ex]post 
conditionalities as exemphfied by the PRSP approach, may therefore be framed as 
the beginnings of a transition from Foucault's disciplinary society to a society of 
control vis-a-vis the governance of borrowing member countries 'in relation to the 
World Bank and the IMF. Foucault's conception of power in society charts a 
historical, epochal passage from a modality of power that is disciplinary 'in its 
function to train and normahse behaviour and whose success is derived from 'the use 
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of simple instruments: hierarchical observation, normalizing judgtnent, and ... the 
examination' to a form of power in which power is immanent within the society itself 
and is reproduced through networks outside the traditional institutions of discipline 
(Foucault, 1991: 261 - 261). 
The historical exposition of conditionality enables us to chart the passage from 
disciplinary power of conditionality in which borrowing member states submitted to 
a regime of rules, customs and habits in the form of performance criteria, program 
reviews and waiver requests, to a regulatory framework in which such power adopts 
an more indeterminate and heteromorphous form by constituting itself within the 
body politic of the borrowing country authorities and creating the voluntary will or 
desire to reform through compliance with prior actions and pre-financing triggers. 
This power, notes Best and Kellner, 'operates not through physical force or 
representation by law, but through the hegemony of norms, political technologies-, 
and the shaping of the body and soul' (Best and Kellner, 1991: 49). 
Traditional modalities of conditionality regulated the behaviour of borrowing 
countries through a system of normalisation ('discipline) - compliance with an 
established set of economic truisms (the Washington Consensus) and the adoption 
of institutional and policy reforms in pursuit of the framework laid down by the 
World Bank and the IMF - and through the 'penalty of the norm' (Foucault, 1991: 
196) - the 'nonobservance' of the prescribed economic rationale of the Washington 
Consensus leading to a d6nouement of the community of nation states and therefore 
access to multilateral funds. In contrast., the new modalities of conditionality intensify 
the 'normalising apparatuses of disciplinarity' (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 23) through 
ensuring that borrowing countries accept the disciplinary framework of adjustment 
lending and the econon-uc rationale that underpins them, but are yet regulated 
through their own desire to adopt the reform measures and miternalise them under the 
rubric of 'country ownership'. 
In this manner, the regulatory power exerted by the financing institutions through 
the modalities of conditionality becomes not repressive but productive, imbued with 
a biological power to reproduce the mechanisms of control. In the same manner that 
Foucault conceives of the 'indispensable element' of bio]power in the development of 
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capitalism in Europe through the 'controlled insertion of bodies into the machinery 
of production and the adjustment of the phenomena of population to economic 
processes' (Foucault, 1991: 263), the sustenance of the Washington Consensus 
doctrine of reform as a global project depends on the appropriation of consent and 
the reproduction of life in the mirror of the Consensus framework through the 
concept of 'country ownership'. 
Conditionahty in its new manifestations - and particularly, as operationalised 
through the PRSP framework - reflects the shifting characteristics of regulatory 
power in global economic governance. The modalities of conditionality have evolved 
to reflect the increasing importance of dialogic webs of regulation 'in international 
economic governance as opposed to mechanisms of reward and coercion 
(Braithwaite and Drahos, 2000: 556 - 558). Braithwaite and Drahos' extensive survey 
of actors involved in the globalization of business regulation revealed that '[a]1most 
all five hundred actors interviewed' expressed 'a strong preference for playing games 
of global regulation through dialogue than through rewards and sanctions' as rewards 
and sanctions are costly in financial and diplomatic terms (ibid: 557 - 558). 
According to Braithwaite and Drahos, these webs of dialogue deliver high rates of 
compliance with globalizmg reforms because such dialogue: 
(1) defines issues as a problem; (2) enhances the contracting 
environment so that complex interdependency and issue linkage can 
motivate agreement and compliance; (3) constitutes normative 
commitments; (4) institutionalizes habits of compliance; and (5) 
institutionalizes informal praise and shame for defection from the 
regime' (Braithwaite and Drahos, 2000: 556). 
Similarly, this chapter has dernonstrated that the practice of conditionality has 
evolved to assume a more dialogic characteristic as opposed to a disciplinary role 
in 
order to maximise the effectiveness of the reforms pursued by the World 
Bank and 
the IMF and the hegemonic actors within the Bank and Fund membership. While 
there remains a strong and substantial element of coercion in the practice of 
conditionality, the new modalities of conditionality enables the 
internalisation of 
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reform in means that were not possible under the coercive attribute of traditional 
conditionahty. 
In this case, new modalities of conditionality increase the uptake of reforms pursued 
by traditional conditionality as the rubric of 'ownership' enables country authorities 
to identify with the policy architecture of the Washington Consensus reforms and 
reiterate their conu-nitment to it, notwithstanding the force of financing that 
underpins the pressure for compliance. This capture of the biopolifics of the 
borrowing state is further reinforced by the discursive function of the PRSP 
approach (discussed in the f6flowing chapters) which legitimises the nomenclature of 
partnership, ownership and participation. 
The bio-political power exercised by the international financial through 
borrowing member states is then reified through the structural changes that are 
adopted by the latter under the auspices of 'ownership' as conditionality. The 
legitimacy of the reforms that are undertaken under the new financing instruments/ 
adjustment operations linked to the PRSP process must be sustained not only 
through the capture of policy space within the borrowing member states and of the 
elite policymakers that negotiate on their behalf but also through a more systemic 
restructuring of the socio-political fabric of the countries subject to the reforms. The 
following two chapters examine how this concept of 'ownership' has been 
operationalised in order to re-engineer the political, economic and social institutions 
of borrowing member states under the PRSP framework. 
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Chapter Five 
Reforming the Nation State: PRSPs and the 
Rehabilitating the Structurally Adjusted State 
the state remains a titalpoint of concentration of ca italistpower, even, or qbecially, in ,P 
todqy's global capitalism, and that the empire of capital depends upon a gstem of multole 
states. ' 
- Ellen Meiksins Wlood, 2003: 14 - 
The introduction of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper approach as a mechanism 
for governing the relationship between low-income countries and the international 
development community has resulted in significant changes to the domestic 
constitutions of these countries. A retreat from the first generation' adjustment 
reforms which sought to roll back the state, this new approach goes further than the 
second generation reforms by seeking to reconstitute fundamental elements of the 
state, resulting in the immediate (and almost uniform) reorganisation of political and 
bureaucratic processes across a large swath of countries in the third world. 
The previous chapter demonstrated that the principle of 'ownership' as enshrined in 
the PRSP approach represents a continuation with the existing practice of 
'conditionality' in which financing is exchanged for external resources. 'Ownership', 
as operationalised under the PRSP framework and the attendant instruments of the 
'new architecture of aid', extends the disciplinary power of conventional 
conditionality through the capture of the body politic of the client state. The 
following two chapters demonstrate how this bio-political power exercised by the 
Bretton Woods institutions and by extension the wider donor community, over these 
countries is reinforced by the operational changes imposed upon, and absorbed by, 
client states under the PRSP approach. 
1 The term 'first-generation' reforms are commonly used to refer to the policy reforms introduced in 
developing countries through SAPs, constituting the economic policy prescriptions of the Washington 
Consensus. 'Second-generation' reforms are used to refer to the institutional and policy reforms of the 
(good governance' agenda (see discussion in section 5.1 below). The PRSP reforms are often now 
referred to as the 'third-generation' reforms. 
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Towards this end, it is argued that the reforms implemented by the PRSP framework 
serve two essential purposes vis-a-vis governance of these countries in the wider 
global economic arena: Firstly, the PRSP framework acts as a dis(iplinag mechanism 
by facilitating extensive regulatory and institutional reforms in the recipient state 
required for entrenching the policy reforms imposed through substantive 
conditionalities. Secondly, the PRSP framework performs a Iýgitimising function by 
reconfiguring the relations in domestic policy and political circles in order to mobilise 
disparate voices behind the objectives of the aforementioned substantive 
conditionalities. 
Here, I argue that the current drive to rehabilitate the state apparatus in developing 
countries, through mechanisms such as the PRSP framework, stems not from the 
desire to transfer policy autonomy to governments in the south but from: (1) the 
need to co-opt recalcitrant states into submitting to the necessary regulatory and 
policy reforms for the conducive operation of transnational capital, or, in the case of 
'failed states' or post-conflict states 2, to restore basic institutional structures to pursue 
such reforms; and (2) to mitigate the dislocations associated with the pursuit of such 
reforms through the rehabilitation of the state's regulatory and economic oversight 
function, and, to a lesser extent, its function as an overseer of citizenry welfare. 
These objectives are achieved via a similarly two-tiered process under the PRSP 
framework. The first objective is achieved through the capture qfpolig space and the 
internalisation of the politics of reform by the recipient states under the rubric of 
'ownership' and partnership', the association of the policyrnakers and politicians that 
form the disciplinary aspect of the approach. The second objective is achieved 
through the capture ofpolificalspace' by the donor community and of political and social 
capital via the PRSP consultative mechanism and focus on social sector expenditure 
2 These countries are generally referred to, in Bank and Fund parlance, as 'Low-Income Countries 
under Stress' (LICUS). The Bank describes LICUSs as 'fragile states characterized by a debilitating 
combination of weak governance, policies and institutions, indicated by ranking among the lowest (< 
3.0) on the Country Policies and Institutional Performance Assessment (CPIA)' (World Bank, 20051). 
Thirty countries are classified as LICUS with 'three out of four LICUS are affected by on-going armed 
conflicts' (ibid). 
31 use the term 'policy space' to denote the arena in which decision-making is conducted - through 
elected officials and the civil service which support them - and 'political space' to refer to the arena of 
public and parliamentary bargaining where access to and allocation of resources are contested. 
This, in 
no way, excludes the fact that there is often overlap between the two. 
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under the rubric of 'participation' and 'poverty reduction'. The systemic imperatives 
of neoliberal imperialism therefore dictate the introduction of a mechanism of 
control - the PRSP process - and its attendant discourses of 'ownership', 
cpartnership', 'participation' and 'poverty reduction' as a means of legitimising and 
controlling the direction of policy reform and 'development' options within the states 
in receipt of development financing. 
This chapter considers the mechanisms through which the state apparatus of PRSP 
countries are reconfigured so as to enable the capture of domestic policy space by the 
donor community and how these modalities of state reconfiguration serve the 
disciplinary and legitiýmising function ascribed to the PRSP framework outlined 
above. In particular, it considers the means through which the PRSP framework 
facilitates the reinscription of the state's regulative capacity - through globalizing 
development planning and standardising bureaucratic governance in PRSP countries 
- and examines the manner in which such reforms have served as a disciplinary, as 
opposed to emancipatory, function in managing PRSP countries' engagement with 
the international community. 
This discussion will then be followed up in the next chapter which explores how the 
PRSP framework subsequently reconstitutes the relationship between this 
reconstructed state apparatus and its political constituents so as to further entrench 
and legitimise its underlying disciplinary objectives. 
5.1. PRSPs and the Good Governance Agenda: Continuities 
and Discontinuities 
A dominant feature of the epistemology of globalization in the mid-and late-1990s 
was the hegemony of discourses on the role of the state. Notably prevalent were 
theories on the erosion of state autonomy and national sovereignty in the wake of the 
intensification of cross-border social, cultural, technological and economic relations 
(see for example, Strange, 1996). 
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This epistemic movement mirrored the prevailing conceptual framework that 
underlie the policies pursued by international financial community, notably the 
Washington Consensus approach to economic policy of the IFIs M the 1980s and 
the early 1990s, premised on the need to roU back the state and on the withdrawal of 
the state from economic activity (see Chapter Three). The subsequent - and current 
- retreat from the discourse of the withering state is correspondingly tied to the shift 
in this conceptual and operational framework. 
Consequently, commentators, such as Jayasuriya and Wood, have sought to 
reconceptualise the role of the state Mi light of the shifting forms of governance at 
the global level, notably the resinscription of state regulation 'in the disciplinary 
framework of global governance. According to jayasuriya the current drive to 
reengineer the state's institutional form and the reconstruct elements of its 
relationship with the exterior must be placed within the context of how 'economic 
order is produced and reproduced in the global economy', with the maintenance of 
such order in today's 'emergent global economy' contingent upon the reshaping of 
domestic regulatory regimes' Gayasuriya, 2001b: 5- 6). For Wood, this present 
reconstruction reflects the enduring disciplinary significance of the entity of the 
nation state in the sustenance of what she terms the 'empire of capital', manifested 
today in 'the new imperialism we call globalization' (Wood, 2005a: 10 - 14; 154 - 
155). 
The 'good governance' agenda, the predecessor to the PRSP approach, can be 
viewed as forming the operational backdrop to these conceptualisations. 
Acknowledging the failure of policies to liberalise and deregulate economic activity 
without corresponding state capacity to coordinate such reforms, this agenda sought 
to develop the institutional structures necessary to facilitate policy implementation. 
An important component of governance reforms was therefore the development of 
what jayasuriya terms a 'new proceduralism' Uayasuriya, 2001a: 120) - the 
enhancement of accountability and transparency in economic decision-making and 
adjudication - but at the same time, reducing or eliminating the state's productive 
and/or redistributive role in the economy'. 
4 See Chapter One, section 1.3 for a discussion of jayasunya's epistemology of power. 
5 For example, jayasuriya notes that one of the concerns of the 'good governance' agenda 
'has been to 
ensure that the process of economic deregulation and privatization 
does not lead to the capturing of 
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Towards this end, the development of the rule of law under the aegis of Judicial 
reform and the endorsement of public sector reforms, such as anti-corruption and 
transparency in procurement nutiatives formed the bulk of these 'second generation 
reforms'. As Tuozzo observes: 'Governance policies therefore emphasised the role 
played by institutional change, politics, regulation and the rule of law principally as 
enabling elements for economic performance and economic development' (Tuozzo, 
2005: 7). Viewed from a postcolonial perspective, the 'good governance' agenda 
therefore provided the 'moral and intellectual foundation' for developing and 
reproducing in the Third World the institutions and policies of the western liberal 
state to enable the furtherance of economic globalization (Anghie, 2004: 249.1 253). 
PRSPs and the New Govemance Agenda 
1n spite of similarities, the 'good governance' agenda is distinctly conceptually and 
operationally divergent from the policy and practice that underpin the PRSP 
approach. As Abrahamsen notes, the policies and practice of the 'good governance' 
project did little to reinvigorate the functions of the state that had been 
circumscribed by the free market reforms of the first generation structural reforms: 
'The ideal 'good governance state' is still a minimal state; it is just more efficient and 
competent in carrying out economic reforms' (Abrahamsen, 2000: 42). 
These reforms therefore entailed changes around the periphery of government 
functions and while they included some contentious political and judicial reform 
projects, were largely technical in nature, involving the restructuring of state-owned 
enterprises, the development and improvement of legal and judicial institutions to 
facilitate such restructuring, and so on. The reforms did not intrude into the core of 
portanty/, neither were they made policy decisions in the client countries, and more im 
preconditions for financing from the World Bank, the IMF or bilateral agencies. 
Instead, governance reforms were largely funded by project aid and were 
key markets by politically connected groups and individuals' Uayasuriya, 1999). This observation has 
been shared by other analysts of the Bank's governance programmes. For Tuozzo, a major focus of 
the governance reforms has been the role of the state in 'lowering transactions costs through the 
provision of information and predictable actions' (Tuozzo, 2005: 8). Meanwhile Thuo Gathii notes 
that the imperative to release market forces from the clutches of regulatory controls' imposed by the 
state has assigned 'two major roles' to 'public law and policy': 'first, to protect private property against 
re-distributive interventionism and second, to enforce contracts' (-fhuo Gathii, 2000: 1000). 
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considerably delinked from the policy-based loans of the World Bank, and even 
more so, shielded from the stabilisation programmes of the IMF. 
The PRSP initiative, on the other hand, adopts a more holistic, and consequently, 
more interventionist approach to the embedding of structural reforms. 'Government 
effectiveness' (World Bank, 2005o: para 7) is now considered a central plank of any 
World Bank operation, reflecting the Bank's new conceptual approach aimed at: a) 
defining 'the role of the state on the basis of its capacities' and b) increasing such 
ccapacity over time by strengthening public institutions' in support of the Bank's 
economic reform agenda (ibid: para 8). PRSP-related instruments, such as the 
PRSCs., therefore operationalise the Bank's new approach towards governance 
reforms 'emphasizing a cross-cutting approach rather than stand-alone, discrete 
actions., and shifting from supply-side reforms and technical advice to governments, 
toward broader efforts to enhance domestic ownership and demand for reforms' 
(ibid: para 9). 
In this manner, the PRSP approach reflects a shift into the realm of policymakiq as 
opposed to policy implementation under the 'good governance agenda', regarding the 
capture of the policy space within client countries as equally important, if not more 
so, than establishing the mere institutional structures to support neoliberal economic 
reforms. The PRSP approach establishes a normative framework - subscription, for 
example, to the values of 'poverty reduction' and 'participation' - under which these 
economic reforms should be undertaken. 
More importantly too, the PRSP approach provides the operational link to key 
financing instruments, not only in the requirement for the completion of a PRSP to 
access financing from the Bank, Fund and under the HIPC initiative, but also in 
allowing the implementation of governance measures, such as improved public 
expenditure managements systems, to constitute conditionalities for loans, such as 
the PRGF loans JMF, 2000a: para 21). jayasuriya notes the difference between these 
early governance programmes and the policies of this new architecture of aid. He 
observes that: 
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the former, governance connoted the effective 
implementation of policies of economic liberalisation while in the 
latter, there is greater emphasis on governance as an instrument to 
promote the regulative capa6ifies of the state Gayasunya, 2001b: 2, 
emphasis added). 
In linking governance and structural reform to the disbursement of external 
financing in an overarching policy at the IF1 level, these reforms may therefore be 
standardised and the discipline of the Washington Consensus reforms internalised in 
a more uniformed fashion. This process of embedding the policies of structural 
adjustment through the rehabilitation of state apparatuses may therefore be located 
in what Jayasuriya describes as the move towards a convergence and 
internationalisation of domestic governance structures, replacing individual 
regulatory systems with a uniformed system of governance across the globe, thereby 
complementing rather than replacing the policies of the Washington Consensus 
UayasUrlYa, 2001b: 1- 6). 
5.2. Disciplining the State: Reinventing the Regulative 
Capacity of the State 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the development of the concept of 'country 
ownership' and the modalities of engendering such 'ownership' under the PRSP 
framework constitute a significant part of the shift in the regulatory mechanisms of 
the World Bank and the IMF (and, to a lesser extent, the wider development 
financing community), representing a more bio-political form of control over the 
client countries. The rationalities of the adjustment reforms are absorbed 
by the 
client states, through this process of inclusion and incorporationý 
both at the 
transnational negotiation level and at the domestic institutional level. Reinstating the 
regulative capacity of the domestic state facilitates the transplantation of adjustment 
policies not merely through the institutional discipline of conditionality 
(the pohtico- 
juridical) but also through the reproduction of the normalising ftamework of 
adjustment rationalities by the client state widiin its 
domestic jurisdiction. 
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From the point of view of the BWIs (and other donor agencies), the embedding of 
economic reforms is unlikely to succeed without a parallel capture of the key 
policyrnaking space in client countries, and without the corresponding internalisation 
of reform strategies by the policyrnaking elite in these countries. For example, the 
World Bank concludes that the lessons distiRed from the research on aid 
effectiveness in the 1990s highlight 'the importance of a country's ownership of its 
reform program': 
... donors can advise on and support, but cannot buy or induce, 
economic reforms. Thus, government willingness to reform - where 
possible, with broad popular support - is essential to successful 
ptograms' (World Bank, 2005q: 6). 
Field research for this thesis has also indicated that there is less of a shift in the 
outlook of Bank and Fund staff vis-a-vis the substantive content of the economic 
programmes under financing arrangements than there is on the procedural aspects of 
such financing. Both Bank and Fund staff, aside from a few exceptions, remain 
remarkably wedded to the Washington Consensus model of econormic reforms at the 
same time as acknowledging that the success of the reforms requires not only more 
complex institutional reforms - more than the second generation/ governance 
reforms - but also much greater government commitment to implementing the 
reforms (interviews, various Bank and Fund staff, 2004-05)'. 
As one Bank official contended, although 'governments must take ownership of their 
economic policies ... the idea is not to get away from world consensus [on sound 
economic policy] but on how to implement in countries the institutions necessary to 
regulate policy reforms' (interview, April 2005). This official, who declined to be 
named, argues that while governments, under the PRSP framework, should be placed 
in the driving seat in terms of policy formulation, there remains an imperative to 
6 Also gleaned from observations of statements made at Bank and Fund public dialogues and meetings 
during the same period. For those inside the institutions who view the PRSP approach as a positive 
shift in transferring back some of the policy autonomy of client countries removed by decades of 
structural adjustment, the frustration arises from the conditions that have been attached to new 
modalities of financing such as those discussed here. These individuals contend that the PRSP 
framework has been circumscribed by the policies of the major shareholders - notably the G7 
countries - who insist on more interventionist mechanism for regulating the new financing facilities. 
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ground developmental policies in the underlying economic 'fundamentals', notably 
the macroeconomic framework set by the IMF (ibid). 
Similarly, senior Bank economist jean-Jacques Dethier believes that 'ownership' is 
about facilitating a voluntary subscription to the policies of the Washington 
Consensus, evidenced by the 'success' of countries such as Vietnam, which adopted 
adjustinent-like reforms without SAPs: 'these adjustments are successful because 
there is a willingness in the country to reform - the social revolution facilitated by 
good policies' and a willingness to regulate the policies of adjustment (interview: 
Dethier, 2005). 
This 'good policy' / 'bad policy' dichotomy is a constant refrain among Bank and 
Fund staff For the likes of Dethier and other Bank officials and consultants, such as 
Daniel Morrow and Linda van Gelder, and Fund officials such as Mark Plant or 
Elliot Harris', the PRSP framework is clearly not a licence to adopt 'bad policy' or, in 
other words, policies contrary to the established economic truism of the Bretton 
Woods institutions (interviews: Dethier, 2005; Van Gelder, 2004; Morrow, 2005; 
Plant, 2004 & 2005; Harris, 2005). The challenge instead is to ensure pohcymakers in 
recipient countries internalise the logic of the social and economic policies advocated 
by the Bank and the Fund so as to ensure the conditionalities of adjustment and 
stabilisation programmes are complied with. 
This challenge is accompanied by an acknowledgement that the complexity of 
institutional reforms necessary to implement the economic reforms under financing 
programmes require a substantial degree of domestic expertise and knowledge which 
'cannot be well designed primarily by an external agency [b]ecause good design 
requires intimate knowledge of the local setting and institutions and because 
implementation requires some degree of consent from the many stakeholders' 
(Morrow, 2005: 4; also Interview: Morrow, 2005). Such domestic 'ownership' is also 
perceived to reduce the 'transaction costs' for implementing reforms and reflects the 
view, as observed by Piron and Evans, 'that 'ownership' is instrumentally important 
to the efficient use of aid' (Piron with Evans, 2004: 4). 
7 These officials are, or were at the point of interviews, significantly involved with the implementation 
of the PRSP framework at their respective institutions. See end of the 
Bibliography for a list of 
interviewees and positions held at time of interview. 
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The conceptual shift of the PRSP framework may therefore be viewed as recognition 
of the importance of the role of the nation state as a nodule for capital accumulation 
and neoliberal globalization, whether in pursuit of such policies as an end or as a 
means of achieving socio-econon-Lic development and/or 'poverty reduction'. This is 
due not only to the state's inherent ability to translate transnational. regulation into 
domestic norms - for example adjustment conditionalities and international trade 
obligations into local law - and maintaining domestic governance mechanisms to 
ensure the implementation of such norms - through liberalisation and privatisation 
measures - but also to its power to enrol nationalist ideologies to legitimise the logic 
of these reforms. The modern nation state, even the most fractured state, continues 
to exercise sole sovereign authority over its political, territorial and economic 
jurisdiction and commands the domestic legitimacy in support of such authority, 
however circumscribed this authority and legitimacy may be. 
The maintenance of discipline within a state, incorporated as the state may be into 
the international political economy, remains dependant on the internal state 
apparatuses and the political and policymaking elite who administer the institutions 
of the state. Consequently, the bio-pohtical power that is exercised by the 
international financial institutions and the hegemon states in the international 
political order needs to be translated into the local setting, through what Poulantzas 
(relying on Foucault) calls the instruments of 'physical constraint' - the prison, the 
army, the police, the judiciary - and through the 'manipulation and the consumption 
of bodies'. an order which moulds the domestic citizenry and inserts them into 'the 
various institutions and apparatuses' of the state (Poulantzas, 2000: 29). The state is 
necessary in order to install 'a uniform national language' and ehminate all other 
languages, not only for 'the creation of a national economy and market, but still more 
for the exercise of the State's pohtical role' in this market economy (Poulantzas, 
2000: 58). 
For Poulantzas, the characteristic of a capitalist state is its role *in atomising or 
individualising components of the market economy: 'the atomonization of the body- 
politic into what are called 'individuals' - that is, juridical-political persons, who are 
the subjects of certain freedoms' (ibid: 63). Such diffusion of elements require the 
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existence of both a 'centralized, bureaucratized State' to instaH and organise this 
atornization as well as 'a representative State' to lay claim to national sovereignty and 
cpopular will' to hold together this fracturing of the 'people-nation' (ibid: 63; 65). 
In this manner, while the reforms of the adjustment and governance period served to 
instil the form of liberal politics and liberal legality in the recipient countries through 
privatisation and liberalisation of the domestic economy and the installation of 
institutions to police this Individualisation, these reforms failed to instil (and in the 
first instance, dismantled) the organisational structure of the state to effectively 
manage the discipline of the neoliberal market reforms. As Fitzpatrick notes, in 
relation to structural adjustment conditionalities, 'these conditions, for all their 
seemingly anti-statist character, still call for a strong national state to enact and 
enforce them' (Fitzpatrick, 2001: 214). 
Therefore, it can be argued that the new conceptual framework of development 
financing is predicated upon the need to rehabilitate the regulative (and to a certain 
extent, prescriptive) function of the state, to reinvigorate both the functions of the 
cnational representative State" (Poulantzas, 2000: 63) as well as the 'hierarchical and 
bureaucratic centralism' (ibid) of the state subject to adjustment policies. At the same 
time, the framework does not and can not ascribe to the state the autonomy that is 
associated with full-fledged articulation of national sovereignty at the risk of 
fracturing the existing international political economy's dependency on this unequal 
relationship. 
Instead, this rehabilitation is mediated through the new precepts of 'ownership' and 
'partnership' under the rubric of the PRSP initiative, providing the disciplinary 
framework to: a) create a facilitative domestic political as well as bureaucratic 
environment for the embedding of substantive fiscal and structural reforms a1a 
Washington Consensus and b) replicate this environment universally across all 
countries subject to the reform. At the same time, the PRSP process legitimises the 
reforms through a capture of political consensus (and therefore resistance) 
in the 
consultative /participatory mechanisms (see Chapter Six). 
The role of the state in this respect is discussed further in Chapter 
Six. 
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In this manner, the PRSP approach serves to address a challenge that is posed by the 
reinstatement of the state as the locus of current globalization trends, that is-, how 
these states can and should be managed internally. Describing the 'political form of 
globalization' as not one of 'a global state but a global system of multiple local states 
structured in a complex relation of domination and subordination', Woods contends 
that the 'administrative and coercive functions' of nation states remain important 
local facilitators of global capital, providing 'regularity, predictability and legal order' 
critical to capital's operations in each locality (Wood, 2005a:: 141). She argues: 
because the new imperiahsm depends more than ever on a system 
of multiple states to maintain global order, it matters more than ever wbat 
localforces, govern them and homý (ibid: 155, emphasis added). 
The PRSP approach is an attempt to facilitate this 'what' - policyrnakers, politicians, 
civil society members who share in the underlying ideology of the reforms and - 
'how' - commitment to what Gould describes as 'a multi-tethered program of state 
reform' (Gould, 2005a % b: 2) in return for financing. These reforms, as Gould 
demonstrates through his compendium of empirical studies9, 'both reorgani*. Ze and 
rafionali. Ze the social relations of aid management' (Gould, 2005b: 143) and, in the 
process, setting a precedent for future modalities of delivering aid but also for the 
governance of the international political economy. 
5.3. Modalities of State Reconfiguration 
The process of restructuring the state apparatuses under the PRSP approach takes 
place on two fronts: (1) through the imposition of a standardised mechanism for 
policy discussion and formulation - the Poverty Reduction Strategy process- and 
a universal blueprint for developing national development plans - the PRSP 
document; and (2) through efforts to centre key policymaking processes around the 
PRSP and to standardise bureaucratic practice along the principles established by the 
PRSP approach and the attendant norms of the 'new architecture of aid'. 
9 Gould's edited collection The New Conditionako: Pover-O Reduction Strategies, Aid and Domestic Poktics 
compiles empirical studies of PRS processes in Tanzama, Vietnam and Honduras 
(Gould, 2005a). 
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The 
-reconstituted regulative capacity of the state is subsequently strengthened 
through basing access to financing instruments on the assessment of countries' 
comnutments to reform processes, for example, through the JSAN process and other 
ex-post conditionality and new modalities of financing, such as budget support and 
programmatic lending (see section 5.4 below). 
5.3.1. Globalized Development Modelling 
The PRSP is , in effect, a universal blueprint for the development of a particular form 
of national economic planning. According to senior World Bank economist Pablo 
Guerrerro, the Comprehensive Development Framework and the PRSP were both 
born out of a recognition by key Bank staff of the contribution of investment 'in 
developing a long-term strategy' towards a 'successful development experience' and 
the systemic failure of ad-hoc, uncoordinated development financing, particularly in 
low-income countries (interview: Guerrero, 2004)'0. Much of this has been a 
response to the fragmented nature of financial planning in PRSP-ehgible countries 
and the duplicity of administration relating to development financing, a perennial 
symptom of aid dependency. 
Consequently, the PRSP approach involves, in many cases, a radical overhaul in the 
business of government M PRSP countries. Not only do PRSP country governments 
have to establish new mechanisms of domestic dialogue and consultation to fulfil the 
procedural requirements of the PRSP initiative, national planning strategies and 
priorities must also now be reframed in the language of the new PRSP discourse. As 
such, the PRSP 'aims to be far more than a forum about the exchange about 
priorities', representing, instead, the domestic manifestation of a 'globally prescribed' 
set of economic and social reform policies (Craig and Porter, 2003: 60). 
10 In developing the strategic content of the CDF/PRSP, Guerrerro's team, the Operational Policy and 
Country Services (OPCS), at the Bank represents the reformers within the institution whose interests 
in developing more progressive policies at the institution corresponded with the technocrats who 
viewed reform as necessary to address the shortcomings of aid ineffectiveness. The responses from 
members of this team, as evidenced in interviews as well as hstserv postings on electronic consultative 
for demonstrate an acknowledgment of the failure of previous Bank policies Vis-a-vis development 
and poverty reduction and an admittance of the general failure of conventional structural adjustment 
policies. However, although there is recognition of the disjuncture between the strategic objectives of 
this team and the operational departments of the Bank, there remains either a reluctance to admit, or a 
failure to question the fundamental shortcomings of the Washington Consensus model, particularly 
with regard to the macroeconomic strategies advanced by the BWIs, and on issues of privatisation of 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs). 
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a) Unified Policy Process 
Most notably, the PRSP framework requires the establishment of a 'participatory 
process' through which the PRSP document will be formulated 'to design and to 
build ownership for the strategy' (World Bank and IMF, 2005b: Annex 1, para Al). 
This should include, inter alia, participation by all segments of the government 
(central ministries,, regional departments, parliaments and subnational governments); 
other 'stakeholders' (civil society groups, groups representing minority communities, 
the epistemic community, the private sector, trade unions, etc); and bilateral and 
multilateral donors (ibid). It must also make provisions for consultations with 
representatives of 'the poor' (ibid). The objective of the PRSP approach is thus to 
secure a political consensus around a set of national expenditure priorities and the 
economic policies to achieve those priorities. 
Figure 5.1 reproduces a chart from the World Bank's PRSP Sourcebook showing how 
the institution expects a PRS to unfold at country level. The chart indicates that 
although the Bank (and the Fund) claim that the PRS process is not prescriptive, 
these institutions have a fairly comprehensive template for what constitutes an 
appropriate policyrnaking and policy coordination process and consultative 
mechanism for policy dialogue. The tension between the objective of engendering 
'country ownership' of strategies for poverty reduction and economic development 
and the need to do so under a strict timeline and prescribed conditions -a key point 
noted by both the Bank's and Fund's internal evaluations of the PRSP gMF, 2004e; 
World Bank, 2004k) - is clearly highlighted through this process. Not only is the 
overriding framework for policy dialogue predetermined, these 'home-grown' 
strategies must also fit into a series of prescribed bureaucratic action plans with 
specified results. 
A notable effort in the task of fostering 'country ownership' in PRS processes - 
aside from the external consultative process discussed below - is the integration of 
'line ministries' into the PRSP process, broadening up the scope for policy 
formulation for development financing priorities to include ministries other than the 
finance or economic planning ministries. As the BWIs note: 'Line ministries are key 
to successful implementation and need to be involved in PRS formulation to help 
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identify development objectives and prepare sectoral plans to achieve thern' (World 
Bank and IMF, 2004: para 28). 
Understanding the nature 
of poverty 
Choosing poverty reduction objectives 
Defining the strategy for poverty 
reduction and growth, including: 
macro and structural polices 
governance 
sectoral policies and programs 
realistic costing and funding 
Implementation of programs and 
policies 
Monitoring outcomes and 
evaluating impact 
Figure 4: How A PRS Can Unfold at the Country Level 
(Reproduced from Klugman, 2002: 5) 
Actors and participatory 
processes, including: 
" central govermnent 
agencies and 
interministerial. 
working groups 
" parliaments and 
other representative 
structures 
" the public, including 
the poor 
" civil society 
" external partners 
While this can be interpreted as a positive recognition of the role played by the cross- 
section of government departments in the process of social and economic 
development, it can also be seen as a means of co-opting policyrnakers who may not 
subscribe to the reforms required as conditionalities under financing agreements as 
they were previously negotiated by the finance ministry and the BWls. By ensuring 
that civil servants and politicians in peripheral departments are integrated into the 
planning processes, the BWIs will be able to ensure that they continue 'to be active 
by further developing implementation action plans in their respective areas of 
responsibility' (World Bank and IMF, 2004: para 28). 
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This measure is less about counteracting the hegemony of finance ministries in client 
states - which arose from adjustment-era financing relationships as these ministries 
assumed the role as conduits for external financing and fiscal discipline (see 
Harrison, 2001b: 664 - 665) - than about ensuring that compliance with the 
substantive policies of post-adjustment financing. As Harrison notes, in his study of 
what he terms as the 'post-conditionality regime"' in Uganda and Tanzania, finance 
ministries and public service ministries have gained ascendancy in the post-SAP era, 
the former as 'powerful producers of neo-liberal orthodoxy' and the latter as 
cexecutors of administrative reform programmes', as a result of the ongoing efforts 
by external donors to internalise neoliberalism and to administer public sector 
reforms in pursuit of this orthodoxy (Harrison, 2001b: 668). The PRSP framework 
extends this process by broadening political ownership of adjustment reforms, 
ensuring that a broad range of ministries are involved not just in the execution of 
policy but in the formulation as well. 
The scope for policy formulation under the PRSP framework is, however, severely 
straitjacketed in line with the reformist orthodoxies which characterise this 'new 
architecture of aid' (see Chapter Three, section 3.2). VVI-iile the stated objectives of 
the PRSP initiative are that of country ownership and while the BWIs have 
repeatedly reiterated the need to tailor country strategies to country conditions - 
particularly in the past two years as the lessons from the initial round of evaluations 
are distilled - the PRSP process and substance remain formulaic and prescriptive. 
All PRSPs ate expected to address key issues and follow a set template for 
presentation of these issues (see Figure 5.1). In preparing an assessment of a 
country's PRSP in the joint Staff Advisory Note, Bank and Fund staffs ate therefore 
guided by a country's coverage of the following 'five basic elements': 
(1) Assessment of poverty in the country and its key 
determinants; 
(2) Setting targets for poverty reduction 
(3) Prioritising public actions for poverty reduction; 
" See Chapter Four, section 4.5. 
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(4) Establishing monitoring of poverty trends and monitoring 
the impact of government policies on poverty reduction; 
(5) Description of the participatory process (Klugman, 2002: 
4; World Bank and IMF, 2005: Annex 
The uniformity of these policy interventions is then further maintained through 
pivoting disbursements on the PRSP through donor-coordinated financing 
mechanisms, such as the Multi-Donor Budget Support (MDBS) programme In 
Ghana and the Tanzanian Partnership Framework for Budget Support, so that 
different donor programmes are consolidated around the countries' PRSPs and 
PRSP annual progress reports (APRs) (see for example, Government of Ghana, 
2005; Thompson, 2004; also section 5.5 below) 
12 
. 
b) Universal Targets and Indicators 
In spite of rhetoric to the contrary, the strategic priorities of the PRSP must fit into 
the parameters established by the World Bank and the IMF. Under the PRSP 
approach, priorities for pubhc expenditure and government action in relation to most 
social and economic pohcies have largely been predetermined. As win also be 
discussed in section 5.5 below, these parameters are fairly narrow and do not allow 
for much deviation from the standard Washington Consensus economic model, 
particularly in relation to structural and macroeconomic policy. 
The overarching framework for government action in PRSP countries is that of 
engendering 'pro-poor growth' through four priority areas identified by the Bank and 
the Fund., as identified by the PRSP Sourcebook" - 'macroeconomic and structural 
policies'; 'improvements in governance'; 'appropriate sectoral policies and programs' 
and 'realistic costing and appropriate levels of funding for major programs'(Klugman, 
2002: 4, Box 1). 
12 The Ghanaian MDBS, for example, is a Memorandum of Understanding between the Ghanaian 
government and nine financiers, including the World Bank, the UK DFID, the European Union (EU) 
and the African Development Bank (ADB), to establish a common framework for the assessment, 
development and disbursement of grant, credit and loan agreements in support of the Ghanaian 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (Government of Ghana, 2005; T'hompson, 2004). 
13 'Fhe PRSP Sourcebook notes that '[e]very PRSP would be expected to provide an adequate overall 
treatment of each of these four areas [although [w]hat is covered within each area will ... 
differ across 
countries' (Klugman, 2002,4). 
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A review of leaked minutes from Executive Board discussions on various country 
PRSPs indicates substantial support at the Board level of Washington Consensus- 
style policies, such as privatisation, liberalisation, decentralisation and the 
marketisation of the agricultural sector, notably the removal of subsidies for 
agricultural inputs and the pnVatisation of state-owned marketing boards, policies 
which were supported through old-style adjustment lending, as well as 
gmacroeconomic stability' based on deflationary fiscal policies 'in efforts to reduce 
poverty under the PRSPs ýDA Memoranda, various). 
Bank Board members are particularly supportive and encouraging of the privatisation 
of state-owned enterprises, including essential services, as a means of freeing 
resources for poverty reduction. Minutes from the Board discussion on the Ghanaian 
PRSP noted praise from the Board for the Ghanaian government's acknowledgment 
of the 'negative impact of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) in crowding out private 
sector investment and undermining budget stability' and reveal strong support for 
the 'divesture of these SOEs in order to help decrease the size of the state and free 
up resources for InVestment/poverty reduction' gDA Memorandum, 28 May 2003: 
para 41). 
Meanwhile, an Executive Director, when considering the Tanzanian PRSP, for 
example, 'complemented the government's courageous reforms to create an enabling 
environment for private sector activities, including privatization of 80 percent of 
parastatals, and the divestment or liquidation of many state-owned enterprises in the 
manufacturing sector, with the focus now shifting to power and water utilities along 
with key transport services' JDA Memorandum, 1 July 2003: para 15). 
A study by UNCTAD of the PRSP approach in Africa in 2002 has thus criticised the 
policy framework which underpins PRSP formulation, questioning the PRSP 
approach's continued endorsement of 'the very stabilization policies and structural 
reforms that have barely succeeded in bringing about growth and reducing poverty' 
and the lack of concern for these policies on poverty (UNCTAD, 2002a: 59). 
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Hence, the report concluded that 'there is no fundamental departure' from the 
policies espoused under the old structural adjustment programmes underpinned by 
the Washington Consensus' approach to economic reforms designed to 'get prices 
right' (ibid: 6- 7). Instead, the policies of this 'post-Washington Consensus' involves 
an additional focus on country institutions - 'getting institutions right' (ibid) - with a 
focus on strengthening domestic institutional frameworks to support the 
macroeconomic and structural reforms of the previous generation of adjustment". 
The establishment of a uniform blueprint for national development strategies within 
these parameters thus responds less to a need to develop appropriate indigenous 
policies than to a need to facilitate an effective universal mechanism through which 
financing may be channelled and economic policy prescriptions effectively 
internalised. External financiers, notably the Bank and the Fund are therefore, 
inadvertently or not, engaged here at a much deeper structural level than ever before 
in these countries, directly engaging with the process of managing and directing state 
policies on a wide range of domestic policy issues and uni4ring these processes 
through a common framework. 
5.3.2. Standardising Domestic Govemance 
Donor influence in client countries' under the PRSP framework is extended further 
through measures to standardise policyrnaking processes in PRSP countries, 'in 
particular through efforts toward aligning the PRSP process and substantive content 
with existing government policyrnaking processes and policy documents as part of a 
wider objective to centralise all policymaking around the PRSP and PRSP-related 
documents. At the heart of this exercise is the drive to streamline the local executive 
and establish the institutions necessary for the successful implementation of 
prescribed policy reforms, strengthening the capacity of the state to dehver these 
reforms and for financiers to maintain oversight of such policy execution. 
14 Further, the report notes that while 'the new approach recognizes that these policies may have 
unfavourable consequences for the poor', the PRSP guidelines pay little heed to the need for 'social 
impact analysis' of such policies, even if only to enable steps to be taken to mitigate such negative 
effects (ibid). Furthermore, the report notes that even in the design of 'anti-poverty policies' in two 
key areas of education and health, the reforms advocated place 'undue emphasis ... on market 
mechanisms', such as user fees (ibid), policies characteristic of structural reform policies under SAPs. 
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Paradoxically, the World Bank and the IMF have viewed such 'mainstreaming' as 
indicators of 'country ownership' and their 2004 joint progress report on PRSP 
implementation underscored the importance of PRSP integration 'into domestic 
processes such as elections, the budget and prior strategies' as indicators of 'country 
commitment' to the PRSP process, and consequently, to the substantive content of 
the economic reforms to be undertaken under this initiative" (World Bank, 2004k: 
12). 
a) Linking Fiscal Support Systems 
The Bank, Fund and bilateral donors., such as the UK's DFID, claim that without 
adequate links to the operational aspects of public expenditure management (PEM), 
the PRSP document itself lacks operational relevance and this undermines efforts to 
allocate resources M accordance with the expenditure priorities established through 
the participatory consultative process. Furthermore, the objectives of the PRSP 
cannot be achieved if there are unrealistic fiscal projections of resources not tied to 
the discipline of a working macroeconomic framework. 
The Medium-Term Expenditure Framework is the primary vehicle which the World 
Bank and the IMF expects countries to link their PRSP policies to. The idea of an 
MTEF has been strongly mooted by the World Bank in the mid-and-late 1990s, 
particularly in low-income countries,, particularly as an instrument of public 
expenditure management". MTEFs are required for all PRSP countries seeking 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Credits from the World Bank and may inform the 
macroeconomic framework required for IMF PRGF loans. They are also considered 
part of the country assessment under the HIPC initiative and under the new MDRI. 
Linking public policies and budgets over a medium-term period of three to four 
years, the MTEF provides the fiscal and budgetary discipline that the Bank and Fund 
15 The report notes that: 'For sustainable impact, the PRS process needs to be aligned with country- 
specific decision-making processes and institutions. While many PRSs have been built around eXisting 
domestic planning documents, the linkages between them are not always clear, leading to confusion 
and undermining ownership ... ' (World 
Bank and IMF, 2004: para 25 - 26). 
16 A World Bank working paper in 2002 noted that the World Bank has been actively engaged in the 
adoption and implementation of =Fs in developing countries, particularly in the Africa region 
which accounts for over half of the NMFs implemented in the developing world (Le Houerou and 
Taliercio, 2002: 1). The authors commented that: 'In fact, the MITF has become a standard item in 
the Bank's PEM) toolkit. More and more, =Fs are considered the sine qua non of good PENI' (ibid). 
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believe client countries require in order to achieve the objectives of 'Pro-poor 
growth' (World Bank, 1998: 32, in Le Houerou and Taliercio, 2002: 2). Aimed at 
'integrating the top-down resource envelope with the bottom-up sector programs', 
the MTEF attempts to align resource allocations - determined by fiscal targets, 
revenue estimates and expenditures - with sector programmes - underpinned by cost 
estimates of development projects (ibid: 2-3). 
Countries are encouraged to dialogue with external financing agencies in forrnulatiýng 
an MTEF in order to align expenditure priorities with potential revenue from grants, 
loans or debt relief. As such, Craig and Porter View the MTEF as 'the national 
budgetary complement to the PRSPs, together providing one, comprehensive device 
binding together global arrangements, national intersectoral. budgeting and highly 
localized investments that were never possible through the 'national development 
plan' and 'national account' type devices popular in the immediate post-colonial 
period' (Craig and Porter, 2003: 61). Thus, it can be argued that while the PRSP 
represents the means by which the World Bank, the IMF and other financing 
agencies can control client governments' strategic priorities, the MTEF provides the 
framework in which these strategies are operationalised and through which they 
intersect with global financial developments. 
While harmonisation of domestic policyrnaking and national development planning is 
in principle, a progressive step forward, the linking of PRSP-type priorities and 
strategies to other economic and social development planning instruments may have 
the impact of subverting all other national priorities to those championed under the 
approach. This may be viewed as a means of disciplining countries' fiscal and 
budgetary options by reorienting domestic expenditure priorities and policy choice 
towards those which fit into the institutions' prevailing economic ideology. 
The Bank and the Fund, in their evaluation of PRSPs, expect countries to address the 
structural and sectoral. policies that support the economic reforms outlined in the 
document and the institutional constraints on the achievement of those objectives, 
including, inter alia, the 'prioritization and sequencing of reforms', 'private sector and 
financial sector development' and 'key social sector policies and programs' as wen as 
tpolicies for social inclusion and equity' (World Bank and IMF, 2005: para D). These 
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institutional components have gained importance in the years since the PRSP 
inception. For example, the changes in the PRS architecture which were endorsed by 
the Executive Board in September 2004 have reiterated that, among others, 'the PRS 
initiative needs to emphasize improvements in ana#Isis, Po&ies, institutions, andprocesses 
that underpin a PRSP rather than emphasizing production of papers"' (ibid: para 2, 
emphasis added). 
This 'mainstreaming' exercise has, therefore, as much, if not more, to do with the 
need for donors to improve domestic financial resource management as it has to do 
with linking poverty reduction strategies with financial aid. Aligning government 
processes with the principles of PRSP enables the opening up of government action 
to public (and hence, donor) scrutiny and encourages the participation of 
stakeholders, including financing agencies, in the monitoring of government policy 
vis-a-vis public expenditure allocations. As the IMF noted in its PRGF operational 
guidelines, 'a primary focus [of the PRSP initiative] will be on improving the 
management of public resources, achieving greater transparency, more active public 
scrutiny, and generally increasing government accountabilio in fiscal management' JMF, 
1999a: para 14, emphasis added). 
b) Establishing Institutions for Public Accountability 
As a consequence of the drive for accountability, one of the main initiatives of the 
PRS approach has been opening up of public accounts to external mispection, 
including from auditors from the financing agencies and reforming PEM systems in 
client countries. As Gould observes, ' under the 
PRSP initiative, the 'core of the 
reform agenda comprises a radical renovation of the mechanics of public financial 
management' (Gould, 2005a: 2). Linking the PRSP process to the MTEF process 
is 
one means of strengthening such oversight, and enables external financing agencies 
17 'nese institutional reforms should include 'improvements in governance and public sector 
management', such as 'measures to address systemic problems 
in budget formulation and execution, 
financial management and procurement systems, and monitoring of public spending', 
'steps to ... 
improve transparency and ensure accountability of public institutions and services vis-ý-Vls the needs 
and priorities of the poor' and 'efforts to address critical problems 
inhibiting civil service performance 
and any issues of corruption in the public service' 
(World Bank and IMF, 2005: Annex 1, para D. 7). 
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to determine the size and shape of the overall resource envelope of a PRSP country 
and the type of policies such resources should be spent on". 
Another World Bank recommendation for increasing PEM surveillance is through 
Bank-facilitated Public Expenditure Reviews (PERs)". The PER is an extensive 
review of a country's expenditure framework carried out by World Bank consultants, 
including analysis of the procedural and substantive aspects of a country's PEM 
system. A PER may include a detailed analysis of a country's fiscal framework, 
including the constraints that may impede 'effective use of public resources', 
institutional reforms necessary to expedite budget allocations and measures to 
20 improve such allocations (World Bank, 2005d: 1 -2). In many cases, the adoption of 
an MTEF have been a result of a PER (Le Houerou and Taherclo, 2002: 1). 
The PER is only one of many technical assistance projects that have accompanied 
the PRSP initiative in PRSP countries, albeit an increasingly fundamental one. Some 
of these projects aim to complement the PRSP approach by assisting countries to 
develop the capacity for formulating PRSP projects but many ate primarily self- 
serving as they aim to inform donor interventions in PRSP countries and have, 
consequently, increased donor presence in policy formulation. For example, PRSCs 
are usually underpinned by the Bank's traditional economic and sector work (ESW) 
assessing, inter alia, 'public financial management systems and key social, structural 
and sectoral policies', utilising the PER and other economic assessments, such as the 
Country Financial Accountability Assessment (CFAA) and the Country Procurement 
Assessment (CFAA) as well as the Poverty and Social Impact Assessment (PSIA) 
(World Bank, 2005e: para 6). 
These assessments and reviews provide the background to determining what money 
is allocated to a PRSC recipient country and how much. According to the Bank, 'the 
18 It is interesting to note that while in most industrialised countries and many mature developing 
economies, such independent accountability mechanisms exist within the legislative and judicial 
apparatuses, usually overseen by domestic apex court but the form of PEM/PFM prescribed by the 
Bank and Fund usually involves accountability to external institutions, notably the BWIs themselves 
or other external donor agencies and ratings agencies. 
19 For example, the Bank's 2004 PRSP evaluation suggested that PERs 'are useful inputs into aligning 
PRSPs with budgets, particularly if they are carried out on a rolling basis' (World Bank, 2004k: 30). 
20 More often than not, these reviews follow an austere fiscal framework that challenges the size of the 
civil service and state-owned enterprises and a deflationary fiscal policy that places constraints on 
budgetary expenditures. 
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PRSP provides the overall framework and policy direction for Bank assistance-, the 
ESW informs the policy dialogue that guides the design of the PRSC and helps policy 
makers formulate a clear agenda to achieve the country's development objectives' 
(ibid) - 
As the standardising of bureaucratic procedures under the PRSP approach becomes 
extensively commonplace, capacity building projects to 'assist' client countries meet 
these technocratic requirements are set to increase. For example, the World Bank 
jointly with the UN and other bilateral donors administer the multi-donor PRSP 
Trust Fund (PRSTF)21 which supports all in-country PRSP formulation or 
implementation efforts, including technical assistance for institutionalising 
participatory processes, improving PEM systems and poverty diagnostics as well as 
establishing monitoring and evaluation systems for PRSPs (World Bank, 2004h). 
Aside from grant aid, technical assistance may also form a part of a client country's 
actual PRSP and such capacity building projects may be costed as part of the 
country's application for concessional financing from the Bank, Fund or bilateral 
donors. Paradoxically, countries may end up having to repay financiers for the 
technical assistance projects undertaken as part of their application for financing or 
to meet mpost conditions, such as CPIA criteria (see Chapter Four, section 4.6.2) for 
such financing. 
Bank and Fund staff have admitted that much of these governance reforms and the 
ensuing technical assistance have been implemented at the insistence of the major 
shareholders at the institutions in return for approval of extending limited autonomy 
to client countries under the CDF/PRSP framework. A senior Bank staff member 
reveals that much of the stringent and interventionist reforms have been imposed 
upon countries at the behest of the G7 shareholders at the Bank in response to new 
approaches to financing to ensure that such flexibility was only facilitated within 
strict parameters (interview, 2004). It is therefore significant that PRSCs focus 
extensively on public sector reforms with '[m]ore than 45 percent of all PRSC 
21 The Trust Fund was established in 2001 and is currently supported by contributions from Japan, the 
Netherlands and Switzerland allocated over a four-year period (October 2001 - December 2005) but 
is expected to last for a further four years, Decisions for disbursements are undertaken in-country by 
Steering Committee comprising representatives from the government, the Bank, the UN and bilateral 
donors (World Bank, 2004i). 
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binding measures entail public sector reforms, of which upward of 64 percent 
specifically address weaknesses in public financial management' (World Bank, 2005e: 
para 66). 
This justification is replicated in other donor organisations, such as the European 
Commission which expects public financial management (PFNý indicators to serve 
as an important criteria for the disbursements for financing under the Poverty 
Reduction Budget Support programme of the EC (European Commission, 2005: 
paras 22 & 30). For some client governments, the standards are often too onerous to 
comply with given the lack of institutional capacity and resources available to meet 
these conditions but instead of dispensing With the requirements, donors have 
instead chosen to assist countries fulfil these criteria through technical assistance22. 
5.4. Assessing Country Ownership and the Principle of 
Country Selectivity 
The capture of states' policymaking space under the PRSP framework is 
strengthened by the operational link between the principle of 'ownership' and the 
policy of conditionality. The PRSP approach allows donors to respond to country 
initiatives and provide financing only if and wben countries develop strategies that are 
acceptable to or correspond with the aid policies of the donor community. A 
corollary of the establishment of the 'ownership' principle has, therefore, been the 
development of the concept of 'country selectivity' as a basis for financing 
allocations. 
For example, the UK government provided technical assistance to HIPC countries under the HIPC 
Capacity Building Project for countries which did not qualify for debt relief for failing to meet the 
good governance criteria of the initiative (UK Parliament, 2003: Para 26). This focus on technical 
assistance for compliance with PEM/PFM requirements has had the effect of increasing the share of 
technical assistance/ capacity building in aid budgets. For example, the UK DFID's allocation for 
technical cooperation made up 19 percent of its total bilateral aid budget for 2005 - 06, the third 
largest share of the budget after grants and other aid in kind; and poverty reduction (27 percent) and 
budget support financing (21 percent) (DFID, 2006). Technical assistance also constitutes the third 
largest share of OECD aid after debt relief and humanitarian aid in 2005, taking into account that 
2005 was an exceptional year for development financing given the inclusion of the Iraqi and Nigerian 
debt cancellation deals and aid in the aftermath of the tsunami disaster in south-east and south Asia 
(see OECD DAC, 2005). 
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As discussed in Chapter Four, shifts in the modalities of conditionality at the BWIs 
have resulted in the increase in the use of ex-post conditionality - conditions which 
countries will have to fulfil before financing is approved (assessments based on actual 
results/action not forecasts) - in contrast to ex-ante conditions - which countries 
fulfil upon signing the financing agreement (assessments based on forecasts rather 
than actual results). The practice of 'country selectivity' may be situated Within this 
new framework of conditionality. 
Although this practice does not link policy reform in client countries directly with a 
specific instrument of financing, it does inform financing decisions at a very political 
level. The exercise of 'selectivity' bases a country's access to development financing 
on the country's policy and institutional environment and rewards countries for 
'good behaviour' (the adoption of policies agreeable to the financing institutions), 
using certain indicators of country performance to measure countries' current and 
future potential for reform. 
Rewarding 'Good' Behaviour 
The rationale for 'country selectivity', born out of the aforementioned debate on 'aid 
effectivenesS, 23 , is that a country's track record of policy performance should 
be one 
of 'the most robust predictors of whether reforms will be implemented' (Koeberle, 
2004: 16). Consequently, a government's commitment to future reforms is judged by 
its voluntary implementation of policies and mstitutionalreforms which the financing 
institutions, notably the Bank and the Fund, consider appropriate for the objectives 
of development and economic stability. 
The Bank's view is that country ownership may be bolstered by foregoing 
conditionalities 'involving promises of future actions and instead allocate policy- 
based loans on the basis of a country's track record' (World Bank, 2005q: para 11; see 
also Koeberle, 2004: 17). For a client government then, the challenge of 'country 
selectivity' 'is no longer reaching agreement with the Bank on a set of reform 
measures' but instead, is one of 'building sufficient support for reforms' already 
implemented by the country (Morrow, 2004: 6). 
23 See Chapter Three, section 3.3, for a detailed discussion. 
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The PRSP framework enhances this policy of selectivity by providing a universal 
template upon which the practice of country selectivity may be exercised. The 
standardised framework across all PRSP countries facilitates more efficient resource 
allocation on the part of the financing agencies as it enables financing 'institutions to 
determine with greater ease which countries and projects they would support. As the 
PRSP represents a country's national development plan from which the donors can 
pick and choose the projects and areas which they would like to support, the impetus 
is on the country to design a strategy which maximises the financing that is to be 
24 received, adhering to the normative framework set by the financing institutions . 
As discussed in Chapter Four, most PRSP countries, as IDA borrowers, are already 
subject to some form of 'selectivity' practice 21 . The Bank itself acknowledges that 
IDA's performance rating is to ensure 'that good performers get a higher share of 
IDA's available resources' (IDA, 2003). It is therefore no surprise that the Bank's 
internal evaluation of the PRSP initiative found that IDA lending has increased for 
PRSP countries, relative to non-PRSP countries 21 and that '[a] nnual lending volumes 
have been less volatile to the PRSP countries than to the non-PRSP countries' 
(World Bank, 2004k: 38). 
The modalities of financing under the PRSP initiative reflect this new approach of 
rewarding 'good performers', in particular, the Bank's PRSCs. The World Bank has 
indicated that PRSC financing 'should remain a selective approach that is reserved 
for good performers with a proven track record of program implementation' (\Vorld 
Bank, 2005e: para 41). Accordingly, it is no surprise that PRSC countries tend to rate 
quite highly in their CPIA ratings with almost all countries for which PRSCs have 
been approved to date falling into the top three quintiles for the CPIA ratings (ibid: 
para 20). 
24 The close relationship between a country's PRSP and its MMF enhances the operational link 
between the principle of 'selectivity' and the design of the PRSP. The overarching objective of this 
exercise is to eventually encourage all countries to develop an MMF linked to a PRSP which will be 
used as a guide to external development financiers. As such, for the development agencies which 
determine the size of the resource envelope of each country depending on the country allocations, the 
policies contained in the MMF (and hence, the PRSP) may influence the resources allocated. 
25 As IDA borrowers, their access to financing from the IDA is subject to the IDA performance- 
based allocation (PBA) (see Chapter Four, section 4.6). 
26 Based on aggregate IDA lending for 35 countries with PRSPs at the end of 2003, compared to four- 
year periods before and after the PRSP initiative was launched 
(World Bank, 2004k: 38 and figure 4.1). 
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As the Bank's own survey notes: 
... all but four of the PRSP countries in the top two CPIA quintiles 
are either currently implementing PRSCs or have a new PRSC in the 
pipeline. By comparison, only five of the 21 countries in the lowest 
three CPIA quintiles are or will be implementing PRSCs (ibid). 
As such, PRSC programmes have tended to reflect the priorities of the 'selectivity' 
assessments, specifically the inordinate emphasis on governance. Out of 16 CPIA 
criteria, five are concerned with aspects of domestic governance 27 (IDA, 2003; Wood, 
2005c: 12), areas prioritised under the PRSP framework. According to Wood's study, 
this means that up to 66 percent of the overall country performance rating for IDA 
financing is based on countries meeting these governance criteria (Wood, 2005c: 12). 
The study found that a total of 427 public sector governance conditions (prior 
actions and benchmark S)28 were imposed on client governments out of 20 PRSC 
programmes examined, equivalent to 38 percent of total conditionality in these 
PRSCs (ibid). 
The majority of PRSCs therefore focus substantially on domestic institutional 
development and social sector expenditure. The Bank's own statistics indicate that 80 
percent of programmes supported by PRSCs 'are overwhelmingly focused on social 
sector and public sector management themes' in the years 2001 to 2003 as compared 
to similar policy-based lending in 1998 to 2001 in which the same sectors only made 
up 45 percent of the lending (World Bank, undated 1: para 3). Out of these 
programmes, the Bank statistics indicate that more than 45 percent of all PRSC 
conditionalities 'entail public sector reforms, of which upward of 64 percent 
specifically address weaknesses in public financial management' (World Bank, 2005e: 
para 66). 
27 Of which three arc focused on assessing a country's quality of public administration, efficiency of 
resource mobilisation and the quality of its budgetary and 
financial management (IDA, 2003; Wood, 
2005: 12) 
28 See Chapter Four for detailed elucidation of the difference between 'prior actions' and 
'benchmarks'. 
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Additionally, while the share of PRSCs as a percentage of IDA policy-based lending 
has increased (from two out of 23 in 2002 to 10 out of 23 in 2004), the overall share 
of policy-based lending vis-a-vis IDA lending has remained almost the same (ibid). If 
the PRSC is indeed a 'reward' for 'good performers', this may indicate that weaker 
4performers' stand to lose under this new framework of 'country selectivity' as more 
financing is geared towards PRSC-eligible countries. 
This concern has been voiced by the UK's House of Commons Select Comrruttee on 
International Development when considering DFID's similar policy of 'targeting 
'high poverty/good policy' countries' in their disbursement of financing in the 
context of the department's Departmental Report of 2002.. According to the Select 
Cornnuttee: 
... we are broadly convinced of the logic of this policy, particularly 
the emphasis on targeting the poorest countries. However, in many 
cases, the poorest countries are those affected by conflict, crisis or 
lack of good governance. This begs the question: What is on offer for 
the poor performers ?' (UK Parliament, 2003: para 25)29. 
'Selectivity' and institutional reform are also gaining increasing prominence in the 
switchover from project and programme financing towards budget support financing 
(see sections 5.3.1 above and 5.5 below). Here, external financing is channelled 
directly into the client countries' budget and, subject to a negative list of prohibited 
expenditures, is not ring-fenced around a particular project or set of expenditures but 
which is usually contingent upon the adoption of key policy actions established at the 
outset30. 
29 Ile UK government's response to the parliamentarians was an acknowledgment of the concerns 
and an indication that 'is is seeking to influence and engage with poor performers' through, among 
other things, 'supporting large and effective NGOs and connecting them to government [thereby 
leading] to useful input into Government policy' (UK Parliament, 2003: para 27). Capacity building 
projects and technical assistance schemes (as discussed above) are therefore, once again, viewed as 
means to which countries can be aided into meeting donor criteria for financing. 
30 For example, funds under the PRBS in Tanzania is disbursed based, inter alia, on PRSC 
commitments and the 'assessment of performance against the public financial management and 
service delivery indicators agreed for the European Commission's 'variable tranches' OLawson, Booth, 
Msuya, Wangwe and Williamson, 2005: 3). 
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The effect of seemingly untied external resources injected into cash-strapped 
economies reverberate beyond fiscal policies and goes into the heart of political 
consensus. Countries have a political impetus for institutionalising the policy 
environment expected of them by external financiers under the 'country selectivity' 
approach as the resources are administered directly into the annual budget. As the 
Bank notes in its PRSC stocktaking exercise: 'The PRSC is equivalent to a vote of 
confidence, with the Bank trusting countries with proven track records to allocate 
untied resources consistent with PRSP priorities"' (World Bank, 2005e: para 17, 
emphasis added) - 
This is a relatively new phenomenon that is confined not only to Bank and Fund 
r- - miancing. As Harrison observes in Uganda and Tanzania: 
Individual donors select aspects of country programmes which fit 
with their particular development ethos ... The country strategies are 
clearly produced by African officials with an eye to the international 
orthodoxies within which donors work ... it is certainly the case that 
a country strategy which effectively taps into international 
orthodoxies of development and governance stands a much better 
chance of being funded by donors (Harrison, 2001b: 669). 
Once again, the aim of these programmes has been largely to standardise state 
institutions and regulatory policies across a large cross-section of countries 
introduced through a governance model set by the financiers. The assessment via 
ccountry selectivity' enables these donors to assess compliance with such policies and 
methodologies and thus appears to be a means of disciplining countries through the 
reward of financing rather than administering aid based on needs. 
As Harrison has noted, donors 'do not Just impose conditionahties' but donor- 
funded technical assistance also introduces 'new methodologies' of fashioning 
31 ParadoxicaRy, one of the indicators of countries' 'commitment to reform' is the undertaking of 
Bank policy-based loans to support such institutional reforms in the three years leading up to the 
PRSC programme (World Bank, 2005a: para 19). This not only raises questions as to the objectivity of 
the Bank's 'selectivity' exercise, notably as to whether this may be a case of the Bank feathering its 
own nest vis-A-Vis increasing its lending portfolio, but also reveal a great deal as to the motivations 
behind the Bank's exercise of 'country selectivity'. 
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country processes (Harrison, 2001b: 671). Financing tied to public administrative 
reform thus 'ensures that state cadres have the capacity to taken on innovations in 
policy techniques' with donors responding favourably with financing if countries 
adopt prograrnmes aligning with donor objectives (Harrison, 2001b: 668 - 669). 
5.4.2. The New JSAN Guidelines and Bio-political Control 
The amendments to the PRSP evaluation mechanism, the joint Staff Assessment, 
now known as the joint Staff Advisory Note and introduced in 2005, encourage this 
ccarrot not sticks' approach to structural and institutional reform in PRSP countries. 
Where previously, suitability of a PRSP to serve as a 'sound basis for concessional 
assistance' and/or debt relief was based on an assessment of the strategy by Bank 
and Fund staff (World Bank and IMF, undated: para 2) and subsequently endorsed 
by the Executive Boards of the Bank and the Fund as such, the new JSAN guidelines 
dispenses With this requirement. 
The removal of the endorsement mechanism of the PRSP framework addresses one 
of the core criticisms directed at the PRSP framework,, namely the tension between 
the requirement for institutional approval of a country-developed strategy and 
'country ownership' (World Bank and IMF, 2004: para 101). As such, in order to 
'reduce the perception of Washington 'signing off' on PRSPs (ibid), the concluding 
paragraph of a JSAN no longer includes the following statement: 
The staffs of the World Bank and the IMF consider that this PRSP 
provides a sound basis for Bank and Fund concessional assistance. 
The staffs recommend that the respective Executive Directors if the 
World Bank and the IMF reach the same conclusion" (World Bank 
and IMF, undated: para 2, footnote 1). 
However, the move away from a direct endorsement of PRSPs may be viewed as 
having less to do with recognition of the need to confer actual rather than rhetorical 
policy autonomy on PRSP countries than with a need to better manage the outcomes 
of desired reforms. The Bank and Fund, for example, 
in designing the new 
32 For countries under the HIPC initiative, the paragraph also states that the PRSP provides a 
'sound 
basis for debt relief (World Bank and IMF, undated, para 2, footnote 1). 
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assessment guidelines, recognise that the finality of the former JSA's concluding 
paragraph may , and has, 
led to 'assessments that are not always as candid and as 
nuanced as desired' (World Bank and IMF, 2004: para 102). 
In other words, cognisant of the political and operational implications of a PRSP 
endorsement or, more importantly, a failure to endorse, Bank and Fund staff may 
have felt constrained in their criticism of country policy in the PRSP, and this 
shortcoming of the JSA approach may have prevented the assessment mechanism of 
the PRSP from serving more disciplinary role vis-a-vis countries. 
Consequently, the new guidelines have been designed so as to shift, once again, the 
regulatory mechanism from one of coercion to one of voluntary compliance. The 
dispensation of the aforementioned concluding paragraph has correspondingly been 
replaced by a specific encouragement for Bank and Fund staff 'to provide focused, 
frank and constructive feedback to countries on their PRS' (World Bank and IMF, 
2005b: para 4, emphasis added). Specifically, Bank and Fund staff are to note in 
particular, areas where: 
a. there are significant inconsistencies between the PRS and 
its policy framework and the content of Bank and Fund 
programs that reflect existing analytic work, and/or 
b. further analysis is needed in order for the PRS to provide 
a framework for Bank and Fund assistance 
JMF, 2005a: para 4). 
Therefore, although a country's access to financing from the Bank and Fund (and 
accordingly, other financiers) is no longer dependant on a satisfactory assessment of 
its PRSP, compliance with the policy and institutional requirements of the Bretton 
Woods institutions have, paradoxically, become more onerous. Access to financing is 
now dependant on whether the PRSP countries have sought to redress the weakness 
in country systems identified in the JSAN. The operational link between the PRSP 
and concessional financing now takes place at the level of the individual financing 
facilities,, such as in the Bank's Country Assistance Strategy or the PRGF which 
4should explicitly discuss the alignment with the country's PRS, and how a country is 
193 
Chapter Five 
addressig any serious concerns that were noted in the JSAN (World Bank and IMF, 2005b: 
para 6, emphasis added). 
Accordingly, conditions for financing now include countries instituting measures to 
overcome what the Bank and Fund staff view as deficiencies in their poverty 
reduction plans or development strategies. The IMF, for instance, will only approve a 
new PRGF arrangement or complete a review of an existing programme 'if 
weaknesses in the poverty reduction strategy that are critical to Fund support have 
been addressed' with the Fund staff assessing such resolutions on the basis of the 
country's Letter of Intent and/or Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policy 
(IMF, 2005a: para 11). 
The PRGF Trust Instrument has been amended to insert a new subparagraph (g) 
into Section II on Eligibility and Conditions for Assistance under the Trust 
which provides that the PRGF trustee, the IMF, 'shall not approve a new 
arrangement or complete a review' unless any weaknesses in the member's I-PRSP, 
PRSP or APR 'such as those identified in the joint Advisory Note' and which 'are 
critical to Fund support' have been addressed' (IMF, 2004b). As discussed at various 
junctures of this thesis, what constitutes 'weaknesses' in policy programmes mi Bank 
and Fund terms remains questionable and subjective at the least. 
The JSAN approach therefore consolidates the move towards the 'country selectivity' 
approach of development financing as financiers can now be more explicit about 
what they expect from countries in return for financing. In order to remove the 
disjuncture between the policies articulated in the PRSP and the financing 
documents, which belie the actual nature of the PRSP framework vis-a-vis its 
rhetorical objective of 'country ownership', the JSAN now enables the IFIs to close 
this gap by ensuring that: a) significant inconsistencies between the PRGF 
programme and the country's PRSP are redressed by the country authorities before 
financing or further financing is disbursed; and b) where there is a lack of alignment 
between the PRSP and the LOI or MEFP, it is for the LOI or MEFP to 'explain 
how the authorities intend to modify policy coordination procedures to ensure 
alignment with future PRS documents' (IMF, 2005a: paras 15 - 16). 
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This ensures that country authorities comply with the policy proposals set out in 
their PRSP documents and operationalise the reforms as opposed to producing a 
PRSP for the sake of receiving financing. It also ensures that the articulation of 
policies contrary to Bank and Fund received wisdom ate viewed as fundamental 
strategy 'weaknesses' rather than an assertion of sovereign autonomy notionally 
conferred by the PRSP framework. 
In the case of the PRGF, the Fund would expect countries to maintain the austerity 
of a conventional stabilisation programme in their development strategies and where 
there is a failure to follow the conventional Fund prescriptions, recourse to the PRSP 
as a 'country document' is not sufficient for accessing further Fund financing. 
Instead, the resolution of the 'weakness' in policy identified by the JSAN can and will 
be insetted as a condition of PRGF lending as Fund conditionality can now 'be used 
to remedy weaknesses in the [poverty reduction] strategy as it is implemented in 
PRGF-supported programmes (for example, an unrealistic macroeconomic or fiscal 
framework) where correction of the weakness is critical to achievement of program 
objectives' (IMF, 2005a: para 16, emphasis added). 
Although JSAN guidelines state that the JSAN should avoid normative language in 
assessing the PRS as a whole and in particular avoid language that suggests the PRS 
document meets of falls short of overall standards' (World Bank and IMF, 2005b: 
para 5), the more 'candid' nature of assessments in the JSAN enables Bank and Fund 
staff to openly dismiss or commend countries' policy and institutional environment 
as a basis for access to concessional financing. 
Consequently, there will be more pressure on countries to pre-empt a negative 
assessment by adopting policies acceptable to the Bank and the Fund. For example, 
Bank and Fund staff in the JSAN of the Malawian PRSP Annual Progress Report 
(APR)" commend the new Malawian government for its 'candid assessment of past 
policy slippages included in the APR' and its efforts at reigning in what the staff term 
as 'fiscal indiscipline' of its 'expansionary fiscal policies' through an adoption of 
33 APRs are mandatory requirements for all PRSP countries and further disbursements from the 
PRGF or PRSCs are contingent upon a country's completion of an APR. 
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'sustainable macroeconomic Policies' supported by an IMF Staff Monitored 
Program 14 (IMF, 2005b: patas 4- 5). 
By ensuring that countries operationalise the policies set in their PRSPs. the Bank 
and Fund have addressed the two most pressing criticisms against the PRSP 
framework. Firstly, that the operational documents of concessional financing, such as 
the LOI/MEFP or the LDP do not reflect the contents of the PRSP and therefore 
are not 'country owned' and, secondly, that where such policies are articulated so as 
to receive financing, these policies are subsequently not implemented by the client 
countries as financing has already been granted based on the PRSP document. The 
new JSAN guidelines thus consolidate the increasing shift towards country selectivity 
as a means of regulating access to financing. By ensuring the assessments are more 
critical, and that assessments have a direct bearing on the financial resources received 
by the client state, financiers can ensure that states voluntarily adopt reforms before 
applying for financing on that basis. 
5.5. Donor Interventions and the Politics of Partnerships 
Reforms under the PRSP framework significantly increase donor influence and 
presence in a country, facilitating increasing and deeper policy dialogue between 
donors and country governments. It legitimises the presence of donors in countries 
by encouraging the practice of 'partnership' - the intimate collaboration between 
country governments and bilateral and multilateral development agencies in the 
design of financing programmes, budgets and prioritisation of resource allocation 
through innovative mechanisms of development financing and new rules governing 
access to such financing. Conversely, therefore, the PRSP framework increases 
exposure of country policy processes to external input while, at the same time, doing 
very little to redress the imbalances of power characterising this new 'partnership'. 
34 The question of what constitutes appropriate fiscal discipline in relation to a country's 
macroeconomic framework is a subject of controversy. Many Fund watchers contend that the Fund's 
programme for fiscal reform does not allow room for fiscal manoeuvre, including the build-up of 
domestic debt, contrary to the economic prescriptions undertaken by countries such as the US and the 
UK. In this case, Malawi is rapped for incurring a seven percent budget deficit (IMF, 2005b: para 5) 
but the UK and US economies routinely run budget deficits of up to three percent of GDP with most 
of it fuelled by domestic consumer debt, an approach which it not favoured by the IMF In relation to 
developing countries (see Rowden, 2004). 
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Whereas previously, bilateral donors may only confine their interventions to 
discussion on ring-fenced development projects, the shift to more strategic 
mechanisms for resource allocation - via the PRSP and PRSP-related financing 
instruments - enable these donors to play a much bigger role in the shaping of 
country policies. By imposing a uniform strategic development template for all PRSP 
countries and by standardising corresponding public policy and policy processes, the 
PRSP initiative has enabled donors to permeate into what Abugre terms 'the heart 
and lungs of public policyrnaking in a country' (Abugre, 2005a). 
5.5.1. Micro-Management and Diverted Emphasis 
External policy and institutional interventions in PRSP countries facilitated by the 
PRSP framework are supported by the shift towards budget support as a financing 
mechanism - such as the MDBS in Ghana (linked to the Ghanaian PRSP) and the 
Poverty Reduction Budget Support in Tanzania (linked to the Tanzanian PRSP) -M 
which policy influence is exchanged in return for a more budgetary autonomy. 
Outwardly, budget support is viewed as promoting 'ownership' of development 
policies, 'as a vote of confidence in the government's program, as outlined in the 
PRSP, because external resources are given directly to recipients to support their own 
programs' (World Bank, 2004k: 38) but in practice, the resources are rarely untied 
from an expectation of donor input into policy content. As a World Vision study 
observed: 'in terms of political influence, donors prefer direct budget support, 
because relatively little money can buy significant access to political decision-making' 
(World Vision, 2005: 47). 
A UK DFID-commissioned evaluation of the budget support approach in 2003 
found that where donors are willing to lend support to a country's development 
agenda via disbursements to the budget, consultation and influence in government 
policy is expected, particularly where the agenda 'cannot be fully specified' (DFID 
and Oxford Policy Management, 2003: 79 -80). In other words, '*in supporting the 
budget, donors are lending their loyalty to the government's policy programme [and] 
in exchange for loyalty, donors are granted a formal 'voice' in policy dialogue, debate 
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and influence' PFID, 2003: Box 5ý. This 'voice') according to researchers, Lawson 
et al (2003), becomes important as 'loyalty' - to the extent that both parties meet the 
ends of their bargain - 'is influenced by the extent to which members are able to 
actually influence the agenda' (Lawson, Booth, Harding, Hoole and Naschold, 2005: 
78). Therefore, the greater the influence donors have on policy and institutional 
reform, the greater financial commitment they are likely to make to the client state. 
The PRSP framework provides an instrument for operationalising a normative 
agenda of donors, ironically therefore delimiting the policy space of countries by 
conferring a set of established values and strategic priorities which governments have 
to aspire to and which they have to adopt and implement to secure external 
financing. While some of these reforms may be desirable - such as focusing on 
social welfare programmes - this effort redefines the obligations of states vis-a-vis 
their citizens, reducing accountability and responding instead to the strategic 
priorities of the donors. As acknowledged by the aforementioned Select Comrnittee 
on International Development in 2003: 'Countries preparing PRSs will inevitably be 
influenced by what they think donors, including IFIs want' (UK Parliament, 2003: 
para 44). 
The first generation of PRSPs are an example of such a response with almost all of 
them focused on social sector expenditure in areas of health and education with little 
variation in the development of overall economic strategies of the countries. The top 
10 priority areas of PRSPs as surveyed by the Bank's evaluation in 2004, indicates 
that PRSPs were focused 'largely on leveraging public expenditures to reduce poverty 
and have not uniformly delineated non-expenditure-related policies or actions for 
enhancing growth or explored their impact on poverty reduction' (World Bank, 
2004k: 15). Furthermore, it was found that '[w]ithin the domain of public 
expenditure, allocations to expanding service delivery In the social sectors (education, 
health, and social protection) dominate over investments in economic or productive 
sectors' (ibid). These were considered areas which were prioritised by donors, 
indicating the leverage that such an approach has over domestic policymaking, 'in 
spite of rhetoric to the contrary. 
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Senior World Bank economist Linda van Gelder, who plays a central role in the 
operationalisation of the PRSP framework 35 , admits that the Bank is unlikely to 
finance programmes which did not fit within the general parameters of Bank 
financial support, even if the policies did emerge from the participatory process of 
the PRSP approach: 'Basically if there is a fundamental difference in view - if the 
PRSP was saying we want to do this and the Bank is not comfortable with it - it 
would be an area that we choose not to lend in )36 (interview: van Gelder, 2004). At 
the same time, van Gelder stressed the subsequent policy discussions which follow 
on from such decisions aiming at providing policyrnakers 'with the analysis as to why 
we actually think that what they are proposing to do doesn't make sense from a 
development perspective' with a view towards renegotiating aspects of the country 
proposal (ibid). 
Van Gelder's account of this form of 'policy dialogue' is indicative of the leverage the 
Bank and Fund have over policy choices in developing countries and why critics 
remain highly sceptical of the 'ownership' element of the PRSP approach. The close 
link between the choice of policy prescriptions and financial resources along with the 
Bank's influential intellectual input through such 'policy dialogue' undermines the 
PRSP's 'country-driven'policymaking process. As van Gelder explains: 
the focus has really been on where we would be having Policy 
dialogue with the governments in order to try to provide additional 
analysis or information that may make a case for where we think the 
policy direction needs to shift (ibid). 
Both the Bank and Fund's evaluation office 37 assessments and the Bank's own 
stocktaking of the PRSC framework have furnished further examples where the 
35 At the time of interview, Van Gelder was senior economist with the Bank's Poverty Reduction 
Group which is responsible for managing, among others, the PRSP process and related operations for 
both the IBRD and the IDA. 
36 This includes, for example, restructuring of public utilities which involve 'massive subsidies' for 
which a proposal for financing an expansion of a power network under such plans would meet with 
rejection by the Bank (interview: van Gelder, 2004). 
37 The Bank's Independent Evaluation Group (formerly the Operations Evaluation Department) and 
the Fund's Independent Evaluation Office. Both offices are 'independent' only in the sense that the 
staff report directly to the Executive Boards of the World Bank and the IMF and are therefore outside 
the institution's bureaucratic hierarchy. However, although these offices have, on occasion, furnished 
critical reports of the Bank and Fund activities, their role is primarily to assess the efficacy of Bank 
and Fund operations rather than to critique the policy directions of the institutions. Furthermore, all 
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involvement of donors in the process have undermined -rather than enhanced 
country autonomy over policyrnaking. The IMF and the World Bank, in a 2005 
review of PRS processes, admits that '[w]hile the PRS approach was intended to put 
countries squarely in control of policy formulation, the link to the HIPC Initiative, 
combined with longstanding relationships between low-income countries and the 
Bank and the Fund based on conditionality, often emphasiZed external 
accountabilities rather than domestic ones' (IMF and World Bank, 2005: para 21, 
emphasis added). 
This review highlights this 'drive for the 'wrong' results', contending that the focus 
on results-oriented development strategies in PRSPs can lead to countries 'cherry- 
picking' policies 'where it is easier to show results (either because data are available, 
causality is easier to map, or because policy, institutional or capacity constraints are 
not as pronounced)' (ibid: para 102). The review also found that often policy 
interventions are designed to meet objectives on which international attention is 
focused, such as in the aforementioned social sectors as opposed to investment in 
productive sectors such as economic infrastructure and this is driven by donors' 
needs to justify expenditure to their domestic constituencies and to pressure groups 
(ibid; see section 5.4.1 above). 
Consequently, it is no surprise that the 2004 OED and IEC) evaluations of the PRSP 
approach found that 'donor inputs in Nicaragua were perceived as overstepping the 
line between support and imposition, pushing the government toward a social sector 
emphasis in the PRSP', reflecting 'pressures from donors that could not be easily 
resisted' (World Bank, 2004k: 18; World Bank and IMF, 2005a: 65). The Nicaraguan 
case study found that some stakeholders in the PRSP process perceived that 'the 
strong donor backing of the PRSP was a manifestation that the strategy reflects a 
'Washington Consensus' on how poverty reduction is best achieved' (World Bank 
and IMF, 2005a: 65). The Bank itself admits that negotiations under the PRSC 
framework are so intensive as to lead 'several governments and some donors [to] 
view these measures as excessively intrusive, negotiated more in line with traditional 
conditionality, and not reflective of government views on the pace, timing or 
priorities of the reform program' (World Bank, 2005e: para 49). 
reports will have been cleared by the Executive Boards prior to publication and the staff of 
both 
mstitutions will have had a chance to input into the final reports. 
200 
Chapter Five 
However, as Harrison notes, these country selectivity exercises do have their flipside 
for the donors. Due to heavy investment of political and financial capital in states the 
donors and IFIs have chosen as 'exemplars 38 and the corresponding high costs of 
perceived programme failure, donors, especially the BWIs, are often reluctant to 
insist on strict programme compliance, often ignoring or overlooking slippages in the 
implementation of aforementioned reforMS31 (Harrison, 2001b: 672 - 673). In these 
countries therefore, some form of 'mutual (but still unequal) dependence' does exist 
between the state and the donors with donors willing to overlook indiscretion 
(including instances of corruption) where such acknowledgment would disrupt the 
carefully constructed 'image of partnership, progress and claims of showcase status' 
(ibid: 67 3). 
5.5.2. Discipline of the Bottom Line 
One of the defining characteristics of the PRSP approach as it has developed over 
the years since its inception is the framework's emphasis on developing domestic 
accountability for monitoring the effectiveness of concessional financMig based on 
the standards established by the approach. The securing of domestic political 
consensus to facilitate this is discussed in detail in the following chapter but it is 
important to note here that the logic behind this approach towards domestic 
accountability follows the similar reasoning which underpins the shift towards 
(country selectivity'. It is to ensure that client governments undertake prescribed 
reforms on a public platform - that is, through the establishment of concrete goals 
and targets and institutional mechanisms to support implementation of such 
objectives - to maximise compliance with such objectives. 
Accordingly, the PRSP framework does not guarantee disbursements of financmg by 
donors in the absence of the policy environment in which the donors envisage 
expenditure. As discussed above, the allocation of resources is contingent upon a 
38 In the context of the 'new architecture of aid', Uganda and Tanzania have emerged as poster 
children for the successes of the new strategies, especially that of the PRSP approach. 
39 In many respects, this is not different to the practice under the first generation reforms in which the 
BWIs would often overlook countries' failures to implement certain reforms under the Washington 
Consensus economic model if and when the countries involved are politically or geo-strategically 
important. 
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plethora of other processes, of which the PRS process is only one. The 
aforementioned UK Select Committee on International Development had observed 
that while donors, notably DFID, have maintained that budget support 'is not a 
method of buying policy reform' in the sense of traditional conditionality, 'there 
seems to be nothing to stop donors withdrawing DBS if their conditions are not met' 
as had occurred with Malawi and Kenya (LJK Parliament, 2003: para 3 1). 
In Malawi, disbursements from the IMF, IDA and a group of bilateral donors 
providing budget support under the PRSP-linked Common Approach to Budget 
Support framework4o were discontinued in 2001 after the Malawian government 
failed to meet conditions of its PRGF programme due to what the IMF terms 'fiscal 
indiscipline', leading to a significant reduction in government revenues to fund the 
Malawian Poverty Reduction Strategy (MPRS)41 (IMF, 2005b: para 3; Krakowski, 
2004: 1) 6) 9; see discussion below). 
These developments illustrate the continued vulnerability of PRSP countries to the 
behaviour of donors and regulatory reform favoured by these financiers and belies 
the rhetoric of the PRSP approach as a country-owned process. Moreover, while the 
PRSP remains the document upon which negotiations for financing are notionally 
based, there is very little alignment between the priorities articulated in a country's 
PRSP and the policies that underpin financing mechanisms, such as the PRGF or 
financing from integrated budget support mechanisms. 
Importantly, it is the IMF programme which largely determines allocations from 
donors as it is the country's programme under the PRGF, or recently the Policy 
Support Instrument (PSI), which determines its macroeconomic framework, a debate 
40 These were the European Commission, the UK, Sweden and Norway (Krakowski, 2004: 9). 
41 PRSC credits and budget support under the CABS framework were suspended to the Malawian 
government in November and December 2001 when it failed to implement the structural and 
macroeconomic reforms of its PRGF programme entered into in December 2000 
(Government of 
Malawi, 2003: para 1; Krakowski, 2004: 6; 9). As a result, the financial situation of Malawi deteriorated 
drastically between 2001 to 2003 as the government built up a high level of internal debt with high 
interest rates and this affected Malawi's progress towards reaching Completion Point under the 
HIPC 
initiative (Government of Malawi, 2003: para 1; Krawkoski, 2004: 6). Although Malawi completed it 
first successful review of the PRGF programme in 2003, indicating that its macroeconomic 
framework was back on track, and donors resumed budget support on this basis, this was subject to a 
strict IMF staff-monitored programme of fiscal adjustment 
(Government of Malawi, 2003; IM]F, 
2003a; IMF, 2005b: Para 3- 5). 
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42 
on which is largely closed for negotiations . Although PRGIF conditions were 
theoretically supposed to be drawn from countries' PRSPs, country experience over 
the past five years has not borne this out. The World Bank and IMF progress reviews 
of the PRSP process in 2002 highlighted the 'disconnect between the 
macroeconomic frameworks emerging from countries' PRSPs and those used for the 
national budget process and reflected in the PRGF-supported Program' JMF, 2003c: 
para 8). 
The IMF and the World Bank attribute this largely to the lack of 'operational detail 
of programs and policies in the PRSP itself (World Bank and IMF, 2004: para 94) 
rather than the political dynamics which underlie these processes. According to Fund 
official Elliot Harris 43 , this operational relevance is key to donor support of any 
'country owned' strategy. He contends that: 
... if PRSPs were clear about targeted objectives and[these objectives] 
were clearly country-owned, then donors will be more inclined to 
align their disbursement triggers to the PRSP. In many cases, the 
PRSPs do not provide clear objectives or detailed benchmarks' upon 
which a working macroeconomic framework and, consequently, fiscal 
and monetary conditions, can be drawn (interview: Harris, 2005). 
Consequently, the Fund has argued that dialogue between the institution and country 
authorities on alternative macroeconomic policy options 'has been limited' due to 
'data and capacity constraints in many low-income countries', thereby resulting in the 
macroeconomic framework presented in PRSPs often being based on estimates and 
analysis by the authorities and Fund staff JMF, 2003c: para 20). 
At the same time, it has always been the IMF's contention that 'greater emphasis on 
ownership was not meant to imply the acceptance of any homegrown policy package' 
JMF, 2004e: para 107) but was instead aimed at creating 'greater scope for country- 
42 See Chapter Six for a detailed discussion on the disjuncture between the principle of participation 
and the reality of the IMF policy role. 
43 At time of interview, Harris was serving as advisor at the Fund's Policy Development and Review 
(PDR) department, specialising in the PRS process. 
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driven alternatives and the investigation of alternative strate es by e, % andiq the polig gi 
space acceptable to BfPY (ibid, emphasis added). 
It is unsurprising therefore that the 2004 IMF Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) 
evaluation of the PRSP and PRGF frameworks found that, in practice, there is only a 
limited opening of policy space in macroeconomic areas under the PRGF and that 
the Fund generally did not look to the PRSP process as 'a significant avenue for 
exploring macroeconomic policy alternatives' (IMF, 2004e: para 11) . Where there has 
been some room to manoeuvre in this restrictive macroeconomic space, the Fund is 
quick to insist that 'home-grown options' formulated 'without the IMF staff pushing 
for a particular approach', usually only take place in countries which the IMF 
considers as having 'a strong implementation record and macroeconomic stability' 
(IMF, 2004e: para 11). 
Therefore, for the IMF, at least, the purpose of engagement with country authorities 
under the PRSP framework is less about facilitating policy options on 
macroeconomic scenarios in the PRSP and other national development plans but 
rather to bring PRSP policy discussions within the macroeconomic frameworks 
advocated by the IMF. The alignment between countries' PRSP and the 
macroeconomic framework of a PRGF/PSI programme is viewed not from the 
perspective of harmonising Fund programmes with domestic policy options but 
rather as an alignment of domestic strategies with those advocated by the IMF. This 
objective is further highlighted in the remedial element of the new JSAN where it is 
expected that the 'weaknesses' in economic programme design articulated in country 
PRSPs are to be addressed through policy reforms in PRGF programmes (IMF, 
2005a: para 16; see section 5.4.2 above). 
The importance of the IMF as a gatekeeper to other sources of development 
financing means that, for many developing countries, ceding to the IMF's policy 
prescriptions is si . he qua non44. The IMF's signalling role has expanded with debt relief 
initiatives and current shifts to programmatic and budget support lending. An 'on- 
track' PRGF or PSI programme is usually either an explicit pre-condition of 
44 As the Fund acknowledges: 'most donors require evidence of a satisfactory macroeconomic 
situation to continue their support, particularly budget assistance, and look to the IMEF to provide this 
assessment' (World Bank and IMF, 2004: para 97). See discussion in Chapter Two, section 2.3.2. 
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financing (for example, for IDA credits or debt relief under the HIPC and 
Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative) or as evidence satisfying the requirement for a 
sound macroeconomic framework (for example, for many bilateral budget support 
mechanisms)". 
Recent experiences have demonstrated the vulnerability of client countries under this 
framework in which a harmonised mechanism for delivering financing to countries 
have been contingent upon successful compliance with a PRGF programme and, to a 
lesser extent, the general policy prescriptions of the BWIs. The Malawian experiences 
above, for example, serves as a critical lesson to all PRSP countries on the financial 
imperatives of maintaining an 'on-track' IMF programme and illustrate the 
increasingly tight constraints that countries operate within under such an integrated 
approach as the PRSP framework. 
The PRSP framework formalises dialogue between client countries and financiers 
while, at the same time, abolishing formal mechanisms of legitimate dissent to 
conditions of financing imposed through an unequal bargaining process. 
Abrahamsen points to the 'power of partnerships as a form of inclusion' in the 
politics of aid negotiations, as 'political interventions' aimed at producing 'modern, 
self-disciPlined citizens and states by enlisting them as responsible agents in their 
own development' (Abrahamsen, 2004: 1464). Abrahamsen conceives of such 
'partnerships' as a 'form of advanced liberal power' which work not through 
'domination and imposition' but through 'incorporation and inclusion' (ibid). These 
'partnerships', she contends: 
... derive their power through simultaneously excluding and 
incorporating, in a manner that shapes the behaviour and interests of 
states and state actors ... Failure to meet the agreed criteria 
for 
inclusion in the partnerships (sound social and economic policies) can 
be cast as the ill-discipline of particular countries (ibid). 
45 Positive review of a country's PRGF implementation will, for example, be sufficient to 'indicate an 
appropriate macroeconomic position' and IMF Executive Board decisions 'Win provide sufficient 
information for donors to take decisions' (DFID, 2005: 3). 1he importance of the IMEF's signalling 
role is also demonstrated in the recent willingness of non-HIPCs - namely Nigeria - and post-PRGF 
countries - such as Cape Verde, Ghana, Tanzania and Uganda - to agree to the adoption of a 
PSI. 
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Hence, the increased use of the process of 'selectivity' as a means of regulating 
countries' access to financing means that extensive regulatory and institutional 
reforms - some which the aforementioned World Vision study has charactensed as 
bordering on 'remote micro-management of the country' and violating country's laws 
(World Vision, 2005: 49) - can be instituted as a result of informal leverage through 
policy dialogue between client countries and financing agencies without grounding or 
justification in contractual terms of an explicit financing agreement in which onerous 
and unconstitutional obligations could, at the very least, be challenged by both the 
sovereign state and by its citizens. 
By masking policy leverage under the rubric of 'partnership', the PRSP framework 
attempts to conceal the power dynamics which underlie the aid relationship rather 
than redressing its inherent democratic deficits which the PRSP framework claims to 
redress. Instead, the politics of partnerships and the 'technologies of agency' it 
employs subverts the concept of development financing Cas a principle of 
international solidarity' and instead, defers the onus onto the client state to desen)e 
such assistance, placing these countries in the driver's seat in managing their own 
'underdevelopment wisely' (Abrahamsen, 2004: 1460). 
5.6. Conclusion 
The PRSP initiative is only the latest in a lineage of interventions by the World Bank 
and IMF into the social, economic and political fabric of its client countries but it is, 
by far, the most intrusive and most extensive in terms of scope and content, and 
most ambitious in terms of what it aims to achieve. The reorganisation of political 
and policy space in PRSP countries starts from the assumption that there is an 
appropriate mode of government and an accompanying framework for appropriate 
governance in all countries who are reliant upon external financing, not only from the 
BWIs but, also, from other multilateral and bilateral donors and from debt relief 
initiatives. This assumption is correspondingly derived from a conviction, justified or 
otherwise, by the architects of the PRSP initiative that the, 'universal', 'non- 
contestable' notions of transparency, accountability and legitimacy must accompany 
the disbursements of such financing to these countries. 
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Consequently, it follows that the PRSP country, the recipient of concessional. 
financing and debt relief, must demonstrate its desire to be disciplined by a set of 
rules constituting the values which represent the universal normative framework for 
all state resource extraction, allocation and administration. The overarching 
prescription of growth and poverty reduction, to be achieved through means 
outlined in the PRSP Sourcebook and in the conditionahties of resource exchange 
between the financing institutions and the clients states) must therefore be 
accompanied by the institutional structures which monitor and evaluate the measures 
undertaken and which, most importantly, generate the necessary consensus Without 
which the legitimacy of the project is undermined. 
All this is mediated through the aegis of the state -a notion yet undefined but which 
can be collectively ascertained from the multifaceted literature emanating from the 
BWIs. as one which consists of both the bureaucratic apparatus of state power (the 
civil servants, the diplomats, the executive minions) and the political circuit (the 
executive leaders and to a notional extent, the legislative and judicial members) - 
which again is deemed worthy through its submission to the discipline exerted by the 
financing institutions ('country selectivity'). 
This chapter has demonstrated that the bio-political power exerted over client states 
in the shift in the modalities of conditionality regulating developing countries' access 
to financial resources discussed in the previous chapter has been reified through 
fundamental reorganisation of state apparatuses under the operational framework of 
the PRSP approach. This mode of regulation maintains disciplinary control over 
client states via their continuing subjection to what Foucault terms as the 'disciplinary 
penalty' - the punishment of 'nonobservence, that which does not measure up to the 
rule, that departs from it' (Foucault, 1991: 194) - through the marginalisation of 
states which do not institute the PRS participatory requirements, which fail to meet 
PRGF programme requirements, which depart from 'sound' economic practice and 
'good' institutional performance of a functioning regulative state. At the same time, 
this new mode of power supervises the internahsation of the rules and 'normalizing 
judgment' of the discipline (the substantive conditionalities, the rationalities of 
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structural ad*ustment) through a' ri se 'es of interventions and re: gulatog control? 
(Foucault, 1991: 262 - 263) of the supervised entity - the client state. 
Where the reorganisation of the state apparatuses through the globalization Of 
development modelling - the setting of uniform 'development' targets, the 
establishment of a umversal policymaking process - and the homogenismg of local 
bureaucracy - serves to establish conformity with the norms of global neoliberalism 
and legal order it establishes by excluding those who do not play by the rules, the 
contingency of the reforms under the 'selectivity' process begins the process of 
assimilating recalcitrance by incorporating the state to the conditions of its own 
subjection. 
By binding the state to the underlying logic of adjustment reforms under the rubric 
of 'ownership' and 'partnership', the IMF, the World Bank and other hegemonic 
state actors with the power of financing enrol in the 'technologies of self' - 
subjectivising the individual state vis-a-vis the conditions of its dependence on 
external resources for state functions and bringing them to bind their own collective 
consciousness and identities to that of the external power (see Agamben, 1995: 5; 
Foucault, 1991: 262 - 263). 
This is exposed in the linearity of the 'partnership' process M which financiers are 
given a seat at the policyrnaking table of client states but never vice-versa. As the 
World Vision report notes: 'whereas donors get involved in influencing government 
PRS priorities, developing country governments do not have opportunities to directly 
influence donor preparation of their country assistance programmes or assistance 
plans' (World Vision, 2005: 47). Harrison observes that it is this 'idea of an equality 
of participation between the IFIs and indebted states' contained within this rubric 
that allows the Bank (and equally the Fund and other donor agencies) 'to involve 
itself in a state's politics without appearing to be intervening, interfering, or 
imposing' (Harrison, 2001a: 542). 
Discipline is then exerted by subjecting such 'ownership' and 'partnership' 
mechanisms to the omniscient policies of macroeconomic and structural adjustment 
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as negotiated between the state and the BWls- As the UNCTAD report summarises 
succinctly: 
The emphasis on ownership and participation appears to aim at 
granting considerable autonomy to countries in the design of safety 
nets and targeted anti-poverty spending programmes. However, the 
freedom of action of recipient governments in the determination of 
the nature and content of macroeconomic stabilization and structural 
strategies continues to be severely constrained by conditionalities 
attached to multilateral lending and debt relief (UNCTAD, 2002a: 
58). 
At the heart of the PRSP reforms is therefore the validation of the chentelist 
relationship of between the north and the south and the logic of dependence and 
universalisation which underpin these relationships. For Badie, this relationship of 
dependence necessitates the constitutional and juridical imitation of the patron state 
by the client state (see Chapter Two) for continued access by the dependent client 
state to external resource mobilisation (Badie, 2000: 14 -15,28). The internalisation 
of the western political order in what Badie terms as peripheral states is therefore 
driven by the need to prove, at least on the part of the political elite ('the princes of 
the south'), their affinity with and adherence to the norms and standards of the 
patron state in return for resources from the exterior. 
At the same time., this relationship of dependence is reinforced by the logic of 
universalisation which stakes a universalist claim of western rationality and the 
construction of the 'western' state. 'Developmentalism' -a conceptualisation of not 
only 'how the universal was realized within non-Western societies' (ibid: 51) - 
requires the progression from authoritarianism to a Weberian rational state with the 
construction of a representative 'civil society' holding the state in check (see 
following chapter) and also with the requisite institutional apparatuses in place to 
manage this process of accountability. As Anghie argues, in relation to the 'good 
governance' reforms, these extensive tentacular institutional trans formations 'are 
directed at reproducing in the Third World a set of principles and institutions which 
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are seen as having been perfected in the West, and which the non-European world 
must adopt if it is to make progress and achieve stability' (Anghie, 2004: 249). 
This chapter has demonstrated the shift in the modalities of control over developing 
countries exerted at the level of the global governance institutions, namely the World 
Bank and the IMF, and bilaterally, through donor financing aligned with the PRSP 
framework. The operational reforms of the PRSP framework therefore are evidence 
of a larger shift in the modalities of power at the very high levels of inter-state 
governance. This power is premised on the restoration of 'agency' to the actors in the 
process and the contract that such 'agency' is not 'abused' by the persons to whom it 
is conferred. As Abrahamsen notes, 'partnerships' under these new governance 
arrangements, such as the PRSP framework, 'work not primarily as direct domination 
and imposition, but through promises of incorporation and inclusion' so that 
'[flailure to meet the agreed criteria for inclusion in partnerships (sound social and 
economic policies) can be cast as the ill-discipline of particular countries 
(Abrahamsen, 2004: 1464). 
Further legitimacy for the project of post-adjustment reforms ('pro-poor growth) is 
correspondingly justified through the nexus between the transnational policy elite - 
the INGOs and expatriate policy advocates from the epistemic community for 
example - and the local constituencies of the BWIs and its major shareholders. 
The 
G8 countries can and will draw upon the PRSP policy of engagement and 
stakeholder participation as a means to justify continued foreign policy expenditure 
in low-income countries. Further discipline is also provided through this practice in 
securing political consensus and domestic accountability by subjecting state action 
under the restructuring process to oversight by its own citizens and a globalized 
network of 'policy watchdogs'. The following chapter elaborates upon this second 
mechanism of state reconfiguration and subjectivisation to achieve the capture of 
pace. pace where this first-tier of reforms has achieved a capture ofpolig s political s 
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Chapter Six 
Redesigning the Political Project: Discipline and 
Legitimation through Participatory Policymaking 
_Y 
defining the reduction op ve D, as the over ýf 0 -iidingfirameworkfor allpublicpolig and 
e, %, pendilure, and by seeking to extend tbepolig consensus to include 'Civil society' the current wave 
ofpost-developmentalism reveals ilseýf as neo-liberalism re onsfiluled in apopu ist ode .e cZm-- 
Tb 
'consultative conditionalit 'that bas been one of the crite ' for Bretton Wloods assessment of an y na !Y 
PR, V is tbus a ballmark of the merxiq trend towardpopulist neoliberalism. 
- Jeremy Gould andjulia Ojanen, 2003: 31 - 32 - 
The participatory process is the cornerstone of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 
framework and represents the single most extensive 'intervention of the Bretton 
Woods institutions - and the wider development financing community as a whole - 
in client countries to date. The requirement that PRSP countries involve a wide range 
of stakeholders in the discussion of policy proposals put forward in their PRSPs has 
led to, 'in varying degrees, the reconfiguration of the political landscape in PRSP 
countries as state political apparatuses - legislatures, constitutions, regional and local 
governments - and political relationships - between the executive and the legislature, 
between state and civil society - are reorganised to conform with and respond to the 
conceptual and operational dictates of the 'new architecture of aid'. 
Central to the reorganisation of socio-political structures under these new 
'participatory' modalities of consensus and decision-making are efforts to embed 
specific discourses about the nature of government and governmentality and the role 
of the state in resource allocation and socio-econorrac regulation. In particular, the 
participatory process places emphasis on the links between the furtherance of a 
liberal political order - exemplified by the promotion of a state/civil society 
dichotomy, an institutionalised relationship between the two and the decoupling of 
the political order from the economy - and the achievement of international 
development targets, including PRSP indicators (see Chapter Five). 
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This is accompanied by the establishment of appropriate political instruments 
through which public consultation on government policy, including economic and 
social policies promulgated and supervised by external financiers, are discussed. It 
creates a focal point for the convergence of resistance to the financing 
conditionalities, establishing strict parameters in which such contentious policy 
discussions may be confined. 
This chapter follows on from Chapter Five which outlined how the bio-political 
power exercised by the international development community over client countries is 
reinforced by the operational interventions of the PRSP framework. Specifically 
where the preceding chapter examined how discipline is maintained through the 
pture ofpolig space - the internalisation of policy and institutional reform by the ca 
policyrnakers of PRSP states, this chapter seeks to examine how these reforms are 
pace - the mobilisation of domestic political legitimated through the capture ofpolifical s 
consensus in support of such reforms. 
Thus, this chapter examines the external 1 participatory process under the PRSP 
framework, considering how these socio-political changes have been operationalised 
in order to reconstitute political and social relations in PRSP countries, locating the 
participatory process within the overarching effort to rehabilitate the state apparatus 
under the PRSP framework. I consider how the PRSP framework has reshaped the 
internal political dynamic and state-civil society relations within the PRSP framework, 
establishing a mechanism which secures both political consensus and political 
disciplining of the PRSP state by non-state actors. 
Here, it is argued that the participatory process is aimed at securing political 
consensus around a set of policy reforms and development strategies which have 
been largely predetermined by external financiers through the capture of the state's 
policy space under the rubric of 'ownership' and 'partnership', and to establish 
formalised channels through which resistance to such policies and grievances about 
policy implementation may be confined and diffused. At the same time, the 
participatory process serves to discipline the state by establishing an oversight 
I As opposed to 'internal' participatory process involving members and segments of the executive 
which has been discussed in Chapter Five 
(see Section 5.31). 
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mechanism that incorporates domestic stakeholdets into the policy and policy 
monitoring process. 
Equally important in this analysis is a consideration of how the PRSP framework 
validates the structural powers at work in the global governance arena and how the 
discourse of 'participation' itself creates a problematic through which the substantive 
conditionalities of structural adjustment may continue to apply in the post-structural 
adjustment era. At the heart of the PRSP reforms therefore is the questionable 
characterisation of PRSP countries as sites of intervention for political reform and 
the assumption that existing political mechanisms in these countries are inadequate 
to address the wider challenge of engendering development and poverty reduction 
established by the PRSP framework. 
6.1. The Liberal Political Project as an Antidote to State Autonomy 
The capture of the pohcymaking apparatus of sovereign states under the PRSP 
framework, through the reinscription of state regulative capacity via the politics of 
partnership and ownership discussed in Chapter Five, is reinforced and magnified by 
the capture of political space through the institution of the participatory process of 
the PRSP approach. Where the politics ofpartnersbo and ownersho reorganise means in 
which the state encounters its external constituents - the financiers and global 
pation reorga ises the means in which the governance institutions - the polifics ofparti(i M 
state's domestic constituents encounter the state. 
6.1.1. Responding to the 'Democratic Deficit' 
In many respects, the efforts at restructuring the internal political dynamics of 
SAP/PRSP countries and their relationship to the external financing community, 
responds to the geo-strategic pressures, discussed in Chapter Three, on the existing 
international economic order. In particular, the participatory Poverty Reduction 
Strategy process responds to the question of 'voice' and 'representation' in the 
regulatory frameworks of economic globalization with the domestic consultative 
process specifically responding to the clamour for inclusion, notably by certain 
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transnational actors (see section 6.3.2) in the process of decision-making and norm 
creation. 
These 'pressures for new forms of democratization of the accountability of formal 
regulatory rule-making' at the national and international level has resulted from the 
exclusion of traditional modes of political franchise in the regulation of 'post- 
industrial, globalized capitalism' (Picciotto, 2000: 163), notably at the institutions of 
global economic governance. Where the resistance to the economic policies and 
norms of global trade and finance targeted what Cameron and Palan term as 'a 
'democratic deficit' between nationally based systems of political representation and 
transnationally organized structures of political authority' (Cameron and Palan, 2004: 
139) - the World Bank, the IMF, the WTO- addressing this political marginalisation 
becomes pertinent to the suppression of resistance where revision of the status quo 
is unfeasible or unimaginable. 
Picciotto speaks of a process of remodelling the "public' sphere of politics' in the 
evolving nature of the state in the current globalized economy, of transforInIng the 
ways in which domestic political structures respond to the "pnVate' sphere of 
econoMIc activity' under neoliberal globalization (Picciotto, 2000: 158; 161 - 163). 
The fragmentation of the public sphere - the redefinition of the role of the state 
from one of provider to regulator2 - and 'the emergence of new patterns of 
governance" therefore necessitates a 'rethinking of accountability or legitimacy' (ibid: 
163). 
Viewed from this perspective, it can be argued that the PRS process reflects the 
organisational, if not geo-political, response of the Bretton Woods institutions and 
northern state financiers towards facilitating avenues through which such forms of 
accountability and legitimacy may be realised to a limited degree. The participatory 
2 By 'provider' I mean the role of the state as an economic agent in its own right, as the primary driver 
of economic processes and the provider of goods and services, both in a redistributive sense (public 
goods and services) and facilitative sense (capital goods, technology and general goods and services). 
By 'regulator' I mean the role of the state as the supervisor of economic activity of other economic 
agents in the private sector - individuals or corporations - acting through the market, whether via 
direct supervision of the market economy or Via the frUtigation of market failures. While most states 
today play both roles, the overarching logic of neoliberal. globalization has been a sustained erosion of 
the role of the state in the former and a circumscribed role for the state in the latter. 
3 For Picciotto, this includes 'market-facilitative regulation' guided by technocratic norms of efficiency, 
resulting in interventions targeted at corrections of market failures rather than redistributive purposes 
(picciotto, 2000: 158; 161 - 163). 
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process is thus an attempt to redress the democratic deficits of pre-existing external 
as well as internal processes of development financing, but established on terms set by 
the official financiers rather than developed through an endogenous process of 
political batter between the affected constituencies. 
In this version of enabling political franchise, it is the state that is problematised, as it 
is the case in relation to its regulative capacity under the discourse of aid 
effectiveness (see Chapter Five, section 5-2). The conjoined notions of 'poverty 
reduction' and 'participation' in the context of a national development programme 
posit the issue of social and economic exclusion as one primarily resultant from the 
lack of. 1) access to domestic structures of political representation and decision- 
making 4 through which local constituents may seek to articulate their interests in a 
contest over economic resources and socio-political recognition; and 2) processes 
and institutions of domestic governance which enable political accountability and fiscal 
transparency to ensure the result of the aforementioned contest and recognition are 
respected. 
While there may be access to international structures of economic governance via a 
circuitous route of state mediation, the overt supposition of the PRSP ftarnework as 
articulated through its discourses and practice is that the nation state bears the 
primary responsibility for addressing the social and economic needs of its citizenry In 
'partnership' with external financiers. 
Hence, struggles over resource allocation and modes of economic governance 
affecting local individuals and communities should be directed at the state apparatus 
through a reorganisation of political representative structures mediated by 
international institutions and external financiers, such as the World Bank and the 
IMF. Correspondingly, the participatory process is orgardised so as to further 
circumscribe the limited policy autonomy ascribed to states under the PRSP 
framework by subjecting the nation state and government apparatus to scrutiny by its 
citizens. 
4 As opposed to the lack of access to supranational structures of decision-making. 
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The reconstruction of the state in PRSP countries through the participatory process, 
therefore aids the rehabilitation of the regulative capacity of the state at the same 
time as it constrains the state by subjecting it to an internal process of accountability 
and external scrutiny. This reconfiguration of the political space in PRSP countries 
legitimises the process of the PRSP framework, through the restructuring of social 
relations between state and non-state actors and external financiers, as well as 
conferring credibility on the substantive content of the resultant social and economic 
policies, even as it fails to reform the existing policy and practice of development 
financing. 
6.1.2. Liberal Legality and Neocolonial Representations 
This reorganisation under the PRSP framework is premised upon the logic of what 
some scholars have termed 'liberal populism' (Harrison, 2001a) or 'populist 
neohberahsm' (Gould, 2005a & b; Gould and Ojanen, 2003) where legitimacy for the 
project of neoliberal globalization is secured through a process of engendering 
broad-based political support for the requisite economic reforms. For Harrison, this 
approach is 'liberal because of its fundamental faith in the free market' and 'populist' 
because while it neglects issues of 'class and exploitation', the ideology claims to be 
working for the general interest of that of 'the ordinary citizen' (Harrison, 2001a: 
537). 'Liberal populism' thus, according to Harrison, 'constitutes an attempt to 
provide a political language to work with neoliberalism's approach to the economy' 
(ibid). 
At the same time, the operationalising of constructs of domestic 'citizenship' and the 
confined activism of 'civil society' provide the antidote to the state rehabilitated 
within the parameters of the PRSP framework. In concert with the discipline exerted 
over PRSP states through the reconfiguration of governance discussed in the 
previous chapter, the positing of the state as the primary site for realising the gains of 
concessional financing and the participatory process as a means to influence such 
outcomes obscures the substance of such financing and channels political resistance 
to substantive financing conditionalities towards a monitorable technical process 
supervised by the BWIs. The aption'assumption that the policy interventions of debt 
relief and concessional lending operations work towards alleviating social and 
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economic dislocations caused not by the policies themselves but by state 
inefficiencies and limited accountability over resource allocation creates a logic that 
predicates alleviation of such dislocations on a reform of state political structures. 
This premise is not novel to the PRSP approach. Conceptually, as noted *in previous 
chapters, the World Bank has shifted steadily in this direction since the early 1990s 
with the emergence of the 'good governance' agenda which was concerned primarily 
with the creation and sustenance of liberal legalism. Here, the brokering by judicial 
and administrative structures of entitlements to resources - cultural or material - of 
citizens and corporate entities within a state was based on the premise of individual 
entitlements to the market economy. The 'good governance' agenda, as charactenised 
by Sano, was 'the child of a modified liberal agenda which made concessions to the 
fact that efficient resource utilisation also depended on modes of governance and 
public involvement' in resource allocation and management (Sano, 2002: 123). 
The narratives and the operational consequences which followed frorn the adoption 
of this agenda (and subsequently that of the PRSP framework) - for example, 
administrative and legal reform projects, civil service capacity building and technical 
assistance - are often premised on paternalistic if not pejorative suppositions of the 
nature of the state in aid-dependant countries. This reflects the continuing 
application of the 'dynarnic of difference' characterising postcolonial international 
relations (see Chapter Two) in which the 'aid recipient' state is juxtaposed in binary 
opposition to the state apparatuses in the 'donor' countries and consequently, in need 
of reconstruction. 
Specifically, such representations routinely delegitimise the non-western state, often 
characterising its political organisation as an extension of social networks, riddled 
with patrimony and nepotism and lacking In the formalised bureaucracy which serve 
as the cornerstone of western public administration'. The construction of third world 
5 Scholars, such as Halvorsen and Nfichelsen, for example, conceive of an effective, operational state 
on the basis of the professionalisation of its civil service - 'the precondition for the public 
administration of the European kind giving autonomy to objective knowledge and solutions' - and its 
abstraction from but social contract with, civil society (Halvorsen and Nfichelsen, 2002: 154, emphasis 
added). Consequently, the failure of 'governance' in the African state (the subject of their analysis) is 
ascribed to the lack of civil service subscription to this 'normative foundation' - constraining the 
exercise of state power by its agents through a universal 'trust' in the 'values' of the state as an 
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states as sites for the manifestation and reproduction of communal leadership and 
not on a programme of political franchise have thus validated not only the ad-hoc 
reforms of 'good governance' era but also form the backdrop to constructing 
interventions in the successor PRSP state. 
In the remedial approach taken by champions of institutional governance reforms - 
of rehabilitating the 'misappropriating, inefficient and patrimonial State' (Sano, 2002: 
123) through a reproduction of the western political order - is the inherent belief 
that the socio-political structures of the state in countries targeted for such reforms 
must be purged of such parochialism and patrimony in order for it to meet the socio- 
political and material needs of its constituents. Therefore, in the absence of an 
endogenous 'civil society' of the Anglo-European tradition which developed political 
representation from domestic taxation, the PRSP framework attempts to substitute 
this by enforcing institutional 'participation' in policy formulation if not in political 
voice. 
For activists Chavez Malaluan and Guttal, the PRSP framework has enabled 'the 
manipulation of civil society' by the external financiers with the preference for 
institutionalised, transnational policy advocacy- dominated consultations reflecting 
the fact that 'vernacular civil society formations do not fit comfortably into the 
conceptualisations of state, market and society' held by the BWIs and other financing 
institutions (Chavez Malaluan and Guttal, 2003: 10; 2002: 7; see section 6.3.2). The 
parochialism of this process is reinforced by the fact that external donors view 
themselves as valid intermediaries between civil society and national governments, 
engendering what they perceive as an absence of political franchise in the aid- 
dependent state. 
Consequently, by representing the crisis of development as a problem of a deficient 
state and by drawing a causal link between poverty and domestic political 
representation, the intrusive structural and institutional interventions of the PRSP 
approach are justified whilst validating the structural disequilibrium in international 
economic relations. Inasmuch as the PRSP framework provides the operational 
institution - and instead, its affiliation to enduring kinship ties and the resource transfers such 
networks entail (ibid: 154 - 155). 
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apparatus to influence the strategic direction of the political elite under universalised 
prescriptions for development planning, the framework also provides the umbrella 
through which the political consensus for these strategic decisions are consolidated 
and legitimised. The nation state and its political apparatus are therefore reorganised 
under the PRSP framework to serve a purpose that both imposes discipline on the 
PRSP state as well as leglt*='ses the forms of discipline imposed through both the 
discourse and practice of the participatory process. 
6.2. Participation, Politics and Policy Accountability 
The Bank and the Fund expect 'participation' to take place in most stages of the 
PRSP process - from early analytical work and poverty diagnosis to PRSP policy 
formulation to monitoring PRSP implementation (see for example, World Bank, 
2001c: 7). The World Bank defines 'participation' as 'the process through which 
stakeholders (those affected by the outcome of reform or capable of affecting 
reform) influence or share control over setting priorities, making policy, allocating 
resources, and ensuring access to public goods and services' (World Bank, 2004, in 
IMF and World Bank, 2005: para 54, fn 63). 
In the seven years since the inception of the PRSP project, the focus of the 
participatory process has broadened from that of participation in policy formulation 
to encompass, increasingly, participation in monitoring implementation of policies. 
The IMF and World Bank 2005 review of the PRSP approach, tellingly entitled 
'Balancing Accountabilities and Scaling Up Results' reiterates that the 'PRS, approach 
is intended to serve as a platform for balanced and mutual accountability', requiring 
not only cspecific operational plans to support PRS implementation and donor 
alignment' but also 'that aid be provided in support of the priorities set out in the 
PRSP in ways that reinforce, rather than detract from, domestic accountability' (ibid: 
13). 
For the Bank and the Fund, the participatory process is pivotal in efforts to 
operationalise this 'mutual accountability framework' under which states would be 
made accountable to their domestic constituents as well as to external financiers for 
developing a coherent and relevant economic programme to address and account for 
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public expenditure met by external financing (ibid: 11 - 13). 'Participation, according 
to the Bank and Fund, 'can be a key factor to enable stronger accountability 
mechanisms' (ibid: para 54) through the engagement of stakeholders mi the framing 
of 'clear development goals and targets' as well as to 'monitor implementation In 
order to facilitate adjustments in policies and programs' (ibid: para 25). 
In this manner) the PRSP framework extracts targeted public commitments from 
PRSP governments on public expenditure and economic development plans within 
PRSP-set parameters and utilises the participatory mechanism to hold governments 
accountable to such commitments. Instead of subjecting the state to the discipline of 
conventional, external mechanisms of monitoring policy compliance', the PRSP 
framework transfers such monitoring to domestic constituents instead. 
This includes not only the PRSP country policymakers themselves, as discussed 
above and in Chapter Five, but also interest groups and communities under the 
auspices of the PRS participatory process (see following section). The PRS process 
thus affords the operational framework through which financier countries may enrol 
the support of communities in implementing the substantive socio-economic 
reforms of financing operations. 
Accordingly, the Bank views participation as a process that 'brings elements of 
legitimacy, accountability, and continuity to national development strategies' (World 
Bank, 2005h: para 51) with the engagement of non-state actors crucial because: 
Strategy is legifimiýZed as stakeholders' inputs and assessments are 
accounted for ... Sustained stakeholder participation and 
dialogue 
help to ensure continuity of strategy even in the face of political change 
(ibid, emphasis added). 
ln considering the participatory process in the JSAN, Bank and Fund staff are 
advised to look at the involvement of the following in the formulation of the 
country's PRSP: a) government entities - central ministries, parliaments, and sub- 
national governments; b) other stakeholders including civil society groups, women's 
6For example, Via traditional modes of conditionality enforcement (see Chapter Four). 
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organisations, representatives of ethnic minorities, research institutes and academia, 
private sector, trade unions and regional representatives; c) bilateral and multilateral 
'external development partners' ; and d) representatives of 'the poor' (World Bank 
and IMF, 2005: Annex 1, para A). Staff must also describe the '[e]xtent to which the 
participatory process has been well integrated with existing processes of the 
government for policy and decision making' and whether the PRSP is 'related to any 
other current government documents that set forth national or sectoral development 
plans and/or budgets' (ibid). 
Bank and Fund staff have been instructed by the Executive Boards not to evaluate 
the participatory process in their assessment of a country's PRSP (ibid) and have 
stressed that PRSP processes should 'not undermine existing institutions and 
processes for decision-making' JDA, 2001b: 5). The Bank and Fund, at least 
rhetorically, have maintained that the participatory process should reflect 'the 
different experiences and political systems of countries producing PRSPs' JMF and 
World Bank, 1999: para 20) and have reiterated that donors 'need to be aware of (and 
not bypass) participatory and representative processes and institutions that already 
exist' JMF and World Bank, 2005: 14). 
The Participation Myth 
In reality, the PRSP framework has been criticised for Imposing an ethnocentric 
model of policymaking- promulgating a form of Weberian consensual politics 
reminiscent of the institutionalised Anglo-American democratic tradition' - and 
which favours a core of elite transnational policy advocates whose familiarity with the 
language of 'international development' have enabled them to permeate into 
domestic decision-making structures with greater ease and more influence than local 
representatives and civil society groups. 
7 HavoIrsen and Nfichelsen (2002) conceive of the Anglo-American model of public administration as 
a 'weak State and low trust' system of political barter which is shaped by constant 'antagonism' 
between the state - represented by a small cadre of specialised civil servants - and civil society 
'competing for influence over the public sphere' (151). Here, civil society, conceived both as citizens 
bearing 'certain rights' and as 'representatives of the economy', is argued to 'have been shaped as 
collective actors in opposition to the State' (ibid). The authors further argue that it is this model, as 
opposed to the European 'strong State and high trust' model in which 'the State and collective actors 
developed in a more co-ordinated manner, fostering greater 'trust between the citizenry and its public 
administration', that is replicated in the 'good governance' reforms (ibid: 152 - 153). 
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Furthermore, the PRS process is heavily state-di-rected, lending credence to the 
argument that 'participation' in the PRS process has less to do with fostering genuine 
broad-based debates on resource mobilisation and allocation than about 
technocratising an inherently messy process of political barter to secure domestic 
political consensus around the framework of globalized development planning, 
discussed in Chapter Five, and to universalise this practice in all PRSP countries. 
This reflects the conceptual legacy of the PRSP framework, discussed above, 
underpinned by the embedded neocolonial. representations of PRSP states as 
(underdeveloped' and the political institutions of these states as unresponsive and 
non-facilitative of the essential characteristics of a liberal western order in need of 
reform. Paradoxically therefore, the project of participatory pohcymaking within the 
PRSP framework serves to reinforce rather than revise underlying structures of 
power, both in the domestic sphere and in interactions with external actors. Most 
vulnerable in this equation are the marginalised communities who the PRSP project 
sweepingly terms 'the poor', citizens of states for whom the policies of structural 
adjustment are felt mostly acutely and often most violently, but against whom the 
process excludes (see section 6.3.2 below). 
The PRS process can reproduce the hierarchies of power inherent not only within 
the dynamic of the financing relationship between the state and its external financiers 
but also between the state and its internal financiers and citizens. A study of the PRS 
processes in Malawi and Zambia concluded that the 'embedded' concept of 'national 
ownership' M such processes 'may act to conserve the retrogressive institutions that 
produced poverty in the first place', including the 'retention of clientalist politics' 
which limit the access of communities to structures of pohcymaking and 
accountability (Bwalya, Rakner, Svasand, Tostensen and Tsoka, 2004: 4- 5). 
Mote importantly, scholars, such as Cooke, Kotharl and Mohan, have challenged the 
precept of 'participatory development' and its operational manifestations' as 
embedded in politics of Eurocentricism and postcolonial representations of the 
south and in danger of reproducing the very disempowering discourses and 
8 Of which the PRSP is one of many manifestations, which include 'participatory action research', 
gender mainstreaming, participatory poverty assessments (PPAs), etc. 
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structures it purports to chaUenge (see Cooke and Kothari, 2002; Kothan 2002; 
Mohan, 2002). 
Kothari, for one, argues that participatory mechanisms 'can encourage a reassertion 
of power by dominant groups and individuals', leading to 'the reification of social 
norms through self-surveillance and consensus-building' (Kothani, 2002: 142). 
Accordingly, the power that is embedded and disbursed in the social field - the 
Foucauldian biopower - is reproduced in the very act of conferring 'participation', 
resulting in what Cohen (1985) terms as programmes of 'inclusionary social control' 
which make it difficult for people to discern and challenge power structures (Kothan, 
2002: 143). By using the 'promise of development assistance' to bring previously 
excluded communities into the design of research and policymaking, Kothati 
contends that 'participatory development' not only 'reduces the spaces for conflict' 
but disempowers those who have 'the greatest reason to challenge the prevailing 
hierarchies and inequalities' through the 'inducement of conformity', manipulation 
and the representation of knowledge (ibid). 
The Bank and Fund acknowledge that competition for external resources may skew 
the participatory process and undermine efforts for domestic accountability as line 
ministries and civil society organisations 'have incentives to align their interests to 
donors in a bid for financial resources and to focus on donor reporting requirements' 
(IMF and World Bank, 2005: para 100). Thus, the framing of needs and interests by 
those in the 'driving seat' of the PRSP process - ministries or transnational policy 
advocates familiar With the language of evidentiary policymaking (see below) - may 
not necessarily reflect those of the general populace. More critically, where 
communities are subject to the plethora of data-mining processes, such as the 
Poverty and Social Impact Assessments (PSIA) to support policies of the PRS 
process, the unequal power relations between the researchers and policyrnakers and 
the subjects inevitably reorient the outcomes of such processes. 
6.3. Reconfiguring the Political Landscape: PRS Processes in 
Operation 
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The institution of the PRS process in recipient countries has led to a reconfiguration 
of forces, alliances and institutional dynamics within the political structures of these 
states. The disciplinary and legitimation function of the PRSP framework is 
evidenced by the impact of the PRSP framework on the socio-political constitution 
of PRSP countries. While it is not within the scope of this thesis to consider i detail in 
the reforms brought about by the PRSP framework in individual PRSP countries, 
examination of empirical studies on PRSP participatory processes', including those 
from the BWIs, reveal general trends in support of the aforementioned arguments. 
The following sections consider three critical impacts of the PRSP framework,, 
discerned from these studies, on the constitution of the state in PRSP countries. 
6.3.1. The Imported State" 
In an effort to create a unLiversalised framework for development policyrnaking (see 
Chapter Five), the PRSP framework also attempts to reorganise systems of political 
franchise in PRSP countries, positing a new form of politics in these countries, 
notwithstanding the Bank and Fund's constitutional Prohibition against such political 
interference". Although the Bank (and Fund) suggest that countries'PRSPs 'build on 
and provide consistency with other current governments processes' and build upon 
existing sectoral and national strategies (Klugman, 2002: 6), countries have, more 
often than not, started entirely from scratch, mainly out of pressure to conform with 
'best practice' guidelines on participation as laid down in the PRSP Sourcebook and 
elsewhere. 
The OED evaluation found that-, on the whole, 'participatory activities for the PRSP 
were weakly linked to established domestic participatory processes, where they 
I These studies have been drawn from a variety of sources, including from the World Bank and IMF's 
staff and internal evaluation departments JMT, 2004e; World Bank, 2004; World Bank, 2005h, 20051, 
20051,2005k; World Bank and IMEF, 2005a) research institutes (Gould, 2005; McGee with Norton, 
2000; Moleanars and Renard, 2002) and NGO studies (ActionAid, 2004; World Vision, 2005). 
10 Title taken from Badie's treatise The Imported State: The Wlesterni, -ation of the Political Order. I allude to 
Badie's conceptual premise at various stages of this thesis (see Chapters Two and Seven). 
11 Article IV, Section 10 of the IBRD Articles of Agreement and Article V, Section 6 of the IDA 
Articles of Agreement provide that the Tank and its officers shall not interfere in the political affairs 
of any member; nor shall they be influenced in the decisions by the political character of the member 
or members concerned'. However, the interpretation of this prohibition remain subject to contest and 
interventions, such as the implementation of 'governance' conditions, have been justified by 
successive Bank General-Counsels, including the justification that political interventions may be 
necessary in order to achieve the Bank's overarching mandate of development and economic growth 
(see Dafiino, 2006; Shihata, 200a: 220 - 244). 
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existed' (World Bank, 2004k: 13). The result has been that even in countries with a 
pre-existing consultative mechanism, the national planning document resulting from 
these domestic processes would still need to be adjusted to meet the standards set by 
the Bank and the Fund. 
Empirical studies of participatory processes in PRSP countries have demonstrated an 
uncanny similarity in the shape and content of the participatory processes undertaken 
in these countries and in many cases, the PRS has replaced domestic strategic 
planning mechanisms where they existed prior to the PRSP framework. Some 
Tanzanian civil society groups, for example, questioned the need to develop a 
process separate from the national planning processes, such as the National Poverty 
Eradication Strategy formulated in 1997, at a time when the country was already 
developing a Tanzania Assistance Strategy with donors (Gould and Ojanen, 2005: 
26). 
Meanwhile, in post-conflict Cambodia, the government was in the process of 
formulating the second round of its legally mandated Socio-Economic Development 
Program (SEDP 11)" in 2000 when it had to shift gears and complete a PRSP as wen 
to access financing from the Bank and Fund (Royal Government of Cambodia, 2003: 
8; World Bank and IMFJ, 2005a: 18). The decision to launch two parallel planning 
processes arose largely because Bank and Fund staff were keen on ensuring the 
'preparation of strategy document comparable in quality to first-round PRSPs from 
other countries' and because the staff did not believe the SEDP would 'provide a 
credible alternative to the PRS process and could not be retrofitted within the 
required time frame' (World Bank and IMF, 2005a: 22). 
Even in Uganda, the poster child of the PRSP project, and whose Poverty 
Eradication Action Plan (PEAP), developed through a wide-ranging consultative 
process, set the example upon which the PRSP project was modelled, had to 
repackage their national strategy to suit the framework set by the Bretton Woods 
institutions. Barbara Kalima, former coordinator of the African Forum for Debt and 
Development (Afrodad), contended that such massaging of 'the PEAP to conform 
12 This was supported by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) (World Bank and IMEF, 2005a: 18). 
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to the PRSP framework' compromises the very ownership the Bank and Fund 
purport to initiate under the frarnework: 
What was wrong With the PEAP ? If it had all the social components 
to it, if it had different ways of generating wealth domestically or 
externally, if it had all those components, why didn't the Bank and 
Fund fund the PEAP ? Why did they have to reinvent the wheel ? 
(interview, Kalima, 2004). 
As a result of cases such as these, the OED and the IMF's IEO, mi the 
aforementioned evaluation on the PRSP initiative, found that such preoccupation 
with formal PRSP requirements 'has often been at the expense of adaptation of the 
PRS process to country circumstances, reflected in the misplaced 'emphasis on 
producing documents rather than improving underlying policy processes' (World 
Bank and IMF, 2005a: 5). 
Presc. dptive Participation 
Yet, even in countries where there have been efforts to structure a participatory 
policyniaking process for sustenance outside the PRSP document, these processes 
remain formulaic and prescriptive. The Bank and the Fund themselves have admitted 
that the frequent cases of PRSPs produced in processes 'parallel to existing planning 
processes' has led to a disconnect between the PRS cycle 'from domestic political 
cycles' and compromised 'domestic accountability' JMF and World Bank, 2005: Pata 
99). 
There appears, as did in the case of Cambodia, concerted efforts on the part of Bank 
and Fund staff as well as country authorities to initiate participatory processes that 
conform to the prevailing institutional vision of such processes. Country authorities 
are encouraged to draft and adhere to 'Participation Action Plans' (PAPs) which set 
out a framework for designing, formulating, organising and implementing 
participatory policyrnaking a'la PRSP (World Bank, 2005h: 18 -26). PAPs are to focus 
on '[dlevolopmg institutional arrangements for coordinating the PRSP process' M 
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countries, identifying not only the stakeholders who will be engaged as part of the 
process but also the coordinating framework for such arrangements (ibid: 24). 
These arrangements have commonly taken the shape of a highly government- 
directed process involving the establishment of a centrally-directed focal point for 
dialogue - usually in the shape of a steering committee, task force or inter-ministerial 
working group - chaired by a central minister or, in some cases., the prime minister 
or president. Consultations generally take place within the framework otganised by 
this central coordinating mechanism and, more often than not, take the form of 
consultative workshops held with invited participants from civil society groups 
and/or other 'stakeholders' such as trade union representatives, private sector 
associations, and so on. Consultations may also take place at regional, district and 
local level and may or may not be open to the public. Draft PRSPs, written in some 
cases by external consultants 13 , are circulated for discussion at these consultations 
but, as we shall consider later) are not necessarily revised to take into account the 
input of participants. 
For example, in Zambia, the Ministry of Finance played a central role in the design 
and coordination of the PRS process and, ultimately, the PRSP document. The 
ministry was charged with the responsibility of coordinating the PRSP, deciding on 
thematic groups and selecting participants for the consultative process and 
developing the terms of reference (TORs) for engagement (Bwalya et al, 2004: 19). It 
also acted as the national secretariat for the process, drafting the initial document and 
preparing the final plan (ibid). The PRS process in Malawi was also dominated by the 
finance ministry, with the Minister of Finance playing a dominant role in steering the 
process under the aegis of a Ministerial Committee consisting of representatives from 
six ministries although the chair was held by the Minister of Agriculture and the 
National Steering Committee of the process helmed by the treasury secretary (ibid: 
9). 
This state-directed pattern is repeated across PRSP countries. In Tanzania, the 
government established the Inter-Ministerial Technical Comrnittee in October 1999 
to chair the PRSP process which was coordinated by the Vice President's Office 
13 Such as the Albanian PRSP which was vmtten by local consultants in light of the government's 
limited capacity (see World Bank and IMF, 2005a: 11). 
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(United Republic of Tanzania, 2000: Annex 1, para (i)) This committee was 
supported by a Technical Comrnittee, comprising officials from various ministries 
and coordinated by the Ministry of Finance, charged with the task of drafting the 
Interim. -PRSP g-PRSP) and the PRSP, as weH as coordinating the PRS process, 
including organising zonal and national workshops and convening consultative 
meetings with donors and parliamentarians (ibid). 
In Ghana, the process was coordinated by the National Development Planning 
Commission (NDPC), a central government agency, which was appointed by 
president to establish a task force for this purpose (World Bank, 2005k: para 120). 
This task force comprised mainly of consultants from academia, local think tanks or 
'highly skilled Ghanaians living abroad, who left once the GPRS 14 was approved' 
(ibid). The NDPC was responsible for organising the workshops and forums for 
collecting views on the GPRS from government ministries, civil servants, unions, 
civil society and private sector representatives among others although it was left to 
the Ministry of Finance to table the draft GPRS to parliament (ibid: Box 6). 
Pakistan's PRS process was similarly piloted by a National Steering Committee 
headed by the Federal Secretary of Finance and coordinated by a PRSP Secretariat 
based at the Ministry of Finance (Government of Pakistan, 2003: 8). 
In Vietnam, responsibility for coordinating the process was given to the Ministry of 
Planning and Investment which established an Inter-Ministerial Working Unit to 
organise discussions and consultations for PRSP formulation (Socialist Republic of 
Vietnam, 2003: 101 - 102). However, much of the participatory process 
in the 
Vietnam case was handled by the World Bank and international NGOs (INGOs) and 
financed largely by these organisations (World Bank and IMF, 2005a: 93). 
This external financial support of the process is replicated in most PRSP countries as 
the majority of PRSP countries lack not only the administrative capacity but, 
crucially, the financial resources to undertake such an ambitious project. Pakistan's 
PRS communication strategy - aimed essentially at disseminating information on the 
process - was, as another example, developed 
in collaboration with the UK's DFID 
(Government of Pakistan, 2003: 9). 
14 Ghanaian Poverty Reduction Strategy. 
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Meanwhile, in Malawi, the national coordinator of the PRS process within the 
National Steering Committee (NSC) was a Malawian national on secondment from 
the World Bank office in Lilongwe although the secondment took place prior to the 
PRS process and the PRSP drafting team included an IMF consultant (Bwalya et al, 
2004: 9). While these examples may not be necessarily representative of all PRS 
processes, they do highlight uncanny similarities in the operationahsation of the 
PRSP framework across a diverse spectrum of PRSP countries. 
Enforced Democracy 
The universalised construction of this process of participatory policymaking further 
undermines the PRSP project's rhetorical underpinnings of pluralism even as its 
architects - the Bank, the Fund and the handful of transnational policy actors (see 
Chapter Three) - propound its processual heterogeneity and policy autonomy. All 64 
PRSP countries have had to introduce some form of participatory process under the 
PRSP framework, many of which have had to amend existing legislation to enable 
such procedural reforms to take place. 
While there are exhortations of structuring 'alternative institutional arrangements' 
(read: non-centrally-directed)" for participation (World Bank, 2001c: 24), the 
overarching objective (whether intended or consequential) has been to Mstitutionalise 
and standardise political engagement across the board in PRSP countries. As a result, 
the consultative process is structured around a stylised bureaucracy of checklists, 
action plans, diagnostic tools, and 'workshopping' (Shivji, in Gould and Ojanen, 
2005: 28), creating what a World Vision report 16 terms 'a technocratic parallel 
15 The two 'alternative' scenarios suggested by the World Bank in its chapter on participation in the 
PRSP Sourcebook remain premised on a centralised coordinating mechanism. The first is a centrally- 
directed government process of regional dialogue involving, for instance, the coordination by the 
Ministry of Local Governments of participatory processes structured regionally or centred upon 
district-level consultations which are fed back to the central government. The second alternative 
arrangement propounded is where the government sub-contracts the participatory process to a 
coalition of NGOs and engages With the coalition as a focal point for consultative dialogue. This 
creates its own problems of representation as discussed furtherin the following section (World Bank, 
2001c: 24). 
16 J'his report was compiled by a group of consultants in conjunction with World Vision organisations 
in Zambia and Bolivia and based on a combination of desk-based literature review and fieldwork on 
the PRS processes in Zambia and Bolivia (World Vision, 2005: 5). 
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government' to service the procedural requirements of donors (World Vision, 2005: 
33). 
Consequently, the PRSP framework has created consultative mechanisms in 
countries where such participatory policyrnaking has never been a tradition and , in 
many cases, such processes were created in haste in response to external financing 
needs. For example, in Bolivia, the government scrambled together the National 
Dialogue 2000 in late 1999 to kick start the consultative process that would result in 
the Estrategia Bolim'ana de Reduc6i*on de la Pobreýa (EBRP), the first Bolivian PRSP, in 
order to meet deadlines for debt relief under the HIPC 11 initiative. (World Bank, 
2005k: 7- 8). As Bolivia is highly dependent on official development financing 17 , 
external donors were heavily involved in the preparation of the EBRP and continued 
to use existing working groups to provide analysis of the EBRP as well as drafting 
the EBRP (World Bank, 2005k: 23). However, the law enabling public participation 
in the EBRP formulation, the National Dialogue Law was only debated and passed 
by the Bolivian Congress in July 2001, a year after the National Dialogue ended 
(World Bank., 2005k: 22). 
According to Molenears and Renard (2002) - whose study of the PRSP process in 
Bolivia highlights the disjuncture between the rhetoric of broad-based ownership and 
the operational realities of disenfranchisement among poorer communities - the 
problem hes with the attempt to transpose a participatory process that is 'based on 
Western experiences, where participation and the growth of civil society has been 
(more or less) an endogenous process that evolved over centuries', leaving third 
world states to cope with immediate and 'considerable external pressure' to "increase 
the role, weight and influence' of civil society (Molenears and Renard, 2002: 4). 
Consequently, in recent years, bilateral and multilateral financiers have focused 
substantially on developing and strengthening civil society work and participatory 
mechanisms in client countries. The proliferation of organisations which 'are donor- 
bred and fed' has consequently meant that in many PRSP countries 'the strength of 
17 Such financing accounted for 34.2 percent of central government expenditure in 2001 and 
constituted almost 60 percent of total public investment in 2002 with bilateral assistance representing 
the largest share, amounting to 76 percent in 2002. The World Bank and the Inter-Amen'Can Bank 
JDB) represent the largest multilateral financiers (World Bank, 2005k: 22 - 23). 
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organized civil society may be to some extent artificial' and unrelated to the lives of 
the people they represent (ibid: 28). In a political climate where the externally-driven 
(and externally- funded) 'civil society participation' is subsequently mandated by the 
national government, it is unsurprising that the outcome of this 'new partnership', as 
observed by Gould and Ojanen, is a 'state-society relationship' that is commensurate 
with the model desired by the external policy community rather than local 
constituents (Gould and Ojanen, 2005: 46 - 47). 
In Malawi, for instance, the Malawi Economic justice Network (MEJN) was formed 
in early 2001 as an umbrella organisation of 28 member organisations, drawing upon 
the international links of its initiator, the Catholic Commission for justice and Peace 
(CCJP) which played a key role in jubilee 2000 debt campaign, to emerge as a 
(singularly active player in the PRSP process, largely with funding from Oxfam' 
(Bwalya et al, 2004: 12). Although this organisation and input from civil society into 
policymaking was a welcome change from the previously executive-dominated 
process, there have been concerns about the representativeness of these 
organisations, many of whom are not membership-based (ibid). 
Furthermore, the Bwalya study found that many civil society organisations (CSOs) 'in 
Malawi, as elsewhere in aid-dependant countries, 'have been started by enterprising 
individuals with a laudable purpose and connections to funding sources, though 
often without a grassroots foundation' (ibid). This trend has been accelerated by the 
PRS process by virtue of governments' need to include some vestige of civil society 
within the participatory mechanism. 
The state apparatus is thus reconstructed to formalise mechanisms which, 
paradoXically, do not engender accountability as 'a national process connecting 
citizens and the state' but rather create 'a technocratic control mechanism' (World 
Vision, 2005: 33) through which governrnents generate the political consensus 
necessary to legitirnise substantive policies, not only for themselves, but for the 
credibility of external financiers to whom they are primarily accountable in the 
current international political economy. Consequently, In accounting to donors, the 
state is required to undergo a globalized process of engagement with stakeholders so 
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that the process is framed in a language understandable and quantifiable by the 
assessors of the process to quahfy for disbursement of funds. 
6.3.2. The Politics of Technocratic Governance and the Role of 
Transnational Advocates 
As demonstrated in the preceding discussion, the participatory process in the 
majority of PRSP countries is highly state-directed, largely out of the executive 
expediency to complete the documentation necessary to access debt relief and funds 
from the PRGF, but also as a consequence of positive reinforcement by the Bank 
and Fund of the role of the executive in economic decision-making". This state- 
directed process has had ramifications for the efficacy of the participatory process 
for those who view it as the forum for political engagement. C; " 
Firstly, the link between the completion of a PRSP (and hence, the PRS process) and 
financing disbursements necessitates, as discussed in the preceding sections, the 
confinement of the parameters of engagement in terms of procedure (the limited 
scope for stakeholder involvement in the process) and substance (the scope of policy 
discussion). 
Secondly, and equally importantly, a natural progression of the above limitations, has 
resulted in the crafting of a state-directed framework that is both depolifised - in a 
sense that it is divorced from the political bargaining process that characterises 
conventional resource mobilisation and allocation mechanisms - as well as exclusive 
and ditisive - in a sense that the space for policy engagement and influence privileges a 
set of actors whose familiarity with the technocracy of aid and aid relationships 
enables them to maximise the consultative opportunities that have opened up to the 
exclusion of other stakeholders. 
a) Transnational Civil Society as Default Policymakers 
18 The Bank, for example, has reiterated, on several occasions, that a 'key element of PRS ownership is 
a. rofid leadersbip role guiding the PRS content' supported by some sort of Institutionalised stakeholder 
participation (World Bank, 2005h: 16 -17, emphasis added). 
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A common feature of participatory processes in PRSPs has been the engagement by 
the executive arm of the PRSP government of a select core of NGO participants in 
the institutional framework of the PRS, leading to what Gould and Ojanen have 
termed a 'crowding out' of national policy space for other actors (Gould and Ojanen, 
2005: 34). The 'consultative imperatives of the PRS' (Gould and Ojanen, 2005: 51) 
have compelled governments to enter into selective 'partnerships' with civil society 
groups, notably a core of transnational policy advocates who correspondingly draw 
legitimacy from their own 'partnerships' with grassroots or local groups working 
primarily in basic service delivery. 
This engagement under the PRSP framework has taken the form of a either a 
contracting out of the participatory aspect of the PRS process to NGOs or a 
coalition of NGOs or the entry into a contract of policy participation with a select 
core of NGOs, usually organisations based in the capitals and usually those with 
strong international links, if not as subsidiaries of international NGOs. These 
partnerships facilitate what Gould terms 'a vision of fast-track democracy' which 
Icgitimises the technocratic partnership between the financial institutions, the 
government and a 'transnational corps of development professionals' (Gould, 2005: 
33). 
Chavez Malaluan and Guttal, activists who both participated in as well as studied 
PRSP modalities in Lao PDR, Cambodia and Vietnam, noted that in PRSP countries 
as a whole, '[p]articipation has by and large been limited to inviting some prominent 
and well-resourced NGOs to offer their perspectives on pre-prepared documents' 
(Chavez Malaluan and Guttal, 2003: 9). More often than not, the NGOs invited to 
the table are local 'branches' of large northern-based INGOs or 'transnational private 
aid agencies' (IFPAAs) (Gould and Ojanen, 2005: 34) rather than smaller, local groups 
who are perceived not to possess the capacity to engage in such a process (Abugre, 
2000; Chavez Malaluan and Guttal, 2003: 10). 
A study by Eberlei'9 observed: 
19 The study was comrnissioned on behalf of a coalition of German church groups 
(Eberlel, 2005). 
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What is conspicuous is the particularly active role that non- 
governmental organisations with strong international links ... play in 
several PRS processes. As a rule, they run their own offices in the 
capital, have well-trained full-time staff and at least some financial 
resources to participate in the PRS process ... Nearly everywhere, 
those organisations acting on behalf of the rural population are clearly 
underrepresented (Eberlei, 2005: 4). 
In Vietnam, the three INGOs invited to participate in the Poverty Task Force (PTF) 
charged with preparing the participatory poverty assessment (PPA) entitled Vietnam: 
Attacking Povert hildten y in preparation for the PRS process were Oxfam, Save the C 
and ActionAid 'because of their experience with participatory assessments and their 
grassroots contacts in some of the provinces' in cooperation with the Swedish 
International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) who co-financed the 
project (Norlund, Tran and Nguyen, 2005: 90). The privileging of INGOs continued 
throughout the PRS process with representatives of local NGOs invited to 
participate in the process 'more as personalities than as organizations' (ibid: 92 - 93). 
This scenario is repeated across many PRSP countries, including Tanzania, Ghana, 
Cambodia, Pakistan and Honduras, where INGOs played a key role in, and 
sometimes, dominated, either PPAs or PRSP consultations" although in many cases, 
local offices of such INGOs were 'Indigenised' (see Gould and Ojanen, 2005: 34-35 
21 
on Tanzania) to the extent that the staff were drawn from the local population . In 
Tanzania-, the Policy Forum for NGOs which was established to succeed the original 
Tanzania Debt and Development (ICDD)/PRSP coalition to lobby for greater 
consultative space within the PRS process contained 'an expended presence of 
transnational private agencies' (ibid). 
The 2005 World Vision report recognises the difficulty in securing 'direct 
participation' of communities in the PRS process -'material problems prevent strong 
organisations from emerging at the local level' - and acknowledges that this has left 
20 See empirical studies in Gould (2005). 
21 This does not mean however that such staff, many of them made up of an elite core of western- 
trained 'development specialists (often with higher degrees in 'development studies' and related areas 
from a western university) necessarily reflect the interests of the general populace. 
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'the poor reliant on civil society groups to represent them' in policy discussions, even 
though many CSOs are ill-equipped to do so 'either because of the nature of their 
relationship to people as clients or beneficiaries (rather than citizens)', or their lack 
of expertise within policy arenas' (World Vision, 2005: 30). 
NGOs invited to the PRSP discussions have often been, in the words of World 
Vision policy and advocacy director Alan Whal 171 itesý 'not surp, 'singly ... the same old, 
same old - the big NGOs, the international NGOs who turn up to all the meetings' 
(interview: Whaites, 2004). Whaites, although himself representing a large INGO 
with local offices in most PRSP countries, acknowledges and is critical of the 
complicity of INGOs in this process of validation by their absence of dissent: 
NGOs thernselves were not terribly good at looking around 
the roorn and [asking] who isn't here ... NGOs in a sense 
colluded in some countries with a very poor selection process 
for participation (interview: Whaites, 2004). 
For the most part, the absence of local stakeholder participation in the processes has 
been attributed to the lack of 'capacity' on the part of such participants, but Chavez 
Malaluan and Guttal argue that this is usually translated as meaning 'the absence of 
NGOs who are already familiar with, or can be taught the formal vocabulary of 
modern development" (Chavez Malaluan and Guttal, 2003: 10). This is 
compounded by the fact that the finguafranca of the PRSP process is English and 
participation by local groups is limited by the production of most documentation in a 
non-native language. 
In Cambodia, Lao and Vietnam, drafts of the I-PRSPs and PRSPs were not 
translated into local languages until the final stages, excluding much local input into 
the policy formulation (Chavez Malaluan and Guttal, 2003: 10; Chavez Malaluan and 
Guttal, 2002: 5; World Bank and IMF, 2005a: 19). In Bolivia, the World Vision report 
found that the 'political and technical groups maintain a colonial mentality that 
marginalises their efforts to represent poor groups' (World Vision, 2005: 31), with 
22 This is because in many aid-dependent countries, as highlighted in Chapter 'I'liree, the legacy of 
structural adjustment has meant that CSC)s have taken over the role of the state as providers for 
essential public services, such as health, education and sanitation. 
23 For example, the use of vocabulary such as participation, planning, poverty reduction, sustainability, 
stakeholder analysis, good governance, etc (Chavez Malaluan and Guttal, 2003: 10). 
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effective participation compounded by the fact that representatives from poor 
communities invited to consultations 'had to present their proposals in Spanish 
instead of using their native language' (ibid: 30). 
Even if language was not an issue, the specificity of terminology employed by the 
PRSP framework as in other aid and financing documentation, prevents constructive 
engagement by groups unfarnihar with this. Chavez Malaluan and Guttal found that 
in Lao PDR, Cambodia and Vietnam: 
Local populations M the three countries are not generally 
familiar with the technical language that dominates policy 
documents and have to grapple with concepts not found in 
their cultures. The challenge here is not simply using precise 
words, but contextualising alien concepts. This makes it 
extremely difficult for local people, including many 
government officials to confidently read and respond to 
translated policy documents (Chavez Malaluan and Guttal, 
2002: 5). 
With country authorities desperate to complete a PRSP that win secure them the 
necessary external financing, it is not difficult to see how governments find the idea 
of contracting of experienced policy advocates, schooled in the developmenqbeak in 
the policy formulation, both expedient and alluring. At the same time, the clamour 
for consultative space has continued to marginalise some groups while it has 
empowered others. The PRS process therefore compounds an existing problem 
confronting southern NGOs in which INGOs are overwhelming the space for 
endogenous politics and civil society representation". 
The PRS process thus reinforces rather than redresses the power dynarlUcs Mherent 
in international aid relationships and reemphasises the dependency of the south on 
the north. Local groups are not only being excluded from the process by their own 
24 For example, the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) 'Southern Voices' project recorded 
concerns from southern civil society groups regarding the growing influence of INGOs at the local 
level in the current aid architecture. Specifically, it was noted that INGOs may be 'competing unfairly 
with local CSOs for financial and other programming resources' and consequently 'undermining the 
growth and effectiveness of an independent and autonomous indigenous civil society sector' (Rocha 
Menocal and Rogersen, 2006: 20). 
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governments because of the aforementioned lack of 'capacity', they are conversely 
being engaged by northern-based transnational organisations to serve as 'local 
partners' in the PRS process and other processes of aid dialogue". 
This form of 'partnership' also serves to lend legitimacy to the INGOs' advocacy and 
lobbying campaigns, both in the domestic political structures and in the INGOs' 
home ground with funders and other aid agencies" (interview: various, 2004-2005; 
see also Gould and Ojanen, 2005: 42 - 43). The instrumentalism of this process 
reveals how the unequal 'partnerships' between third world governments and 
external financiers are subsequently reproduced in relationships between civil society 
organisations M the north and communities in the south. 
b) Fracturing of Resistance 
The technocratic partnerships between the state, financing institutions and 
transnational pohcy advocates are indications of the increasing influence of the BWls 
and other donors in the domestic pohtical sphere of chent countries and the divisive 
impact the PRS process is having on the politics of resistance in PRSP countries and 
elsewhere. Insofar as the participatory process creates a mechanism for the entry of 
certain groups into the pohcyrnaking space and excludes - whether by intention or by 
default - other groups, the PRSP framework determines the form and content of the 
domestic pohcyrnaking process. In doing so, it captures a significant part of the 
pohtical space in PRSP countries, thereby fracturing the potential for critique and 
resistance to dominant modes of engagement and pohcyrnaking. 
The Bank and Fund's rationale for the existence of 'neglected stakeholders' is that 
they do not fit Mto the temporal, geographical and methodological frames of 
conventional policyrnaking (IMF and World Bank, 2005: para 70). The 2005 review 
of the process therefore attributes the problem of marginalisation to the fact that 
25 For example, as mentioned earlier, the establishment of the MEJN and its participation in the 
Malawian PRS process was funded primarily by Oxfam International (see section 6.3.1. above). 
26 Although a couple of the larger transnational groups - ActionAid USA and World Vision for 
example (see Rowden and Ocaya-Irama, 2004 and World Vision, 2005) - have been self-reflexive in 
questioning their involvement and their organisational impact on the PRSP framework - other groups 
have been less inclined to critique their activities of the World Bank and IMF and/or unwilling to 
vocalise criticism against the PRSP project for fear of losing fimding (interviews: Alexander, 2004; 
Kessler, 2004; see following section). 
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C J. * - curect engagement of poor people' is more time-consuming than 'existing planning 
cycles allow', that 'empowerment of the most vulnerable members of society is 
fundamentally difficult' and that the 'Powerlessness' of these groups and their lack of 
access to networks, assets and political representation leads to a failure to vocalise 
concerns about the 'policies and actions which will affect thern' (ibid: para 73). 
Preferring to view the participatory process itself as problematic rather than 
symptomatic of such marginalisation, the institutions' recommendation is to widen 
the use of such participatory methods in policy formulation through, for example, 
recommending the 'use of participatory poverty assessments for raising the visibility 
of poor people's views' (ibid). 
However, as highlighted in section 6.2 above, the engagement of marginalised 
communities in such exercises may serve to reinforce the source of domination and 
disempowerment by filtering knowledge about their needs through conventional 
analytical frames rather than using such data to challenge existing structures and 
policies. Analysts of participatory approaches have argued, the underlying power 
dynamics of participatory development processes - either participatory policyrnaking 
or participatory research - more often than not, shape the outcomes of such 
processes. 
Similarly, in the PRSP framework, the needs of 'the poor' and 'local communities' 
who have a stake in the formulation of national and international policies affecting 
their lives and livelihoods are filtered through the PRS process and resistance to 
policies are diffused through first, exclusion of critical voices, and second-, 
negotiation of resistant voices. Often times, the canvassed perspectives of the 'poor' 
are mediated through the agenda 'within which their 'voices' are solicited and 
analysed', an exercise in validation and authentication with wl-lich the respondents 
have 'little or no Mfluence' (Brock et al, 2001: 24). In this case, the usefulness of the 
participatory process is determined by either its value in framing policies which toe 
the line of structural adjustment or in legitimating the status quo. 
This is evidenced in a Bank Board discussion on the Malawian PRSP during which 
an Executive Director questioned the participation of civil society groups, 
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commenting that 'in his experience, participation by civil society usually led to 
gridlock and poor economic policies' and that 'the involvement of civil society in the 
economic policy dialogue did not guarantee that this would lead to sound policies, 
including liberalization in areas such as the tobacco sector' (IDA Memorandum, 20 
September 2002: para 33 & 35). The Executive Director further questioned 'whether 
civil society and NGOs would support further adjustment operations or become a 
deterrence to them' to which Bank staff replied that dialogue with NGOs were 
important and that 'the NGOs needed to be at the table because they also served as a 
conduit for communicating information about government objectives to their 
constituencies' (ibid: para 36). Civil society actors are therefore treated, not so much 
as equal partners in the development process, but as means of securing legitimacy of 
predetermined policies. 
This has been compounded by the proliferation of 'technical assistance' and 'capacity 
building' projects that have accompanied the inception of the PRSP framework 
funded by the World Bank and bilateral donors for participation in PRS processes, 
such as the Poverty Reduction Strategy Trust Fund which disburses grants in support 
of 'any activity that is a country priority for strengthening the formulation or 
implementation of poverty reduction strategies"' (World Bank, 2004h). The 
availability of financing from such sources for engagement With the PRS process has 
encouraged the participation of civil society groups in the PRS process and 
incentivised the legitimation of the framework by such groups. 
While not denying there may be genuine reasons for such support, Katima is 
suspicious of the motives underlying the Bank's financing of CSOs in client 
countries: 'I think it's basically for their own interest, to make sure there is a oup of gr 
civil society that is able to counter the other voices [of opposition]' (interview: 
Kalima, 2004). This is exacerbated by the non-PRS-related funding of CSO activity 
27 The PRSTF is based at the World Bank and supported by contributions from Japan, the 
Netherlands and SwItZerland, for example, and provides grants 'to support activities in all IDA-eligible 
countries ... which are at some stage of preparing or implementing a 
PRSP' (World Bank, 2004h). 
Grants may be disbursed to any 'stakeholder' of the PRS process - government agencies, 
parliamentarians, CSOs, education and research institutions and private sector bodies - and activities 
may include establishing or institutionalising the participatory process, improving poverty diagnostics, 
public expenditure and prioritization of public actions, undertaking Poverty and Social Impact (PSIA) 
analyses, and establishing monitoring and evaluation systems for the PRSP (ibid). 
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by the Bank 28 w ch has made beholden some groups to the Bank. Kahma is 
concerned that such financial incentives may act to censor dissent, especially among 
grassroots organisations: 
I think, in a way, they ate buying out power base. Because the 
moment you go and talk against the policies that the Bank 
and Fund are employing, they won't listen to you ... And they 
ate funding civil society groups that ate very, very progressive 
... which makes it very difficult for them to speak against [the 
Bank] (interview: Kalima, 2004). 
Doug Hellinger, who coordinated the Washington DC end of the Structural 
Adjustment Participatory Review Network (SAPRIN)", is concerned that the Bank is 
increasingly vindicated by the encouragement of NGOs' participation and that 
NGOs have not learnt from the lessons of the SAPRI experience in which the World 
Bank distanced itself from the findings of the research when the results were proving 
to be negative of the Bank's policies: 'SAPRI showed that the Bank is not genuine *in 
its dealings with NGOs. Maybe NGOs should stop asking the Bank to open up the 
space for discussion and expand the Bank's remit' (conversation: Hellinger, 2004). 
This amnesia, compounded by the selective participatory process favouring 
transnational policy advocates, has created schisms within civil society groups, at the 
national and international levels. Where previously, a division had existed between 
service provider NGOs'O and NGO policy advocates, now divisions are entrenched 
between policy advocates who engage with participatory approaches and those who 
do not. There have been schisms, even within the INGOs themselves, with regard to 
participation in the process. Some INGOs, such as ActionAid International, which 
have a decentralised governance structure, have allowed their subsidiaries to decide, 
28 Such as those disbursed under the Bank's Development Grants Facility which supports CSO 
activities directly in different areas through various financing mechanisms Examples include the Small 
Grants Program which supports 'civic engagement activities by local CSC)s which disbursed US$2.5 
million in 2002 (an average of US$4,000 per grant), the Consultative Group to Assist the Poorest 
(CGAP) supporting micro-finance initiatives which disbursed US$7 million in 2002, and the 
Information for Development JnfoDev) which supports 'civil society knowledge management, 
information technology, and internet initiatives around the world'which disbursed US$3.3 million in 
2002 (World Bank, 2005n). 
29 See Chapter Three, section 3.3.3, for details on the SAPRI project. 
30 See Chapter Three, section 5.5 for a fuller elucidation of the role of service delivery NGOs versus 
policy groups vis-A-vis their participation in local policyrnaking. 
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based on local knowledge whether to engage or disengage from the PRS process 
whereas others have maintained a strict line of engagement3l (conversations: 
ActionAid staff member, 2005 & staff member, 2006). 
The conflict which arises from implementation of the participatory process has 
served, in many respects, to divert attention from the substantive aspects of the 
econon-uc programmes associated with the PRSP framework, such as the PRGF. 
More resources are spent on the politics of bargaining and negotiation among CSOs 
on the procedural framework of participation than on critically examining the policy 
prescriptions accompanying the adjustment programmes the PRSPs support, often 
leading to the fragmentation of traditional opposition to such policies. 
6.3-3. The Marginalisation of Indigenous Politics 
One of the most critical effects of the technocratising of strategic economic planning 
characteristic of the PRSP framework has been the increasing marginalisation of 
representative politics in PRSP countries. Almost all studies of PRS processes in a 
range of PRSP countries found that the participatory process has sidelined electoral 
political structures In these countries in favour of the technocratic partnerships 
discussed in the previous section 32 . 
The civil society bias inherent in the discourse and practice of the PRS process, 
compounded by the conservative political climate and historical relationships 
between the executive and external financiers, in many PRSP countries have resulted 
in this bypassing of domestic legislatures M the participatory process. For many 
countries dependent upon external financing, the close relationship between the 
government, notably the finance ministries and central banks, and external financing 
institutions, such as the World Bank and the IMF, is historically constituted. Finance 
ministers haise very closely with Bank and Fund officials in negotiations for loans 
and other development financing and often, have traditionally acted with a great deal 
31 For example, ActionAid Pakistan has disengaged from the process (conversation: Action-Aid staff 
member, 2006). 
32 The aforementioned World Vision report highlighted what it felt to a' 'recurring theme' of its 
country studies which is 'the sidelining of representative democratic institutions, particularly 
parliamentarians' in the PRS processes (World Vision, 2005: 31). Meanwhile, the OED aniIEO had 
also earlier found in their PRSP evaluations that '[t]he involvement of parliaments has been a 
particularly weak aspect of the process in case study countries' (World Bank, 2004k: 11). 
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of discretion and a lack of accountability - both on the part of the government as 
well as on the part of the institutions (interviews: various, 2004-2005). 
Rubber-Stamping Legislatures 
The constitutional realities of many PRSP countries m irror those characteristics 
observed by Gould and Ojanen in Tanzania in which 'formal representative 
democracy is weak' as a result of the 'non-political aid relationship' between the 
executive arm and the financing institutions and the 'de facto one-party rule' (Gould 
and Ojanen, 2005: 54). Eberlei and Hann, for example, note that in the 28 sub- 
Saharan African (SSA) countries documented in their study on parliaments and the 
PRSP process, only in two countries - Ethiopia and Lesotho - is the primacy of 
parliaments over other organs of state constitutionally established while the 
'overwhelming majority' of countries had presidential systems in which the president 
plays a dominant role in policy formulation (Ebetlei and Hann, 2003: 14). 
This legacy has been difficult to shift, even with the inception of a formalised 
participatory framework such as the PRSP". Moreover, it could be argued that the 
PRSP framework has conversely restricted the already limited role of parliaments by 
encouraging the formation of technocratic partnerships between the state, 'civil 
society' and external donors. Studies of participatory processes have revealed that 
most legislatures in PRSP countries do not enter into the process until the latter 
stages of the PRSP formulation and are often merely rubber-stampig what has been 
drafted by the executive and refined in the consultative process with non- 
parliamentary stakeholders. 
There is no formal requirement under the PRSP framework for PRSPs or PRSP- 
related documents to be approved by national legislatures, even though the 
document is aimed at serving as a strategic policy document through which all other 
budgetary decisions will be made. Most policy decisions remain undertaken by 
executive government ministries and monitoring is conducted 
by 'technocratic 
33 For example, Bwalya et al's study of the Malawian and Zambian PRS processes attributed the weak 
involvement of parliaments in the PRSP framework to the 
bistorical subordination of national 
legislatures to the executive branches of government in these countries (Bwalya et al, 2004: 14 - 15; 
21 
- 23; 26 - 
27). 
242 
Chapter Six 
secretanats-, usuafly at the behest of donors' with very little input from or oversight 
by parliaments (World Vision, 2005: 33). 
The Eberlei and Hann research concluded that in most of the SSA PRSP countries 
studied, parliamentary participation has not involved institutional participation by 
legislature but has been largely 'restricted to participation by individual members of 
parliaments in consultation sessions' (Eberlei and Hann, 2003: 9). Even this form of 
participation by parliamentarians has been limited. In Malawi, it was estimated that 
only about a third of MPs took part in district consultations, the primary vehicle for 
parliamentary involvement in the country, in spite of the fact that there were 
upcoming parliamentary elections (Bwalya et al, 2004: 14). The lack of 
parliamentarian presence in local constituencies during this key period suggests the 
disjuncture between the PRS process and local representative politics and between 
the PRSP and domestic contests over resource allocation. 
(1-p A World Bank study of PRSPs and Transitional Results Matrices 'MS)34 found 
that there was only significant parliamentary involvement in the PRSP process *in 
over a quarter of 59 countries surveyed (World Bank, 2005h: iii). Only in Uganda and 
Ghana were there active parliamentary scrutiny 15 of the PRSP and other development 
plans whereas in another 16 countries, parliaments approved a PRSP or a long-term 
development plan or both (ibid: 21). 
In 10 of these 16 countries - Burkina Faso, Dj*ibouti,, Guinea, Honduras, Lao PDR, 
Madagascar, Mauritania, Mozambique, Tajikistan and Timor-Leste - parliaments 
were constitutionally mandated 'to approve national development plans, or in the 
case of many francophone countries, any laws which lay out econorruic and social 
objectives' (ibid). In eight of the 59 countries surveyed - Burundi, Cape Verde, 
Ethiopia, Liberia, Mongolia, Republic of Congo, Vietnam, and Yemen - national 
34 TRMs are integrated planning tools which may act as precursor to PRSPs in low-income countries 
under stress (LICUS) (World Bank, 2005h: iii). TRMs have been launched in five LICUSs - the 
Central African Republic, Haiti, Liberia, Sudan and Timor-Leste (World Bank, 2005h: iii). Haiti 
completed its Interim-PRSP last year and qualified for the HIPC initiative. It is currently undergoing a 
PRSP process. 
35 The Bank considers that there is such substantial parliamentary involvement where parliaments play 
a role in the formulation, implementation and revision of the PRSP and other development plans, 
such as the formation of a special parliamentary committee on poverty reduction in Ghana and the 
participation of the Ugandan parliament in PRS implementation and revision through the preparation 
of the annual budget and other economic planning (World Bank, 2005h: 21). 
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legislatures are 'constitutionally required to approve or make recommendations on 
socioeconomic development plans, but parliament has not yet approved the PRS or 
the TRM' (ibid: 22). In most other countries, parliaments are not constitutionally 
required to approve the PRSP, even if some are mandated to approve other 
development plans, for example in Bolivia". 
However, even where there has been parliamentary participation in the PRS process, 
parliaments played a limited role in the drafting and revision of the policy content of 
PRSPs due to limited capacity and the short legislative time-frame allocated for 
discussion of the PRSP and PRSP-related documents. 
In Ghana, parliamentarians entered into the GPRS process in July 2001, a year after 
the process was officially launched and although parliament had formed a special 
committee in the GPRS and workshops were held to discuss it, the report presented 
by the committee on the draft PRSP 'did not bring about any substantial change in 
the GPRS' as '[m]any parliamentarians had been unable to understand some of the 
technicalities and did not have the resources to elaborate an in-depth assessment' 
(World Bank, 2005k: 60). In Tanzania, parliamentary engagement in the PRSP 
process was limited to parliamentarians' participation in a PRSP seminar in June 
2000, the National Assembly perusing a draft of the document in July 2000 and 
parliamentarians' participation in a consultative workshop on the first PRSP progress 
report in 2001 (Gould and Ojanen, 2005: 55; World Bank, 2005i: 269). 
Bank an d Fun d In volvem en t 
The World Bank and the IMF are becoming increasingly aware of the importance of 
parliamentarians in national development planning, such as the PRSP, particularly in 
securing the consensus and legitimacy necessary for successful implementation of 
policy reforms under financing instruments. Bringing parliamentarians into the 
planning framework of the PRSP also facilitates greater legitimacy for policy reform 
36The Congress has had a limitedimpact on the EBRP formulation process and even though 
parliamentarians had participated in discussions, 'their contribution was largely symbolic in that they 
did not make specific policy proposals' (World Bank, 2005k: para 68). Although the 
Congress is 
constitutionally mandated to examine the Plan General de Desarrollo 
Econdmicoy So, ýial (PGDES), 
Bolivia's indigenous development plan and approve the national budget, it is not required to approve 
the EBRP and has not done so, nor is there parliamentary oversight of the EBRP and implementation 
of other development planning documents (ibid). 
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required as a condition for financing under PRSP-related instruments, such as the 
PRGF and the PRSCs, even though the policy matrices which accompany these 
instruments may, and often do, depart from the policies contained in the PRSPs (see 
section 6.4 below). 
The bio-political power that is exercised by the BWIs over the state apparatus in 
these countries through the executive arm of government (see Chapter Five) is thus 
extended to the legislative arena. The link between the PRSP and budgetary 
processes is considered crucial as most PRSP countries require parliamentary 
approval of budgets. By encouraging parliamentary involvement in the drafting of the 
policies contained in a strategic document such as the PRSP or the MTEF, the Bank 
and Fund hope to inject revenue realism into the process of political bargaining over 
resource mobilisation and public expenditure. 
In other words., the Bank and Fund hope that by enabling parliamentarians to 
participate in the formulation of national strategic plans, these electoral 
representatives may acquiesce to the trade-offs of policy reform contained in the 
financing instruments which purport to provide the funds necessary for delivering 
the aforementioned development strategies. As the Bank contends: 
In countries where external loans must be approved by parliament, 
ensuring that external financial assistance supports country 
development objectives would facilitate parliamentary approval 
(World Bank, 2005h: 21). 
Both the Bank and Fund have now established parliamentary units to facilitate 
dialogue between the Bank and the Fund and parliamentarians 'in client countries,, 
reflecting the increasing importance the Bank and Fund ascribe to parliaments, but 
also as reflecting the pressure that has been placed on the institutions by civil society 
advocates vis-a-vis the need for parliamentary scrutiny of Bank and Fund activities". 
37 See for example the International Parliamentarians Petition JPP), a network established by a group 
of NGOs including the Bretton Woods ProJect, Christian Aid, jubilee Debt Campaign and 
Action 
Aid, to petition for greater parliamentary oversight of Bank and Fund activities in client countries (see 
IPP website: httl2: //xvww. il2j2info. org/index. hLm) (1 March 2007). 
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Although the Bank itself has been involved in work with parliamentarians over the 
years", it has increased its activities in this area as a result of the PRSP initiative. The 
World Bank Institute now organises a 'Parliamentary Strengthening Program' to 
build capacity among client country parliamentarians and to develop the institutional 
capacity of parliaments as a whole, including enabling the capacity of parliaments to 
oversee allocation and use of public funds and to assist parliamentarians M 
representing constituency interests (World Bank, 2005m). 
Once again, the objectives of such capacity building projects are questionable. The 
financial support for parliamentary technical assistance both increases the leverage of 
the BWIs vis-a-vis the governance of client countries while creating another 
mechanism of accountability to donors/ financiers. In some ways, the capacity 
building programmes are little more than an exercise in securing consensus around a 
set of economic policies favoured by the Bank and Fund and to improve fiscal and 
financial oversight of domestic expenditure. 
The World Bank's Development Communications unit cites, for example, a study by 
Campbell-White and Bhatia (1998) listing 'the lack of consensus as one of the top 
five constraints on privatization in Africa' to highlight the importance of strategic 
communication in successful implementation of privatisation reforms mi client 
countries (Cabernero-Verzosa and Nfitchell, 2002: 1). Another Bank handbook, Public 
Communication ProTrams for Pfivahýqhon PrVect. - A Toolkit for Vorld Bank Task Team 
Leaders and Clients, advises Bank staff in borrowing countries to overcome 
parliamentary opposition to privatisation by working with the executive to secure 
parliamentary sympathy with the reforms: 
To achieve timely passage of legislation on privatization, it is 
necessary that the government identify a key group of legislative 
supporters for individual transactions and that tbg be nurtured in a 
systematic and consistent manner. Consensus building and 
38 Such as the establishment of the Parliamentary Network on the World Bank (PNoWB) which is 
now an independent NGO (see PNoWB website: http: //w-vAv. 12nowb. or and the parliamentarians 
section on the Bank website: 
http: //-, veb. worldbank. org/WBSITE/EýXTERN-A, L/E-XTABOUTUS/PARTNERS/E. XTPARLL-ý-\l 
ENT. ARIANS/O,, contentiN, IDK: 20221390-menuPK: 478528-12agePK: 64165880-12iPK: 64165858-tli 
eSitePK: 464534,00. htmi) (1 March 2007) 
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communication mechanisms have to be put in place early on, so that 
key members of the legislature are fully briefed on upcoming 
proposals through institutional channels, are aware of the benefits of 
passage and the costs of Maction, and develop a stake in the success of 
priVatization (World Bank, 2002c: 35, emphasis added). 
Bank and Fund staff often view the lack of parliamentary capacity as stemming from 
limited access to information and/or the incompatibility of information received to 
enable parliamentarians to arrive at consensus for supporting Bank/Fund-prescribed 
policies, including those involving the contentious Washington Consensus-style 
reforms (interviews: Harris, 2005; Plant, 2004 & 2005). It is a well-known fact that in 
most countries, Bank and Fund country office staff often haise with local civil 
servants and the executive in building legislative consensus around an IMF or Bank 
policy reform to be implemented (interviews: Plant, 2004 and various NGOs 
representatives, 2004-05; Afrodad, 2004c: 20). 
In addition to the securing of political consensus - the legitimising of Washington 
Consensus-style structural and macroeconomic reforms - parliaments are also 
deemed a necessary institutional framework for domestic and external accountability 
of donor resources inasmuch as the transnational civil society is. By imbuing in 
parliamentarians a watchdog sensibility M political climates where executive power 
has been traditionally unchecked, the institutions hope to promote parliamentary 
activism by supporting members of parliament in holding the government 
accountable for revenue expenditure. 
In this manner, parliamentarians become as much accountable to the donors as the 
executive is in terms of national development planning and implementation of 
economic plans. At the same time, parliamentary power is kept in check through 
retaining the status quo of exclusivity in the negotiations for financing between the 
executive and the financing institutions. In other words, as we shall see below, while 
parliaments are encouraged to hold governments accountable for the implementation 
of loan policies, the actual policies are still determined by the executive in partnership 
with the IFIs and other donors. 
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6.4. The Globalization of Political Consensus 
The reorganisation of domestic institutional and political structures under the PRSP 
framework is couched in the terminology of 'country ownership', 'participation' and 
poverty reduction' but its operational realities belie its rhetoric for two reasons. 
Firstly, both partic'Patory formulation and civic and parliamentary oversight of the 
PRSP process is moot in the context of wider national development strategies and 
structural reform as the PRSP serves only as a strategic policy document with no 
operationa teeth. The participatory PRS process does little to redress the problem of 
accountability and transparency in domestic policyrnaking, particularly vis-a-vis aid 
and external financing relationships between the PRSP country authorities and 
external donors/ financiers as the substantive conditionalities of financing 
instruments are not openly debated or discussed. 
Secondly, there is a clear disjuncture between the proposals contained in the PRSP 
document - as a national planning document - and the policy prescriptions of these 
financing instruments, such as the LDPs for the Bank and the LOIs for the Fund. 
This dissonance is exacerbated by the fact that the PRSP is essentially a proposal for 
public expenditure and that domestic ownership of such expenditure plans are 
limited by a macroeconomic and structural framework imposed by the Bretton 
Woods Institutions. 
6.4.1. PRSPs and the Lack of Operational Relevance 
In spite of the emphasis on participation and country ownership in the PRSP 
process, it is clear therefore that such participation occurs only within the parameters 
established and approved by the BWIs. While there is increasing civic and political 
participation in domestic policy formulation and decision-making in countries, albeit 
circumscribed, under the PRSP framework, much of the participation is limited to 
formulation of national Planning documents, namely the PRSP and, in a few cases, 
other domestic planning instruments such as the budget and the MTEF. The 
negotiations for external policy documents, such as the LDPs or LOIs and the policy 
matrices which accompany them, remain closed to public and parliamentary 
consultation. 
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Studies indicate that while the PRS process has opened up some scope for political 
participation in PRSP countries, it is only limited to the formulation of a non- 
binding, non-operational documents such as the PRSP or under the participatory 
poverty assessments. The financing conditionalities which bind the government and 
which ultimately, when implemented through national policies, affect the livelihoods 
of citizens in PRSP countries, are subject neither to public not parliamentary debate 
and discussion. 
A 2002 report on the Ugandan PRSP process revealed Ugandan NGOs' concern that 
while all eyes were focused in the PEAP/PRSP and HIPC II processes, no-one was 
cscrutinizing any of the nearly [US]$1 billion in other World Bank loans to the 
Government of Uganda approved since the PEAP process began in 1997' 
(Nyamugasira and Rowden, 2002: 16). The report contends, attaching an annex of 
World Bank loans to Uganda from 1998 - 2001, that between 1998 - 2000, the 
World Bank approved or planned 21 different policy-based or project loans worth 
over us$l,, 085,000,000, of which only US$150 million constituted the PRSC (ibid). 
These negotiations were not designated for public consultations and remained 
'agreements signed between the Government of Uganda and the World Bank outside 
of public view' (ibid). 
While the Bank and the Fund have increasingly liberalised their information 
disclosure policies in recent years, much of the information required by 
parliamentarians, civil society actors and other stakeholders in the PRSP process to 
participate meaningfully in discussions and to contribute to national development 
planning are not disclosed, or if disclosed, are released 'when decisions are fait 
pli, not in draft form or prior to government agreement or World Bank or IMF accom 
Executive Board approval where such information would be useful for public 
debate' (Rowden and Ocaya-Irama, 2004: 11). 
Although draft 1-PRSPs and PRSPs may be circulated to stakeholders prior to 
submission to the Bank and Fund, government-prepared country policy intention 
documents, such as LDPs, LOIs and Memoranda of Economic and Financial Policy 
(MEFP), are usually only made available to the public with the consent of the 
borrowing state after the related loan or credit has been approved by the Bank or 
Fund Executive Boards (World Bank, 2002d: para 22; IMF, undated). 
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Country documents - documents prepared by the Bank and Fund staff in relation to 
support in a particular country - are usually only available after they have been 
finalised by the institutions and approved by the Boards. The Bank does not release 
CASs for IDA countries until they have been discussed by the Executive Directors 
and finalised", neither do they release Programme Documents" for adjustment 
operations until they have been approved by the Executive Board and, in the case of 
non-PRSC lending, after consent has been given by the borrowing state (World 
Bank, 2002d: paras 20 - 21). 
A joMt report by Afrodad and Christian Aid in 2004 concluded that, outside the PRS 
process, there is very little scope within the formal loan cycle of the Bank or the 
Fund for the active participation of parliament or civil society in the content of 
development financing agreements between the state and the IFIs (Afrodad and 
Christian Aid, 2004: 2) 24). In two of the five countries surveyed - Mozambique and 
Tanzania - there is no provision, constitutionally or otherwise, for parliamentary 
approval of a loan agreement or for enactment of the conditions thereof (ibid: Table 
5 and Figure 5). The other three countries - Malawi, Uganda and Zambia - have 
requirements that parliamentary approval is necessary to authorise and ratify loan 
agreements made between the executive and the financing institution but the 
legislatures generally do not have much control over the details of the loans or the 
extent to which the countries are exposed to external debt. 
In Zambia, for example, although the Loans and Guarantees (Authorisation) Act, 
Cap 366 of the Laws of Zambia provides that ceilings on loan borrowings must be 
authorised by the Zambian National Assembly in a statutory instrument, the Act 
gives the Minister of Finance substantial power to borrow within and outside the 
country and 'external loans are not subjected to the scrutiny of Parliament before 
they are obtained nor is the Auditor General supplied with an the loan 
documentation' (Afrodad, 2004e: 13). Moreover, the minister is authorised under 
section 26 of the Act to vary the ceiling on borrowing to raise an urgent loan or 
guarantee when the National Assembly is not M session if it is in the public interest 
and with the approval of the president (ibid). 
39 CASs for non-IDA and non-blend countries are made available only 'at the request of the country 
concerned' after Board discussion and finalisation (World Bank, 2002d: para 8). 
40 Documents setting out a description of the progran-une, 'the Bank's appraisal and assessment of the 
feasibility of, and justification for, the program' (World Bank, 2002d: para 19). 
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In Malawi, although an Act of Parliament is required to authorise external loans and 
ratify loan agreements, the study found that, to date, 'there have been no cases where 
Parliament has not passed a Loan Authorisation Bill'3 partly as a result of the heavily 
partisan nature of the legislature and the lack of parliamentary independence from 
executive influence (Afrodad, 2004a: 16,22). Similarly, while the Ugandan 
Constitution of 1995 decrees that all loans and guarantees must be authorised by an 
Act of Parliament, parliament can delegate authority to the government to enter into 
an agreement for the giving or acquisition of a loan or grant in the public interest 
under section 5 of the Constitution (Afrodad, 2004d: 15). In none of the countries 
surveyed are non-parliamentary stakeholders, such as civil society groups, able to 
participate in discussions for loan agreements, with the executive or in parliamentary 
standing committees although there may be limited access to individual 
parliamentarians. 
Moreover, as discussed in Chapters Four and Five, the principle of 'country 
selectivity' which is increasingly guiding the World Bank's disbursement of financing 
to client countries requires countries to institute institutional and structural reforms 
outside the framework of a formal financing agreement between the state and the 
Bretton Woods institutions. Conformity with such requirements - notably prior 
actions and other exýpost conditionality - entails governments to undertake both 
minor and significant institutional and policy reforms agreed upon between the 
country authorities and the World Bank and/or IMF staff These reforms, unless 
they involve parliamentary approval for legislative changes, are not subject to debate 
or discussion outside executive circles. 
Furthermore, the problem of loan scrutiny may yet be exacerbated by the 
requirements of the mandatory joint Staff Advisory Notes of PRSPs. As discussed in 
Chapters Five and Six, the JSAN dispenses with the need for a 'Washington sign-off 
of a country's PRSP in order for the country to qualify for concessional financing 
from the institutions and shifts the onus onto the country to ensure that any 
structural and macroeconomic weaknesses identified in the JSAN are redressed in 
the country authontles'LDP, LOI or MEFP (see Chapter Five, section 5.4). 
This and the fact that financing conditionality may be used to remedy such identified 
4 weaknesses' in the PRSP moves the venue for policy discussion of substantive 
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economic policies back in the realm of the loan document. This precludes any 
potential for significant domestic input into the policies that will ultimately bind the 
countries and affect citizen and business livelihoods as policies discussed and agreed 
upon the public documentation process of the PRSP framework remains subject to 
substantive revision in the loan policy documents. 
6.4.2. Dissonance between Policiesý Practice and Programmes 
As a result of these operational realities, it is not surprising that, while theoretically, 
policies in the PRSCs and the PRGF, are supposed to be drawn from the countries' 
PRSPs, there is a disjuncture between the PRSPs and the policy matrices of the 
LDPs and LOIs. In particular, while the PRSP framework encourages external Mput 
into policies for revenue expenditure (read: social sector spending), the PRSP 
ftamework appears to have curtailed country autonomy over macroeconomic policy 
and foreclosed public discussion on this issue. 
Various studies, including the OED/IEG and IEO evaluations, have indicated that 
there is very little scope for discussion on macroeconomic policy issues in PRSPs and 
almost none in PRGF policy matrices. The IEO report found that PRS processes in 
the eight countries surveyed" rarely addressed macroeconomic concerns with the 
exception of public expenditure composition and concluded that 'outside the narrow 
official circle', the PRS process 'has had limited impact in generating meaningful 
discussions' of alternative macroeconomic and macro-relevant policy options JMF, 
2004e: 50, para 27). 
Moreover, there is little use of impact assessments, such as the World Bank's Poverty 
and Social Impact Assessments, M the formulation of macroeconomic and structural 
policies under PRSPs although the PRSP initiative was designed to incorporate the 
use of such tools to assist countries and national stakeholders in weighing the trade- 
offs of various policy options and to present alternative macroeconomic policies to 
that of the Washington Consensus (Rowden and Ocaya-Irama, 2004: 36; see also 
UNCTAD, 2002a: 59). 
41 Tanzania, Mauritania, Mozambique, Guinea, Vietnam, Tajikistan, Ethiopia and Cambodia JMT, 
2004c: 51, Box 2-4). 
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There also appears to be little fiscal flexibility in the design of both the 
macroeconomic framework of PRSPs as well as in the PRGFs by country authorities 
and almost no alignment between the macroeconomic content of PRGF 
programmes With PRSPs, even though 'PRGF-supported programs are supposed to 
be embedded in the overall strategy for growth and poverty reduction' 9MF, 2004e: 
72, para 2). While the IEO attributes this to the fact that many of the existing PRGFs 
studied preceded the PRSPs 42 , it concedes that this practice has continued with newly 
negotiated PRGFs in which 'slightly more than half were finalized before the PRSP' 
(ibid: para 3). This not only raised 'doubts about the claim that the program design is 
guided by the PRSP' but also, as the case studies suggested, 'that the reverse 
influence is more common, with key elements of the PRSPs' macroeconomic 
framework drawn from PRGF negotiations (ibid). 
The impact of adherence to the strict macroeconomic policy package of the PRGF 
has had the result of constraining the very autonomy over budgetary expenditure the 
PRSP framework was supposed to confer on PRSP countries and their citizenry. The 
IMF's traditional insistence on countries' adherence to low-inflation targets and low 
budget deficits has lead to strict caps on the countries' public expenditure (for 
example, through ceilings in its MTEF), thereby limiting the government's capacity 
41 to spend on areas of health, education and other public services (Rowden, 2004: 
13). This has constrained the ability of national stakeholders to formulate policy, 
even if the policy space is one confined to budgetary allocations, as expenditure, even 
'pro-poor' expenditure has to be developed within the expenditure ceilings set by the 
IMF. Parliaments in many PRSP countries cannot increase the expenditure ceilings 
beyond those outlined in the countries' MTEFs. 
42 This was a common feature in the first generation of PRGFs whereby the Fund continued to lend 
to countries eligible under the former Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF) without 
enforcing the new procedural requirement of having completed a PRSP or I-PRSP to ensure that 
countries did not have financing disrupted in the changeover (interview: Plant, 2004). 
43 ActionAid USA's report Blocking Prqýgress. - How the FiýhtAgainst HIVI-ArDS is Beiq Undermined by the 
Vorld Bank and the InternationalMonetag Fund contends that this strict adherence to the IMEF's low- 
inflation targets and public expenditure ceilings can result in countries not accepting aid that is 
earmarked for public services even when the resources have been pledged to them (Rowden, 2004). 
The INM's rationale for such budget austerity is based on the idea that the 'rapid inflow of foreign 
exchange associated with the increase in aid receipts can drive up the value of the recipient country)s 
currency', increasing the price of its exports and undermining its competitiveness on the global 
market, an occurrence known as the 'Dutch disease' (Ooms and Schrecker, 2005, p 1821; also 
Rowden, 2004, p 7). 
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Furthermore, as these and other studies have also revealed, there is little to 
distinguish between the policies enshrined in the PRSPs and PRSP-drawn financing 
instruments - PRSCs and the PRGF - and the policies of the old structural 
adjustment loans. The UNCTAD study has questioned the ultimate feasibility of the 
PRSP project in achieving its rhetorical objectives of poverty reduction when country 
authorities remain disciplined by the conditionalities of multilateral lending and debt 
relief. It concluded that for the most part, the newly acquired autonomy of countries 
to design their own economic strategies has been 'circumscribed by the same 
considerations that dominated the structural adjustment programmes over the past 
two decades' (UNCTAD, 2002a: 6; 19). 
Additionally, the report expressed concern that domestic public expenditure patterns 
are being reshaped by PRSP-mandated priorities and that the new focus on social 
sector spending at the expense of capital investment may paradoxically hinder rather 
than help domestic growth and poverty reduction strategies (ibid: 25 - 26). Rather 
than establish a genuinely country-owned economic strategy therefore, the PRSP 
framework has merely served to weave in social safety nets to offset the dislocations 
accompanying conventional stabilisation and adjustment reforms (see ibid: 4). 
The conclusion of the IEO evaluation report summarises the views held by many 
Bank and Fund staff and some Executive Directors when it argues: 
The aun [of the PRSP approach] was to create greater scope for 
country-driven alternatives and investigation of alternative strategies 
by expanding the policy space acceptable to BW17s, especially on issues 
where the evidence on links from policies to growth and poverty 
reduction is not well-established or is likely to depend on 
circumstances in a particular country JMF, 2004e: 107, para 6). 
The process of participation therefore appears to both legitimise the substantive 
policies of the post-Washington Consensus at the same time as it disciplines country 
authorities. The process subjects governments to external scrutiny, ensuring that the 
resources are managed in a manner consistent with the objectives of the BWIs by 
prioritising social sector expenditure while prohibiting discussion on 
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macroeconornics. This creates a public space for participation and subjects the state 
to additional scrutiny by its own domestic constituencies and at the same time 
making sure that the domestic constituency, as remapped by the BWIs, police their 
own resource allocations. 
6.5. Conclusion 
The participatory process of the PRSP framework has sigi-lificantly redrawn the 
political landscape in many Bank and Fund client states and this reorganisation of 
domestic political institutions under the PRSP framework has fundamentally altered 
the manner in which the state is made accountable, not necessarily however to its 
own citizens. Specifical1y, the process has subjected the state to greater external 
scrutiny, not just of its economic policies but of its practice of governance itself, and 
hence, increases its exposure to greater external remedial action, notably to the 
interventions of external donors seeking to mediate the development of domestic 
political franchise. 
The conceptual underpinnings of 'participation' under the PRSP process is therefore 
the assumption, as that of the good governance reforms, of a dichotomy between 
state and civil society and the binary opposites of what each represents vis-a-vis 
governance and development in developing countries. At the same time, this self- 
assumed, self-validating 'mediating role' of external donors between 'civil society and 
national governments' weakens the influence of endogenous groups in national 
policy formulation and national accountability processes in favour of such external 
oversight (Chavez Malaluan and Guttal, 2003: 10). 
onsequently, the PRSP framework exerts disciplinary power over country 
authorities by subjecting them to a paradoxical relationship of oversight and 
partnership with non-state actors, notably transnational civil society organisations, 
who translate the language of the post-Washington Consensus in both directions. 
The state is scrutinised yet legitimised in this exercise of consultation. 
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Legitimacy in this form of participation is derived in two ways. Firstly, at the 
local/national level, consensus has been massaged to lend credence to the 
substantive policies 'populist neohberahsm' (Gould and Ojanen, 2005) - by 
appropriating the space for representative democracy and replacing it with 
consultative-partnership politics. Secondly, at the metropole level of the 
donor/financier agencies, the practice of participation and the discourse which 
accompanies it provides a feedback loop to justify aid expenditure and legitimises the 
role of the World Bank and the 1MF to the electoral constituencies who have a stake 
in the foreign policy budgets of the financier countries. 
Further legitimacy for the project of post-adjustment reforms is correspondingly 
secured through the nexus between the transnational policy elite - the INGOs and 
expatriate policy advocates from the episternic community for example - and the 
local constituencies of the BWIs and its major shareholders. The G8 countries can 
and will draw upon the PRSP policy of engagement and stakeholder participation as 
a means to justify continued foreign policy expenditure in low-income countries. 
Further discipline is then exerted by subjecting such 'ownership' and 'partnership' 
mechanisms to the omniscient policies of macroeconomic and structural adjustment 
as negotiated between the state and the BWIs. 
This reorganisation of domestic political space has been critical given the geo- 
strategic imperatives underpinning the introduction of the PRSP approach. As 
highlighted in Chapter Three, the merging strategic interests of the bloc of 
developing states and transnational social movements, led by a cadre of highly 
specialised NGO technocrats, in the late 1990s had created a powerful wave of 
resistance to the systemic inequities of the international economic architecture. 
The PRSP framework can therefore be viewed as a means of incentivising the 
continued participation of southern states, notably those indebted, structurally 
adjusted states, in the global economic order and of managing their integration into 
the international system. At the same time, the project fractures the resistance to 
such integration through reorganising the means through which the state encounters 
and engages with its domestic constituents and transnational actors within its 
territory and influence. 
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In this manner, the PRSP framework resonates with not only the 'civilizing mission' 
of the pre-colonial and colonial period, but also with the technologies of colonial 
management which sustained this mission. For Pahuja, the colonial continuity within 
international economic governance today is manifested in the quelling of what Guha 
(1998) terms as 'the prose of counter insurgency' through which popular protests to 
SAPs are delegitimised through the exclusion of 'the masses, or the subaltern in 
crucial issues of governance' (Pahuja, 2004: 171 - 172). The 'potential for disruption' 
is therefore contained in a similar vein to the suppression, in anti-colonial struggles, 
of voices other than those of 'the indigenous elite who had largely adopted the 
epistemology of the coloniser' (Pahuja, 2004: 172, relying on Guha, 1998). 
Taking Pahuja's analysis a step further, I argue that the PRSP framework goes further 
by attempts to appropriate this 'prose of counter insurgency' for its own ends rather 
than dispelling it. By formalising institutions - the PRS process - through which 
dissent from the policies of government may be represented and where protest may 
be legitimised, the PRSP framework turns resistance on its head. 'Participation' in 
governance structures thus becomes a form of resolving the social and economic 
dislocations of neoliberal economic globalization so that dissent from the economic 
policies of SAP financing operations is confined and diffused. 
Confinement of emancipatory politics within the territorial boundaries of a nation 
state-, and within it., the geographical boundaries of the district and the viUages, not 
only problematises the state - the inefficient, predatory state (see Santos, 2006: 43) - 
but also creates a cartography of Impoverishment which locahses poverty to create a 
disempowering counter-discourse. Reducing economic marginahsation and social 
inequity to the lowest territorial denominator not only distorts the magnitude of the 
problem, it also minimises the potential for social dislocation and political change. 
Cameron and Palan, critics of New Labour's urban regeneration policies in the UK, 
have contended that 'by suggesting that the local scale is the most salient and, *in 
practice, the only scale at which social exclusion ought to be tackled, the possibilities 
for intervention in poverty are similarly restricted' (Cameron and Palan, 2004: 142 - 
143). Similarly, the localisation of poverty in the PRSP process envisages the 
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localisation of anti-poverty politics and policies, disregarding the impacts of external 
economic pressures. 
At the same time, the process legitimises these policy interventions inasmuch as they 
legitin-iise the institutional presence of the BWIs and bilateral donors in the country. 
This not only confines the disruption of resistance to the current international 
economic order, but also the notion of politics and political franchise within the 
territorial bounds of the nation state, thus fracturing the global resistance to 
hegemonic global practices and policies of neoliberal globalization. Whether the 
global powers have been successful in quelling this resistance remains to be seen, in 
particular, the question remains if such technocratic solutions are sufficient to 
suppress the percolating 'globalization from below' in the next round of global 
economic crises, an issue I will consider briefly M the following chapter. 
This chapter and the previous chapter has demonstrated the shift 'in the modalities of 
control over developing countries exerted at the level of the global governance 
institutions, namely the World Bank and the IMF, and bilaterally, through donor 
financing aligned with the PRSP framework. The operational reforms of the PRSP 
framework therefore are evidence of a larger shift in the modalities of power at the 
very high levels of inter-state governance. This power is premised on the restoration 
of 'agency' to the actors in the process and the contract that such 'agency' is not 
'abused' by the persons to whom it is conferred. These shifts have significant 
implications on the construction of global polity and will be explored as we tie the 
discussions together M the following concluding chapter. 
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Chapter Seven: 
Consolidation and Conclusion 
the trageývfor the Third Worl 9m d is that the mechanisms used b inte alional law to achieve 
decoloni5, xafion also were the mecbanisms that created neocolonialism and that, jurtbermore, the lqal 
structures , ideologies andjufiýbrudenfial techniquesforfurthenhw neocolonialism largeyl were in 
place before Third- Wlorld states actually, attained independence' 
-Anthony Anghie, 2002: 627 - 
The Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper framework currently forms the basis for 
policy dialogue and aid negotiations for 64 developing countries. While originally 
intended as a multi-stakeholder harmonisation instrument for external financiers with 
broad-based participation, the initiative has remained primarily driven by the Bretton 
Woods institutions, their staff and major shareholders. The PRSP framework has not 
only altered the nature of these countries' relationship with development financiers, 
but also the terms of their engagement with external economic forces. 
The impact of the PRSP framework on international economic relations and, 
consequently, on the constitution of global economic governance has been 
significant. A historical reading of the PRSP framework; its situation within a 
continuum of political events and policy narratives in the period immediately 
preceding its inception; and its contextualisation within the legacy of postcolonial 
economic relations enables us to ascribe the framework with wider economic and 
geo-political significance beyond its immediacy as an instrument for aid 
disbursement 
This thesis has demonstrated how the PRSP framework has changed the regulatory 
landscape of international development financing and how these changes have 
reconfigured the internal and external political dynamics of countries subject to its 
interventions. It has also analysed how the reorganisation of domestic drivers of 
countries' policymaking processes and institutions under the PRSP project have 
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served to mediate these countries' encounter with the international financial and 
trade system and the international law underwriting such engagement 
In this concluding chapter, I seek to consolidate the findings of the preceding 
chapters in the context of the PRSP framework's disciplinary impact on the third 
world states it regulates. Accordingly, I seek here to locate the PRSP project within 
wider shifts in the configuration of global power and examine what these changes 
mean in the wider context of global economic governance. In particular, I examine 
how the reforms of the PRSP framework may have served to foreclose the 
possibilities for a radical revision of asymmetries of current rules and institutions of 
international economic law but yet, how an understanding of the forms of power 
which underlie this circumscription may, paradoxically, serve as opportunities for 
negating this foreclosure. 
A New Global Compact 
At the outset, this research posed two related questions: (1) does the PRSP approach 
to development financing constitute a departure from the existing modalities and 
regulatory norms of international development financing? and (2) if the PRSP 
approach does constitute a departure from existing modalities and norms, what are 
the implications of this shift on the constitution of global economic governance and 
international law ? 
This thesis surmises that the PRSP approach constitutes botb a de a urefro and a P IY m 
restatement of existing modalities of financing and existing legal and political 
framework of international development financing. This is measured against the 
conceptual framework of the 'new architecture of aid' on which the PRSP initiative is 
based as well as the policies and programmes through which this conceptual 
framework is operationalised, that is through a) the PRSP process itself; b) the policy 
instruments the PRSP underpins, such as the Country Assistance Strategy and 
Medium Term Expenditure Framework; and c) the financing instruments the PRSP 
informs, such as Poverty Reduction Strategy Credits and the Poverty Reduction and 
Growth Facility. 
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An examination of these processes and instruments demonstrates that in spite of 
rhetoric to the contrary, the new framework for regulating aid flows has not 
redressed the democratic deficit of previous modalities of development financing. 
Instead, where there has been a change in the process of accessing official 
development financing, there has been little traction on reforming the substance of 
development financing, notably the attached economic policy conditions, and these 
shifts in the procedural aspects of financing have correspondingly reinforced rather 
than ret4sed the nature of substantive negotiations between client states and their 
external financiers (see Chapters Four, Five and Six). 
At the same time, the changes to the framework of aid relations and the operational 
policies of official development financing have impacted on the constitution of 
global economic governance, specifically third world engagement in the processes 
and outcomes of international economic relations. This is demonstrated through an 
analysis of the PRSP framework's impact on the modalities of regulating state access 
to development financing, notably through its effect on the 'instrument of 
conditionality (see Chapter Four) and the impact of internal interventions of the PRS 
process on states' relationships with their external financiers (see Chapters Five and 
six). 
Accordingly, this thesis has shown that while there are significant processual. shifts in 
the modalities of the 'new architecture of aid', the substance of this new framework 
for disbursing financial assistance to low-income countries remains driven by both 
the bureaucratic imperatives of the Bank and the Fund and, more importantly, the 
geo-political and economic agenda of their major shareholders. The centrality of the 
BWIs to the mobilisation of external resources for postcolonial states, especially 
since the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in the 1970s and the debt crisis of 
the 1980s, has served to establish them as key institutions for managing the third 
world's relations with the exterior (see Chapter Two), and consequently, as pivotal 
institutions for managing the crisis of legitimacy in the late 1990s which precipitated Cý C. Do 
the PRSP framework (see Chapter Three). 
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The PRSP framework, as a subset of the wider post-Washington Consensus 
pohcymaking agenda, may be viewed as a means of the quelling potentially insurgent 
nation states in the south in the face of the global loss of faith in the neoliberal global 
economy and reinscribing the discipline that its predecessor framework, structural 
adjustment, was failing to establish in the face of mounting dissonance in the 
international political economy at the time (see Chapter Three). Encapsulating the 
post-Washington Consensus' core of 'anti politics' by substituting 'the politics of 
procedure for the politics of bargaining' Gayasuriya, 2001b: 1), PRSPs therefore 
represent a conceptual departure from structural adjustment programmes in three 
critical areas: the constituents of domestic policyrnaking, external political barter and 
the regulation of access to capital (see Chapter Three). 
This is facilitated through a reorganisation of a) the modalities of regulating states' 
access to international development finance and b) the extensive reforms wrought by 
the PRSP framework on the internal constitution of the recipient states, with the 
reorganisation of such structures predicated upon the imperative to enforce 
compliance with a set of policy and regulatory prescriptions that sustain rather than 
subvert the status quo of economic globalization and geo-political landscape of the 
postcolonial period (see Chapters Four, Five and Six). The process of universalising 
national economic planning - setting uniform 'development' targets and common 
prioritisation of public policy - and globahzing bureaucratic and political structures - 
establishing a template for public participatory pohcymaking and intra-governmental 
policy dialogue - creates a framework which punishes non-conformity with pre- 
established norms (see Chapters Five and Six). States which fail to play by the rules 
are excluded, not by coercion but through evaluation of their willingness to be 
subjected to these 'universal' values and objectives of state-society organisation (ibid). 
This thesis has thus attempted to demonstrate that the conceptual and operational 
premise of the PRSP framework responds not only to a geo-strategic urgency to 
reassert the hegemony of the northern states who underwrite the rules of multilateral 
engagement in the face of resistance, but also an imperative to secure legitimacy for 
the reformulated rules of engagement (see Chapters Two and Three). The modalities 
of the regulatory discipline ascribed through the PRSP framework therefore establish 
new modalities of control, representing the shifting manifestations of power in the 
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new international political economy. Specifically, this thesis has shown how the 
PRSP framework exemplifies the transition from what Foucault terms a 'disciplinary 
society' to that of a 'society of control' (see Chapters Four and Five; section 7.4 
below). 
The response of the aforementioned crisis of legitimacy is therefore not one 
predicated upon the revision of international economic law and the purging of its 
asymmetries, but one that revises state engagement with international law and the 
political economy which sustains it. Correspondingly, the response of the PRSP 
framework to the social and economic marginalisation of states and communities 
resultant from neoliberal globalization underwritten by the rules of international 
trade and finance is not one of international redistributive justice not one of 
reparational justice but one of bilateral and financial mediation on the terms establisbed 
by the begemon states. The pivoting of all discourse of social and economic exclusion on 
the issue of 'aid' and the merit of countries to receive 'aid' subverts the real and 
persistent causes of such marginalisation in the global economy. 
In light of the analyses of the conceptual and operational framework of the PRSP, it 
is possible to conclude that the PRSP framework impacts upon the constitution of 
international law and governance by establishing a new regulatory framework that 
restructures fundamental relationships between actors, states and institutions in the 
area of development financing policy and practice. The constituents of this new 
regulatory mechanism are reflective of the emerging manifestations of global 
disciplinary power, representing both a continuation and an exacerbation of the 
asymmetrical sovereignty characterising postcolonial international law and 
international relations and the imperial nature of the 'development project' which has 
so far sustained the logic of these asymmetrical relationships between the 'core' and 
peripheral states of the global economy. 
7.2. A New Regulatory Project 
One of the explicit objectives of the PRSP framework is to provide 'a vehicle for 
better aid coordination', envisioning 'that the PRSP wifl be the primary instrument by 
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which a country articulates a strategy around which external development partners 
could align their own programs of support' (IDA, 2002: 11 - 12). In other words, the 
PRSP approach seeks to harmonise the fragmented regulatory webs involved in the 
negotiation, evaluation and disbursement of officlal development financing. 
This globalization of aid relations follows on from the rapid globalization of 
regulation in areas of trade and commercial finance which has taken place in the 
world economy over the past three decades. The PRSP framework and its attendant 
processes of aid harmonisation and donor coordination therefore exemplifies, 
inasmuch as it intensifies, the globalization of policyrnaking and regulatory norm 
setting characterising international law and governance today. 
a) A Global Administrative Space 
This new regulatory framework deviates from pre-existing structures of global 
governance in two fundamental respects. Firstly, it reconfigures the 'internal dynan-nics 
of relationships between the states subject to regulation and the exterior, and by 
doing so, introduces (and universalises) new structural norms into economic 
regulation through development financing. The agenda for norm-brokerage in this 
new configuration depends less on the establishment of coercive rules and principles 
for engagement and more on the discretionary application of 'voluntary' accession to 
the discipline. This is demonstrated, for example, in the movement away from norms 
to processes in the global economic regulation, such as the shift away from the use of 
ex-ante conditionalities in development financing agreements to a reliance on ex-post 
conditionalities (see Chapter Four), and in the shift towards using 'incentives as 
instruments for disciplinary control (see Chapters Four and Five). 
Here, the terms of access to development financing and the rules by which states in 
receipt of it are governed have therefore evolved to incorporate notJust the adoption 
of substantive conditions - that is, the economic (and to a limited extent, 
governance) policy reforms of the accompanying adjustment or stabilisation 
programme - but also the implementation of processual conditions - such as the 
institution of consultative decision-making mechanisms - as a criteria for accessing 
financial resources. The construction of the relationship between the parties to the 
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financing assumes a more globalized form, undertaken under the tutelage and 
management of the BWIs and facilitated by the expansion in their discretionary 
powers (see Chapter Four). 
Correspondingly, the effect of a globalized system of Policymaking, universalised 
across a diverse range of third world states, is the systematic insertion of domestic 
state structures into the larger global regulatory order, ceding not only significant 
internal rulemaking and norm-brokerage to the 'international community' - 
represented here by the administrative capacity of the BWls - but also the related 
implementation and adjudication functions as well. 
The internationalisation of these institutions under the PRSP framework is therefore 
contributing to the emergence of what some scholars term a 'global administrative 
space' - the increasing inseparability between global and national regulatory space In 
which substantive and procedural norms established the global level, supplemented 
by webs of unifying national regulation and global coordination are 'penetrating 
deeply into domestic regulatory programs and decisions' (Kingsbury, Krisch and 
Stewart, 2005: 25 - 26). In this emerging form of transnational regulation, much of 
the specifities and implementation of norms is determined by 'transnational 
administrative bodies', including organisations such as the World Bank and the IMF, 
which 'perform administrative functions but are not directly subject to control by 
national governments or domestic legal systems' (ibid: 16). 
The cessation of national control over crucial aspects of norm creation, enforcement 
and adjudication, including the dispensation with domestic ratification of externally 
negotiated rules, is a hallmark of this global administrative plane (ibid: 25 - 26; 
Krisch and Kingsbury, 2006: 3- 4). According to Kingsbury et al: 
The rise of regulatory programs at the global level and their infusion 
into domestic counterparts means that the decisions of domestic 
administrators are increasingly constrained by substantive and 
procedural norms established at the global level; the formal need for 
domestic implementation thus no longer provides for meaningful 
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independence of the domestic from the international tealm 
(Kingsbury et al, 2005: 26). 
However, the increasing enmeshment of local and global regulatory structures have 
differing impacts on the third world than on the industrialised states which control 
the international institutions forming part of this global administrative space. As 
Chimni has argued, the significance of this regulatory network of international 
institutions for third world states today is that, together, this network, 'has been 
established or repositioned, at the initiative of the first world and together, they 
constitute a nascent global state whose function is to realize the interests of 
transnational capital and powerful states in the international system to the 
disadvantage of third world states and peoples', resulting In an 'evolving global state 
formation' which is 'im petial in character' (Chimni, 2004: 1- 2). The PRSP framework 
may thus be regarded as part of this emerging 'global state', regulated through the 
new technologies of power discussed in section 7.4 below. 
b) Discursive Discipline 
The second characteristic of the new regulatory framework established by the PRSP 
framework is the significant -restructuring of the 
discourse of development and there 
is evidence of a mutually reinforcing relationship between the structural regulatory 
force of the PRSP framework and its discursive power. The concepts that are 
problen-latised by the PRSP project, namely popedg reduction, participation and national 
ownersbo, are constituted as new areas of regulation through dynamics of power and 
influence that underlie the formulation of this initiative. 
Thus ramework from an analysis of an , in addition to approaching the 
PRSP f 
institutional process, the initiative may be viewed as a textual foundation of 
knowledge production with the discourse of the PRSP process and its associated 
regulatory instruments ascribed with meanings and representations that support the 
constellations of power which inhabit the process. Here, Foucault's theory of 
discourse politics - the creation and enforcement of norms through the construction 
of specific discursive relationships (see Chapter One, section 1.3) - assists us 
in 
understanding how the formation of the rules of knowledge about particular objects 
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reproduce the relationships of power under which they emerged and under whose 
authority these objects were characterised and classified OFoucault, 1972: 40 - 47; 
also 1991: 336 - 337). 
In this respect, the implications of the PRSP project extend beyond the policy and 
institutional incorporation of resistance to encompass a much wider range of cause 
and effect to include the production and dissemination of discourses on 
'development' and constructions of 'poverty'. The language of the PRSP framework 
has important resonance in movements for social and economic justice but equally, 
and somewhat conversely, it also shapes the debate about the nature of international 
economic relations and represents the narratives that have gained currency *in the 
context of these relationships due to the hegemony of the actors who underwrite 
their emergence. 
This ancillary process of knowledge production has, once again, created a universal 
framework through which knowledge about heterogeneous cultures, and socio- 
political and economic organisation has been collected, filtered and disseminated, 
establishing a frame of reference which disciplines through marginalisation and 
exclusion of those which fall outside these received identities. 
The implications of this on the wider global regulatory structures and networks are 
significant. Specifically, conceptualising 'poverty reduction' as a priority policy 
intervention and 'ownership' as a political pro)ect forecloses negotiations for the 
reform of the rules of international trade and finance that facilitate the exploitative 
relationships underlying the impoverishment and human dislocations in PRSP 
countries. 
The emphasis on developing and fulfilling priorities established in conforrmity with 
the parameters set by the PRSP framework - and within the qualified notions of 
'poverty reduction', 'participation' and 'ownership' - thus shifts the debate away 
from the international arena and places the burden of meeting the challenge of social 
and economic developmental objectives on national governments. It is the nation 
state - the structurally adjusted, indebted, aid dependant state - that now bears the 
primary responsibility for ensuring that the communally-ascribed MDGs are met 
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through a further programme of structural adjustment (now renamed 'development 
policy' operations), foreclosing debate on issues of international econonuic Justice, 
redistribution and communal responsibility for the provision and protection of 
public goods (see following section). 
Once again, the logic which sustains these interventions is that of the 'dynamic of 
difference' discussed in Chapter Two. Prevailing discursive representations of third 
world states, particularly of low-income, highly indebted countries, as incapacitated 
states requiring assistance from the 'international' community to enable growth and 
development maintains the legitimacy of the BWIs in determining for these states, 
the appropriate terms of their engagement with the international community. The 
states' acquiescence to such interventions reflects the asymmetrical sovereignty which 
characterises postcolonial international law (see Chapter Two, section 2.1). 
In this manner, where the operational dimensions of this new regulatory project acts 
as the 'mechanism of restraint' under Stephen Gill's conceptualisation of a 'new 
constitutionalism', the disciplinary power of the discourse associated with the PRSP 
project serves as a 'mechanism of incorporation' (Gill, 2000; see section 7.4 below). 
The production and dissennnation of key concepts shape the debate about the nature 
of the international economic order and structure the terrain of knowledge on the 
modalities of state engagement with the international economy, impacting 
significantly, as we shall see in the following section, on third world state engagement 
with it and with international economic law. 
7.3. Foreclosing International Reform 
One of the most important consequences of the new regulatory project forwarded by 
the PRSP framework has been its effect in foreclosing the possibilities for a radical 
revision of the rules and institutions of international economic law. The PRSP 
project does so by reframing fundamental tenets of international cooperation and 
global communal responsibility. In the PRSP discourse, the challenges of meeting 
developmental objectives and overcoming socio-economic exclusion in the 
globalized, interdependent era - both of nation states and communities within them 
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- reside in the reconstruction of the state apparatus and not in the stenu-ning of the 
currents of neoliberal globalization through international mechanisms and resolution 
of structural iniquities at the global level 
This is achieved through: a) the discounting of the role of the 'international' in the 
resolution of social and economic exclusion within states, particularly developing 
states in the south subject to the torrents of globalized neoliberalism. and b) rupturing 
communal struggles to the forces of international impoverishment calling for a 
revisiting and revising of the rules of the international economy through the 
incentive of individual engagement. 
7.3.1. Problematising the State 
The mode of engagement prescribed by the PRSP framework is one that transfers to 
the affected state autonomy over, but correspondingly, res ponsibilio for state interaction 
with and commitment to the norms, legal or otherwise, of theinternational economy. 
The effects of the state's wilful entry into the international market and the rules 
which govern it are correspondingly borne by the state with assistance from the 
'international' community to mitigate the dislocations of adjustment. 
Correspondingly, redistributive justice under the PRSP framework takes place in the 
domestic sphere, not the international, if at all. 
'Poverty' in PRSP countries is less tooted in the 'international' than in the 'national% 
caused primarily not from the lack of financial resources caused by the iniquities of 
current rules of global trade and finance but by a) states' incapacity to generate or 
absorb financial resources due to inappropriate fiscal, monetary or structural 
economic policy choices; and b) states' inability or disinclination to utilise resources 
generated in a productive and redistributive manner (see Chapter Five). The failure 
of structural adjustment policies in these countries, leading to social and economic 
dislocations, has more to do with 'policy slippages' and not 'policy design' 
(UNCTAD, 2002a: 5). 
The state is thus problematised in the context of 'poverty reduction' and 
'development' - the inability to reap the benefits of globalization or to effectively 
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utilise 'aid' allocated is attributed to the 'inefficient' and 'predatory' state and the 
incapacity of the state to organise domestic econornic functions and enrol sufficient 
domestic political support to legitiiýise its strategic role in the economy. The 
function of the PRS process is thus to rehabilitate the state's prescriptive and 
regulative capacity to enable better organised strategic development planning and to 
institutionalise non-state (read: civil society) oversight capacity to enable greater state 
transparency and accountability for resources generated, accumulated and distributed 
(see Chapters Five and Six). 
The nation state that is reconstituted under this framework is therefore one that is 
facilitative of the project of global neoliberalism and northern corporatism, 
rehabilitated through a series of institutional interventions of the PRSP framework. 
Such an assignment of responsibility, predicated upon the unquestioning acceptance 
of the status quo of economic globalization processes, obfuscates the role of the 
international community in securing economic justice for economically marginalised 
nation states and their impoverished constituencies. 
Consequently, the focus of the PRSP framework has consistently centred upon the 
necessity of PRSP countries to develop a coherent programme of social sector 
expenditures to meet its international development targets without corresponding 
consideration of the underlying policy design of national economic strategies and the 
interaction between these strategies and the global economy (see Chapter Five). The 
onus is therefore on specific countries to prove their capacity to absorb the financing 
bequeathed to them by the northern states and demonstrate the institutional 
discipline necessary to utilise the resources (ibid). 
7.3.2. The Nation State as a Site of Political Struggle and Redistribution 
It follows from the problematising of the state in economic development under the 
PRSP approach that the national sphere has also been constituted as the primary site 
for any contestation over the resource allocation and redistribution and the state 
correspondingly ascribed with the primary duty to discharge the social and economic 
challenges ascribed internationally, such as the Millennium Development Goals. 
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The institution of a mandatory participatory policyrnaking process under the PRSP 
framework, while enabling a degree of domestic political franchise by opening up 
hitherto inaccessible spaces for citizenry engagement in national decision-making 
processes, diverts collective struggle away from the international towards the 
national. Discontent resulting from the social and economic dislocations of structural 
adjustment and integration into an uneven international trade and finance playing 
field by individual countries is now refocused on the individual state and not the 
community of nations. 
The emphasis In the PRSP framework of 'priority public actions' and the linking of 
state economic resources to clear, targeted and accountable public expenditure In 
social sectors may result in more transparent resource allocation but it also places the 
responsibility of providing public goods onto national governments. This diffuses 
dissent to the inequality of current global economic structures and the injustices of 
global policy decisions by refocusing the debate away from the resource constraints 
third world states face as a result of external pressures towards one centred on how 
states can best allocate limited resources to meet developmental challenges. 
Furthermore, the access to political structures and limited possibilities for 
engagement M national strategic planning via participatory processes in individual 
countries have the effect of fracturing globalized resistance, either in the form of 
mass citizenry mobilisations or global civil society cooperation. The reconfiguration 
of the political space in PRSP countries legitimises the process of the PRSP 
framework, through the restructuring of social relations between state and non-state 
actors and external financiers, as well as conferring credibility on the substantive 
content of the resultant social and economic policies, even as it fails to reform the 
existing policy and practice of development financing. 
Moreover, the emphasis on 'poverty reduction' as priority governmental action 
subverts the principle of 'development' encompassing calls for fairer rules in the 
international economic order to facilitate such growth (see following section). It does 
not address the asymmetries which prevent countries' attainment of ftffler economic 
and social objectives. For example, the redress of declining terms of trade 
for 
commodity-dependent states in the south as a result of continuing depreciation of 
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prices for primary commodities, the tariff escalation rules in multilateral trade law 
and the intransigence of northern policies on agricultural subsidies. Gore, for 
example, notes that '[t]he key missing link in the current international approach to 
poverty reduction is the absence of any kind of international commodity policy', a 
key international instrument for redressing the social and economic impoverishment 
of many low-income states and communities (Gore, 2003: 125). 
7.3.3. Subverting the 'Right to Development, 
The assignment of responsibility for addressing developmental challenges to 
individual nation states is not exclusive to the PRSP framework. It reflects the 
conceptual framework that has consistently guided official aid flows from northern 
to southern states in the postcolonial period which have sought to resist the 
incorporation of any language of redistribution or Universal collective responsibility 
in the area of social and econornic cooperation in bilateral and multilateral financing 
relationships. 
The circumscription of the role of the international community, particularly that of 
the northern states and northern capital which represent the principal beneficiaries of 
the current international economic order, in any normative framework for 
international development has been a significant feature of all international 
negotiations In the area of trade, finance and development cooperation since the 
collapse of the third world movement for a New International Economic Order in 
the 1970s and 1980s and the gradual erosion of the UNCTAD mandate in the 
structural adjustment eral. 
The refusal of western states to acknowledge collective responsibility for the 
condition of third world states and to accept complicity in their social and economic 
marginalisation from the international economic order was evidenced by the north- 
south split' In the voting patterns for the UN Declaration on the Right to 
1 See discussion in Chapter Two, section 2.2 and Chapter Three, section 3.2. 
2While eight developed countries voted for the declaration with eight others abstaining (out of a 
combined total of 146 votes in favour), this number was almost reversed in the subsequent resolution 
for a plan of action calling for a binding resolution of the debt burden, the elimination of protectionist 
trade policies in the north and the increase in official development financing withl 1 developed 
countries voting against the resolution (ibid: 8- 9). 
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Development in 1986. The Declaration, championed by the Group of 77 
developing states stressed 'the collective obligation of all states to create a just and 
equitable international environment for the realisation of the right to development' 
and emphasised 'a collective duty of all states to eliminate barriers, such as unfair 
trade rules and the debt burden' (Nyarnu-Musernbi and Cornwall, 2002: 8). 
The most heavily contested elements of the declaration involved questions on the 
nature of the right to development, specifically the assignment of rights and duties, 
and the balance between the national and international characteristics of these rights 
and duties. For southern governments, the 'right to development' is international In 
character and the responsibility for realising such a right 'cannot remain at the 
national level' as 'globahsation, international trade, foreign domestic economic 
policies, foreign debt and intellectual property rights constrain national development 
efforts' (Piron, 2002: 18 - 19). The 'right to development' therefore encompasses a 
revision of the rules of international trade and finance to enable greater participation 
and control of developing countries in the global economy, including but not 
exclusive to the establishment of international mechanisms to implement the 
principles of the 1986 Declaration (ibid). Specifically, the southern states have argued 
that this right 'cannot be reduced to international development assistance, nor to 
national eradication programmes' (ibid). 
In contrast, contemporary interpretations of the 'right to development' by northern 
states are based on the 'partnership' model which underpins the PRSP framework - 
'one based on shared responsibilities and mutual commitments between developed 
and developing countries and international organisations' (ibid: 5). In particular, 
northern governments do not recognise the provisions of the 1986 Declaration as 
forming part of customary human rights law not forming a normative basis for their 
aid financing, external trade and foreign policies vis-a-vis developing states. Instead, 
these governments have generally interpreted the 'right to development' as a right of 
individuals against states, notably the right of citizens M developing countries against 
their own states, and not a right exercised by states against other states. While 
recognising the international dimension of the' right to development', northern 
governments have argued that it is states which 'have primary responsibility for the 
realising of the [right to development]' (ibid: 18) and that such 'assistance is based on 
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a moral - not legal - obligation to alleviate poverty' (Nyatnu-Musembi and Cornwall, 
2002: 9; Piton, 2002)'. 
Consequently, all subsequent international negotiations on social and economic 
cooperation have been couched along the lines of the new language of 'Partnership' 
and 'poverty reduction' in contrast to the call for international cooperation and 
redistributive justice that underpinned third world calls for an NIEO. just as the 
Millennium Declaration which gave birth to the MDGs focused on individual state 
responsibility to meet '111ternationally-agreed' developmental objectives, the 
Monterrey Consensus adopted at the 2002 UN Financing for Development (FFD) 
Conference focused on the responsibility of the international community to mobilise 
and increase the effective use of national and international financial resources to 
achieve these objectives (Monterrey Consensus, 2002: para 3). The Monterrey 
Consensus declared that achieving such targets 'demands a new partnersbo between 
developed and developing countries' including the commitment to 'sound policies, 
good governance at all levels and the rule of law' (Monterrey Consensus, 2002: para 
4). 
The PRSP framework not only provides the operational mechanism for such a 
partnership but it also ensures that discussions for external resources and redressing 
social and economic exclusion of countries remain at the level of the state and at the 
level of individual financing arrangements with official creditors, whether on a 
bilateral or multilateral basis. By establishing the parameters for negotiation within a 
small cartel of donors and creditors, the discourse created by the PRSP approach 
limits the capacity for PRSP countries to form collective demands for equity at the 
international level. The core of the PRSP framework thus reflects an effort to 
'manage' world poverty rather than to resolve it. 
7.4. Bio-Power and the New Technologies of Discipline 
3 According to Nyamu-Musembi and Cornwall, the UK foreign office 'specifically advised proponents 
of a rights-based approach within the UK's Department 
for International Development to exclude 
any reference to the [19 86] declaration' (Nyamu-Musembi and 
Cornwall, 2004: 9). 
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At various junctures, this thesis has contended that the PRSP framework constitutes 
a new form of discipline of third world states in the current postcolonial period, 
representing both a continuation and ail extension of old mechanisms of imperial 
and neo-imperial control. I have argued that this may be framed as the beginn-ings of 
a transition from Foucault's disciplinary society to a society of control vis-a-vis the 
governance of third world states (see Chapters One, Four, Five). 
The construction of a new global regulatory framework for disciplining third world 
states under the aegis of the PRSP framework is evidence of the shifting modalities 
of power at the global level. The evolution of the disciplinary instrument of official 
development financing into its current state marks a wider reconfiguration of the 
aforementioned forms of global governance and the postcolonial juridical order 
which sustains it, signalling a refinement of the wider techniques of discipline and 
reflective of this shift (see Chapter Four; Gill, 2000: 14 - 15; Hardt and Negri, 2000: 
22-24). 
As discussed in Chapter One, the Foucauldian conception of power rests upon its 
plurality of forms and its immanence in the social field. For Foucault, power is not 
hierarchical, dispersing as it were from a central institutional structure, but is 
something which proliferates and reproduces at the micro or capillary levels of 
society, which is then assumed by institutional forces (Foucault, 1994: 339 - 345). 
Hence, the study of power should involve the study of 'power relations' rather than 
the institutional manifestations of such power (ibid: 343; see Chapter One). This 
thesis has studied the institutional manifestations of power but have located such 
power in wider frame of power relations - between the object of power - third 
world states - and the authorities of power - the first world and their institutions , 
namely the World Bank and the IMF. 
Foucault classifies the technologies through which this power is exercised within 
plinag 
_Power - 
the building blocs of the these relationships into two forms: a) disei 
institutional exercise of power; and b) bioplificalpover - the regulation of the body 
(or body politic in the case of states) -a more sophisticated means 'around which the 
organisation of power over life was deployed' (Foucault, 1991261 - 262; see 
Chapters One and Four). For Hardt and Negri, the new paradigm of power in the 
275 
Chapter Seven 
postmodern economy of today is bio-political in nature, 'a situation in which what is 
directly at stake in power is the production and reproduction of life itself' (Hardt and 
Negri, 2000: 22 - 25). The supervision of the body of the object of power 'is imbued 
with the mechanics of life', their supervision 'effected through an entire series of 
interventions and regulatog controh- a bioplifics of tbepopulation' (Foucault, 1991: m 262). 
Therefore, while the PRSP framework continue to possess the elements of the 
disciplinary society - the structuring of policy processes, substantive economic 
engagement and socio-political organisation within certain parameters of thought and 
practice and 'normal' or 'deviant' behaviours therein sanctioned or prescribed by the 
BWIs and their major shareholding states - this new regulatory project also exercises 
this bio-political control over third world states. In this new schema of power, 
contends Hardt and Negri, the 'mechanisms of command become ever more 
'democratic", the 'behaviors of social integration and exclusion proper to rule are 
thus increasingly Mtenrorized within the subjects themselves' (Hardt and Negri, 
2000: 23). This, as we have seen, is demonstrated through the PRSP framework's 
focus on 'ownership', 'partnership' and 'participation' (see discussion above) - 
The formation of the new imperialism, according to Hardt and Negri, is thus 
premised on the 'establishment of a global society of control' in servitude to capital 
and its need to realise a world market (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 332). Consequently, 
the essence of 'imperial administration' is therefore 'to manage this process of 
integration and therefore to pacify, and control the separated and segmented social 
forces' to short-circuit the possibilities for resistance (ibid). Again, we have seen, 
from our discussion above and in the preceding chapters, how the PRSP framework 
serves to fracture the resistance to the asymmetries of neoliberal globalization 
through the process of integration and fragmentation. 
This analyses dovetails with Gill's conception of a 'new constitutionalism' in world 
order. This 'new constitutionalism', featuring the politics of incorporation and co- 
optation, represents the 'dominant political-juridical form' of today's global political 
economy, the counterpart to its 'socio-econorn1c form' which 
Gin terms as 
'disciplinary neoliberahsm' - the organisation of society in accordance to the 
dictates 
of global capital (Gill, 2000: 3). Although Gill does not refer to Foucault's work on 
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bio-power, his construction of the new global constitution, like Hardt and Negri's, is 
also premised upon the capillary effect of power M the current world order and the 
shift in modalities of discipline based on the exercise of such power (see ibid: 16 - 
18). 
According to Gill, 'the crucial strategic significance of new constitutionalism is how it 
seeks to provide political anchorage for the power of capital in the lonT term' through 
the use of political and legal measures to a) reconfigure the state apparatuses in 
favour of global capital; b) measures to construct and extend capital markets; and C) 
measures to deal 'with the dislocations and contradictions produced by disciplinary 
neoliberalism' (ibid: 3; 11 - 15). 
The movement away from the first two mechanisms of regulatory control - applying 
legal and constitutional means of facilitating capital mobility and liberal capital 
markets - which GiU terms 'mechanisms of restraint' towards the third mechanism 
termed 'mechanism of incorporation' - aimed at facilitating 'legitimation as well as 
compensatory measures to prevent social atornisation' resulting from the effects of 
neoliberal globalization (ibid: 15 - 16) exemplifies the development of PRSP 
operational apparatus. Gill argues that while the punitive mechanisms of restraint or 
so-called 'locking-M' measures Insulate against the potential of regulatory revisions 
wrought by neoliberal globalization, mechanisms of incorporation represent 'the 
consensual counterpart in that they seek to reduce the demands for other types of 
reform in the first place' (ibid: 18). 
Consequently, the PRSP framework represents one, albeit an important part, of the 
many forms through which this bio-political power is exercised over third world 
states. Increasingly, in other areas of regulation - from bilateral and multilateral trade 
rules to the regulation of intellectual property rights to the adoption of financial 
codes and standards under agreements such as the Basel Code for Banking 
Supervision - the modalities of power are shifting from the coercive force of 
disciplines to the pervasive power of bio-politics. Instead of coercive or punitive 
regulation, third world states internalise the rationalisation and normalisation of a 
particular world view and economic engagement. 
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Resistance and 'GlobaKzation Arom Below` 
The philosophy of the aforementioned new bio-political power however, is 
inherently subversive, presenting us with opportunities to explore the possibilities for 
rebuilding the fractured resistance and the fragmented alliance which, in many ways, 
demonstrated its effectiveness by the very imperative to implement a framework 
such as that of the PRSPs. Foucault, for one, argued that while discourses and 
biological discipline are controlled by the institutional manifestations of power, they 
are not subservient to it and counter-dis courses and bio-struggles have the potential 
to resist the normalised identities and create new forms of consciousness if unleashed 
(Foucault, 1994: 342 - 348; 1991: 262 - 267; 1972: 40 - 46; see also Best and Kellner, 
1991: 57 - 58). This is because '[a]t the very heart of the power relationship, and 
constantly provoking it, are the recalcitrance of the will and the intransigence of 
freedom' (Foucault, 1994: 342), creating the potential for resistance once the 
mechanisms of discipline are unravelled. 
Similarly, for Santos, the conventional processes of globalization - the globalization 
of a hegemonic localisms (western capitalist business norms and western culture for 
instance) and the localised impact of this globalism - also bring with them an 
intensification of other relationships, notably the globalized organisation of 
subordinate actors in the global system (Santos, 2002: 178 - 180). This parallel 
process of what Santos and others have termed the 'globalization from below 4 (and 
manifested in the aforementioned dissonance in the international political economy 
in the 1990s) cannot be easily extinguished as such organisation, aimed at 
counteracting the 'detrimental effects of hegemonic forms of globalization' tend also 
to evolve 'out of the new opportunities for transnational creativity and solidarity 
created by the intensification of global interactions' (ibid: 180). 
In uncovering the planes of conceptual rationalisation under which the principles and 
operational forms of the PRSP framework has emerged, it is therefore hoped that the 
process may unmask the dynamics of power which underpin this new regulatory 
4 Santos also calls this 'subaltern cosmopolitanism' and argues that this exists because 'prevalent forms 
of domination do not exclude the opportunity for subordinate nation-states, regions, classes or social 
groups and their allies to organize globally in defense of perceived common interests' (Santos, 2002: 
180). 
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force in order to shape a new resistance to the colonising force of this power. 
Importantly, unmasking the hegemonic unity of purpose - geo-strategic and 
economic - of the PRSP framework, may yet lead to a unifying of the disparate and 
fragmented opposition - segmented through processes such as the PRSP initiative - 
to redraw the landscape of global and local resistance to the excesses of neoliberal 
globalization and, With hope, the landscape of the asymmetrical global economy and 
postcolonial international law. 
7.5. Concluding Remarks and Directions for Further Research 
In this thesis, I have attempted to situate the emergence of a new regulatory 
ftarnework for development financing - the PRSP framework - within the wider 
context of global governance and international law. Specifically, I have argued that 
this initiative has wider ramifications outside its immediate role as a mechanism for 
regulating state access to external financial resources and that located within a 
specific temporal and geo-political context, contributes towards foreclosing the 
possibilities of reforming an inherently asymmetrical system of law and governance. 
Since the inception of this research, the PRSP framework has been extended to more 
low-income countries and has served as the centrepiece for new financing and non- 
financing initiatives, including the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative implemented last 
year and the IMF-monitored Policy Support Instrument introduced in 2005. The 
PRSP framework or similar initiative is also expected to form the basis of the new 
United Nations financing model and it is expected that the Bretton Woods 
institutions will play a significant role in the reconfigured United Nations system 
which will see greater centralisation of the UN's sustainable development functions 
5 and funding (United Nations, 2006). 
5 This new system has been recommended by a high level panel of experts convened by the United 
Nations to examine ways of reforming the UN. The panel recommended the establishment of a 'One 
UN' at country and headquarters level, merging the existing ten UN agencies into one central 
programme and one central budget (United Nations, 2006: 2- 3). At the national level, the 
'One UN' 
system will consolidate all the UN's programme activities under a single umbrella, 
headed by a single 
resident coordinator and financed through a single budgetary framework 
(bid). At the headquarters, 
this means the establishment of a UN Sustainable Development Board 'responsible for endorsing the 
One UN Country Programme, allocating funding and evaluating performance against objectives 
agreed with the programme country (ibid). While this is expected to streamline the currently 
fragmented nature of UN operations - under which different agencies operate individually and have 
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One of the key pillars of this new UN framework would be the application of a 
'results-based' funding mechanism based on national country priorities. According to 
the proposed reforms: 
Country-led development frameworks, such as poverty reduction 
strategies, are seen as the main vehicle to achieve internationally 
agreed development goals. They serve as a platform for aligning all 
partners' contributions to national development priorities and 
provide an inclusive forum for policy dialogue (United Nations, 2006: 
12). 
The proposals also call on the UN to work closely with World Bank and the IMF 'in 
supporting countries in their national development strategies, including Poverty 
Reduction Strategies and MDG Strategies' and envisage closer cooperation between 
the BWls and the UN to establish common frameworks for data collection and 
performance monitoring (ibid: 36). Given the extensive development of the PRSP as 
an operational framework for policy dialogue and instrument for regulating 
disbursement of development financing, it is likely that it will be adopted as the 
default mechanism for the UN system as well. There is therefore scope for further 
research into the new forms of operationalising the PRSPs and new PRSP-enabling 
instruments and their impact on their client states and the communities within them. 
Furthermore, the insertion of the PRSP framework into the UN system also 
demonstrates, once again, the 'forum shift" in the regulatory regime pertaining not 
only to international development financing, but also in the governance of the global 
economy as whole. The movement of the regulatory agenda from the UN to the 
BWIs signifies, again, how Mternational regulatory arenas have been adapted to suit 
the interests of dominant states in the global economy. This is also demonstrated by 
budgetary autonomy for different operations - there are some concerns that the proposed system will 
centralise too much authority, resulting in the more powerful state actors in the UN system to control 
the disbursement of financing (and attach relevant conditions to the fands) from a more centralised 
framework. This model emulates, in many ways, the World Bank model of financing. Eight countries 
- Albania, Cape Verde, Mozambique, Pakistan, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uruguay and Vietnam - are 
currently in the pilot phase of the country-level 'One UN' (United Nations, 2007). 
6 See Chapter One, section 1 . 3, for a description of Braithwaite and Drahos' concept of 'forum 
shifting'. 
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the evolution of the content of Bank and Fund Programme conditionalities, both in 
terms of their modalities of discipline - from ex-ante to ex-post (discussed in Chapter 
Four, section 4.6 & section 7.1 above) - and in the content of the conditions from 
structural conditionalities to the prevalence of public governance conditions. 
More research is necessary to consider the impact of such a 'forum shift' and the new 
modalities of power on the constitution both of global econormic relations and 
international economic law, as well as third world engagement in them. 
Consideration of other institutional manifestations of these new forms of power, 
both under the emergence of the 'global administrative space' (and the attendant 
proposals for global administrative law) outlined above and at the national levels, 
such as through new mechanisms of conditionality, is necessary, if not imperative, in 
order to consider the wider implications and impact of this new disciplinary force 
and the emerging modalities of power which accompany it. 
Additionally, there is a need to examine the localised impact of the PRSP framework, 
particularly from a legal anthropological perspective. As in the context of the 'global' 
which I have sought to address in the thesis, much of the research on the local 
manifestations of the PRSP framework have been in the realm of political economy 
or sociological disciplines. There remains a gap In scholarship examining the legal 
and constitutional impact and the manifestations of power relations through 
processual. and substantive shifts in the framework of development financing at the 
national and local levels. 
Finally, there is also scope to consider the impact of the PRSP framework and its 
attendant discourses on the shape and form of global and local resistance to the 
inequities of the current international trade and financial order. While it was beyond 
the scope of this thesis to consider in detail the effect of the project on resistance 
movements - whether locally or globally - or analyse the possibilities for the future 
of the political coalitions which contributed to the incipient crisis of faith and 
catalysed the creation of the PRSPs, this does not extinguish the necessity for 
research to further our understanding of the continuing significance of the initiative Cý C) 
in regulating global and local economic and political forces and the future of 
organised (and disparate) resistance to the asyn-nnetries of the global economic order. 
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Annex I: The PRSP Process 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) are the requirements for debt relief 
under the Enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPC II) and for 
access to concessional. financing from the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund JMF). 
PRSPs are applicable to all countries eligible for grants and loans from the 
International Development Association (IDA), the World Bank's concessional 
lending arm, and from the IMF's concessional lending facilities - the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) and the Exogenous Shocks Facility (ESF). 
Conditions for access to funds are dependent on the relevant facilities (see Annex II 
and Figures 2& 3) but the requirements of a PRSP remain the same in all cases. 
The PRSP process involves two Stages: 
1. The Interim PRSP (I-PRSP) is a shorter version of a full PRSP, serving as a 
'road map' for the preparation of a full PRSP. An I- PRSP should *include a 
description of the country's current poverty situation and policies, a proposal for 
a three-year macroeconomic framework, and details of plans for drawing up a full 
PRSP, including plans for civil society involvement which is not a requirement at 
this stage. An I-PRSP for debt relief should indicate how the incremental 
resources are used for poverty reduction. 
An I-PRSP is assessed by the joint Staffs of the IMF and the World Bank - this is known as joint Staff Advisory Note (JSAN) (formerly known as the joint Staff 
Assessment - JSA) - prior to submission to the Executive Boards of the World Bank 
and IMF. The joint staffs will review the assessments and strategies outlined in the I- 
PRSP and conclude whether or not the I-PRSP provides a sound basis on which to 
proceed towards the development of a full PRSP, and for debt relief or concessional 
lending from the Bank and Fund. 
The I-PRSP is then submitted to the Executive Boards for endorsement, 
accompanied by the JSAN. Approval of an I-PRSP by the Executive Boards of the 
Bank and Fund enables HIPC countries to receive interim debt relief (release of 
partial funds from the PRGF-HIPC Trust to enable partial repayment of debt). This 
is known as the 'Decision Point' under the HIPC II. Approval of an I-PRSP may 
also enable access to funds from IDA or the PRGF. 
2. A full PRSP must be developed through a paiYiiipatog process that involves civil 
society, including connnunities of the poor. A description of this process is 
compulsory in the final draft of the PRSP although there are no clear guidelines 
as to what this process must entail. 
A PRSP must also include three other core elements: a) a country-wide poverty 
diagnosis, including assessments of existing poverty data and poverty impact 
determinants; b) targets, and indicators and monitoring systems, for achieving 
and evaluating poverty reduction strategies; and c) priority public actions for 
poverty reduction over a three-year period. 
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A completed PRSP is submitted to the World Bank and IMF for a JSAN and 
subsequently, for endorsement by the Executive Boards. The JSAN makes an overall 
assessment of the PRSP as to whether the strategy presented in the PRSP constitutes 
a sound basis for debt relief or concessional assistance from the Bank and Fund. 
Under the new guidelines, this assessment will not specifically recommend approval 
or rejection of the PRSP but will highlight deficiencies in the PRSP and 
recommendations for remedies. A description of the participatory process will be 
included in the report but the JSAN will not evaluate the process. 
In preparing a JSAN, the Bank and Fund will take lead responsibility in accordance 
with their primary institutional competencies, such as the Fund's core expertise on 
macroeconomic policies and related structural reform and the Bank's competence 
over design of poverty reduction strategies, public expenditure, social issues and 
governance reforms. Overlapping areas, such as private sector activity, trade, tax and 
customs and budgetary and fiscal transparency issues are for joint assessments. 
If approved by the Boards of the Bank and Fund, the PRSP forms the basis for 
negotiations for loans from IDA or under the PRGF or ESE It may also form the 
basis of other bilateral and multilateral lending. For World Bank lending, the PRSP 
forms an integral part of the PRSP country's Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) 
which is the Bank's medium-term investment plan for borrower countries. 
Successful implementation of the PRSP for a year enables a HIPC country to reach 
its 'Completion Point' for debt relief and the agreed amount of debt is cancelled 
under the initiative. PRSPs are subject to review and revision every three years. A 
PSRP is also a criterion for countries wishing to undergo voluntary IMF supervision 
of their economies by the IMF under the recently introduced Policy Support 
Instrument (PSI). 
As of Match 2007,64 countries are embarked on some form of PRSP--related 
process, With 56 countries having completed a PRSP. Five of these countries - 
Burkina Faso, Ghana, Tanzania, Uganda and Nicaragua - have completed a second 
PRSP. 
Sources. ý Panos, 2002; Cifi,, ý, ens Network on Essential Services, 2000; IDA, 2002; Lowenfeld, 
2002; World Bank, 2007, Wlorld Bank and LMF, 2001,2000 & 1999 
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Annex II: PRSP Enabling Instruments 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) are not ends in themselves but means to 
access a range of development financing instruments for low-income countries. 
Originally conceived as a requirement for debt relief under the Enhanced Heavily 
Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative, PRSPs have now replaced the Policy 
Framework Papers (PFPs) for access to concessional lending from the World Bank 
and IMF. 
Here is a description of the main instruments linked to the PRSP framework: 
1. Enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative 
(HIPC II) 
The Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative was launched in 1996 as a means of 
assisting eligible low-income countries achieve reasonable debt sustainability levels. 
Administered by the World Bank and the IMF, the HIPC initiative was aimed at 
reducing the debt stock of heavily indebted countries to a sustainable level. The 
HIPC was enhanced in 1999 to enable quicker disbursement of debt relief and to 
widen eligibility of countries. 
HIPC II is a two-track programme: 
The First Phase involves indebted countries establishing a thtee-year of structural 
adjustment under the World Bank and IMF and entering into dialogue with bilateral 
and multilateral creditors, such as the Paris Club, for debt rescheduling. Countries 
wishing to receive debt relief under the HIPC Il programme must prepare at least an 
I-PRSP by the 'Decision Point. 
At the Decision Point, the World Bank and IMF conduct a debt sustainability 
analysis of the country to decide on whether the country will be eligible for relief 
under the HIPC initiative. If a country's external debt ratio after traditional debt 
relief mechanisms is above 150 percent debt to exports (calculated at the net present 
value or NPV1), the country is eligible for debt relief The amount of debt relief will 
be determined by the Bank and Fund and creditors will commit to providing 
sufficient assistance by 'Completion Point'. Interim debt relief will be granted by the 
Bank and Fund. 
The Second Phase of HIPC Il sees the country adopting the programmes agreed 
upon at the 'Decision Point' and linked to the I-PRSP/PRSP. If there was no PRSP 
at 'Decision Point'. a PRSP must be completed and implemented at this stage. 
At Completion Point, creditors will agree to reduce the debt stock burden of the 
indebted country at the levels agreed at 'Decision Point'. The World Bank and IMF 
expects bilateral and connnercial creditors to reschedule due obligations with a 90 
percent reduction in NPV. 'Cotnpletion Points' are 'floating' which tneans there is no 
1 The net present value (NPV) calculates the debt stock of a country taking into account its degree of 
concessionality and is defined by the IMF as "the sum of all future debt-service obligations (interest 
and principal) on existing debt, discounted at the market interest rate". Therefore, if the interest rate 
on the loan is lower than market rate, the NPV of the debt stock is lower than the face value, With the 
grant element making up the difference (IMF, 2003b). 
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fixed timeline for the country to meet its requirements under the second phase. Countries which , in the assessment of the Bank and Fund, have satisfactorily adopted 
the reforms agreed upon and implemented core proposals of their PRSP for at least a 
year, will reach 'Completion Point'. 
The multilateral component of the HIPC initiative is financed through bilateral 
contributions to the HIPC Trust (at the World Bank) and to the PRGF-HIpC Trust 
(at the IMF). The Bank and Fund also contribute to the trusts through the profits 
from the IBRD lending (for the World Bank) and gold sales (for the IMF). 
As of March 2007,40 countries are eligible for debt relief under HIPC II with 21 
countries having reached 'Completion Point'. Nine countries have reached 'Decision 
Point' and 10 countries are being considered for the eligibility. 
HIPC H and the Multilateral Debt Reflef Initiative (MDR[) 
The Multilateral Debt Initiative (MDRI) was introduced in September 2005 to 
provide 100 percent cancellation of eligible debt stock owed by eligible countries to 
four multilateral financial institutions - the International Development Association 
(IDA), the concessional. lending arm of the World Bank, the International Monetary 
Fund JMF), the African Development Fund (ADF) and the Inter-American 
Development Bank (IDB)2 - and is separate from but linked operationally to the 
enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative. 
Post-'Cornpledon Point' HIPC countries will further qualify for multilateral debt 
relief under the MDRI from the four institutions - IDA, IMF, IDB and ADF - after 
reaching completion point if they can demonstrate they have complied with the 
following criteria: (1) if they demonstrate that their performance had not 
deteriorated substantially in the following areas: (a) macroeconomic performance; (b) 
implementation of a poverty reduction strategy (PRS) or similar framework; and (c) 
their public expenditure management (PEM); and (2) if they are current on their 
obligations to the financial institutions. 
2. Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) 
The PRGF was established in 1999 to replace the Enhanced Structural Adjustment 
Facility (ESAF), the concessional lending arm of the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), but is run almost along the same lines as the ESAF. The PRGF is 
administered by the IMF through the PRGF and PRGF-HIPC Trusts (which 
replaced the ESAF and ESAF-HIPC Trusts in 1999). 
The PRGF provides loans to low-income countries that are members of the World 
Bank and the IMF. Eligibility is based on an assessment of the country's per capita 
income, drawing upon the cut-off point for eligibility for World Bank concessional 
lending (at present, below US$875). As of April 2003,77 countries are eligible for 
PRGF assistance. 
2 'Me IDB is the latest multilateral institution to announce its participation in the MDRI. The 
institution issued a statement on 17 November 2006 announcing the decision to extend debt 
cancellation to five eligible Latin American countries - Bolivia, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras and 
Nicaragua - pending agreement on the modalities to be negotiated in January next year JDB, 2006). 
2 
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An eligible country may borrow up to a maximum of 140 percent of its IMF quota 
under a three-year arrangement (in exceptional cases, this may be increased to 185 
percent of quota)'. Funds are disbursed upon the approval of a PRSP (and, in some 
cases, an I-PRSP) by the Executive Boards of the World Bank and IMF. The terms 
of the PRGF agreement may be drawn from the proposals contained in the PRSPs 
but this is not compulsory. Disbursements are often tranched (released in segments, 
usually of three) and are contingent upon the fulfilment of the conditions stipulated 
in the PRGF agreement. 
PRGF loans are not project-specific and are intended to assist countries to overcome 
balance-of-payments and other macroeconomic problems. Loans under the PRGF 
carry an annual interest rate of 0.5 percent with repayments to be made twice a year, 
beginning five and a half years and ending 10 years after disbursement. 
The PRGF Trust borrows from central banks, governments and official institutions 
at market-related interest rates to lend to eligible countries. The difference between 
the market rate of interest and the 0.5 percent rate paid by borrower countries is 
financed from contributions made to the Trust by bilateral donors and from the 
IMF's own resources, such as through the sale of gold by the Fund. 
The PRGF Trust therefore operates separately from the general resources of the 
IMF. Resources for drawing by IMF member states under its regular facilities ate 
made up of contributions by the members in accordance with their quota. Financing 
from the regular facilities of the Fund are also not classified as 'loans' but as a 
'purchase/sale/tepurchase transaction A and carry a market-related interest rate. 
3. Poverty Reduction Strategy Credits (PSRCs) 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Credits (PSRCs) are the new lending instruments of the 
International Development Association JDA), the World Bank's concessional 
lending arm, and will form the core financial support of the PRSP. All IDA countries 
are eligible for PRSC loans. 
A PRSC is essentially a series of loans that support a country's programme of 
medium-term development and implementation of its poverty reduction strategies. 
This type of operation is known as 'programmatic lending' or 'policy-based lending', 
as opposed to 'project lending' that is geared towards investment in a specific project, 
such as the construction of infrastructure for schools or roads. 
Once a PRSP is approved, the PRSP document and the joint Staff 
Advisory Note 
USAN) that accompanies it, forms the basis of the World Bank's Country 
Assistance 
Strategy (CAS) for the PRSP country involved. A CAS is the Bank's investment plan, 
tailored for each of its borrower countries, spelling out areas that need support and 
oudining programmes for each area. Based on the CAS, the 
Bank will draw up the 
appropriate PRSC programme for the country involved. 
3 Member states of the IMF are allocated, upon entry into the organisation, a quota, designed roughly 
to reflect their econonuc status. The larger the quota, the greater the country's contributions to the 
Fund, and the greater its entitlement to draw on the resources of the Fund. Voting power in the 
IMT 
is also dependent on the size of a member's quota (Lowenfeld, 2002: 
511). 
4 See Lowenfeld, 2002: 511 - 519 and Qureshi, 1999: 182 - 186 for details on the regular 
facilities of 
the IMF which are out of the scope of this discussion. 
3 
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A PRSC programme will usually involve a series of two or three 'individual PRSC 
operations to support the country's poverty reduction strategy (known as the 
Medium-Term Expenditure Framework or MTEF). Each individual PRSC 
disbursement will require, inter alia, the completion of a set of specific structural 
reforms agreed in negotiations (but not necessarily drawn from proposals in the 
PRSP). The World Bank expects that individual PRSCs will eventually be phased in 
line with the borrowing government's annual budget and policy cycle, thus enabling 
the instrument to serve as external budgetary support for the state. 
PRSCs, like all IDA lending, are not subject to interest rates but carry a service 
charge of 0.75 percent of disbursed balances. Countries eligible for IDA loans 
(known as ccredits') must have a per capita income of less than US$875 and lack the 
financial ability to borrow from the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development (IBRD) whose loans carry a market rate of interest. At present, 81 
countries are eligible for IDA financmg, including some 'blend' countries, such as 
India and Indonesia, which are also sufficiently creditworthy for some IBRD loans. 
Repayments on IDA credits have maturities of 20,35 or 40 years and repayments 
start within 10 years. Unlike the IBRD which raises its capital on the international 
financial markets,, IDA funds come from contributions from M'dustrialised 
5 
countries , 
from repayments of earlier credits, and from profits of the IBRD- 
Relationship between the PRGF and PRSC 
As the PRSP forms the basis of both PRGF loans and PRSCs, the Bank and Fund 
have been aiming to coordinate their policies on both instruments. Each PRSP and I- 
PRSP will be assessed jointly by the staffs of the Bank and Fund using the same set 
of guidelines under the JSA. Coordination and resolution of differences is provided 
through the Bank/Fund joint Implementation Committee. 
In addition, the Bank will regard the presence of an on-track PRGF arrangement as 
adequate evidence of the soundness of the borrowing country's macroeconomic 
environment while the Fund will regard the presence of an on-track PRSC as 
adequate evidence of the appropriateness of the country's social and structural 
programme. 
4. Policy Support Instrument 
The Policy Support Instrument (PSI) is essentially a non-borrowing or non-financing 
Fund-monitored programme of reforms that a country enters into voluntarily with 
the institution. According to the IMF, the PSI was designed to meet the needs of 
'mature stabilizers' - typically countries with an adequate 
level of official international 
reserves,, and who have graduated from financial assistance from the Fund and 
have 
obtained sufficient debt sustainability - who Wish to continue 
being monitored by 
the institution. 
5 Donor countnes get together every three years to replenish IDA funds. The 131h replenishment of 
IDA took place in July 2002 and donors' contributions made up half of the US$23 billion available for 
grants and credits (World Bank, 2002a). 
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Annex 11: PRSP Enabling Instruments 
Policy reforms will carry the same discipline as that of regular upper credit tranche 
conditionality, including the fulfilment of policy conditionalities - performance 
criteria, prior actions, indicative targets and structural benchmarks - within the 
timeframe established essential for successful completion of programme reviews. 
Countries must also complete a PRSP or Intetim-PRSP from which the 
conditionalities are drawn. 
A PSI can last from one to three years and may be extended to up to four years and 
reviews are conducted seml-annually. Successful completion of a programme review 
by the IMF Executive Board 'would signify the Fund's assessment that the program 
is 'on track', similar to reviews under financed Fund programmes - the only 
difference being that this does not trigger tranche disbursements. If a country fails to 
complete two scheduled reviews, it is expected that the Fund would not endorse the 
programme and for the purposes of signalling, this could mean that any bilateral or 
multilateral aid or credit financing tied to this programme could be suspended. 
Currently four countries have signed up to a PSI - Nigeria, Cape Verde, Uganda and 
Tanzania, two of which - Uganda and Tanzania - have graduated from the PRGF. 
6. Exogenous Shocks Facility 
The Exogenous Shocks Facility (ESF) was developed to serve as a 'safety net' for 
low-income countries to cushion against economic shocks, such as natural disasters 
or commodity price shocks. These countries would otherwise not be able to draw 
from the IMF's non-concessional facilities such as the Compensatory Financing 
Facility (CFF). ESF programmes are short-term (compared to PRGF loans), lasting 
one to two years and financing is made on similar terms to that of the PRGF out of 
the PRGF-ESF Trust raised on similar basis as the PRGF Trust. Access to the ESF 
is contingent upon a PRS being M place and for countries who have graduated from 
PRGF programmes, an 'on-track' PSI would facilitate access to financing under the 
ESF. 
Source: IMF, 2006e; 2006f; 2006g; 2006b; 2005d; IDA, 200 1 b;; LMF and IDA, 
1999; 1-omenfeld, 2002; Quresbi, 1999; WYorld Bank; undated. 
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